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As part of an experimental approach to “red teaming” that is studying the problem of en-
emy access denial systems, the author performed a detailed investigation of the vulnerabilities of 
the U. S. military’s power projection capabilities, as they are likely to exist in the year 2020.  The 
primary purpose of this document is to facilitate out-of-the-box thinking by future “red teams”.  
Thirty-six separate areas of vulnerability relevant to access denial were identified, including: 
 
Attacks Using WMD:   Attack by Nuclear Missiles (ICBMs) 
Attack by Other Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
Direct Attacks Against Forces:  Attack by Cruise Missiles 
Attack by Ballistic Missiles or Superguns 
Attack by Transatmospheric Aircraft 
Attack by Naval Mines 
Attack by Advanced Torpedoes 
Attack by Advanced Non-nuclear Submarines 
Attack by Unmanned Air Superiority Vehicles 
Attack by Infrared Anti-Aircraft Missiles 
 
Counters to Offensive Systems:  Reliance on Stealth 
Jamming of GPS & GPS-Dependent Systems 
Jamming of Precision-Guided Weapons 
 
Attacks on C4I Assets:   Attack by Electromagnetic Weapons 
Attack by High-Energy Lasers 
Attack by Information Warfare 
Attack by Antisatellite Weapons 
Reliance on Long-Range Airborne Surveillance 
Susceptibility to Strategic Deception 
Excessive Intelligence-Response Latency 
 
Unconventional Methods of Attack: Attack by Special Operations Forces  
Limited Adverse Weather Operations Capability 
Attack by Nonlethal Weapons    
   
Attacks on Logistics Resources:  Limited Strategic Sea/Air Lift Capability 
Reliance on Limited Overseas Basing 
Reliance on Pre-Positioned Equipment 
Reliance on Underway Replenishment 
 
Attacks on Societal Vulnerabilities:  Civilian Intolerance of Casualties 
Restrictive Rules of Engagement  
Civilian Intolerance of Unnecessary Hardships 
Need for Coalition Support 
Unequal Societal Transparency 
Treaty Limitations 
 
 Technological Change:   Technological Surprise  
      Technological Atrophy   
      Disruptive Technologies 
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The following paragraphs give a brief description of each of these identified vulnerabilities.  De-





Attacks Using WMD – Even if the United States develops and deploys a National Missile De-
fense system, it will only defend against a small number of ICBM threats.  We will remain vul-
nerable to those powers possessing enough nuclear weapons and delivery systems to overpower 
that defense.  The ability of certain adversaries to hold us hostage in a mutual assured destruction 
sense has and will continue to have a profound influence on our policies and military options.   
  
 The United States is profoundly vulnerable to attacks by other forms of WMD, especially 
chemical and biological weapons.  Only military forces have minimal defenses against chemical 
and biological (CB) weapons.  Even these defenses cannot hold up for many days, if an adver-
sary were to employ chemical or biological weapons on a massive and protracted basis.  Current 
U. S. naval forces are capable of surviving CB weapon attacks but must immediately evacuate 
the contamination zone for decontamination.  They cannot stay for extended periods and fight.  
The U. S. homeland is virtually undefended and indefensible against CB weapons.  Terrorist em-
ployment is a likely scenario.  CB weapons employed on a large scale against U. S. logistics fa-
cilities could delay power projection forces for weeks, allowing an adversary more time to pre-
pare or even create a fait accompli for the U. S. to counter.  
 
Direct Attacks Against Forces – The sinking or severe damage to several warships by cruise 
missiles in the Persian Gulf and during the Falkland Islands War has made everyone aware of the 
magnitude of this threat.  Although defensive weapons have improved to where limited attacks 
can be effectively countered, recent studies have suggested that potential adversaries may opt for 
massive attacks.  Any serious adversary can easily afford to buy thousands of inexpensive mis-
siles.  In any littoral engagement, such an adversary can easily and repeatedly attack a battle 
force with more missiles than the defensive systems are capable of destroying. 
 
 Many potential adversaries are procuring ballistic missiles with ranges from hundreds to 
thousands of kilometers.  Some are developing terminal guidance systems for these missiles.  
With adequate targeting information, such terminally guided ballistic missiles are capable of 
sinking groups of warships at sea.  Planned theater missile defense systems may be unable to in-
tercept such threats. 
 
In the changing world economy, the U. S. is not guaranteed to maintain its superiority in 
aircraft and spacecraft.  Should an adversary develop transatmospheric aircraft before the U. S., 
that adversary will not only take a commanding lead in controlling space, but it will also possess 
platforms that will be difficult to defend against, yet can deliver surgical strikes against any point 
on earth at short notice. 
 
Mine warfare has long been one of the weakest of U. S. naval warfare capabilities.  An 
adversary can employ mines to attrit, delay, or divert U. S. naval forces almost at will.  With 
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mines being among the cheapest of ship-killing weapons, we can be use any adversary will de-
ploy them in large quantities. 
 
Modern torpedoes are capable of being fired at distances of more than 100 km, tracking 
down targets by their wake turbulence, and outrunning even the fastest warship.  U. S. warships 
lack adequate defenses against these new torpedoes.  Large fleets of coastal diesel submarines, 
high-speed patrol torpedo boats, or maritime patrol aircraft armed with the latest torpedoes 
would be capable of inflicting significant damage against any naval force that came within range. 
 
Non-nuclear submarines have significant noise advantages over nuclear-powered subma-
rines.  Advanced air-independent propulsion systems promise to free non-nuclear submarines 
from daily surfacing or snorkeling to recharge batteries.  Given the increased submerged range 
guaranteed by such developments, advanced submarines may be able to track, target, and destroy 
even the best nuclear submarines, whether in shallow littoral waters or not.  U. S. superiority in 
submarine warfare could well in jeopardy. 
 
Manned fighter aircraft are limited to maneuvers less than 10 g’s.  An adversary that de-
velops an unmanned air superiority vehicle (UASV) capability will have no such limitations.  
Unmanned “fighters” with 30-g maneuver capability will literally be able to fly circles around 
the best modern manned fighters and to outmaneuver current generations of anti-aircraft mis-
siles.  Remotely piloted UASVs are possible with today’s technology.  Within a few years ad-
vances in artificial intelligence may permit replacement of the remote pilots. 
 
Stealth technology applied to aircraft promises to reduce the effectiveness of radar-
guided anti-aircraft missiles.  Current advances in multicolor imaging infrared missiles should 
prove easily capable of compensating for this loss of radar-guided capability.  Not only will such 
missiles be virtually immune to decoys and jamming, they will be little affected by current 
stealth technologies, and they will not only be capable of autonomously identifying targets from 
non-targets at moderate ranges, they may be capable of identifying friendly aircraft from hostile 
aircraft.  If an adversary develops and deploys such missiles, all of our aircraft will become vul-
nerable to attack, even if initial detection assets are unable to provide fire control solutions ade-
quate for radar-guided missiles.  
 
Counters to Offensive Systems – Stealth has long been considered to be an aspect of U. S. mili-
tary superiority.  Almost every new platform incorporates high levels of stealth, but at the ex-
pense of less defensive weaponry, decreased or limited armor, and vastly increased costs (in-
variably resulting in fewer platforms being purchased).  As soon as a major adversary develops 
and deploys counterstealth sensor capabilities, stealth platforms will be at risk, and may prove 
unable to accomplish their intended missions.  Over-reliance on stealth will change from an asset 
to a catastrophe. 
 
The same statements can be made about reliance on GPS.  The U. S. is making GPS 
guidance a major feature of new weapon systems and reducing investment in terminal guidance 
sensors.  However, GPS can be jammed, and even improved systems will still be capable of be-
ing jammed.  If an adversary devotes even a fraction of his electronic warfare assets to denying 
the U. S. unhindered use of GPS for weapons guidance and navigation, critical strike weapons 
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will not hit their intended targets and a major aspect of U. S. power projection strategy will be 
nullified. 
 
Another U. S. strength is its capability to employ precision-guided weapons, permitting 
even critical targets to be destroyed with limited expenditure of ordnance.  However, all forms of 
precision-guided weapons can be jammed.  An adversary that invests in such jammers can deny 
the U. S. ability to effectively use its huge investment in precision-guided weapons.  Once again, 
a perceived strength could be converted to a liability.  
 
Attacks on C4I Assets – Although most military systems are supposed to be hardened against 
nuclear electromagnetic pulse, the actual degree of hardness achieved is questionable.  Use of a 
single nuclear weapon to produce localized EMP over the theater of conflict would likely render 
many of our systems inoperative.  Because of their higher frequencies, U. S. systems will be 
even more vulnerable to non-nuclear electromagnetic weapons such as high-power microwaves.  
Civilian systems that were designed with no hardening requirements are extremely vulnerable to 
attack.  Terrorist or special operations groups could easily deliver such attacks.  
 
U. S. weapons and systems have limited defenses against high-energy laser weapons.  For 
the same reasons the U. S. is developing this technology (ballistic missile defense, cruise missile 
defense, anti-satellite weapons), any near peer competitor will attempt to acquire such weapons.  
If they are successful, then almost any U. S. airborne or spaceborne asset (aircraft, missile, satel-
lite, or spacecraft) will be at risk of immediate, instantaneous, and overwhelming attack.   
 
The U. S. military and indeed the entire infrastructure and economy of the U. S. is de-
pendent on computer networks and the information they contain.  Since even a single hacker is 
capable of accessing critical computer systems (causing loss of data, corruption of data, or crash-
ing of the system), the potential of an adversary army of information warriors to exploit our 
computer dependence is truly staggering. 
 
Of all the world’s militaries, the U. S. is the most dependent on space assets.  Weather 
support, navigation, communications, overhead reconnaissance, and even weapon guidance all 
depend on satellites.  Should an adversary develop anti-satellite weapons based on existing tech-
nologies, that adversary could deny the U. S. the use of any or all of these satellite functions at 
the most critical times.  The impact on U. S. military capabilities would be staggering.    
 
U. S. battle planning and operational conduct place significant importance on long-range 
airborne surveillance assets such as JSTARS, AWACS, and E-2C Hawkeyes.  There are limited 
numbers of these platforms in our inventory and fewer still available to any one theater of opera-
tions.  If an adversary were to specifically target these assets with sufficient force, they can be 
destroyed.  This would eliminate critical intelligence needed to coordinate ground operations and 
would make it impossible to conduct efficient air defenses or to coordinate air operations. 
 
The U. S. intelligence services have become overly dependent on technical means such as 
satellites and communications interception and decryption.  The severely limited human intelli-
gence and on-site inspection opportunities afforded by some potential adversaries leaves us open 
to strategic deception operations.  Critical technology developments, facilities, test sites, and 
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even military forces can be completely hidden by determined adversaries in massive under-
ground facilities or disguised as something else entirely.  Any attack on such adversaries will un-
doubtedly result in numerous unpleasant surprises for U. S. forces. 
 
The United States possesses tremendous intelligence capabilities in its satellites and sig-
nals intelligence assets.  Unfortunately, it takes for any information to be collected, processed, 
analyzed, and disseminated to those who need that information for tactical purposes.  Once re-
ceived additional delays result in planning missions, allocating resources, and deploying weap-
ons against the targets.  Delays can range from minutes to days.  New initiatives may reduce la-
tency but will probably never reduce it to insignificant levels.  The excessive intelligence-
response latency times can preclude many missions from being efficiently performed, such as 
“Scud-busting” during the Gulf War.  An adversary can take advantage of the latency by maxi-
mizing the degree of mobility afforded to certain assets.  Ballistic missiles systems that can move 
from under cover, set up, launch, tear down, and return to different covered hides in periods of a 
few minutes will be extremely difficult to target, even if they are detected.  Similar mobility af-
forded to air defense sites would make it difficult to plan air missions for minimum attrition. 
 
Unconventional Methods of Attack – The Special Operations Forces (SOF) of the United 
States military are capable of conducting sabotage, intelligence, and/or surgical strike operations 
against the military forces, government, or infrastructure of any country, anywhere, anytime.  
Although U. S. forces and facilities are off-limits except during exercises, U. S. SOF would be as 
effective in operations against them as they would be in operations against our adversaries.  If an 
adversary creates its own SOF, there is no reason to expect that they would be less effective 
against U. S. targets.  Our military forces and civilian population are too complacent and totally 
unprepared to defend against such attacks. 
 
 As we proceed into the 21st Century, we will learn more and more about weather and the 
forces that cause it.  U. S. forces are unable to operate in adverse weather.  Bombs (even laser-
guided bombs) cannot be dropped with precision when the targets are obscured by fog.  Aircraft 
cannot fly safely through severe storms.  Surface ships sail hundreds of miles out of their way to 
avoid the hazards of sailing through tropical cyclones.  If an adversary has better knowledge of 
the weather than the U. S., he can plan his operations so that weather provides the maximum 
limitation to U. S. forces and the minimum impact on adversary forces.  At some point in the 
next century, it will likely become possible to control the weather.  If an adversary gains this ca-
pability before we do, he can devastate our economy, damage our infrastructure, and hinder our 
forces. 
 
 Nonlethal weapons pose a special problem because we have neither a firm policy on how 
to respond to their use, nor defenses tailored to defeat these weapons.  Enemy employment of 
nonlethal weapons is most likely to be used by “civilian” forces as a delaying tactic to permit 
accomplishment of military operations in other area.  Their employment is more likely during 
times of crisis that have not escalated to open hostilities.  The U. S. lacks response options other 
than use of lethal force, alteration of course (probably ineffective), or withdrawal.  On-scene 
commanders will be forced to either take actions that will minimize the delay but may make 
them war criminals, or to refer the problem to higher command, adding to the delay that is the 
primary objective of the adversary. 
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Attacks on Logistics Resources – The United States has a very limited number of aircraft and 
ships that it can use to perform airlift and sealift functions.  Should an adversary attack and de-
stroy these assets or their support facilities, the U. S. would be unable to transport follow-on 
forces and equipment to the operational theater in a timely fashion.  This would leave the rapid 
deployment forces to carry on the war by themselves for periods far longer than intended. 
 
Concurrent with the downsizing of the U. S. military, the U. S. has reduced the number of 
overseas bases at which it maintains forward-deployed forces.  A number of nations have limited 
U. S. use of their ports and airfields for military purposes.  Without bases close to a region of 
conflict, the U. S. is unable to marry-up Marine and Army forces with maritime pre-positioned 
equipment.  We are also unable take advantage of shortened logistic supply lines.  Our weakness 
in this area would be exacerbated if an adversary were to take active measures (such as direct 
attack) against the few remaining U. S. forward bases. 
 
Because we have inadequate sealift and airlift capabilities, the U. S. has opted to pre-
position large quantities of military equipment and supplies near regions of anticipated future 
conflicts.  This equipment represents almost all of the equipment available for the first wave of 
follow-on forces.  Centralized in a few weakly defended locations, this pre-positioned equipment 
is a logical target for pre-emptive strike by an adversary.  Destruction of this equipment would 
delay arrival of effective follow-on forces for many weeks. 
 
U. S. naval forces carry limited amounts of food, fuel, and ammunition.  In combat it is 
expected that ships would be regularly replenished at sea by dedicated ammunition ships and oil-
ers.  The U. S. possesses only a limited number of such combat support ships.  These ships often 
sail unescorted over long distances between resupply ports and the combat operating areas.  If an 
adversary were to selectively target the replenishment ships, it could cripple U. S. ability to con-
duct naval operations.  Lacking the specialized “unrep” equipment, conventional cargo ships or 
tankers used as alternates would be highly inefficient at best, even if they could be readily ob-
tained. 
 
Attacks on Societal Vulnerabilities – The U. S. public has shown a high degree of intolerance 
of casualties in U. S. military operations.  Many senior military commanders have even less tol-
erance.  If an adversary can demonstrate the ability to inflict large numbers of casualties on U. S. 
forces early in any engagement, those casualties may cause U. S. forces to withdraw or to pursue 
other tactics.  Commanders will try to prevent provoking the sort of “Vietnam War” syndrome 
that turned public support against the military and ultimately forced U. S. withdrawal.   
 
The U. S. military operates under “Rules of Engagement” that restrict the operations it 
can conduct, the weapons it can use, and the targets it can attack.  Even in wartime these rules 
are enforced to prevent fratricide, unnecessary civilian casualties, and attacks against neutrals 
and non-combatants.  An adversary can use these rules of engagement against us by collocating 
military targets with off-limits targets (such as hospitals) or disguising unconventional warfare 
craft as neutral fishermen or merchantmen.  
 
The U. S. civilian population is intolerant of hardships that they consider unnecessary.  
Adversary actions that lead to civilian hardships without directly threatening people could lead to 
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erosion of public support for continued conflict.  Possible actions include: causing gasoline ra-
tioning by disrupting world oil production, limiting public air travel by forcing the U. S. to draft 
Civilian Reserve Air Fleet assets for airlift purposes, or causing limited food shortages through 
biological weapon attacks on major food crops. 
 
In recent conflicts the U. S. has been reluctant to act alone.  It has desired coalition efforts 
to mollify world opinion, to foster civilian support for the action, to share the costs of military 
operations, and to provide additional capabilities that the U. S. military needs.  An adversary can 
take many actions to make forming a coalition harder or to break up or weaken an existing coali-
tion.  Should these be successful, the U. S. would be forced to reevaluate its strategic position 
and ambitions in the region, and possibly withdraw from the conflict. 
 
U. S. society is almost completely transparent to outside observation.  Many potential ad-
versaries are closed societies in which it is difficult for outsiders to conduct intelligence opera-
tions.  The inequality in transparency results in lop-sided flows of technical, economic, and cul-
tural information necessary to predict long-term goals, short-term capabilities, and governmental 
priorities.  Serious adversaries take advantage of the unequal transparency to evaluate their rela-
tive capabilities vs. U. S. forces and to acquire the information necessary to reduce and minimize 
any deficiencies they uncover. 
 
The U. S. is a signatory to many bilateral and multi-lateral diplomatic agreements (trea-
ties, protocols, etc.) that significantly restrict military options for responding to crisis situations.  
Some of these treaties create vulnerabilities.  For example, the ABM Treaty prohibits testing of 
ballistic missile defense systems against targets missiles with ranges and velocities well below 
those of ICBMs, yet well within the range of practical construction.  If an adversary deployed 
antiship warheads on such longer-range missiles, we could never assure ourselves that our de-




No country today can be the leader in every field of technology development.  However, 
it is important to be a credible player in every field.  Failure to do so can lead to technological 
surprise.  If an adversary develops a critical technology and can keep it secret, then that adver-
sary has a significant window of relative superiority that it can exploit.  It is considerably more 
difficult to effect a significant degree of surprise, if both sides have roughly comparable levels of 
expertise in a subject.  In addition, the duration of any window of vulnerability will certainly be 
shorter, if the surprised party is only a short way behind the surprising party in the relevant tech-
nology.  The U. S. will become more vulnerable to technological surprise as it relinquishes it 
leadership in more and more technologies (a trend that also creates a second distinct form of vul-
nerability).  
 
The technological superiority that kept the U. S. a superpower during much of the 20th 
Century is in danger of disappearing.  Complacency, poor policy decisions, deteriorating educa-
tional systems, and the lack of a national vision of the future, to name a few of the factors, have 
combined to produce conditions where our national technological might may begin to atrophy.  
If things decay to a state where other countries are developing the cutting edge weapons, then 
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our military will no longer have the technological force multipliers.  Loss of these multipliers 
coupled with our diminished manpower may mean we are unable to fight and win those battles 
deemed critical to our national security. 
 
“Disruptive technologies” are technologies that completely disrupt the status quo.  They 
may be slow to develop.  They may have little impact as they become established, except in 
niche areas, but they have the potential to change almost every aspect of how wars are fought.  
For example, the tank, once its function had been truly appreciated, transformed land warfare 
from “attrition warfare” (defense-oriented trench warfare) to “maneuver warfare” (offense-
oriented blitzkrieg).  U. S. military forces invest so much effort and capital in expensive yet evo-
lutionary high technology equipment and extensive doctrine and training at all levels in the use 
of that equipment, that they often cannot respond quickly when disrupting technologies arise.  
Potential adversaries that are quicker to adapt to disrupting technologies can exploit that poten-
tial vulnerability in U. S. forces. 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The vulnerabilities described above span all ranges from tactical to strategic, from weap-
ons to logistics, and from military to societal.  The agreement between this “list” of vulnerabili-
ties and a previous list prepared independently by the Defense Science Board is striking.  There 
is additional strong support for this list in the specific weapons systems that the three different 
“red teams” involved in the access denial study (all of whom preceded the completion of this 
study) opted to develop for their 2020 epoch force structures.   
 
Each of the 36 vulnerabilities identified here is examined in detail to define the nature of 
that vulnerability, its causes, and the things that affect it.  In addition, specific ways in which a 
potential “near peer competitor” could exploit those vulnerabilities to enhance his access denial 
capability are discussed.  In addition to it future use in “red teaming”, it is expected that this 
analysis can aid: 
• U. S. military staff in their long-range planning activities,  
• the military R&D community in determining areas that need additional research, and  
• intelligence professionals in identifying out foreign activities that might indicate a 
competitor’s intent to create an access denial capability. 
It can also be used as a starting point for other vulnerability studies.  
 
If the reader is willing to accept various technical assertions on faith, then reading the 
main body of the paper will suffice.  The analyses of vulnerabilities presented therein are basi-
cally non-technical in nature.  However, for those who question some of the technical assertions, 
or those who need more explanation of a subject, a number of technical notes and technical ap-
pendices are included which elaborate on the more technical aspects of the analysis.  These are 
designed for the reader with a limited degree of technical training, but an advanced degree is not 
required.  Included are discussions of weapons of mass destruction, radar performance analysis, 
ballistic missile defense, stealth, missile guidance, directed energy weapons, and nonlethal 
weapons, among others.  
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CHAPTER 1.   INTRODUCTION – THE AREA DENIAL STUDY 
 
 
 The cornerstone of United States political/military foreign policy rests on an almost un-
disputed ability to project military power on short notice to virtually any corner of the world.  
The four pillars on which our power projection capability is based are [1]:   
1) Capable, forward-deployed forces in regions of probable conflict, 
2) Pre-positioned equipment and supplies in or near potential conflict areas,  
3) Pre-positioned equipment afloat, and  
4) Rapid transportation of air, land, and sea forces from CONUS and other theaters.   
Whenever trouble of any kind arises overseas, our first response is to move one or more forward-
deployed aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) to the region to show the flag and demonstrate 
our national concern.  We may also move one or more Marine amphibious ready groups (ARGs) 
into the region.  Should the situation appear to involve imminent hostilities, we may then deploy 
the 82nd Airborne Division (or a similar light division) and/or a Composite Air Wing to friendly 
bases in the region.  If hostilities escalate, we are then in a position to immediately provide what-
ever response is warranted.  This response can vary from destroying a key facility with a single 
Tomahawk missile to attacking assembled hostile forces with a massive air strike to blunting a 
planned invasion with a battalion-sized (or larger) blocking force of Marines or infantry sup-
ported by air power.  If hostilities begin in earnest, we will move additional personnel and read-
ily mobile assets from their bases in the United States or other theaters to friendly bases where 
equipment and supplies have been pre-positioned or ports where maritime pre-positioned equip-
ment has been transported and unloaded.  These larger and more heavily armed follow-on forces 
will reinforce the rapid deployment forces already in theater.   
 
This mode of operation has served the United States reasonably well over the last few 
decades.  However, some military strategists have become concerned that our reliance on this 
mode of power projection to influence foreign policy will lead potential competitors to develop 
area denial systems (or more properly access denial systems) to blunt our ability to project 
power.  If a competitor were successful in developing an access denial system, our ability to in-
fluence affairs in that region of the world by any means other than economic ones (trade, loans, 
investments, etc.) would almost entirely disappear.  As we will see, the very pillars of our power 
projection ability create areas of vulnerability that a potential adversary can exploit to achieve 
access denial.  Given that competition is a constant in world affairs – new competitors will arise 
whenever old competitors fade away – then the potential rewards of having an access denial sys-
tem guarantee that one or more potential competitors will try to acquire one.    
 
 Because of this, access denial is a topic that is receiving increasing attention at the high-
est levels of our military [2], [3].  Recently, the term “anti-access systems” has begun to replace 
access denial systems in the lexicon of many military leaders.  Given the origin of the present 
work, we will continue to use the term access denial throughout this report.  However, anti-
access could be substituted one-for-one for access denial and the meaning and impact would not 
change in the slightest.  Access denial can be defined as the ability of competitor military forces 
to keep United States power projection assets (carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups, 
long-range aviation, and airborne troops) at sufficient distance to prevent those assets from in-
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flicting significant damage on the competitor’s military forces or civilian infrastructure for a pe-
riod of time sufficiently long for the competitor’s objectives to be achieved.  As part of almost 
any access denial strategy, in-theater air, sea, and land bases will be denied to the United States, 
precluding the gradual buildup of forces which is the cornerstone of current campaign planning.  
Gradual peeling back of the defenses of the adversary will be made difficult by adversary defen-
sive systems with coverage (range and angle) greater than those of U. S. offensive systems.  In 
short, the United States will be forced to return to a strategy of attrition warfare, and accept the 
massive casualties that inevitably result, or it will be forced to withdraw and avoid the confronta-
tion. 
 
Had Iraq possessed an access denial capability, the sea, air, and land bases in the Persian 
Gulf would not have been open to Coalition forces or open only under threat of frequent attack.  
Bases in Turkey would have become equally hazardous for U. S. forces.  There would be no safe 
havens.  The Red Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Arabian Sea would have become areas of sig-
nificant risk for any naval combatant (surface or subsurface).  Thus, the lengthy low-risk buildup 
of Coalition ground forces in Saudi Arabia would not have been possible.  Naval forces could 
not have delivered the massive cruise missile strikes that opened the air war without suffering 
serious losses.  Only long-range bombers and fighters operating from bases in Western Europe 
(using multiple air-to-air refuelings) could have been used in the air war.  These would have 
faced air defenses that had not been disrupted by attacks on command & control nodes and sup-
pressed by direct attacks as well as air forces that had not been destroyed on the ground.  In short 
the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait could not have been seriously contested by the conventional mili-
tary means then available if Iraq had possessed an access denial system. 
 
No nation lacking an access denial capability could be considered a true peer competitor 
to the U. S. or a superpower.  It should be noted that throughout the Cold War the conventional 
military forces of the Soviet Union gave them a sufficient access denial capability that we did not 
dream of sending any military forces (other than spy submarines) into those “bastions” which the 
U.S.S.R. declared off-limits.  Among these bastions were the Sea of Okhotsk, the Black Sea, the 
Eastern Baltic Sea, the Barents Sea, and anywhere in Eastern Europe.  Except for the traditional 
diplomatic observation of national sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of our allies, 
we accorded the same treatment to no other nation.  Indeed when countries like Libya (in the 
Gulf of Sidra) attempted to establish such off-limits zones, we routinely defied the attempts with 
lethal results.  
 
The work described below was initiated as part of the NPS Area Denial Study.  In 1997 
and subsequent years at the request of the Office of Naval Research and the Executive Panel of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, the Naval Postgraduate School undertook to develop a credible 
and fully justifiable set of long-term threats (circa 2020).  Several teams of students and faculty 
were assembled, each team representing a different potential 2020 adversary to the United States.  
Each team had four to five officer students (drawn from each of the four military services and 
more or less equally split between national security and engineering studies) and one or two fac-
ulty advisors (typically highly experienced in the systems engineering, design, development, and 
manufacture of large-scale defense systems).  Over the course of several months, each team pro-
ceeded to develop their military force structures in three successive 7-year epochs.  In each ep-
och, the team was given an estimate of the military budget it would have available and a national 
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military strategy.  The budgets and strategies were developed by outside teams of expert consult-
ants drawn from industry, academia, and government.  Wherever possible, the consultant teams 
included nationally-recognized economic, political, and intelligence experts on the countries be-
ing gamed.  The consultant groups were chartered to develop strategies and budgets that repre-
sented the groups’ best estimates as to the actual future course of events.  The only guidance 
given to the groups was to assume less than benign intentions on the part of the foreign govern-
ment.  Obviously, if a potential adversary decides on peace, then there is no need for a military 
response on the part of the United States.  Since we were looking to define possible future adver-
sary characteristics, we forced each of the targeted nations to be adversarial.  However, no guid-
ance was given as to the nature that the adversarial character should assume. 
 
 Basically at the beginning of each epoch, each team and its consultant group met in a De-
cision Day to answer the following six questions: 
1. What is the expected threat to your national sovereignty, or what are your territorial or 
other ambitions, which could generate conflict during the Epoch under consideration? 
2. What economic, foreign, and military policies and programs do you choose to pursue for 
this Epoch? 
3. What is the projected size of your national economy for the years of this Epoch? 
4. How much of the national economy do you intend to spend on national defense during 
this Epoch?  And, what fraction will go for the creation of the “Access denial Force”? 
5. How much of the national defense expenditures will you allocate to each of the following 
resource allocation categories: 
A. Current Operations 
B. Combat System Procurement 
C. Intelligence (including procurement of intelligence systems) 
D. Counter-Intelligence and Deception 
E. Research & Development 
i. Basic Research 
ii. Specific Capability Development (e.g., high energy lasers) 
iii. Combat System Development/Improvement to provide a quantified 
change in: 
a. Area Coverage of the Combat System (Detection, Engagement, 
Control, Command) 
b. Fire Power (number of targets engageable at a time) 
c. Responsiveness (time delay) 
d. Countermeasure Susceptibility Reduction 
e. Availability of Combat Systems (e.g., logistics, basing structure, 
etc.) 
6. What are the forces anticipated for the end of the Epoch in light of the decisions taken by 
the Decision Day members?  And, what are their projected combat capabilities character-
ized in terms of the five categories listed in Question 5.E.iii? 
 
Each Decision Day was preceded by several weeks of intense research to generate possi-
ble answers to each question.  Answers were obtained after significant give and take between the 
political, economic, technological, and military representatives on the teams. 
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Given its country’s strategy and budget, the student team was free to develop forces and 
equipment consistent with that strategy and that budget.  Resources were allocated among re-
search & development (R&D), manpower, procurement, operations, intelligence acquisition, and 
counter-intelligence.  All aspects of the military (land, sea, air, and space) were considered in the 
allocations.  Specific R&D programs and specific equipment acquisitions were identified.  
Equipment acquisitions could only be made from those items that had been allocated full R&D 
funds in prior epochs, or which were available on the international arms market.  It was assumed 
that major arms suppliers (such as France, Sweden, and Russia, to name a few) would not reduce 
their levels of foreign sales and would not stop developing state-of-the-art weapon systems.  The 
systems engineering faculty validated budget estimates as to R&D cost, and unit equipment costs 
for every hardware type based on their extensive experience (typically 20 or more years each in 
the defense industry).  The input to the first epoch was the best available intelligence on current 
budgets, force structures, and defense R&D investments.  The consultant groups used the outputs 
of the first epoch to define the inputs to the second epoch, and the outputs of the second epoch to 
define the inputs to the third epoch.  In this manner, our knowledge of that country in 1999 was 
projected in a budget- and politics-constrained fashion out to the 2020 time frame.  This ap-
proach does not generate a probable future, but does define a plausible, realistic, and 
achievable one.  The results of this analysis are politically sensitive, producing enlightened fore-
casts of what potential adversaries might do.  To avoid condemning nations for actions they have 
not yet taken (and hopefully will never take) we will not identify the specific countries studied or 
their specific responses. 
 
 The output of this study (as of early 1999 – the project is still ongoing) was a set of po-
litically and economically constrained force structures as fielded in 2020 for three potential ad-
versaries.  The teams representing these adversaries firmly believed that their resulting force 
structures constituted viable access denial systems that could prevent U. S. power projection.  
Documentation consisted mainly of a set of videos that recorded the final flag-level debriefings 
of each of the teams.  The results were both fascinating and frightening. Because the force struc-
tures were budget-constrained, many potential vulnerabilities were identified and considered 
whose exploitation could not be afforded because other identified vulnerabilities were selected 
for exploitation.  That one “adversary” decided not to exploit those vulnerabilities does not mean 
another adversary cannot choose differently.  Had the student/faculty composition of a country 
team been altered, it is likely that the team would have selected a somewhat different set of vul-
nerabilities.  In an attempt to capture more of the work of this program and possibly make a lar-
ger positive impact on the military leadership, the author performed this independent analysis of 
the access denial problem.  As the faculty leader of two different teams in successive years, the 
author had first-hand visibility into many of the debates that led to the final results.  Many of the 
vulnerabilities discussed below were first suggested by the students.  Others suggested them-








 History has shown that no armed force is absolutely invincible.  Changing circumstances 
require changes in doctrine and equipment that often do not occur in a timely fashion.  Despite 
an awesome collection of military capabilities, the armed forces of the United States are vulner-
able to a number of threats.  These forces will become even more vulnerable with the passage of 
time unless significant changes in defense priorities and defense budgets occur in the near future.  
Many of the vulnerabilities can be exploited by a competitor in the design and implementation of 
his access denial system.  In the following we will summarize our understanding of those vulner-
abilities as they apply to the access denial problem.  We also summarize those specific actions a 
large regional competitor or near peer competitor might take to exploit those vulnerabilities and 
deploy a viable access denial system.  One purpose of this paper is to make clear the magnitude 
of the potential threats faced by our military in this supposed low-threat, post-Cold War envi-
ronment.  A second purpose is to provide a catalog of possible competitor responses to cue intel-
ligence professionals and other military observers to actions that are indicative of a country’s at-
tempting to develop the access denial capability that will make them impervious to U. S. influ-
ence by military means. 
 
That our military is developing significant potential vulnerabilities has been recognized 
before.  The theme of Joint Vision 2010 [4], [5] is the creation of a dominant military force, 
equipped with offensive weapons capable of inflicting unacceptable damage to an adversary and 
defensive systems capable of preventing unacceptable damage to our own forces, regardless of 
the task or the adversary.  In a 1995 Summer Study [6], the Defense Science Board (DSB) out-
lined a number of capabilities that an adversary could develop that could be used in asymmetric 
warfare to counter, negate, or even overwhelm supposed U. S. strengths.  These capabilities are 
listed in Table 2-1.  Although the vulnerabilities described in this work were uncovered inde-
pendently of the DSB study, and address a specific concern in detail rather than a broad concern 
in general, the correspondence between the DSB list and the author’s list (Table 2-2 in the fol-
lowing section) is both striking and significant. 
 
Table 2-1.  DSB list of capabilities that 21st century adversaries 
may pursue to counter U. S. strengths. [6] 
 
Offensive Information Warfare 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, & Target Acquisition (RSTA) 
Precision Strike 
Counter-RSTA 
Camouflage, Concealment, & Deception 
Large Numbers of Inexpensive Missiles 
Sophisticated, Very Low Observable Cruise Missiles 
Land and Sea Mines 
Diesel Submarines and Advanced Torpedoes 
Underground Facilities 
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The hypothetical near peer competitor exploiting U. S. vulnerabilities will be referred to 
as “NPC” in the remainder of this document.  The term “near” peer competitor is possibly mis-
leading.  A country does not have to be nearly equal to the United States in every aspect.  It must 
only possess an economy robust enough to acquire or develop military forces capable of success-
fully implementing an access denial system.  At least two dozen countries have economies strong 
enough and military forces large enough to qualify for developing significant access denial capa-
bilities.  Several possess the potential to become true peer competitors (and world superpowers) 
by the middle of the 21st century.  One or two of these could become peer competitors within 25 
years.  The more nearly a peer competitor is a potential adversary, the more vulnerabilities that 
country will likely attempt to exploit in implementing its access denial strategy.  We will use the 
term “near peer competitor” to refer to any country with the potential to implement any effective 
form of access denial.  By definition, the military of any such country will be able to prevent the 
United States from exercising its power projection capabilities and influencing regional politics 
at will.  Any such military deserves significant respect. 
 
Fortunately, most of the countries with vigorous (or potentially vigorous) economies are 
currently friends and allies of the United States and will be unlikely to attempt access denial sys-
tem development to counter U. S. influence.  Unfortunately, at least half a dozen are less friendly 
and could pose serious threats by the 2020 time frame.  More than one of these is almost certain 
to try to develop an access denial capability.  Any country willing to spend on defense over the 
next 20 years, that quantity of economic resources comparable to what the United States cur-
rently spends, would have a formidable military in 2020.  This is even more true if that country is 
willing to abandon any legacy systems it possesses, suffer a period of somewhat reduced military 
capability, and concentrate on developing and procuring only the best systems most suited to its 
long-term military objectives.  This last approach is something the United States has not been 
willing to do and it reduces our ability to rapidly restructure our military forces in the face of 
changing requirements. 
 
 It should be noted that it may not take a near peer competitor to develop a viable access 
denial system.  A competitor may possess an access denial capability, yet lack the ability to de-
feat the United States in a prolonged, high intensity conflict, or even in a single large massed en-
gagement.  If a single amphibious task force (carrier battle group plus amphibious ready group) 
can be successfully prevented from entering a denial zone with limited or remote friendly bases, 
the U. S. ability to project power will be delayed for a period of many weeks.  Additional carri-
ers, amphibs, and pre-positioning ships will be required to transit to a remote rendezvous area, 
and mass for what might become an opposed amphibious invasion.  This delay might provide 
enough time for the competitor to present the United States Government with a fait accompli, to 
which we are inadequately prepared to respond.  In Kuwait, air strikes from an aircraft carrier 
and the reinforcing of indigenous forces by landing a battalion of Marines might (this is a point 
of debate) have stopped the invasion, had they been accomplished during the early hours of 
Iraq’s invasion.  Having failed to do this, we required six months to amass an invasion force ca-
pable of ousting the entrenched Iraqi forces.  Even if a fait accompli is impractical, the adversary 
may be able to inflict enough damage on the initial U. S. forces to cause the U. S. Government to 
reevaluate whether the benefit of continued conflict is worth the price.  All too often, the U. S. 
projects its power in situations where vital national interests are not at stake.  In such instances, 
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an adversary that gives the U. S. a “bloody nose”, such as Somalia [7] or Lebanon [8], can force 
a U. S. withdrawal.   
 
 As a result, we cannot equate economic or political size of a country to whether or not it 
will possess an access denial capability.  Any country (even a small one or a substantial transna-
tional group) can attempt to establish one.  Size or economic power will affect only the type and 
number of vulnerabilities that the adversary can attempt to exploit and the rate at which that ex-
ploitation can be implemented.    
 
In each of the following sections we examine a specific area of vulnerability.  Each sec-
tion has the format of a paragraph(s) describing the nature of the vulnerability followed by a 
paragraph(s) cataloging specific responses that the NPC could and should take to exploit that 
area of vulnerability.  Many of the suggested vulnerabilities are related.  In some cases, U. S. at-
tempts to reduce vulnerability in one area have produced one or more additional vulnerabilities.  
Because the characteristics of these additional vulnerabilities differ significantly from the origi-
nal vulnerability, we have listed them separately.  In a few instances, the vulnerability may not 
yet be significant, but will likely become significant given the trends currently being pursued by 
our government.  The vulnerabilities described below are loosely grouped by similarity.  The or-
der of presentation does not convey any indication of priority or criticality.   
 
Some individuals may take exception to some of the vulnerabilities listed below.  They 
may not believe all of the author’s contentions of how easy it is to defeat one or another of the 
capabilities of existing systems.  Although the author has been directly involved in the develop-
ment of many kinds of system (or their countermeasures) described here, he will admit that he 
and the analyses he has drawn upon may not be 100% correct in every instance.  However, if 
only a few of the vulnerabilities described here are as serious as stated, then U. S. forces will 
face a severe problem in the future.  The author also reminds the critical reader that as late as 
1996 [9], proponents of GPS guidance were vociferously claiming that such systems could not 
be effectively jammed.  A short time later, critics of U. S. reliance on GPS guidance demon-
strated that jamming was relatively easy (with systems reputedly built from approximately five 
hundred dollars of Radio Shack parts) [10].  The history of electronic combat clearly demon-
strates that viable countermeasures can be rapidly developed for any system, no matter how well 
it is designed [11].   
 
Other individuals may contend that one or more items the author has listed as vulnerabili-
ties are in fact among our greatest strengths.  That was almost certainly true in the past.  It may 
even be true at the present time, but the author believes that the United States has become or is in 
the process of becoming over-dependent on these “strengths”.  Over-dependence on an asset 
turns it from a strength into a liability when the enemy discovers a way to exploit that over-
dependence.  As evidenced by the ever-escalating spiral of measure and countermeasure in radar 
and electronic warfare [11], such exploitation is seldom long in coming.  It is also true that a fac-
tor can be both a strength and a weakness.  Our freedom of speech and freedom of the press are 
major pillars of democratic society.  Without them we might not have survived as a free nation.  
However, none can deny that the press has occasionally published information that is militarily 
sensitive if not actually damaging.  During the Cold War it was often reported that the largest 
single customer of the Government Printing Office was the Soviet Embassy.  If true (and there is 
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no reason not to believe it), it is also clear that the Soviets were not buying every document pub-
lished out of a benevolent attempt to subsidize an American bureaucratic institution.   
 
Not every weakness will have an obvious remedy.  For example, it may not be in the na-
tion’s best interests to decrease our societal transparency.  Nevertheless, we should be aware that 
adversaries may take advantage of that transparency and we should try to minimize that poten-
tial.  We should also make every attempt to increase the transparency of those societies that pose 
potential future threats.  This includes a significant increase in investment in human intelligence 
(humint) resources. 
 
Some of the proposed threat responses may also seem unreasonable or even to verge on 
science fiction.  To this criticism the author has two comments.  First, much science fiction is 
fiction based on science and any projection of the future is fiction by definition.  Verne’s [12] 
nuclear submarine, Wells’ [13] atomic bombs, Heinlein’s [14] manned space flights to the moon, 
and Clarke’s [15] “intelligent” computers were science fiction when they were written; yet 
within 50 years each became science fact.  As one futurist [16] has observed, “Just because a 
prediction of future society sounds like science fiction, doesn’t make it true.  However, if it 
doesn’t sound like science fiction, it will certainly be false.” 
 
Second, significant thought by multiple individuals and organizations has been given to 
every one of the responses proposed in this report.  References to published studies and unpub-
lished studies are provided where available.  Unfortunately, not all of the analyses of which the 
author is aware have been adequately documented – in some cases the results have been trans-
mitted “word of mouth” and no hard evidence is known to exist.  In these instances, the concept 
has been reevaluated independently by the author to satisfy himself of the concept’s validity be-
fore inclusion here.  It should be noted that none of the proposed responses violate the laws of 
physics.  With few exceptions (clearly identified in the text) none of the capabilities proposed 
requires major inventions.  They use components that are well within the existing state-of-the-
art, although in many cases these components will be combined, juxtaposed, or utilized in novel 
ways.  The primary reasons for the current lack of these systems in the military inventories of our 
competitors (and our own) include a lack of recognition of need, low priority relative to other 
technology developments, and inadequate funding, not technical impracticality. 
 
As described above, the following analysis is based on numerous discussions with mem-
bers of the Naval Postgraduate School Area Denial Project team and its distinguished panel of 
consultants (which included high-ranking Department of Defense officials, foreign area scholars, 
former members of Congress, and senior military officers).  After several iterations, the author 
assembled the list of vulnerabilities summarized in Table 2-2.  A total of 36 separate areas of 
vulnerability are identified. 
 
Each of the individual vulnerabilities is discussed below from three perspectives:  an ex-
planation of how U. S. forces are currently vulnerable or may become vulnerable in the future 
in the listed area;  what actions a prospective Near Peer Competitor (NPC) should take (and 
might actually take) to fully exploit that area of vulnerability;  and what actions the U. S. 
could or should take to reduce that vulnerability.  The three perspectives will be identifi-
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able by typeface, as shown above.  Vulnerabilities will be discussed in the order of their appear-
ance in Table 2-2. 
 
 No attempt is made in this paper to prioritize the vulnerabilities or to assign relative 
probabilities to them.  The same is true of actions that the U. S. might take to reduce any 
vulnerability.  No competitor could afford to exploit every vulnerability listed here.  The U. S. 
cannot afford to take every action recommended to reduce the vulnerabilities.  Such prioritization 
is the ultimate goal of this project, however, many more trials with more detailed technical, po-
litical, and economic analyses are required.  This report is intended to serve as a guide for con-
tinued study, as an interim progress report on work accomplished to date, and as a warning that 
shortsightedness in planning for future threats may produce results our nation will be un-
able to live with. 
 
To help the reader with limited expertise in some of the fields addressed, the author has 
included a number of technical appendices.  Some of these appendices present overviews of 
broad subjects.  Others present detailed technical analyses that would clutter the main body of 
the text.  Some technical training is assumed on the part of the reader, but an advanced degree is 
not required to understand any of the appendices.  
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Table 2-2.   Vulnerabilities of U. S. forces aiding an enemy’s access denial capability. 
 
 
Attacks Using WMD:   Attack by Nuclear Missiles (ICBMs) 
Attack by Other Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
Direct Attacks Against Forces:  Attack by Cruise Missiles 
Attack by Ballistic Missiles or Superguns 
Attack by Transatmospheric Aircraft 
Attack by Naval Mines 
Attack by Advanced Torpedoes 
Attack by Advanced Non-nuclear Submarines 
Attack by Unmanned Air Superiority Vehicles 
Attack by Infrared Anti-Aircraft Missiles 
 
Counters to Offensive Systems:  Reliance on Stealth 
Jamming of GPS & GPS-Dependent Systems 
Jamming of Precision-Guided Weapons 
 
Attacks on C4I Assets:   Attack by Electromagnetic Weapons 
Attack by High-Energy Lasers 
Attack by Information Warfare 
Attack by Antisatellite Weapons 
Reliance on Long-Range Airborne Surveillance  
Susceptibility to Strategic Deception 
Excessive Intelligence-Response Latency 
 
Unconventional Methods of Attack: Attack by Special Operations Forces  
Limited Adverse Weather Operations Capability 
      Attack by Nonlethal Weapons 
 
Attacks on Logistics Resources:  Limited Strategic Sea/Air Lift Capability 
Reliance on Limited Overseas Basing 
Reliance on Pre-Positioned Equipment 
Reliance on Underway Replenishment 
 
Attacks on Societal Vulnerabilities: Civilian Intolerance of Casualties 
Restrictive Rules of Engagement  
Civilian Intolerance of Unnecessary Hardships 
Need for Coalition Support 
Unequal Societal Transparency 
Treaty Limitations 
 
Technological Change   Technological Surprise  
      Technological Atrophy 
Disruptive Technologies 







CHAPTER 3.  ATTACKS USING WMD 
 
 
 ATTACK BY NUCLEAR MISSILES (ICBMs) 
  
At the present time, the United States and every other country is vulnerable to nuclear weap-
ons in any form.  Nuclear explosive devices can be delivered by gravity bombs from aircraft, 
torpedoes, cruise missiles, or even hidden in cargo or baggage, but especially by ballistic mis-
siles.  See Appendix A for a technical discussion of nuclear weapons.  Intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) can reach out from protected sites (super-hardened silos or mobile launch-
ers deep in the interior of a country or from ships or submarines in the middle of the ocean) 
and strike anyplace in the world.  Three countries (U. S., Russia, and China) currently possess 
true ICBM development, production, and launch capabilities.  The Ukraine has the facilities 
to develop and build ICBMs that it markets to the world as satellite launch vehicles.  India and 
North Korea are actively developing ICBMs [17].  Iran is developing a missile with a 5500-km 
range that is almost an ICBM.  The list of ICBM possessors may grow rapidly in the future.  
Chinese, Russian, or Ukrainian ICBMs may become available for sale to virtually any nation 
with enough money; their shorter-range missiles are widely exported.  Also, any nation that 
can build satellite launch vehicles can develop ICBMs [18].  In addition to the big three of 
ICBM fame (U. S., Russia, and China), France, Japan, India, and Israel have repeatedly 
launched satellites using their own launch vehicles and launch facilities.  Italy, Brazil, and 
North Korea have their own launch facilities and development of launch vehicles is apparently 
well underway.  Spain and Germany are also apparently pursuing development of launch ve-
hicles [17], [19].  
 
By 2020 it is reasonably certain that the United States will have developed and deployed 
an effective “National Missile Defense (NMD)” system [20].  See Appendix D for a technical 
discussion of tactical ballistic missile defense that also explains some critical aspects of strategic 
ballistic missile defense.  It is a possibility that this defense will be compliant with the ABM 
treaty [21] in its current form.  If so, NMD will consist of at most 100 interceptors based in 
Grand Forks ND coupled to a limited number of extremely capable ground-based radars.  A 
space-based sensor component is permitted and will certainly form part of any NMD system.  
It is anticipated that the space-based component will aid the tracking and discrimination proc-
esses, reducing the requirements that the ground-based radars must satisfy.  The system will 
protect most of the U. S. although the Southwest (including San Diego and Los Angeles) and 
Southeast (including Atlanta and Miami) will not be protected against submarine-launched 
missiles or missiles that fly great circle routes avoiding crossing the Arctic Circle.  Within the 
covered areas the system will provide high confidence of intercepting all of the warheads that 
a lesser competitor or rogue state might be capable of acquiring (reasonably assumed to be 
less than 100).  The radar, space-based sensors, and interceptor guidance will be capable of 
discriminating against many classes of penetration aids (decoys).  Precision replica decoys are 




However, the NMD system will provide no defense against any warhead that a competi-
tor might possess in excess of 100.  As a result it will only provide an extremely limited defense 
against the nuclear arsenal of a peer (or former peer) competitor such as Russia and it will 
provide only limited defense to Alaska or Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Midway, Guam, Diego Garcia, 
or any of our allies (other than Canada).  Any system capable of handling more than 100 
warheads or fully defending any of these other regions will almost certainly violate the ABM 
Treaty.  Many people are pushing for abrogation of this treaty, and several legal experts have 
argued that the treaty ceased to be binding when the Soviet Union collapsed [22], [23].  How-
ever, to date, both the Executive Branch and the Senate continue to resist this notion and the 
Russian Federation has denounced any actions in this direction on the part of the United 
States.   
 
However, if the U. S. is willing to share NMD technology with Russia, Ukraine, Ka-
zakhstan, and Belarus, and/or to provide other substantial economic incentives, there is a rea-
sonable probability that the treaty could be amended to allow limited deployment of additional 
missiles and/or deployment at other sites.  In this case it seems likely that the Grand Forks site 
would be abandoned in favor of an Alaskan site (the farther north the launch site, the earlier 
the intercept of any polar trajectory and the larger the impact zone that can be defended).  
Other sites with additional radar or launcher complexes may also be considered.  The current 
NMD strategy seems to involve a potentially non-treaty-compliant (different site and/or addi-
tional radars), evolutionary approach with an initial early 21st century capability of handling a 
very limited number of “terrorist” missile launches from a rogue state.  The “terrorist” threat 
is assumed to have limited or no penetration aids.  As more interceptors are procured, the ca-
pability would grow to possess an ultimate capability of handling somewhat fewer than the 100 
warheads the ABM treaty allows.  At a later date, additional interceptor sites and radar sites 
could be added to handle more warheads, if it was deemed necessary.  It is unclear if the addi-
tional radar sites will be capable of the same degree of decoy discrimination as the primary 
site. 
 
 The cost of a treaty-compliant ABM system (as well as the cost of the evolutionary, 
non-compliant system) is large enough that its deployment would have to be paid for over a 
number of years.  This is one driver favoring the evolutionary approach.  It is almost certain 
that budgetary constraints will limit even a non-compliant system (more than 100 interceptors) 
to be no larger than 3-4 times the largest compliant system.  Such a system would require de-
ployment over several decades.  Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) launched 
from positions just offshore of the Continental United States (CONUS) are not adequately ad-
dressed by the current NMD approaches nor are launches from the Southern Hemisphere.  As 
a result several hundred ICBMs and SLBMs should be sufficient to overwhelm any missile 
defense system the U. S. will be able to deploy in the next few decades.  Such a modest strate-
gic force could be afforded by a number of nations, including a few potential adversaries.  
Thus even with a limited NMD, the U. S. may still face a “Mutual Assured Destruction” situa-
tion with several adversary nations.   NOTE ADDED PRIOR TO PRINTING:  As of the end of December 
2001, the Bush administration has notified the Russian government that the United States was withdrawing from the 




 The nuclear arsenal of the United States is aging.  As nuclear weapons age, their reli-
ability decreases.  In the past we have relied on full-scale testing to maintain safe and reliable 
nuclear weapons.  In 1996 the U. S. signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) [24].  Even though the Senate has not yet ratified the treaty, it is may be just a matter 
of time before this happens.  Without the ability to conduct tests, nuclear stockpile stewardship 
will depend almost entirely on computational modeling and component testing.  It remains to 
be seen if this will be adequate.  The U. S. nuclear weapon production program has been 
closed down for some time, although there is an inventory of “spare parts”.  When these 
spares are used up, every weapon withdrawn for reliability degradation or component testing 
will be one less weapon in the U. S. total inventory.  At some point an entire class of weapons 
might be declared sufficiently unreliable that it would be removed from the inventory.  It is 
unlikely that such weapons would be replaced.  It should also be noted that not every potential 
nuclear power has signed the CTBT.  Some of our competitors may not be content to suffer 
from aging inventories and may keep theirs up to date through continued testing. 
 
The U. S. is also pursuing numerous strategic disarmament initiatives.  The more suc-
cessful these negotiations are, the fewer missiles and warheads the U. S. will have in its strate-
gic deterrent force.  Although it is doubtful that the U. S. will ever completely give up its nu-
clear weapons, in 20-30 years we may have lost several more classes of nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems.  Each reduction in weapons class whether due to age or arms control will 
reduce the retaliatory options available to military planners.  It is possible that we might be left 
in a position where we could not respond to an opponent’s limited use of nuclear weapons (for 
example, nuclear strikes against our fleets) without resorting to total nuclear war (an option 
that is just not viable).  This is especially important because U. S. naval vessels of every class 
can be severely damaged by even small nuclear explosives detonated at relatively long ranges.  
This was proved at the Crossroads Able and Baker nuclear tests in Bikini lagoon in 1946 [25].  
A single large thermonuclear explosion centered on the aircraft carrier would damage or de-
stroy most of a carrier battle group. 
 
If it already possesses one, NPC should make sure that it retains a strategic nuclear capa-
bility even if the United States develops a National Missile Defense system.  Since NPC likely 
possesses at least a modest nuclear ICBM force, retaining an effective nuclear strike capability in 
the face of an ABM Treaty-compliant U. S. NMD system will mean making modest increases in 
the total missile forces.  At a minimum NPC should strive to maintain a significant number (per-
haps 10 to 20) of missiles in excess of the number of NMD interceptors that the U. S. deploys.  
To minimize expenditures on additional missiles, NPC may find it desirable to develop advanced 
penetration aids (decoys) and multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) technol-
ogy.  These improvements in the ICBM force will not present insurmountable difficulties but 
will require a number of years and considerable investment to accomplish. 
 
Since fixed-site, land-based ICBMs are vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes and the U. S. 
possesses a variety of means to execute such pre-emptive strikes (ranging from stealth bombers 
to cruise missiles to ICBMs to special operations forces), NPC may find it desirable to reduce 
this vulnerability.  NPC should investigate developing a mobile ICBM system.  NPC should also 
develop or purchase a ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) force capable of keeping a 
substantial number of warheads at sea at all times.  As before NPC should attempt to maintain 
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more warheads in both its sea- and land-based missile arms than the United States has ballistic 
missile interceptors.   
  
If the U. S. abrogates the ABM treaty and espouses a total missile defense posture, NPC 
should seriously evaluate the possibility that an arms race might be a cost-effective means of 
maintaining a nuclear deterrence.  Purchase of one hundred new, cheap NPC ICBMs for each 
new deployed, expensive U. S. interceptor complex is a good bargain if the economies of the two 
countries are roughly equal in size.  If the U. S. abrogates the ABM treaty, then NPC should cer-
tainly pursue development and deployment of advanced penetration aids.  Deployment of such 
capabilities may render useless many of the lower-cost ABM approaches that the U. S. might be 
willing to field.  NPC should also upgrade its ballistic missile submarine force in a comparable 
fashion.  Operational launch areas for these submarines should be located such that North-Polar 
trajectories are avoided.  In all likelihood, submarine-launched missiles arriving on trajectories 
from the South, East, or West will be more effective against any U. S. NMD system than will 
land-based ballistic missiles or submarine-launched missiles arriving from over the Arctic 
Ocean.  Shorter time of flight and depressed trajectories will also improve effectiveness against 
ballistic missile defenses.   
 
NPC will certainly recognize that any nation that is not capable of delivering a successful 
nuclear strike against the United States (overwhelming retaliation notwithstanding) will not be 
considered a peer competitor by the rest of the world.  The existence of even a minimal “mutu-
ally assured destruction” capability will severely limit the warfighting options of the United 
States.  In Korea, we refrained from bombing critical Chinese targets because we feared nuclear 
escalation by the Soviet Union.  This, at a time when neither side possessed enough nuclear 
weapons to completely annihilate the other.  In Vietnam, the same fear (this time more realistic) 
prevented our unrestricted bombing and invasion of North Vietnam. 
 
If NPC does not possess ICBMs with nuclear warheads, it should evaluate whether their 
acquisition is consistent with its long-range plans.  Overt proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
ICBMs will bring strong responses from the United States and all signatories of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.  The sanctions that result may cripple NPC’s economy.  If NPC does 
not have global superpower aspirations, then overt acquisition of nuclear weapons and ICBMs is 
probably unwise.  On the other hand, covert (or at least deniable) acquisition of a limited nuclear 
capability (even if delivery is limited to covert special operations, such as smuggling into a har-
bor in the hold of a merchant ship) will benefit any country that anticipates substantial future 
confrontations with the United States. 
 
NPC should conduct a regular evaluation of U. S. nuclear readiness.  If it appears that ag-
ing or disarmament has significantly reduced U. S. limited retaliatory capability, then NPC may 
decide that limited use of nuclear weapons may aid their access denial strategy.  If a MIRVed 
ballistic missile with ten 150 kT warheads was programmed to produce shallow underwater 
detonations throughout a 100-km diameter impact footprint centered on a carrier battle group, 
most ships of that battle group would suffer damage that would prevent them from continuing 
their mission.  Such a limited strike that affected only combatant forces would be unlikely to 
demand massive retaliation on the part of the U. S.  If U. S. nuclear retaliation options are suffi-
ciently limited, the U. S. might be forced to simply accept the loss of the battle group.  Limited 
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nuclear strikes might also be effective against critical ports or marshalling centers, such as Guam 
or Diego Garcia.  Other “limited” uses of nuclear weapons might include nuclear depth charges 
for anti-submarine warfare, production of high-altitude electromagnetic pulse, demolition of ex-
tremely hardened structures (such as dams), and neutron bomb strikes on isolated land forces.  
Under no circumstances should NPC use nuclear weapons on the United States proper. 
 
The United States should continue its efforts to curb the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons and ballistic missile technology.  It should also continue to develop a 
National Missile Defense system.  Although NMD will not prevent a near peer com-
petitor from developing a force adequate to establish a mutual assured destruction 
situation, at a minimum, it will raise the ante with respect to another nation’s being 
able to hold the U. S. hostage to its nuclear weapons.  The United States should give 
careful consideration to implementing any NMD beyond that needed to defend 
against the minimal threat (terrorist, renegade, or accidental launches).  Any capabil-
ity beyond the minimum may inspire an adversary to engage in a one-missile-for-
one-interceptor arms escalation that could favor the adversary from an economic 
perspective.   
 
The Stockpile Stewardship program should make every effort to validate the 
trustworthiness of the computational “systems” – Software and Hardware – used to 
predict the stability and reliability of our nuclear stockpile.  This will almost certainly 
require the completion of the National Ignition Facility (NIF) to permit critical and 
thoroughly instrumented testing of tiny thermonuclear devices that can be used to 
validate the software by comparing computational predictions with the results of ex-
periments.  Should the NIF suffer from funding cuts or otherwise fail to become op-
erational, then the U. S. should reconsider its stance on the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty and on continued adherence to a testing moratorium. 
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ATTACK BY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION  
 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in this section are intended to mean any form of 
chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) weapon.  Although nuclear explosives are clearly 
WMD, they have been addressed separately by the preceding paragraphs.  See Appendix A for 
a detailed technical discussion of all kinds of WMD (nuclear, chemical, biological, and radio-
logical).  Many nations possess WMD capability.  The Federation of American Scientists esti-
mates that there may be 25 countries with chemical weapons programs, 19 countries with bio-
logical weapons programs, and 1 with a radiological weapons program, although some of 
these countries have pledged to destroy any weapons and weapon production facilities that 
they possess [26].  Some of these countries are openly hostile to the U. S., while others cannot 
be considered as friendly.  If hostilities arise between these countries and the United States, 
there may be few good reasons for them not to use these weapons against U. S. forces. 
 
Ships of the U. S. Navy have mixed vulnerability to WMD.  Most warships and support 
ships possess a countermeasure washdown system [27].  In theory, the sea water spray from 
this system will wash a large fraction of any aerosol contaminants out of the air before reach-
ing the ship’s surface.  The spray will also wet the surface of the ship and make it less likely 
for remaining contamination to adhere to the surface.  Finally, the runoff will wash away 
much of the contamination.  However, the washdown system is infrequently tested (several 
times a year) and is both subject to corrosion problems and is a source of corrosion in other 
systems.  It may not function properly when necessary.  Even if it does function, it requires a 
human operator to activate it.  If not activated in time (because the agent delivery occurs too 
quickly for effective response or because a WMD attack is not recognized as such until it is too 
late), significant surface contamination will result.  The spray system typically does not protect 
the uppermost part of a ship’s superstructure and masts.  Wind and ship motion can also re-
sult in incomplete coverage of portions of the hull and lower superstructure.  The uncovered 
areas will almost certainly become severely contaminated.  The washdown system coupled with 
fire hoses and scrubbing and swabbing will only partially decontaminate the exterior of the 
ship.  Special decontaminating agents (such as DS2 or HTH) and decontaminating equipment 
are required to thoroughly decontaminate the ship.  HTH (calcium hypochlorite) is the only 
decontaminating agent routinely available on Navy ships, but it is not usually carried in suffi-
cient quantities on surface combatants.    
 
Most of our warships have been provided with limited collective protection capabilities.  
However, the DDG-51 class is the first ship class designed to have a full collective protection 
system.  This will protect most of the crew for extended periods of time, if the collective protec-
tion system is functional and if the WMD agent is not introduced into the enclave (e.g., due to 
battle damage or by intentional hull penetration by the warhead).  Older combatants, carriers, 
and amphibious ships have been retrofitted with collective protection of selective spaces.  The 
protected spaces usually center on the Combat Information Center (CIC), but often do not in-
clude crew berthing and messing spaces.  Non-combatants (e.g., logistics ships) usually do not 
have any collective protection systems, although they do have ventilation systems that can be 
closed down and hatches that can be secured to create spaces that are resistant (but not com-
pletely impervious) to CBR agent penetration.  This last form of protection might provide a 
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crew survival shelter for limited periods of time (CBR contamination will ultimately penetrate 
these spaces if exposure continues). 
 
Once contaminated, surface combatants may be able to fight buttoned up for extended 
but limited (one or two days) periods of time; however, aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and 
logistics ships cannot conduct their primary operations in a fully buttoned-up condition [28], 
[29].  If the hangar decks, well decks, or cargo holds are opened for operations prior to com-
plete external decontamination, the interior spaces will also likely become contaminated.  If 
these spaces are open when an attack occurs, severe interior contamination is almost certain.  
This would necessitate cessation of all operations for days of thorough decontamination or 
force all operations to be conducted in MOPP 4 (Mission-Oriented Protective Posture 4 – 
wearing of the full CBR protective clothing ensemble), with its concomitant serious degrada-
tion in performance.  If a ship were to be contaminated with a biological “Andromeda Strain” 
agent [30] especially designed for persistence, it is doubtful that it could ever be perfectly de-
contaminated.  Lacking assurances of complete safety, every port facility in the world (includ-
ing possibly our own) would likely refuse entry for the ship (and possibly its crew) [1] until the 
ship finally rusted out and sank.   
 
Although ship and crew may survive conventional WMD attacks, we possess very little 
true defense capability against unconventional weapons such as WMD sea mines, ballistic 
missiles with WMD warheads, or torpedoes or cruise missiles with combined armor pierc-
ing/WMD agent warheads.  WMD sea mines can produce low altitude airbursts of agent di-
rectly over ships within seconds of when they are triggered.  Indeed, during the heyday (early 
1950’s) of the U. S. biological warfare program, the U. S. Navy developed a submarine-
deliverable mine containing a biological agent [31] (almost certainly anthrax).  Combined ar-
mor piercing/WMD agent warheads are designed to penetrate collective protection enclaves 
and introduce the WMD agents into the interior of the ship.  Ships are also vulnerable to sabo-
tage from WMD devices or agents hidden in fresh food and other stores that are on-loaded 
during port visits or carried aboard by visitors to the ship.  They are even more vulnerable to 
chemical and biological sabotage by deep cover agents who are part of a ship’s crew.  Given 
the multi-cultural character of the United States it is virtually impossible to exclude members 
of any ethnic heritage from service in the armed forces.  It is equally impossible to run full 
background investigations on every service member to turn up suspected agents. 
 
Other military units that contribute to force projection also have limited vulnerabilities 
to WMD.  If aircraft fly through a contaminated environment, they will become externally 
contaminated.  Systems are available for protection of the aircrew and for efficient decon-
tamination of the aircraft.  The necessity for decontamination will of course impose opera-
tional and performance inefficiencies.  If WMD is deployed on the friendly facilities being 
used for strategic airlift and/or sealift, the transport airport and ships will become thoroughly 
contaminated inside and out.  Unloading operations can still be undertaken, but continuous 
MOPP 4 operation will take its toll on efficiency.  The necessity to decontaminate the interiors 
of strategic transport aircraft will dramatically reduce cycle time and could reduce airlift rates 
by 50% or more [1]. 
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U. S. vulnerability to CBR weapons is enhanced by an asymmetric policy.  Since 1978 
the official U. S. policy has been:   
“The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to 
the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] or any comparable internationally binding commitment not 
to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its ter-
ritories or armed forces, or its allies by such a state allied to a nuclear weapon state, or associ-
ated with a nuclear weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.” [32]   
That is, if attacked with CBR weapons by an NPT signatory state, the U. S. has pledged not to 
retaliate with nuclear weapons.  If conventional hostilities are already occurring between this 
state and the U. S., this policy denies the U. S. its most significant mode of retaliation.     
 
NPC should determine its position vis-à-vis first use of chemical, biological, and radio-
logical weapons.  If first use is not ruled out, and especially if NPC has decided it cannot have a 
nuclear weapons capability, it should develop or expand its capabilities to develop, test, and pro-
duce selected CBR agents.  As there are world sanctions against developing chemical or biologi-
cal weapons, this program should be carried out covertly.  In the case of chemical agents, the 
agent production facilities can easily be masked as pesticide or pharmaceutical plants.  In the 
case of biological agents, the production facilities can be hidden in any large manufacturing 
complex, disguised as civilian biotechnology facilities, or built into self-contained mobile units 
disguised as commercial semi-trailers (and continually driven from one site to another to avoid 
outside inspection).   
 
NPC should develop equivalents to the “Public Health Service” and the “Center for Dis-
ease Control”.  These entities should participate in worldwide World Health Organization activi-
ties.  This will provide “legitimate” access to emerging pathogenic organisms and provide cover 
for maintaining biosafety level 4 facilities [33].  This would greatly facilitate developing biologi-
cal weapons as well as biological weapon defenses, and if the masquerade is carried beyond the 
walls of these facilities, it would ultimately significantly improve the health of NPC’s citizens 
and military personnel, just as the CDC has done in the United States.  Testing of chemical and 
biological weapons should be done at remote test sites with a minimum of permanent facilities or 
in underground facilities.  This will make it difficult for the U. S. to monitor and correctly iden-
tify the character of the tests. 
 
 NPC should develop or expand it capabilities to defend its own forces against WMD use 
by others.  It should develop advanced personal protective equipment, chemical/biological agent 
detection equipment, and prophylaxis against known chemical and biological agents in the 
inventories of potential adversaries.  It should produce classical WMD munitions and integrate 
them into its land and air forces.  It should also develop a practical antiship WMD capability.  
This last capability (mines, missiles, and/or torpedoes) should take the form that fits best with 
NPC’s general military capabilities.  It should also begin/continue a process of positioning loyal 
NPC agents throughout American society.  Over 20 years it should be easy to infiltrate tens of 
thousands of agents into American society.  At this level there would be few organizations of any 
type, that did not have at least one NPC agent with access to its inner workings.  At the start of 
any conflict, these agents could cause sabotage with WMD on a grand scale, in addition to gath-
ering critical military, political, economic, and technical intelligence.  Such a “fifth column” ac-
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tivity should be initiated for its intelligence and conventional sabotage potential even if use of 
WMD is renounced.  
 
The United States should continue its efforts to curb the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.  It should strive to include effective enforcement 
measures into each non-proliferation treaty it negotiates.  The United States also 
needs to improve the defensive equipment available to its military forces.  Although 
many improvements are being actively pursued, some are not being pursued at all 
and many others have performance objectives that are inadequate to meet potential 
future threats.  Personal protective equipment needs to be capable of protecting in-
dividuals for many days without degradation and of being decontaminated, refur-
bished, and reused without requiring extensive special facilities.  Collective protec-
tion systems need to have airlocks combined with decontamination capabilities that 
will permit rapid ingress and egress from contaminated environments.  Environmen-
tally safe and non-toxic decontamination agents need to be developed that can be 
used to rapidly decontaminate sensitive equipment, such as aircraft electronics.  Na-
val vessels need to be designed to be able to conduct their entire range of opera-
tions for extended periods of time in heavily contaminated environments.  This will 
involve radical design changes to some ship classes such as amphibious ships, lo-
gistics ships, and aircraft carriers to permit vehicles and cargo to be decontaminated 
and have rapid access to/from collectively protected spaces.  Vaccines need to be 
developed for all significant microbiological agents.  Antidotes and safe and effective 
pre-treatments need to be developed against chemical and toxin agents.   
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CHAPTER 4.  DIRECT ATTACKS AGAINST FORCES 
 
 
ATTACK BY CRUISE MISSILES  
 
Antiship cruise missiles continue to pose serious threats to U. S. naval forces.  As dem-
onstrated by the 4 May 1982 sinking of the HMS Sheffield [34], [35], the 25 May 1982 sinking 
of the SS Atlantic Conveyor [34], the 6 June 1982 damaging of the HMS Glamorgan [34] (all 
three during the Falklands War), and the severe 17 May 1987 damaging of the USS Stark dur-
ing the Iran-Iraq War [36], all by relatively small Exocet cruise missiles, cruise missiles are 
proven ship-killers.  The Exocet carries a warhead containing only 60 kg of high explosives.  
Most cruise missiles have larger warheads and are even more lethal. 
 
Active cruise missile defense requires early detection and tracking of incoming missiles 
and high-speed agile interceptors to kill the cruise missiles before they get close enough to the 
ship for debris (from a destroyed missile) to impact and damage the ship.  Unfortunately, the 
low radar cross sections coupled with multipath (interference due to radar returns reflecting 
from the sea surface) and refractive ducting make detection of sea skimming missiles difficult 
at long ranges.  Even scheduled improvements to the Aegis fire control system will not provide 
high certainty detection of very-low altitude missiles in multipath and ducting environments at 
ranges long enough to guarantee intercepts and avoid damage from postulated advanced 
threats.  Operation in littoral waters will provide close-in launch opportunities to land-based 
or small-craft based missile launchers.  Even the inclusion of the much-needed Cooperative 
Engagement Capability (CEC) [37] into the Navy’s weapons command and control systems 
will provide minimal advantage if the enemy employs a rollback attack.  In such an attack, a 
first wave targets and sinks or damages the outer ring of picket ships (these gain only limited 
advantage from CEC in terms of improved detection or warning).  A second wave well behind 
the first takes out the next ring of CEC-equipped ships.  The loss of the outer picket ships al-
most completely eliminates the supposed CEC advantage of ships in this second ring.  Third, 
fourth, and fifth waves successively reduce the rings of defensive capability until the high-
value targets are overwhelmed.   
 
Cruise missiles will become faster, more agile (even to the point of violent maneuver-
ing), and more surface-hugging (advanced autopilots will be capable of measuring local sea 
state and picking the lowest cruise altitudes that provide marginally acceptable wave clobber 
probabilities).  Future cruise missiles will likely employ combined RF and IR seekers for 
countermeasure resistance.  See Appendix G for a detailed description of missile guidance 
techniques.  The missiles may even carry their own self-protection jamming systems just like 
manned aircraft.  On a large, long-range cruise missile the penalties associated with carrying 
jammers or multiple expendable aerodynamic decoys (possibly including active emitters as 
well as retroreflectors for passive cross section simulation) are not likely to be insurmount-
able.  The generation-after-next of cruise missile seekers will almost certainly be capable of 
determining and hitting the most vulnerable point(s) on any class of target.  If the U. S. fails to 
develop directed energy weapons, then U. S. surface forces will be readily vulnerable to 
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“magazine” saturation, that is, attack by more threat missiles than the U. S. forces have inter-
ceptor missiles with which to counter them.  This is one of the threats highlighted by the De-
fense Science Board.  It was also a tactic independently adopted by every red team in NPS’ 
Area Denial study.  Even a country with a relatively modest economy could afford to procure 
tens of thousands of low-cost antiship missiles.  If country X has 20,000 missiles in its inven-
tory, it can easily afford to fire 1000 missiles at a single carrier battle group.  It is noteworthy 
that recent Net Assessment wargames have begun to include similar large missile inventories 
in the adversary’s order of battle [38].  
 
In recent years, surface ships have relied on layered active defenses involving aircraft, 
long-range missiles, short-range missiles, guns, electronic jammers, and decoys [39].  How-
ever, a ship or battle group can carry only a finite number of missile kills in its inventory.  One 
thousand missiles exceeds the most optimistic number of available kills that even a battle 
group would possess.  Appendix B presents a detailed analysis of the active defense of a battle 
group. The bottom line is that after every defensive weapon in the battle group is used up, 
many dozens of attacking missiles still remain to complete the destruction.  Assuming a stan-
dard defensive weapon mix available today, a quantity exceeding 140 missiles (out of a salvo 
of 1000) survives to hit the 7 major combatants assumed to make up the battle group.  This 
averages to 20 missile hits per ship.  Even with an improved weapon mix, 40 missiles survive to 
hit the battle group (giving 5-6 hits per ship). 
 
No matter how many missiles an adversary possesses or how lethal those missiles may 
be, those missiles will not pose a threat if they cannot be allocated against targets of impor-
tance.  Targeting ships at sea has always been a difficult proposition.  The ocean is large and 
ships are small.  At long ranges, it is difficult to detect a battle group let alone a single ship.  
Once detected, the ability of a ship to move makes it hard to hit.  Given perfect knowledge of 
initial position and velocity, the missileer can only fire at a predicted position.  At long ranges, 
missile times of flight become long.  A Mach 0.9 missile requires 1000 seconds to reach 300 
km range.  During this same period a 30-knot warship can move more than 15 km.  The un-
certainty region in target position can be as large as 15-20 km in radius.  If there is a time de-
lay between detection and launch, the uncertainty region can grow larger proportional to the 
delay.  If there is an uncertainty in the original position (due to sensor accuracy), this will add 
to the size of the ultimate uncertainty region.  To complement the adversary’s missiles, he 
must have a targeting system that has high detection probability, good localization accuracy, 
and short sensor-to-shooter communication times.  This is true whether the adversary is using 
subsonic cruise missiles, supersonic cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, torpedoes, or “super-
guns” [40]-[42].  Traditionally, the targeting system has been harder to implement than the 
missile system.   
 
NPC should continue to improve its position with respect to cruise missiles.  It should 
develop or buy faster (Mach 3-5), more agile (15-30 g), and longer-range (300-1000 nmi) mis-
siles.  It should equip those missiles with combined RF/IR imaging seekers and more lethal war-
heads.  It should incorporate self-protection jammers and/or expendable aerodynamic decoys into 
the missile payloads.  It should procure these missiles in enormous quantities.  Since this may 
arguably be the single most important component of an access denial system, it is not unreason-
able that a significant portion of the defense budget should be devoted to cruise missile acquisi-
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tion.  NPC should be willing to expend enough missiles in each attack to guarantee overwhelm-
ing the U. S. defenses.  That may turn out to be a significant fraction (5-10%) of the total missile 
assets unless NPC can afford to procure enough missiles to make the fraction smaller. 
 
NPC should develop launch platforms, targeting sensor systems, and command & control 
networks capable of allowing NPC to strike at U. S. naval forces at extremely long ranges from 
NPC territory.  It should procure adequate launch platforms to conduct the massive strikes de-
scribed in the preceding paragraph.  It should develop multiple systems capable of providing the 
needed targeting data.  NPC should consider space-based imaging, space-based electronic sup-
port measures, space-based radar, underwater acoustic sensor arrays, underwater arrays of sensi-
tive magnetometers, and/or airborne radar technologies for the targeting role.  A high degree of 
integration between different sensor systems and between sensor systems and weapon systems is 
desirable.  If NPC can kill enough U. S. surface combatants before those combatants come into 
Tomahawk missile range of critical targets, the traditional rollback approach of the carrier battle 
group can be negated.  Failure of the rollback approach (i.e., using cruise missiles to defeat the 
air defense and C2I systems, followed by long-range aircraft to achieve air superiority, followed 
by strike aircraft and amphibious forces to project power ashore) will inevitably lead to new 
strategies.  Some of the proposed alternatives are based on increased utilization of Air Force as-
sets and Army airborne assault forces.  Should the alternatives come to be accepted, it might re-
sult in the eventual disappearance (for lack of a mission) of any substantial U. S. overseas naval 
presence. 
 
The United States needs to develop new defensive systems against cruise 
missiles.  Such systems must provide vastly more kills per ship than the best exist-
ing systems.  High capacity launchers of small missiles (such as the 21-missile RAM 
launcher) are one option although longer range, more capable missiles are desirable 
to defeat more capable future threats.  Directed energy weapons (DEW) have the po-
tential for even more kills per weapon than multiple missile launchers.  Only limited 
development is needed to field improved microwave and infrared active jammers 
against infrared missiles.  The United States should expedite the advanced devel-
opment and weaponization of free-electron lasers as anti-missile systems.  Renewed 
effort should be expended to determine if alternative directed energy devices have 
the potential to be used as shipboard weapons.  Current fire control systems are not 
capable of supporting these new weapons.  Improved sensors for longer-range, 
higher resolution detection, tracking, and handover (to missile seekers or DEW aim-
ing sensors).  Even current fire control systems should be investigated to determine 
their susceptibility to missile jamming or expendable decoys.  If these susceptibili-
ties are severe, then development of counter-countermeasures is warranted.  
 
Unless fantastic improvements are made in both quantities and kill probabili-
ties of anti-missile systems, naval vessels subjected to massive cruise missile attacks 
will be hit by one or more missiles.  Naval ships should be designed to survive such 
missile hits.  This may involve incorporation of additional armor, ballistic protection 
of interior compartments, relocation of critical systems (such as the bridge) to more 
survivable interior spaces, and widespread use of automatic flash & fire suppression 
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systems.  Given the increased likelihood of damage, the U. S. should pay increased 






ATTACK BY BALLISTIC MISSILES OR SUPERGUNS 
 
Theater ballistic missiles include any self-propelled weapon following a ballistic trajec-
tory that does not both carry a nuclear warhead and travel intercontinental distances.  The U. 
S. is actively pursuing defenses against theater ballistic missiles.  The first generation (Patriot 
PAC-3 and Standard Missile Block IVA) of theater missile defense (TMD) systems will provide 
limited area defense (including point defense) against short-range (<500 km range) missiles.  
See Appendix C for a technical discussion on missile nomenclature, Appendix D for a technical 
discussion of ballistic missile defense, and Appendix G for a technical discussion of missile 
guidance techniques.  Intercepts will be made within the atmosphere, as the interceptors will 
utilize aerodynamic controls.  The next generation (THAAD and Navy Theater Wide) of TMD 
systems [43] will be located forward and designed to protect rear areas from attack by me-
dium-range (500-1000 km range) and intermediate-range missiles (1000-3500 km range).  The 
“kinetic kill vehicles” of the next generation systems will make exoatmospheric (altitudes 
nominally above 100 km) intercepts using divert motors for aiming control.  These new TMD 
systems will have the capability to defend themselves against short-range and medium-range 
missiles, but possibly not against intermediate-range and long-range (3500-5500 km) missiles. 
 
The longer the range of a ballistic missile, the faster it travels.  Faster incoming mis-
siles must be detected at longer ranges in order for an intercept to be achieved at a desired 
“keep-out” distance.  All other factors being equal, longer detection ranges means larger ra-
dars (75% larger linear antenna dimension to detect a 1500-km range missile vs. a 500-km 
range missile).  See Appendix E for a technical discussion of radar systems performance.  
Against intermediate-range and longer range missiles, the radar needed to detect reentry vehi-
cles, to discriminate them from decoys and debris, and to track the reentry vehicles at ranges 
sufficiently long to permit a self-defense intercept may well violate the ABM Treaty.  See Ap-
pendix L for a thorough discussion of the provisions of relevant arms control treaties.  If the U.S. 
deploys a TMD system, then a threat desiring to have a ballistic missile capability can make 
three responses:  build more missiles than the U. S. can build interceptors, build very fast, 
long range missiles that the TMD system cannot intercept, or deploy penetration aids similar 
to those used with ICBMs.  The best strategy may be a mixture of all three.  Older less capable 
missiles fitted with penetration aids can be used in an initial salvo to attrit the defensive mis-
siles prior to an attack by the more capable missiles (also carrying penetration aids to insure 
their survival to strike the targets).  
 
The ABM Treaty also limits the performance of missile defense components such as 
radars and interceptors that are not specifically ABM components.  Under the ABM treaty, 
only two radar units per country can have power-aperture products greater than 3,000,000 W-
m2.  All other radars must have smaller products.  The power-aperture product is the product 
of the mean power emitted by the radar in Watts and the area of the radar antenna in square 
meters.  3,000,000 W-m2 corresponds to a 10 meter diameter radar radiating an average power 
of slightly less than 40 kilowatts.  A typical large shipboard air search radar has a roughly 4 to 
6 meter diameter antenna with an average radiated power of roughly 2 kilowatts.  Such radars 
lack the power-aperture product to track longer-range missiles at ranges of interest.  It will be 
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difficult to integrate larger missile defense radars into the limited size of a ship’s superstruc-
ture.  
  
The current generation of TMD missiles will have limited speed and agility and will 
have difficulty performing an endoatmospheric intercept against incoming reentry vehicles 
that are much faster than those of short-range missiles.  The next generation will lack an en-
doatmospheric intercept capability (due to lack of seekers capable of operating within the at-
mosphere at higher interceptor speeds and the desire to intercept the warheads earlier in their 
flight).  Given limited radar detection/tracking ranges, the interceptors will need even higher 
speed to achieve exoatmospheric intercepts in a self-defense mode.  Thus, it is doubtful that 
the next generation of TMD missiles can be made to be capable of self-defense against inter-
mediate range ballistic missiles unless a separate sensor (probably airborne or space-based), 
that can generate the necessary tracking data earlier than the radar, can be added to the sys-
tem.  The U. S. will have space-based sensors associated with its National Missile Defense ca-
pability.  It is possible, but not assured, that the space-based assets could provide the needed 
tracking.  They might also be capable of providing additional discrimination.  It is doubtful 
that these sensors will be capable of discriminating against all practical decoy systems. 
 
Against long-range missiles (3500-5500 km range) or “intercontinental” ballistic mis-
siles (range > 5500 km) any component of any viable defense system (self- or rear-area) will of 
necessity violate the ABM Treaty (unless it is never tested against its intended targets – an un-
likely occurrence for a deployed system).  See Appendix L.  It will likely be several years at 
least before enough Senate support is mustered for abrogation of the ABM Treaty to be seri-
ously considered or for approval to be granted to give the TMD technology to Russia in ex-
change for a negotiated amendment to the treaty.  It would be difficult to upgrade any of the 
radars in the fleet to provide the extended range and decoy discrimination capability needed 
for self-defense against intermediate-range or longer ballistic missiles or against even me-
dium-range missiles carrying penetration aids.  It would be cheaper (if not essential) to de-
velop a new class of ships and the first of such a class would not likely be deployed before 
2030.   
 
Another problem in defending against ballistic missiles is the small number of shots 
available to the defender.  Even if a dedicated missile defense ship were deployed with each 
battle group, it will have a limited number of interceptor missiles.  Given reasonable missile 
reliabilities and hit probabilities, the number of missiles that can be destroyed is much less 
(realistically not greater than 80% and possibly less than 50%) of the number of interceptors 
available.  Magazine saturation attacks similar to those described in the section on cruise mis-
siles are a viable option.  An adversary can afford to spend $100 million on ballistic missiles if 
it means almost certain sinking of a $1 billion dollar warship (and destruction of a significant 
fraction of our power projection capability).  It is also likely that an interceptor missile will 
cost more than the ballistic missile it is designed to counter.  Cost to the adversary may be re-
duced if he uses older less capable and less costly missiles early in such magazine saturation 
attacks.   Every missile is a threat if it is not defended against.  An interceptor for each ballistic 
missile arms race is not one the defender usually wins.  The cost disadvantage is one of the 
reasons (but by no means the only one) that the United States negotiated the ABM treaty in the 
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first place.  Even with economic disparities, the U.S.S.R. could afford to build ICBMs faster 
than the U.S. could afford to build ABM missiles 
. 
The self-defense threat to U. S. forces at sea is potentially very real and significant.  
Even if the possibility of warheads carrying nuclear explosives or chemical, biological, or ra-
diological agents can be discounted, the threat from conventional warheads is substantial.  
The Pershing II missiles deployed by the United States in the 1980’s could carry conventional 
warheads as large as 500 kg (although only nuclear warheads were ever deployed – Pershing 
II was a strategic disarmament chess piece from the beginning) [44].  Although not originally 
intended to do so, a Pershing II had the guidance accuracy to hit a ship at 1500 km range (if a 
ship’s signature had been programmed into the radar terminal guidance instead of the tradi-
tional airfield or command bunker targets).  Given a nominal 15-minute flight time, the lim-
ited terminal maneuver envelope might have prevented the Pershing II reentry vehicle from 
attacking high-speed ships that performed an evasive maneuver shortly after launch (and 
thereby moving 10-15 km away from a predicted aimpoint).  However, that limitation could 
have been eased by relatively straightforward design changes, had an antiship role been envi-
sioned, or it could have been countered (at the expense of wasted missiles) by firing several 
missiles in a salvo at slightly different predicted aimpoints to compensate for the maneuvers.   
 
The number of limited-footprint missiles wasted in attacking a battle group would ac-
tually be relatively small since any maneuver of a ship near the center of the group would 
likely bring it under the footprint of a missile intended for another nearby ship of the group.  
Twenty Pershing IIs would probably be enough to destroy the six to ten surface ships in a typi-
cal U. S. carrier battle group.  There are no technological hurdles preventing other countries 
from developing terminally guided antiship ballistic missile capabilities superior to the Per-
shing II’s.  Such missiles would be relatively immune to attack by existing and planned Thea-
ter Air Defense systems.  In fact, land-based TMD systems would make excellent targets for a 
Pershing II-like missile.  Once the TMD systems have been eliminated, then any ballistic mis-
sile could be employed to maximum effect.  The ability of an adversary to target and sink naval 
vessels thousands of kilometers out at sea from deep inland launch sites that are virtually un-
targetable would force current U. S. naval strategy to be drastically revised.  It should be noted 
that numerous sources indicate that both India and China are developing terminal guidance 
systems similar to Pershing II’s for their intermediate-range ballistic missiles [45-48]. 
 
Ballistic missiles might also play a significant role in the air war.  A ballistic missile 
can carry conceivably carry several dozen lock-on-after-launch air-to-air missiles as submuni-
tions and dispense them just as the reentry vehicle enters the stratosphere.  Each submunition 
is individually capable of targeting and downing a different aircraft.  Descending from above 
(conceivably without useful warning) on a large flight of aircraft (such as a bombing raid) or 
over an aircraft carrier conducting launch or recovery operations associated with a large 
strike, the submunitions from a single ballistic missile could annihilate much of an entire air 
wing.  It is important to note that the top-down view is typically the direction considered of 




Missiles are one means of delivering ballistic projectiles at long ranges.  Guns, or more 
properly “superguns” [40]-[42] are another.  These large-caliber guns are capable of firing 
multi-tonne projectiles over distances of hundreds of kilometers, if not farther.  In the 1960’s 
the High Altitude Research Programme (HARP) used a modified 16-inch gun to fire Martlet 
missiles to altitudes as high as 180 km [41].  Before the Gulf War Iraq was constructing a su-
pergun for use against hostile nations in Southwest Asia (most likely Iran and Israel). [42] 
This supergun was intended to have a 1000 mm diameter and be 172 meters long.  A 350 mm 
diameter, 45 meter long prototype had been built earlier.  China has reportedly developed a 
406 mm diameter gun mounted on a modified M-11 ballistic missile carrier.  Firing termi-
nally-guided rockets with over 360 km range, this gun is capable of delivering high explosive, 
incendiary, ground-penetrating, cluster munition, or anti-armor submunition warheads any-
where in Taiwan from the Chinese mainland.  Effective warhead radius (cluster?) is suppos-
edly 450 meters.  Guidance is said to include GPS, television, infrared, and laser sensors. 
[256], [257]  In addition, the United States is studying superguns as possible low-cost satellite 
launch systems [40].   
 
Superguns with ranges in excess of 100 km will be large (tens of meters to perhaps as 
long as a kilometer).  Smaller devices may be transportable on large vehicles similar to those 
used for transporting and launching mobile ICBMs.  Such guns will be aimable to cover any 
target within their range.  Larger guns will be fixed installations.  However, this does not 
mean that the guns are not “aimable”.  Divert thrusters on the projectile, fired shortly after 
clearing the gun tube, should be capable of altering the final trajectory by a few degrees or 
more.  Asymmetric injection of propellant at the gun muzzle will induce a tipoff which should 
accomplish similar angular deflection of the trajectory.  At a nominal range of 1000 km, +/- 5 
degrees corresponds to a cross range deviation of +/- 85 km.  Longer ranges will yield larger 
possible deflections.  This is enough to cover the important regions of many small countries 
such as Israel or Taiwan, or to completely cover a classical choke point such as the Straits of 
Hormuz, the Suez or Panama Canals, or the English Channel.  Furthermore, a single propel-
lant facility should be able to service a number of gun tubes.  A half-dozen gun tubes (each 
being aimed 10 degrees different than the trajectory of its neighbors), yet sharing a single pro-
pulsion system, would provide enormous coverage at a small increase in price over a gun with 
a single barrel.  The gun tubes are cheap compared to the costs of putting the propulsion and 
support structures in place.  The projectiles fired from superguns can be terminally guided to 
permit any target in the gun’s footprint to be attacked and destroyed.   
 
Superguns will have limitations on their rate of fire.  Large projectiles cannot be 
loaded into such a gun as quickly as bullets can be loaded into a machine gun.  The intense 
heat deposited in the gun barrel will need to be removed to prevent the barrel from warping.  
However, taking these factors into account, a rate of fire of one round per minute is not un-
reasonable.  This is one or two orders of magnitude faster than a ballistic missile transporter-
erector-launcher (TEL) is capable of being reloaded and refired.  Superguns will have a finite 
barrel life.  The higher the projectile velocity that is developed, the shorter the barrel life.  If a 
supergun is used for orbital insertion, the barrel life may be as short as one shot.  For a 1000 
km range, barrel life may be as short as a few dozen shots.  All current artillery guns must re-
place the barrel after a specified number of shots (of the order of several hundred to several 
thousand rounds).  A sensible design would provide for rapid replacement of the lining of the 
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barrel without replacing the entire barrel.  Note that even a ballistic missile launcher must be 
completely refurbished after a limited number of firings, so short barrel life is not an over-
whelming disadvantage. 
 
Given the ability of superguns to fire enormous projectiles at ranges comparable to bal-
listic missiles, it should be obvious that everything said in the preceding paragraphs about bal-
listic missiles holds for supergun weapons as well.  Indeed, the gun projectiles might be di-
rectly adapted from the reentry vehicles used on existing ballistic missiles. 
 
NPC should develop and deploy intermediate-to-long-range ballistic missiles (3000-4000 
km range) capable of delivering 1000 kg conventional warheads against moving ships anywhere 
within a 50 km diameter error basket by employing terminal seekers with better than 10 m guid-
ance accuracy.  The launchers and support equipment should be mobile, to reduce the possibility 
of counterstrikes.  A low-latency time (< 5 minutes), accurate (< 5 km position error) ocean sur-
veillance and tracking system should be developed to provide the detailed targeting information 
needed to coordinate an attack.  The post-boost vehicles should be capable of dispensing penetra-
tion aids to reduce any possibility of shipboard radar discrimination, tracking, and intercept of 
the actual reentry vehicles.  Such missile would not only facilitate access denial, but also attack 
of critical ground targets, including those defended by any missile defense system short of an 
ABM-treaty violating design. 
 
NPC should consider using any of its older medium-range ballistic missiles as “armed 
decoys” to facilitate attacks by more capable missiles.  These missiles should be retrofitted with 
penetration aids.  If fired first, the older missiles must be countered by the U. S. TMD system as 
they are still lethal threats.  If enough of the cheaper shorter-range missiles are available they 
may completely deplete the magazines of the U. S. TMD system, allowing a handful of truly ca-
pable (and more expensive) weapons to be assured of hitting the targets of interest. 
 
NPC should also investigate developing air-target submunition payloads for ballistic mis-
siles.  These submunitions can make use of their reentry velocity for maneuver.  This negates a 
need for propulsion.  Because of the high velocities at reentry, infrared seekers may be precluded 
due to excessive window heating.  The air-target submunition will therefore probably employ 
active radar terminal guidance.  This should be effective even against current stealth aircraft de-
signs as the submunitions will target and attack from near the zenith.  The zenith is one angle at 
which stealth designers do not yet expect to find threat radars, thus cross section is not mini-
mized from this direction.  The submunitions would probably carry proximity-fuzed fragmenta-
tion warheads to avoid the need for hit-to-kill.  This would also increase kill probability against 
highly maneuverable aircraft such as unmanned air superiority vehicles.  A viable anti-air ballis-
tic missile capability would allow NPC to attack U. S. carrier aviation assets at the most inoppor-
tune times (for the aviators), such as launch or recovery of a major strike, at almost any range, 
with very limited warning, and almost negligible risk to NPC assets. 
 
NPC may also wish to investigate the development of superguns.  Although superguns 
typically require fixed sites and have limited angular coverage, they have the distinct advantage 
of relative high rates of fire (much higher than reloadable ballistic missile launchers).  It should 
pose little problem to design a supergun capable of firing several 1000-kg terminally-guided pro-
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jectiles every minute for many minutes.  Built into a tunnel, a single supergun might be capable 
of blanketing with fire and effectively closing down one or more strategic choke points (such as 
the Straits of Gibraltar, Hormuz, Malacca, or Tsushima) and be relative secure from counterat-
tack. 
 
The United States needs to recognize the probable total scope of the future 
ballistic missile threat.  Defending against inaccurate battlefield missiles, such as 
Scuds, is useful.  However, by 2020, the real killers will likely be missiles with capa-
bilities more like a Pershing II, rather than like a V-2.  We need to recognize that mo-
bile targets (including ships at sea) will be able to be attacked by intelligent, guided 
ballistic missiles with conventional warheads.  Any ballistic missile defense system 
should have a realistic self-defense capability against the longest-range (>3000 km) 
terminally guided ballistic missiles.  Otherwise, the missile defense systems are 
likely to be among the first targets.  Self-defense will probably require interceptors 
with higher velocities and kill vehicles with excellent decoy discrimination as well as 
enhanced divert capabilities.  The United States should consider abrogation or rene-
gotiation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to permit deployment of ABM-quality 
missile defenses at overseas locations and on selected naval vessels.  To facilitate 
the latter, research into improved long-range radars or other detection and tracking 
sensors such as integrated passive infrared and laser radar systems should be en-
couraged.  Laser radars have real possibilities in discriminating against even preci-
sion replicas.  Incorporation of these capabilities into space-based sensors should be 
actively pursued.  The development of active seekers using ladar techniques might 






ATTACK BY TRANSATMOSPHERIC AIRCRAFT 
 
 The United States is actively pursuing the development of transatmospheric aircraft 
(TAA) or spaceplanes [49], [50].  There are more than a half dozen companies attempting to 
build such vehicles.  Some of these are designed to be single-stage-to-orbit spacecraft.  Others 
will be suborbital spacecraft used as reusable launch vehicles.  At least one other country 
(Germany) has a TAA development program [50].  Many companies and countries have 
started and abandoned similar programs during the last two decades.  Until recently, the tech-
nology could not adequately sustain full-scale development efforts and the costs of research 
and development proved excessive.  However, more than a decade of computational aerody-
namics research and improvements in high temperature materials has offered hope of success 
and a new wave of efforts has begun. The United States is not guaranteed to be the first to de-
velop this technology.  The phenomenal growth (relative to the United States – see Chapter 10) 
of science and technology in Europe in the past two decades coupled with renewed interest in 
space promoted by the recent occupation of the International Space Station will likely cause 
several European programs to be resurrected.  As soon as there is demonstrable success in one 
of the current programs, many others programs are sure to be initiated.  The author expects 
that at a minimum, the United States, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Japan, Russia, and 
China would have demonstrated TAA systems within ten years of the first successes.  By that 
time, many others including Sweden, Italy, Brazil, and Israel will have initiated development 
programs, if they have not already had successes. 
 
A spaceplane is basically a spacecraft that can take off under its own power (possibly 
with solid rocket boosting or electromagnetic launch assistance), achieve orbit or at a mini-
mum exit the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds (> 2 km/s), reenter the atmosphere, and land 
without jettisoning essential systems.  Some systems would have the ability to reenter and exit 
the atmosphere several times without landing (possibly by refueling in space).  Such space-
planes have a number of properties of interest to the military.  If they are orbital platforms, 
they can conduct strikes at any distance from their base.  They fly at hypersonic speeds in the 
atmosphere.  They should be able to carry significant payloads (tens of thousands of kilo-
grams).  Basically, they could be configured as extremely capable strategic bombers (carrying 
conventional weapons – nuclear payloads are prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty [51], al-
though this might not stop some adversaries even if they were signatories).  As a strategic 
bomber it might strike the most critical targets (ICBM silos, antisatellite weapon complexes, 
ballistic missile defense sites, and national command and control bunkers) within minutes of 
the initiation of hostilities.  It could also strike key ports and airfields used for logistics pur-
poses or battle groups at sea.  Spaceplanes could also be used to provide rapid reconstitution 
of satellite constellations decimated by anti-satellite weapons.  They could be used to conduct 
strategic reconnaissance missions swooping down at hypersonic speeds from space to ex-
tremely low altitudes to conduct ultrahigh resolution imaging and then returning to space for 
safe egress from hostile territory.  Spaceplanes might also be used to attack an adversary’s 
spaceplanes.  The attack would likely occur in space, but the ability to change orbits rapidly 
(by using aerodynamic forces in the upper atmosphere to rapidly change direction without los-
ing excessive kinetic energy) inherent in reenter-reorbit-capable platforms would facilitate in-
tercepts. 
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At high hypersonic speeds TAAs would be virtually impossible to shoot down except by 
the U. S. National Missile Defense system or its equivalent.  Given the U. S. lack of an ade-
quate defense anywhere but CONUS and Alaska, an adversary with transatmospheric aircraft 
could strike any of our power projection forces anywhere in the world outside of the NMD 
protective shield.  If the U. S. fails to deploy a comprehensive NMD system, even CONUS tar-
gets would be vulnerable.  
 
 If NPC has an indigenous aircraft or space launch industry, it should attempt to develop 
its own transatmospheric aircraft technology.  If not, and if its economy is sufficiently robust 
with a strong industrial component, it may wish to start a space launch industry.  The long-term 
future of warfare holds a major component revolving around space.  With a viable international 
space launch industry as justification, NPC may be able to purchase one or more TAA’s from 
other nations.  NPC should examine its grand military strategy and determine which applications 
of TAAs can contribute most to that strategy.  Among the applications that NPC may wish to de-
velop include strategic bombing, strategic reconnaissance, and satellite replacement.  An applica-
tion of almost certain critical interest to NPC is defense against U. S. TAAs.  Without such a ca-
pability, NPC possesses critical vulnerabilities the U. S. is certain to exploit.   
 
The U. S. should continue to pursue research and development programs that 
ensure that the U. S. maintains a significant lead in transatmospheric aircraft tech-
nology.  Some of this research should be aimed at determining and exploiting mili-
tary applications of TAAs.  Once reliable characteristics (including possible flight 
profiles) of such vehicles have been ascertained, U. S. ballistic missile defense pro-
grams should be tasked to determine and develop whatever modifications to their 






ATTACK BY MINES  
 
Mines are the premier access denial weapons [52].  U. S. ships are extremely vulner-
able to even the simplest mines.  In past dozen years mines have been responsible for 75% of 
the damage to U. S. warships [53].  In April 1988 the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 98) 
struck an Iranian-planted, Russian-manufactured Type M-08 moored contact mine in the 
Persian Gulf [54].  The Roberts required $98 million of repairs [55].  During the Gulf War, 
on 18 February 1991, two ships struck mines within hours of each other [56].  The USS Trip-
oli (LPH 10) struck an Iraqi-planted Type M-08 moored contact mine [54], [57], [58] and was 
slightly damaged (it was able to remain operational and on station for 3 days until relieved).  
Tripoli required $3.5 million of repairs [55].  The AEGIS cruiser USS Princeton (CG 59) was 
damaged by two Iraqi-planted Manta bottom influence mines of Italian manufacture [58].  
Although Princeton was able to restore its cruise missile strike and AEGIS air defense func-
tions within 15 minutes of the accident [54], it ultimately required $24 million in repairs [55]. 
 
A threatened amphibious assault on Kuwait was a diversion that contributed signifi-
cantly to the success of the land war phase of the Gulf War.  Had an actual amphibious land-
ing been necessary to revive a stalled offensive farther inland, it might have become a disaster.  
As determined from intelligence captured after the war, the Iraqi minefields were far larger 
and denser than anticipated [57].  Mine clearing teams had only cleared a fraction of the 
known fields when the war ended.  Had the assault force sailed toward the beaches, they 
would have encountered unanticipated minefields and suffered serious casualties.   
 
The U. S. currently has very limited primary mine countermeasures assets.  Currently, 
there is one USS Inchon (MCS 12) class mine countermeasures support ship capable of carry-
ing 8 MH-53E Sea Dragon airborne mine countermeasures helicopters, 14 USS Avenger 
(MCM 1) class mine countermeasures ships, and 12 USS Osprey (MHC 51) class coastal 
minehunting ships [59].  The MCM ships carry both minehunting (SLQ-48) and minesweep-
ing systems (SLQ-37 and SLQ-38);  the MHC ships currently carry minehunting systems 
(SLQ-48) although there are plans to replace this capability with a Modular Influence Mine-
sweeping System when this latter system finishes development.  With the exception of two 
MCM ships that are permanently forward deployed in Japan, all of the other ships are home-
ported at Ingleside TX.  In addition there are two mine countermeasure helicopter squadrons 
located in Norfolk VA and Corpus Christi TX each possessing 12 MH-53E helicopters.  The 
helicopters can carry a variety of minehunting (mine detection and location for avoidance or 
subsequent disposal by explosive ordnance disposal teams or minesweeping) and minesweep-
ing (mine neutralization or destruction by intentionally and safely triggering the mine’s explo-
sive mechanism without any necessity for initial detection) systems. 
 
Minehunting and minesweeping are time consuming processes.  Both the airborne and 
shipborne systems require the countermeasure platform to move at speeds much less than 10 
knots.  The U. S. does not possess or have access to sufficient minehunting and minesweeping 
assets to clear a safe path of any appreciable length for even a single carrier battle group.  If a 
battle group faced a significant mine threat over the entire transit distance, it would be unable 
to arrive at its destination in the timely fashion currently demanded.  If all available carrier 
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battle groups (CVBG) and amphibious ready groups (ARG) were sortied for a major conflict, 
there is only enough coverage to provide one MCM per CVBG and one MHC per ARG plus 3-
4 MH-53E helicopters apiece.  Mine warfare has never been very high on the Navy’s priority 
when compared to submarines, aircraft carriers, aircraft, surface combatants, etc.  It is 
unlikely that this will change much in the future.  
 
Mines are sufficiently dangerous that their threat cannot be ignored, even when most 
evidence says that threat is phony.  The possibility that one out of a hundred is real is suffi-
cient to treat them all seriously.  Thus, even a few fake floating mines spread in the path of an 
oncoming carrier battle group will cause it to slow down and convert to a mine avoidance 
mode of advance.  The use of fake mines also poses virtually no risk to those who deploy them.  
Since their use is no more than a harassing tactic, it poses little likelihood of escalation.  Use 
of fake mines might even be considered a viable tactic during peacetime to discourage U. S 
presence. 
 
A number of improvements can and probably will be made to mine technology.  Smart 
mines can wait for precise combined acoustic, magnetic, and pressure signatures giving them 
the ability to attack only the highest value targets.  Mines can be strewn throughout the 
world’s oceans, remaining inert (and probably undetected) until remotely activated in times of 
conflict.  U. S. harbors might have already been sown with remotely activated mines by foreign 
commercial ships, and we would not know it until a conflict broke out or an accident of some 
sort (such as being caught in the nets of a fishing trawler) betrayed their existence.  Self-
propelled mines (essentially remotely-fired torpedoes) do not have to be collocated with their 
sensors.  Such mines might be hidden in shoal waters where minesweeping or hunting would 
not be thought necessary, with tiny sensor packages located miles away at the bottom of navi-
gable passages.  An acoustic modem could be used to trigger the mine to activate and home on 
the target, when an appropriate target was detected.  The small, bottom-lying sensor packages 
would be difficult to detect and locate by any current mine warfare technology with the possi-
ble exception of marine mammals. 
 
By combining underwater missile launch technology with smart mine technology, it is 
possible to create sea mines with effective chemical and biological weapon capabilities.  On 
detection of the appropriate class of ship, the chem/bio mines would release a launch capsule 
capable of projecting a chem/bio bursting munition several hundreds meters into the air di-
rectly over the target ship.  The chem/bio agent would disperse and be drawn into the target 
ship’s interior before any chemical/biological defense condition could be established.  If the 
collective protection system was already activated and the ship buttoned up, at a minimum, the 
agent cloud would thoroughly contaminate the exterior before the washdown system could be 
activated.  At worst, many members of the crew would be adversely affected by the consequent 
cleanup/decontamination required.  See Appendix A for illustrations of these devices. 
 
Presently the operational Navy appears to be moving towards more reliance on mine-
sweeping than minehunting, although minehunting R&D remains strong.  This adds to our 
vulnerability to mines, because there are a variety of techniques that can defeat minesweeping.  
For example, counters can be used to wait until a preset number of trigger signals (each sig-
nal supposedly coming from a separate valid target) is reached.  Thus the mine will not deto-
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nate when the first N-1 targets pass by, but wait for the Nth target.  A minesweeper must prop-
erly simulate a real target N separate times (with a time delay between each simulation) before 
the mine will be swept.  Of course N will never be known in advance and each sweep adds to 
the time required for clearance.  Fortunately, unless employed against commercial shipping, 
the number of high value targets (major warships) that will pass by the mine will be small and 
the enemy must choose N accordingly.  Another counter-countermeasure is to increase the 
number of signatures (or influences) that must be matched for a valid target to be declared.  
These influences may include very sophisticated acoustic signature matching, pressure profile 
matching, and magnetic signature matching, as well as more exotic signatures such as opacity 
to cosmic ray muon flux (wood and fiberglass hulled mine countermeasures ships will not at-
tenuate the muon flux as much as an metal-hulled aircraft carrier) or requirement for simul-
taneous presence of multiple matched acoustic signatures (carriers always have destroyers 
nearby;  minesweepers do not).  Remote activation can also negate minesweeping.  If surveil-
lance can provide precise information as to when high value targets will pass by a mine or 
minefield, the mines can be activated only at the proper time.  They can be dormant while any 
minesweeping is taking place (which may also be determinable from the surveillance assets). 
 
NPC should invest in offensive mine warfare technology.  Although it should not neglect 
shallow-water mines and surf-zone mines, it should place special emphasis on mines that are 
functional in waters deeper than 30 meters (the goal of an access denial system is to prevent the 
enemy from getting close to the beaches).  It should especially emphasize the ability to use 
commercial vessels and submerged submarines to covertly accomplish its minelaying.  It should 
pursue the development of smarter, more lethal mines and mines that can be remotely actuated.  
Any mines developed for deployment outside of NPC’s territorial waters should possess either 
remote or automatic disarming or self-destruction capability.  The goal of mining is to harass a 
specific enemy; it is not to draw the wrath of every nation relying on commercial shipping for its 
economic health.  It might be cost effective to provide these mines with a remotely actuated bea-
con to facility their recovery (and reuse) after employment in an operation.   
 
NPC should invest in minehunting and mine sweeping technologies as the U. S possesses 
a number of aircraft-deliverable and submarine-deliverable mines and has been known to mine 
the harbors of its adversaries.  If consistent with its chemical/biological warfare policy, NPC 
should develop sea mines with chemical, biological, or radiological warheads.  NPC should also 
consider the acquisition of a number of fake mines of indeterminate origin.  Fake mining of cer-
tain shipping lanes might provide NPC with a significant economic advantage over some of its 
competitors (NPC ships’ captains would know the mines were fakes and could deliver the goods 
on time, whereas competitors would not and could not).  If enough fakes are discovered, then 
concerns about mines will diminish, making real mining substantially more effective when it is 
actually performed.  
 
The U. S. Navy should significantly improve both its minehunting and its 
minesweeping capabilities.  Both kinds of capabilities need to be available for static 
(clearing harbors, channels, and chokepoints) as well as in-stride operations (transit).  
Mine detection sonars (or other mine location sensors) should be considered for de-
ployment on combatant and combat auxiliary ships of all classes.  In-stride mine-
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sweeping capabilities should be considered for deployment on all destroyers and 
cruisers.  Aircraft carriers and amphibious ships should have airborne minehunting 
and minesweeping platforms in their aviation complements.   The Navy should con-
sider the development and acquisition of new classes of dedicated mine counter-
measures ships, in order to free our limited numbers of combatant ships for per-
forming their primary duties. 
 
The U. S. may wish to consider supplying minehunting and minesweeping 
equipment to the U. S. Coast Guard.  This would facilitate the protection of critical 
ports, naval bases, and coastal waterways.  Mining U. S. waters used for logistics 
will likely prove to be as effective in helping to establish an access denial capability 
as mining the littoral waters to which access is to be denied. 
 
Consideration should also be given to innovations in ship design.  Incorporat-
ing armor, structural strengthening, and advanced damage control technologies into 
the next generation of ship designs may make them less vulnerable to destruction 
by naval mines.  Despite damage, the new ship designs may be able to continue to 
function and even fight for extended periods of time.  Any damage limitation that 





ATTACK BY ADVANCED TORPEDOES  
 
Most naval vessels lack not only the ability to detect an attack by torpedoes (especially 
those of the wake-homing variety) but also lack any effective defense even if an attack is de-
tected.  Most current defenses use decoys to draw the torpedoes away from the true target.  
Current surface ship decoys are usually towed and can only be employed if the target ship is 
underway and in relatively deep water (nominally several times the ship’s draft).  As decoys 
improve, the seekers on torpedoes will also improve.  It should be relatively easy to design a 
multi-signature seeker that could easily distinguish between a decoy and a real target, espe-
cially during the endgame.  Decoys have another disadvantage.  If they are not sufficiently 
real to cause the torpedo to detonate on closest approach, the torpedo may realize that it has 
lost track and attempt to reacquire the original target or an alternate target.  A protected ship 
may inadvertently cause the destruction of an unprotected ship. 
 
A second type of defense is to shoot the “archer” before he has a chance to fire his tor-
pedoes.  This is a primary reason that nuclear attack submarines are attached to carrier battle 
groups, yet the development of very long-range torpedoes (>100 km) makes it less likely that 
we can detect the launching platforms in time.  Wake-homing guidance permits the firing of 
torpedoes at ranges beyond which targeting data adequate for conventional guidance can be 
acquired.  Mere knowledge of the presence of naval forces in an area is adequate.  Torpedoes 
can be fired in the general direction of the targets; the torpedoes then autonomously acquire 
the wakes and follow them to the present target locations. 
 
The United States is developing a defensive capability against torpedoes [60], however, 
it will probably be of limited effectiveness and require the ship to perform maneuvers that dis-
rupt normal operations.  If the U. S. should develop an effective anti-torpedo torpedo (analo-
gous to an anti-missile missile) and an all-aspect torpedo detection capability, then this vul-
nerability would be significantly reduced.  However, it is not clear that the U. S. could afford 
to place such complex protection systems on every class of ship.  The loss of the unprotected 
ships would require other ships to perform the mission functions of the lost ships as well as 
their own mission functions.  This would clearly reduce the overall effectiveness of any battle 
group. 
The performance of an anti-torpedo torpedo defense system will likely have a strong 
dependence on torpedo speed and on torpedo endgame kinematics.  A system that can reliabil-
ity intercept 60-knot torpedoes may be ineffective against 100-knot or 300-knot torpedoes.  In 
principle it is possible to propel a torpedo at extremely high speeds.  The practical limitation is 
range.  It takes considerably more fuel expenditure to travel one nautical mile at 100 knots 
than it does to travel one nautical mile at 50 knots.  For a given quantity of fuel, the range will 
vary nominally as the inverse square of the speed.  In fact the need for larger engines to burn 
the fuel at faster rates, causes the range (vs. speed) to drop even faster than inverse square 
law.  However, if the high speed is needed only during the last few thousand meters, the 10-
20% reduction in maximum range might be acceptable.  The increased kinetic energy that a 
high-speed torpedo possesses may give it additional lethality if ship designers add increased 
“armor” (such as double hulls) for passive torpedo defense. 
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A torpedo that performs moderately violent maneuvers during its terminal guidance 
phase would be much harder to intercept than one that travels in straight lines.  Inclusion of a 
maneuvering capability or a high-speed sprint capability requires only moderate increase in 
torpedo design complexity, but would significantly degrade the capabilities of any torpedo de-
fense.  
  
NPC should ensure that it has an adequate long-range (>100 km) torpedo capability in its 
force structure.  These torpedoes should have wake-homing, inertial, as well as acoustic terminal 
seeker guidance.  The seekers should be designed to be immune to current anti-torpedo decoys.  
The torpedo attack capability should also be provided to combatants other than submarines.  At a 
minimum, some patrol craft and long-range aircraft should have torpedo attack capabilities.  
Employment of torpedoes in conjunction with mines, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, aircraft, 
and surface vessels in an attack will enhance the overall effectiveness.  Having to fight one threat 
always detracts from one’s ability to fight a second (or third or fourth) threat.  NPC should strive 
to exploit every weakness of the United States if it is to be successful in its access denial mis-
sion. 
 
NPC should follow U. S. development efforts in torpedo defense.  As decoys are im-
proved, seeker designs should be improved accordingly.  If the U. S. develops anti-torpedo tor-
pedoes, then NPC should improve its torpedoes to reduce the effectiveness of the defenses.  NPC 
designers should consider incorporation of maneuvering and high-speed sprint capabilities.  
Conversely, NPC should consider development of torpedo defenses for its own naval assets.  
Submarines are a major component of U. S. anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.  
The ability to defend NPC submarines and surface ships against U. S. torpedoes would signifi-
cantly alter the balance of power.  
 
The U. S. needs to develop improved defenses against torpedoes.  New ac-
tive decoys should be designed to seduce torpedoes with probable more modern 
seeker designs. Consideration should be given to incorporating decoys into 
autonomous unmanned vehicles that could be used as escorts when underway, as 
screening “vessels” when loitering in littoral waters, and as propelled decoys when 
under actual attack. The latter mode might utilize a yet-to-be-developed wake-
generating decoy useful against wake-homing torpedoes.  Decoys will never provide 
complete protection.  Recognizing this, the U. S. should develop anti-torpedo 
weapon systems.  These might be anti-torpedo torpedoes fired along bearings de-
termined by torpedo detection sonars.  They might consist of torpedo-sensitive 
mines delivered by mortars fired along bearings determined by torpedo detection 
sonars or anticipated directions of attacks (if bearing data is unavailable).  They 
might consist of explosive projectiles fired from guns (which are pointed by sonar 
analogs of air defense radars).  Consideration should also be given to incorporating 
armor and other survivability design features into the next generation of ship de-





ATTACK BY ADVANCED NON-NUCLEAR SUBMARINES  
 
Virtually no maritime force in the world today possesses the ability to reliably detect, 
track, and engage submarines in littoral waters.  Non-nuclear, electric-drive submarines are 
virtually undetectable in this environment even when they are moving.  A substantial fleet of 
air-independent-propulsion submarines with the ability to stay submerged for weeks in littoral 
waters would provide a definitive capability to deny littoral waters to any naval force including 
a nuclear attack submarine fleet [61].   
 
A number of developing technologies may provide significant changes in submarine 
philosophy and design.  The continued advances in high-temperature superconductor tech-
nology may ultimately permit the incorporation of superquiet magnetohydrodynamic propul-
sion.  Increased automation of ship’s function coupled with increased reliability of that auto-
mation could result in large reductions in required manpower.  This in turn could result in 
much smaller submarines.  Smaller submarines will use less power to maintain desired speeds 
and can remain submerged longer for a given quantity of fuel, possibly rivaling nuclear sub-
marine submergence times.  The development of non-nuclear submarines with the speed, 
depth, and endurance of nuclear submarine capabilities as well as electric-propulsion quiet-
ness would give the nation that possessed them a global subsurface warfare capability that 
would be nearly unstoppable.  Not only surface ships but also our attack submarines and bal-
listic missile submarines would be at risk from the instant they cleared port.  This too would 
cause naval strategy to be revised in fashions that can only enhance an adversary’s access de-
nial capability.  
 
 The ultimate in reduced manpower is the unmanned submersible.  Unmanned under-
water vehicles can be made very small and exceedingly quiet, yet they can travel substantial 
distances at modest velocities and remain submerged for periods considerably longer than a 
diesel submarine.  Weapon for weapon they would be much cheaper than manned submarines 
and being unmanned could be considered expendable (although there is no reason they 
should not be recoverable).  If artificial intelligence comparable to that discussed in the next 
section on unmanned aircraft were available, then there is every reason to expect that a sub-
marine comparable to a modern manned submarine could be obtained in a platform with one-
quarter to one-third the displacement of the manned platform.  Cost would be comparably 
smaller.  The lack of crew might permit such a platform to dive to depths of thousands of me-
ters and open up new avenues for attack of both surface and subsurface targets.  Even lacking 
artificial intelligence, several much smaller unmanned platforms operated from a manned 
submarine via fiber-optic links or acoustic modems could increase the attack options, make 
adversary defensive measures more difficult to implement, and increase the host platform sur-
vivability. 
 
NPC should buy or steal the best submarine technology from around the world.  It should 
use this stolen and/or purchased high technology to augment and enhance its current non-nuclear 
submarine building programs.  The primary goal is to develop a fleet of ultraquiet, long-
endurance, coastal submarines (SSKs) that can keep U. S. attack submarines at least 500 nmi 
from NPC’s shores.  NPC should procure a substantial submarine fleet.  If possible, at least two 
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different designs should be procured to prevent any single vulnerability from rendering the entire 
fleet at risk.  NPC should have sufficient boats to observe regular training and maintenance 
regimens, to thoroughly patrol all NPC littoral waters, and to be able to sortie multi-boat wolf-
packs to every shallow water choke point on the approaches to NPC coastal waters.  
 
A long-term goal is to develop ultraquiet non-nuclear attack submarines capable of global 
reach.  Bearing in mind that such developments may not be ready until 2030 or beyond, NPC 
should not neglect nuclear attack submarines (SSNs).  A fleet of a half-dozen or more SSNs will 
serve to keep U. S. attack submarines tied up in blue water away from the fleets and away from 
areas where they can perform their traditional intelligence & warning roles.  If available in suffi-
cient numbers some of the SSNs should be used to provide escort defense for NPC’s ballistic 
missile submarine fleet.  However, NPC should attempt to develop non-nuclear replacements for 
the SSNs as soon as the developing technologies permit, unless breakthroughs in reactor quieting 
occur. 
 
 NPC should also consider developing unmanned submersible technology.  Such devices 
could provide stand-alone systems for conducting dangerous yet typically uninteresting missions 
such as picket duty.  They can also provide increased numbers of combatants at little additional 
cost by operating them as adjuncts to more conventional manned submarines. 
 
The U. S. needs to develop improved sensor technologies for detecting ex-
tremely quiet submarines in both littoral waters and the open oceans.  These might 
be based on novel sonar concepts, more sensitive magnetic detection arrays, laser 
backscatter sensing, or some other technology.  New weapons may need to be de-
veloped to exploit the new sensor systems.  Regardless of the types of sensors and 
weapons, both need to be deployed in adequate quantities in the theaters where the 
submarine threat is being faced.  
 
An old saying goes, “it takes a submarine to kill another submarine”.  Since 
our SSNs are vulnerable in littoral waters given the postulated advanced threat, the 
U. S. might consider developing a new class of small, non-nuclear attack submarines 
designed explicitly for littoral submarine warfare.  These submarines might be car-
ried to the theater of operations by a tender or mother ship (to prevent any need for 
extended cruising) and deployed only when entering regions of increased threat.  
These small attack subs might even be remotely piloted (and thus, unmanned).  The 
U. S. should also consider developing or purchasing a few advanced non-nuclear 
submarines comparable to the adversary’s, if only to have realistic targets against 
which to practice new detection and engagement techniques.  If enough of these 
were purchased, they might provide an interim capability against the adversary’s 
submarines until better solutions are found. 
 
For the same reasons that NPC should consider developing unmanned sub-
mersible technology, so should the United States.  The ability to use these devices 
as scouts for the SSNs would greatly enhance combat coverage in littoral environ-
ments and improve survivability as well. 
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ATTACK BY UNMANNED AIR SUPERIORITY VEHICLES  
 
Manned aircraft suffer a fundamental limitation of not being able to sustain accelera-
tions greater than 10 g due to the physiological limitations of human pilots [62].  It is possible 
to design an aircraft to sustain much higher g loads than 10 g.  Accelerations of 20 g, 30 g, or 
higher are possible, although as g-loading increases, more weight must be dedicated to struc-
ture at the expense of fuel or payload.  This penalty is partially mitigated in an unmanned air-
craft because no resources need to be dedicated to the crew’s cockpit, controls & displays, 
ejection system, and life support system.  An unmanned, supersonic aircraft capable of 30 g 
maneuvers and loaded with appropriately-advanced weapons, would not only be able to easily 
outmaneuver and shoot down any manned aircraft the U. S. has conceived, but also be capa-
ble of evading every air-to-air and surface-to-air missile on U. S. drawing boards. “Pilots” at 
remote consoles could provide mission control over wideband data links.   
 
A common rule of thumb used by missile designers is that an interceptor missile must 
have at least three times the acceleration (g) capability of the target it is trying to intercept.  
See Appendix F for a technical discussion on the 3x acceleration heuristic.  Anti-aircraft mis-
siles typically have 30-50 g capabilities to permit intercept of manned aircraft.  Such g capa-
bilities are also adequate to intercept most cruise missiles as these targets seldom have high g 
capability.  However, against an unmanned aircraft with 30 g capability, 30-50 g interceptor 
capability is not adequate.  Any intercepts achieved would be due to random chance or “re-
mote pilot” error.  A single squadron of unmanned air superiority aircraft could conceivably 
defeat 4-16 times as many manned fighter aircraft, depending on the number of weapons each 
unmanned aircraft could carry.  It is only a matter of time before manned aircraft become 
obsolete. 
 
By 2020 it may be possible to replace the remote “pilots” by artificially intelligent auto-
pilots.  In 2020, personal computers may rival the human brain in memory and processing 
power (this is an unequivocal prediction of Moore’s Law, if that law remains valid for the next 
20 years – it has been valid for the last 35 years) [63].  The major uncertainty is whether or not 
the software needed to exploit that processing capacity and provide acceptable artificial intelli-
gence will be available.  Absence of pilot equipment requirements may allow unmanned air-
craft to be somewhat smaller and cheaper than their manned counterparts.  Loss of an un-
manned aircraft will be much less significant than the crash of a manned aircraft.  Even if the 
“pilot” cannot be eliminated, remote control of unmanned aircraft could be delegated to en-
listed personnel rather than officers, resulting in reduced manpower costs.  Lastly, in the first 
major battles between manned and unmanned aircraft, the psychological impact on the 
morale of the aviation community caused by massive losses of trained pilots at the hands of 
unmanned killing machines could be as staggering as the losses themselves. 
 
The same artificial intelligence that permits the development of UASVs will also permit 
the development of unmanned combat platforms of all kinds.  Robotic tanks and unmanned 
submarines present distinct advantages.  Foremost is the potential reduction in friendly casu-
alties that will ensue by removing personnel from direct combat.  However, most of these other 
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unmanned platforms do not present direct performance advantages as overwhelming as elimi-
nation of the “10 g” acceleration limitation.   
 
NPC should take the lead in developing unmanned air superiority vehicles (UASV).  It 
would revolutionize the field of air combat.  Most other countries will be quick to follow NPC’s 
lead.  However, the first country to field viable UASV could name its own prices and would cap-
ture a large share of an entirely new military market.  Unfortunately, the author anticipates that 
the United States will not be able to catch up quickly because its aviation communities dominate 
both the Air Force and Navy and those communities are governed by the “silk scarf” phenome-
non (if you aren’t a fighter pilot, you aren’t a real pilot).  Few members of these communities 
will willingly relinquish their places in the cockpit to a computer or a communications link. 
 
NPC should emphasize development of the software necessary for an artificially intelli-
gent autopilot.  If desired, it can delay the development of the unmanned airframe until later in 
the game (or until another competitor announces its efforts in this arena).  There is no magic in 
designing an agile, supersonic, unmanned aircraft.  It hasn’t been done before because “airplanes 
must have pilots!”  The money saved by substantially reducing the ranks of officer aviators and 
building cheaper UASVs can be used to purchase more UASVs or to permit more training time 
for the enlisted operators.  It is expected that NPC will also follow the general worldwide trend 
in using unmanned vehicles for non-glamorous missions such as reconnaissance, surveillance, 
targeting, or even precision strike.  The spin-offs from the unmanned air superiority program will 
make performance of these other missions extremely cost-effective. 
 
The U. S. needs to begin to make plans for a future in which manned aircraft 
are obsolete.  Despite any potential opposition from the aviation (pilot) community, 
the U. S. needs to undertake development of unmanned air superiority vehicles.  
Such projects can build on the significant efforts currently underway addressing 
unmanned reconnaissance and combat air (strike) vehicles.  Emphasis should be 
placed on both high-g, long-endurance airframe design and on the development of 
an “artificial pilot” using the latest in advancing computer and software technology.  
Concurrent with aircraft design activities, the U. S. should pursue advanced intercep-
tor missiles.  Given the “3x acceleration” heuristic used above, the interceptors 
should be capable of at least 100-g maneuver capability with speeds in the Mach 3-5 
regime, ranges in excess of 50 km, and hemispherical seeker coverage.  When cou-
pled with improved fire control technology these new interceptors would provide 
current aircraft with acceptable kill probabilities against adversary UASVs as long as 
those UASVs are not allowed to close to dogfight distances.  This will require the 
ability to shoot beyond visual range.  Development of a non-cooperative target iden-
tification capability will be the key to permitting engagements without “visual identi-





ATTACK BY INFRARED ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES  
 
U. S. fixed wing aircraft routinely carry integrated radar warning, radar jamming, and 
chaff dispensing equipment. Few if any of these same aircraft carry any infrared countermea-
sures beyond flares occupying a few slots in the chaff dispenser.  Improved infrared flare de-
signs have proved remarkably versatile in providing counter-counter-countermeasure capabil-
ity against almost every infrared seeker counter-countermeasure.  However, the next genera-
tion of anti-aircraft missiles will include a large number of examples employing infrared im-
aging in multiple spectral bands for almost complete immunity to flare (and most other infra-
red) countermeasures.  Even the most advanced flares will be useless against these missiles.  
The generation beyond that (available in 2020 time frame) will integrate both RF and IR ca-
pabilities with extremely robust target detection, recognition, identification, and tracking ca-
pabilities, as well as possessing extremely high speed (>Mach 4) and agility (>60 g).  These 
missiles will also be capable of detecting the infrared skin emissions of stealth aircraft and at-
tacking them, if adequate warning and cueing can be provided from other sources for the mis-
siles to be initially launched in the right direction.  Aircraft without sophisticated “dc-to-light” 
electronic warfare capabilities will not be able to defeat the threat posed by these missiles.   
 
Electronic warfare has consistently been the odd man out in funding skirmishes ever 
since the field was invented.  Nothing is likely to alter this trend.  Even the most advanced 
electronic warfare concepts under examination will not completely counter the threat of the 
generation-after-next missiles.  Directed energy weapons will handle the coming threat, but 
these are likely to be too large for inclusion on small mobile platforms such as aircraft.  Con-
sequently, without new developments in infrared electronic warfare our aircraft may find 
themselves increasingly threatened. 
 
The new generation of missiles will also be quite effective at attacking and destroying 
cruise missiles, negating one of our major means of land attack.  Employment of antiradiation 
missiles against the new air defense threat will be of decreasing effectiveness as the new threat 
will increasingly rely on non-radiating means of targeting, such as infrared search & track or 
multistatic radar systems.  Some variants of these missiles could possess over-the-shoulder air-
to-air firing capability (made possible by computer-controlled stability at angles of attack 
greatly exceeding ninety degrees).  Others with very sophisticated IR imaging seekers will be 
able to pick out a desired enemy target from the middle of a “furball” of friendly forces engag-
ing adversary forces, without external designation by the operator or lock-on-before-launch.  
See Appendix G for a detailed discussion of missile guidance technologies.  The ability to fire 
into an ongoing air battle from the outside, lock on and kill only hostile aircraft, and not pro-
duce fratricide will also have a significant effect on air warfare.  Air cover will no longer need 
to be kept outside the engagement envelope of air defense weapons.  It can continue to engage 
the enemy even as the air defense missile systems begin to become effective.  Pilot workloads 
will also go up dramatically as they must now cope with additional threats simultaneously with 
their other functions.   
 
NPC should make sure that it purchases, or even better, develops the best infrared anti-
aircraft missiles of the generation after next, in sufficient quantities to make U. S. air superiority 
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a questionable proposition at best.  It should develop the basic technologies (infrared detectors, 
multiplexers, array processors) that will make possible multispectral imaging infrared seekers 
with extremely high image resolution, simultaneous imaging in multiple spectral regions, and 
automatic target recognition-based processing.  Such seekers with the ability to intelligently de-
tect and identify targets will permit lock-on-after-launch operation as well as firing into a crowd.  
On-board automatic target recognition will require NPC to develop extremely powerful, com-
pact, data processing systems and software to accompany them.  Such powerful systems will find 
applications in many other weapons such as anti-ship missiles, unmanned air superiority vehi-
cles, anti-satellite missiles, and space-based surveillance systems.  NPC should also attempt to 
develop compact radar seekers and develop the technologies to integrate the radars and infrared 
seekers into true dual-mode seeker systems. 
 
To exploit the capabilities of these seekers NPC should pursue the development of ad-
vanced missile airframes.  These airframes should be faster than any target they are designed to 
attack.  They should have the ability to pull at least 3x the g-levels of their intended targets.  This 
may require advanced thrust vector control.  They should have operational ranges in excess of 
the missiles of the intended adversary (the U. S.?).  They should be stable at angles of attack in 
excess of ninety degrees (i.e., flying backwards).  This will certainly involve intelligent computer 
controlled stabilization and may require innovative aerodynamic shapes.  NPC should procure 
enough of these advanced airframes and seekers to completely replace all of its older generation 
surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles and to provide enough weapons to arm all appropriate plat-
forms for an extended war of attrition.  
 
 The U. S. should continue its efforts at developing advanced imaging infrared 
guided missiles.  These will prove essential in attacking adversary targets employing 
stealth technology.  Anticipating an adversary’s development of similar missiles, and 
recognizing the intrinsic decoy (flare) immunity of the next generation of missiles, 
the U. S. should develop infrared laser-based countermeasures capable of jamming 
(blinding) the advanced imaging seekers by damaging the infrared detectors.  This 
will require development of multi-wavelength, moderate average power, infrared la-
sers.  The U. S. should pursue innovative gas laser techniques as well as solid state 
approaches.  The U. S. has neglected military gas laser research for many years 
without having achieved any of the supposed benefits of solid state lasers.  There is 
reason to expect that new gas laser designs can provide higher output powers at 
higher efficiencies and lower costs in comparable package volumes as those 




CHAPTER 5.  COUNTERS TO OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS 
 
 
RELIANCE ON STEALTH  
 
The United States is spending a large fraction of its defense budget to acquire plat-
forms with reduced observables (stealth) [64]-[66].  See Appendix H for a technical discussion 
of stealth.  There are four basic problems with design for stealth.  First, stealth is expensive.  
Every aspect of exterior design must be meticulously controlled and special materials must be 
employed.  Second, stealth is difficult to maintain.  Modifications to a platform’s exterior, cor-
rosion, aging, or weathering of external materials, sloppy maintenance, failure to properly 
close all external doors/hatches/panels after opening for operations or maintenance, failure to 
stow supplies, equipment, & tools, and opening of doors and hatches for normal operations 
can significantly increase the detectability of a platform.  Third, stealth is a moving target.  
Acceptably low signature levels at one time may not (and probably will not) remain acceptably 
low in the future.  Advances in component technology, packaging, or signal processing permit 
significant advances in detection capability for seekers of the same basic type.  Furthermore, 
stealth in one signature does not imply stealth in other signatures.  A platform designed for 
low radar cross section may be undetectable to a conventional scanning radar seeker.  How-
ever, if the seeker technology changes to use synthetic aperture radar, the low cross section 
may not prevent detection at useful ranges, because synthetic aperture radar relies on image 
contrast for detection, not threshold exceedance.  Similarly, if a platform designer designs for 
low radar cross section, his design may be detectable by passive infrared seekers.  If he also 
controls the infrared signature, the platform may be detectable by laser radar seekers.  If he 
also controls the laser signature, the platform may be detectable by visual (television) seekers 
and so on.  Fourth, stealth is most effective at protecting against the first hit.  If by pure acci-
dent or use of a counterstealth seeker a single missile strikes a stealth ship, the damaged ship’s 
signature will increase dramatically.  The “hole” in the exterior, structural deformations, and 
dislodged radar absorbing materials will serve to increase radar cross section significantly.  
Smoke and fires will increase the visual and infrared signatures significantly.  The noise asso-
ciated with damage control efforts will hamper any attempts to be acoustically silent.  Once a 
stealth ship is hit the first time, it is much more vulnerable to subsequent hits, even by less ca-
pable threats.  Each successive hit will make the situation worse.   
 
It is not difficult and only moderately expensive to significantly reduce the signature of 
a target.  It is very difficult and prohibitively expensive to reduce the signature to effectively 
undetectable levels (levels so low that the target return becomes comparable to background 
clutter or noise). The more signature elements which must be controlled, the more expensive 
will be the resulting design.  The high cost of stealth leads the U. S. to buy fewer platforms for 
an enemy to be forced to defeat. Countering only the conventional radar and infrared threats 
made the B-2 bomber prohibitively expensive (at last count we had procured a total of 21 air-
craft at an average cost of $2.1 billion each) [67].  If low- or moderate-cost counter-stealth sys-
tems can be developed, and our high-cost “invisible” platforms suddenly become “visible”, 
then stealth will become a bad investment for the U. S. to have made.  Even the B-2 stealth 
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bomber is not undetectable; an ABM-quality phased array radar operating at megawatt aver-
age power levels would be capable of detecting the B-2 at ranges capable of allowing inter-
cepts.  However, in most cases it would not be cost-effective to deploy such radars against the 
limited B-2 threat.  Even the best stealth designs cannot eliminate all possible signatures.  
Some kind of sensor or another will be able to detect and track them.  It is merely a matter of 
finding the right sensors or combinations of sensors that can be acquired and fielded at rea-
sonable cost to exploit this vulnerability. 
 
Finally, stealth is not a viable defense against all threats.  A stealth aircraft on the 
ground at an airfield is just as vulnerable to an air strike with cluster bombs as a non-stealthy 
aircraft.  A stealth warship tied up to a dock in a friendly port is just as vulnerable as a con-
ventional warship to destruction by a terrorist truck bomb or by a limpet mine emplaced by 
special operations forces.  That same stealth warship might be relatively immune to cruise 
missile attacks, but is highly vulnerable to damage from medium anti-tank missiles fired at 
point blank range by a crew member of any of the thousands of small fishing and trading 
boats from dozens of nations that frequent the littoral waters.  It would cost very little to pro-
vide infantry anti-armor weapons to several hundred “fishing boats” crewed by reservists and 
flying a false flag.  Random chance encounters would provide the targeting that millions of 
dollars of stealth was designed to avoid.  Small arms fire was responsible for downing a num-
ber of strike aircraft during the Vietnam War.  A jet flying into a “wall of lead” may be de-
stroyed whether or not any gunner ever saw the aircraft.  Mere knowledge that an aircraft was 
in the vicinity was sufficient to trigger the response.  If the probable targets, probable routes of 
attack, and likely times of attacks can be established in advance (this is occasionally relatively 
easy to do), asymmetric defense against even stealth aircraft becomes simpler.  All the preced-
ing examples highlight the hard truth:  the advantages of stealth can be defeated by asymmet-
ric attacks.  
 
NPC should devote significant research and development into counter-stealth technology.  
If a breakthrough is made, it will negate one of the few true advantages that U. S. forces possess 
and turn that advantage into a liability.  Specific technologies that should be investigated include 
improved infrared search & track sensors, coherent laser radars, impulse radars, netted atmos-
pheric acoustic sensors, magnetic sensors, gravitational sensors, and netted multistatic radars.  
NPC should not neglect the possibilities that may accrue from using large numbers of low-cost, 
modest-performance sensors networked with massive data processing (the U. S. sound surveil-
lance system – SOSUS – is essentially a system of this type).  To facilitate development of 
counter-stealth systems, the NPC intelligence services should make acquisition of stealth tech-
nology data one of their highest collection priorities.  NPC should incorporate this stealth tech-
nology into its systems wherever it is cost effective.  However, it should avoid an over-
dependence on stealth to be able to accomplish any mission.  Self-defense equipment and weap-
onry should not be neglected.  The U. S. may well develop its own counter-stealth systems.  NPC 
intelligence should also make every attempt to gain access to U. S. developments in this area. 
 
NPC should determine which U. S. stealth assets pose the biggest threat to its access de-
nial capabilities.  Asymmetric strategies should be developed to neutralize these assets.  Multiple 
strategies are desirable as any asymmetric strategy may work only once and may not neutralize 
all of the U. S. assets.  Special attention should be given to exploiting the signatures that the 
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stealth design did not principally address.  Stealth platforms generally rely on special conditions 
to enhance their survivability.  For example, the B-2 flies at night.  NPC should examine whether 
there are technologies that might alter those special conditions and temporarily create conditions 
advantageous to the defense.  In the B-2 example, perhaps an artificial twilight could be created 
that would silhouette the black aircraft against the suddenly bright sky.  
 
 The United States should take a more balanced view towards stealth.  It 
should recognize that stealth is neither invincible nor a panacea.  Effective undetect-
ability is not likely to be achievable; or if it is then its effectiveness will be short-lived.  
The United States should incorporate only that level of stealth that can be economi-
cally accommodated.  This possibly less capable level of stealth should be balanced 
by enhanced protective design features, self-defense weaponry (hard-kill and soft-
kill), and increased numbers of platforms (made possible by reduced costs).  Given 
its current commitment to stealth in a number of platforms, the United States should 
invest in counter-stealth technology development.  This will provide early warnings 
of where weaknesses have developed with respect to our stealth platforms and 
permit new tactics or missions to be devised that will take advantage of the plat-
forms’ capabilities without forcing them to confront the adversary when they are 
most vulnerable.  It will also permit our own defenses to detect and negate any 





JAMMING OF GPS AND GPS-DEPENDENT SYSTEMS  
 
To save money the United States has committed to making almost every precision-
guided weapon and delivery platform dependent on GPS [68] for required accuracy.  See Ap-
pendix G for a detailed discussion of the GPS system.  In some cases, guidance accuracy is 
provided only by the GPS system with no backup.  In addition, the civilian sector around the 
world has jumped on the GPS bandwagon to permit precision navigation in high-density, con-
fined air and sea corridors.  It has been demonstrated that current GPS-based systems are 
susceptible to “$500-dollar” jamming systems made from Radio Shack parts [9, 10].  Although 
improvements are planned to overcome the current susceptibility, it is likely that “five-
thousand-dollar” jammers made from more powerful components will be capable of jamming 
even the improved GPS.  Improvements in computer technology may even make it possible to 
deceive or spoof GPS guidance systems into hitting the wrong targets.  GPS jamming on the 
U. S. or European home fronts could cause severe problems in air and sea transportation.  
Jamming in San Diego, Long Beach, Seattle, Norfolk, New York or any other major harbor 
would cause ship traffic to revert to older radar-based navigation.  A two-fold reduction in 
traffic throughput (due to increased ship spacing and reduced ship speed) would be a mini-
mum result.  GPS jamming coupled with conventional radar jamming in the English Channel 
would inevitably result in collisions, sinkings, oil spills, and general economic chaos.    
 
NPC should make every effort to develop and deploy powerful GPS jamming systems.  
These jamming systems should be deployed to protect all high value target areas.  They should 
also be deployed with all stationary or slow moving forces.  A strategy should be developed as to 
how to employ GPS sabotage to maximum effectiveness.  Multiple jamming systems should be 
covertly deployed to every major U. S. military and civilian port.  Use of these covert systems 
should be coordinated with the overall NPC war plan and timed to produce maximum disruption.  
If possible the covert jammers should be located on mobile platforms to make it considerably 
more difficult for the U. S. or its allies to radiolocate and destroy the jammers.  NPC should ob-
viously refrain from making any use of the American GPS system for its own purposes.   
 
The advantages of a “GPS” are large enough that NPC should develop and deploy its 
own system using technology sufficiently different from the U. S. that a copycat jamming ap-
proach will not be effective.  Such a system might employ only a regional-coverage satellite con-
stellation or a small satellite constellation combined with a number of fixed surface emitter sites.  
NPC should avoid making the mistake of over-relying on its own “GPS” and should include 
adequate backup guidance (inertial and/or terminal guidance) in all of its weapons and platforms. 
 
  NPC should also consider targeting U. S. GPS satellites with any anti-satellite systems 
they may develop.  If 25% or more of the constellation is destroyed, then navigation performance 
will become sporadic (the likelihood of having four satellites in view will be significantly re-
duced).  It will take months for the U. S. to restore complete GPS capability.  Targeting the GPS 
satellites might be considered more defensive in character and thus less provocative than target-
ing communications or intelligence satellites.  
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 The current GPS system should be improved to reduce its jammability.  New 
satellites should be considered which are designed to radiate considerably higher 
average powers over considerably wider bandwidths (using spread spectrum 
transmission).  Receivers should incorporate antennas capable of generating multi-
ple nulls that can be placed at angles of suspected jammers.  More satellites operat-
ing on differing frequencies could be placed into the constellation making it easier 
for a receiver to find four unjammed satellites.   
 
Nevertheless, the U. S. should place less reliance on GPS for both navigation 
and guidance purposes.  Navigation systems should take advantage of dramatic per-
formance improvements and cost reductions in inertial guidance sensors.  Coupling 
a quality inertial guidance system with GPS would provide precision backup for brief 
periods when GPS might be effectively jammed.  Some guidance systems can make 
similar use of coupled GPS-inertial navigation.  However, the potential for targets to 
be increasingly mobile cannot be solved by inertial navigation adjuncts.  Research 
and development needs to be continued in terminal seekers capable of autono-
mously detecting, identifying, and tracking specific targets while remaining afford-





JAMMING OF PRECISION-GUIDED WEAPONS  
 
Smart weapons [69]-[71] present a highly cost-effective alternative to dumb weapons.  
It is possible to take out a bridge or bunker with a single precision-guided weapon dropped 
from a single airplane without suffering any casualties.  Destruction of the same bridge or 
bunker might require dozens of sorties dropping hundreds of dumb bombs at a cost of a dozen 
aircraft lost.  Because of this, the United States has traded away ownership of large quantities 
of dumb weapons for limited quantities of extremely high precision weapons.  As mentioned in 
the preceding section, many of our newest surface attack weapons use GPS for precision 
guidance.  In addition to using GPS for guidance, the U. S. possesses several other kinds of 
precision-guided weapons.  See Appendix G for a technical discussion of missile and weapon 
guidance techniques.  Foremost among these are laser-designated bombs, missiles, and artil-
lery shells.  A handful of other precision weapons rely on image-based guidance.  The over-
whelming dependence on precision-guided weapons leads to a foreseeable (yet infrequently 
considered) vulnerability.  That is, any precision-guided weapon can be jammed.  The funda-
mental tenet of electronic warfare is: “For every measure, there is a viable countermeasure.”  
In fact, it is not terribly difficult to jam most precision-guided weapons.   
 
High-pulse-rate laser emitters can jam the seekers on laser-guided weapons.  These 
emitters can be packaged as expendable laser jammers or as permanent platform protection 
assets.  Had Iraq possessed such devices, the wonderful news pictures of airborne infrared im-
ages of bunkers and buildings being destroyed by bombs and missiles would never have been 
available.  Wire-guided, fiber-guided, or beamrider missiles constitute another major class of 
weapons.  Jamming or attacking their fire control units can effectively negate these systems.  
As these are invariably electro-optical sensor-based, electro-optical jamming systems would be 
required.  This jamming technology has been available for many years, awaiting a suitable 
threat to justify its deployment.  A third class of systems uses imaging sensors as the main 
component of homing seekers.  High intensity light sources (including lasers) can be directed 
at these seekers to jam or even damage them.  In general, almost all of the United States preci-
sion-guided weapons can be jammed by electronic warfare systems of no higher than medium 
complexity.  Effective jamming of precision-guided weapons can reduce their effectiveness to 
levels far below those of unguided weapons.  In effect our entire arsenal of precision-guided 
weapons could be rendered less effective than an arsenal orders of magnitude larger contain-
ing only unguided weapons. 
 
Similar comments can be made about cruise missiles and anti-aircraft missiles – both 
types of missiles are also precision-guided weapons.  Both cruise missiles and anti-aircraft 
missiles can also be jammed.  Most cruise missiles use active radar guidance and any kind of 
radar can be jammed.  Of course, the targets must have jammers (or at least chaff) and those 
countermeasures must be used.  If we look at the examples of ships that have been damaged or 
sunk by cruise missiles, we find the following interesting facts.  The HMS Sheffield possessed 
both chaff dispensers and an electronic support measures (ESM) system [72].  The Sheffield 
had a weakness in that its satellite communications (SATCOM) interfered with the ESM sys-
tem.  At the time the Sheffield was hit, it was using the SATCOM and had the ESM system 
turned off.  Because of this it did not have enough warning of the attack to dispense chaff.  
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Thus, although it possessed systems to protect itself, the Sheffield was unable to do so, because 
those systems were turned off [34], [35].  After the Sheffield was sunk, surviving members of 
that ship class received radar-jamming equipment at their next overhauls.   
 
The USS Stark did not possess a jammer, but it did possess an ESM system, chaff dis-
pensers, and a CIWS system [59].  However, when the Stark was hit, the chaff dispensers were 
not armed until just before impact and the ship was oriented such that the incoming missiles 
were in the blind spot of the CIWS (CIWS cannot shoot through the mast and superstructure).  
A breakdown in the chain of command prevented defensive systems from being employed [36].   
 
The HMS Glamorgan possessed ESM, active jammers, and chaff dispensers [72].  It 
was approximately 18 nmi offshore when a visual streak of light was observed heading for the 
ship.  The ship immediately fired a SeaCat missile, belatedly fired chaff, and turned stern on to 
the incoming missile [34].  The author has seen no mention made of the ESM system giving 
any warning or the jammers being activated.  It is possible that they were inactive because 
there was no air threat in the vicinity.  The Argentines did not possess any land-launched an-
tiship missiles, so no threat was anticipated from that source.  The Exocet that struck the 
Glamorgan was an air-launched version whose launcher had been removed from an aircraft 
and mounted on the back of a flatbed truck.  An inventive enemy is always a threat.   
 
The Atlantic Conveyor was a container ship taken up from trade.  It possessed no de-
fensive systems.  However, it was located in the middle of a multitude of warships, all of which 
possessed jammers and/or chaff dispensers.  All of the warships that detected the incoming 
missile employed their countermeasures (mostly chaff, but some active jamming) in a timely 
fashion.  Apparently, the missiles locked onto a chaff cloud from the HMS Ambuscade.  Un-
fortunately, as one of the missiles emerged from the cloud, it found the only unprotected target 
(the Atlantic Conveyor) in its seeker field of view, locked onto the new target and struck the 
Atlantic Conveyor on the port quarter.  The missile penetrated to the vehicle decks and started 
a fatal internal fire [73].  In summary, no ship that had a certifiably operating radar jamming 
system or chaff system has ever been hit by an antiship cruise missile.  
 
NPC should develop a comprehensive electronic warfare capability that includes the abil-
ity to counter precision-guided weapons.  Success in this area will negate another of the critical 
U. S. advantages and turn that advantage into a liability.  The United States has long possessed 
the systems knowledge to counter its own precision-guided weapons.  Jamming of laser-
designated weapons has been demonstrated by both expendable jammers and permanently-
installed jammers, but the U. S. never deployed such systems.  Presumably it did not see a sig-
nificant threat from any adversary other than the Soviet Union, whose precision guidance capa-
bilities lagged considerably behind America’s.  Laser-based infrared jammers have been studied 
for years.  However, it is only the recent evolution of image-based infrared anti-aircraft seekers 
that has brought the technology out of the laboratory and into full-scale development programs.  
The same jamming technologies can be used against infrared or electro-optical fire control sys-
tems.   
 
NPC recognizes the threat from U. S. precision-guided weapons and should face no bar to 
rapid and effective development and deployment of countermeasures.  NPC should concentrate 
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on laser-based electro-optical and infrared countermeasures systems.  The systems developed 
should be capable of negating laser-designated weapons, terminal infrared imaging seekers, and 
electro-optical fire control sensors.  The countermeasure systems should be produced in large 
quantities and should be deployed on all kinds of platforms at every level.  Critical fixed sites 
(bridges, bunkers, revetments, logistics depots, headquarters, etc.), aircraft, ships, and land vehi-
cles should all receive appropriate protection. 
 
NPC aircraft and naval vessels should also be supplied with state of the art electronic 
warfare systems including ESM, chaff/flare dispensers, and jammers.  Each platform should be 
equipped with the optimum system for handling the specific threats that platform is expected to 
encounter.  If NPC is not capable of developing the sophisticated ESM and jamming systems, 
then it should procure them on the international arms market. 
 
The U. S. development community needs to recognize and internalize that vi-
able countermeasures exist or can be developed against every precision-guided 
weapon currently in the U. S. inventory or in development.  The author is continually 
amazed and distressed at the lack of countermeasures understanding and sophisti-
cation possessed by many weapons designers.  Their primary reason for being is to 
make the system work.  They are so absorbed in this task that few bother to ask, 
“How can I make this system fail?”  Fewer still are capable of answering the ques-
tion.  These designers are aided and abetted by program managers that do not 
really want the question answered during their brief tenure on the project.  This ap-
proach to design and development needs to be replaced by one with a longer-term 
and more militarily realistic perspective. 
 
The U. S. should strive to develop counter-countermeasure technology appli-
cable to defeat the countermeasures that exist against each of our precision-guided 
weapons.  Those counter-countermeasures should be incorporated into each sys-
tem where it is deemed cost-effective.  Research and development into alternative 
forms of precision guidance should also be undertaken.   That and any other new R 
& D should consider the certainty of countermeasure techniques and strive to incor-




CHAPTER 6.  ATTACKS ON C4I ASSETS 
 
 
ATTACK BY ELECTROMAGNETIC WEAPONS  
 
It is difficult and costly to harden weapons systems against nuclear electromagnetic 
pulse (EMP) [74].  See Appendix A for a technical discussion of EMP.  It is just as costly to 
maintain and test the special design features that make EMP hardening possible.  It is even 
more difficult to harden weapons against the higher frequencies produced by high-power mi-
crowave (HPM) weapons [75], [76].  See Appendix I for a technical discussion of directed en-
ergy weapons (DEW) including HPM.  Without EMP/HPM hardening, our detection, tracking, 
& navigation sensors can be destroyed, command, control, & communications systems can be 
knocked out of action, computer systems can be crashed, and even electrical power distribu-
tion networks can be damaged.  As the threat of nuclear warfare with Russia slowly fades, the 
willingness of the Department of Defense to fund the EMP hardening of new systems will con-
tinue to decrease.  Even during the height of the Cold War, funds for EMP hardening of all 
but the most critical systems were often subject to reprogramming when program costs grew 
beyond expectations.  As emphasis on EMP decreases, it will be harder and harder to justify 
the extra maintenance burdens necessary to maintain EMP hardness.  Any country with even 
a single nuclear weapon is capable of creating a devastating electromagnetic pulse over an 
entire theater.   
 
Even if nuclear weapons are not available, their tactical counterparts (HPM weapons) 
are receiving increased study by almost every military power.  If the United States does not 
continue to emphasize EMP/HPM hardening and maintenance, and provide the needed level 
of funding, then our weapons systems will become progressively more vulnerable to EMP.  
Even a third-rate military power might be able to completely disable key elements of a carrier 
battle group at a critical point in an engagement.  Civilian computer networks are even more 
susceptible to damage and disruption by HPM weapons, because there has never been an in-
centive to expend the resources required for hardening.   
 
NPC should make sure that its own electronic systems are adequately hardened against 
nuclear EMP and against any HPM weapons the United States or its allies are determined to be 
developing.  It should also make sure that the hardening is rigorously maintained and that all per-
sonnel are aware of how their actions might compromise EMP/HPM hardness.  Full-scale 
EMP/HPM test facilities should be built to verify the hardness of all critical NPC systems.  If 
NPC is a nuclear power (declared or otherwise), at least a few of its nuclear missiles should be 
configured for optimum EMP generation and reserved for that mission.  To minimize the risks of 
having the United States escalate to using nuclear weapons, the initial use of an EMP detonation 
should be localized over the denial area where its effects will only impact the local forces en-
gaged in the conflict and not affect either NPC’s or America’s strategic systems.  Timing of the 
use of EMP weapons should be early in the engagement, but well after hostilities have been 
openly declared, to prevent American from claiming that NPC has perpetrated a nuclear “Pearl 
Harbor”.  Research should be performed into non-nuclear generation of EMP.  This is to be dis-
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tinguished from research into HPM.  The non-nuclear EMP should emphasize high-field 
strengths over limited areas at the low frequencies that will couple into communication systems 
and power grids, still considered to be significant targets.   
 
Research and development of high-power microwave (HPM) weapons should also be 
pursued.  Special emphasis should be placed on HPM weapons that can be remotely delivered by 
ballistic missiles or air-launched guided missiles, or that can be employed as terminal air defense 
weapons.  The former may be targeted at specific U. S. systems, such as air search radars, elec-
tronic support measures, or missile tracking radars, or may be intended solely to generally harass 
U. S. electromagnetic systems.  The air defense weapons should be designed to destroy enemy 
guidance and targeting systems.  This will provide additional protection to critical NPC assets 
should the U. S. be able to conduct a long-range strike with cruise missiles or land-based avia-
tion.  Development of battlefield HPM systems should be of lesser importance.  Close-in ground 
combat is usually an indication that access denial has failed.  However, short-range (100-200 m) 
HPM weapons should be developed for special operations force and sabotage use.  These weap-
ons may be used to disable critical computer and communication systems in the United States or 
its allies.   
 
The U. S. has specific criteria for hardening systems against nuclear EMP.  
However, support and funding for enforcement of these criteria in development 
programs waned as the probability of full-scale nuclear war decreased as the Cold 
War ground to an end.  However, the threat from electromagnetic weapons will not 
gradually go away.  If anything, it will continue to get worse.  The U. S. needs to de-
velop criteria for hardening systems against high-power microwaves (HPM) and 
non-nuclear EMP weapons.  Military procurements should require that these levels 
of hardness be met at the system level.  Procedures need to be developed for assur-
ance that the required hardness levels are maintained over time.  Program offices 
need to ensure that adequate funds are available to support increased hardness in 
the initial procurements and that assurance programs are funded throughout the life 
cycle.   
 
Commercial electronic systems are as vulnerable if not more vulnerable to 
electromagnetic weapons as are military electronics.  Because many of these com-
mercial systems are vital to the national defense, the U. S. Government should es-
tablish incentives for commercial systems to follow the same hardness and assur-
ance guidelines, especially in critical sectors, such as banking, securities exchange, 





ATTACK BY HIGH-ENERGY LASERS 
 
 Ever since the first laser was demonstrated by Theodore Maiman at Hughes in 1960 
[77], the military has found applications for them.  Laser rangefinders were fielded in the mid-
1960’s and laser designators for laser-guided weapons became operational a decade later.  
Today lasers are used for purposes ranging from precision gyroscopes to wideband communi-
cations to gunsights for small arms to countermeasures against enemy sensor systems.  Almost 
from the beginning, far-sighted military researchers recognized their potential as air defense 
and anti-missile weapons [78]-[81].  See Appendix I for a technical discussion of directed en-
ergy weapons (DEW) including optical countermeasures and high-energy lasers (HEL).  Many 
programs pushed laser systems to higher and higher powers.  Foremost among the programs 
of the 1970’s and 1980’s were the Air Force’s Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL) [79] and the 
Navy’s Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) [82].  The latter system along with 
its SEALITE Beam Director pointing and tracking subsystem was transferred to the Army to 
be part of the national High Energy Laser System Test Facility (HELSTF).  Both ALL (using 
gasdynamic CO2 laser technology) and MIRACL (using deuterium fluoride chemical laser 
technology) were successful in that they were able to shoot down tactical missiles in flight.  In 
the same time frame significant developments were being made in adaptive optics [83].  This 
technology allows atmospheric distortions caused by atmospheric turbulence and thermal 
blooming to be corrected.  This permits tight focusing of the laser radiation on the target. 
 
A recent follow-on to the ALL is the Airborne Laser (ABL) [84].  The ABL is currently 
in Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR).  Transition to Engineering and Manufac-
turing Development (E&MD) is planned for 2003 with Production scheduled from 2004 to 
2008.   The ABL is based on a chemical oxygen-iodine laser (COIL) and is planned as a thea-
ter missile defense system.  With a nominal 400-km range, it will orbit over friendly territory 
and destroy short-range missiles during their boost phase.  The Tactical High Energy Laser 
(THEL) is a cooperative venture between the United States and Israel [85].  This small deute-
rium fluoride chemical laser is to be the prototype of a system designed to destroy small tacti-
cal missiles (such as the Katyusha) in flight.  Another program still under active development 
is the Space-Based Laser (SBL) [86].  This hydrogen fluoride chemical laser program has 
been active since the early 1980’s.  All of the component technologies of this system have been 
demonstrated.  The next step is a space flight test sometime early in the 21st Century.  The SBL 
is intended to provide a space-based component to National Missile Defense. 
 
 The application to ballistic missile defense is the foremost driver of high-energy laser 
development.  Any country with viable HEL systems can provide a measure of such defense to 
its forces.  However, this is not the only important application.  The Navy is still interested in 
HEL systems for cruise missile defense.  Their studies have shown that a different laser is re-
quired for this application.  The Navy is emphasizing free-electron lasers (FEL) [87].  They 
show the potential for high efficiency, environmental friendliness, and ability to be packaged 
in a form amenable for incorporation on ships.  FELs are still in the development stage, so 
naval applications are some years away.  The high rates of kill (possibly as high as one per 
second) with virtually unlimited magazine size that might be achieved in advanced HEL sys-
tems may be the only viable counter to massive saturation cruise missile attacks against our 
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battle groups.  Line of sight limitations make HELs somewhat less attractive for land-based 
cruise missile defense, but they should still have considerable effectiveness.   
 
 Another possible application of HEL technology is as an antisatellite weapon.  A 
space-based HEL could destroy any satellite that crossed into its “hemisphere” of coverage.  
Within a few hours it could target almost any other satellite.  A ground-based HEL could tar-
get any satellite that passed overhead.  With proper siting of ground-based site, this would not 
be much of a problem, as many satellites of military interest must pass over enemy territory to 
be effective.  More details will be found in the section on antisatellite weapons.  In a similar 
vein, HEL technology might prove a viable counter to transatmospheric aircraft.  High-energy 
lasers could also be used as battlefield antisensor weapons or as antipersonnel weapons, al-
though at this point it does not seem cost-effective to use them in this role.  
 
 Many countries are pursuing high-energy lasers for a variety of applications.  There 
are a number of commercial applications of lasers in the hundred-kilowatt-class.  Although 
many military applications require megawatt-class lasers, hundred-kilowatt-class lasers could 
find military use and can often be scaled to megawatt-class devices.  Russia, United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Japan, and China are among the countries with serious interests in laser 
technology.   
 
 High-energy lasers will be such an important component of warfare in the 21st Century 
that without a command of the technology NPC can hardly be considered a peer competitor.  If it 
does not already have one NPC should establish a vigorous laser research program.  This pro-
gram should probably be four-fold; that is, it should pursue chemical devices, COIL devices, 
FELs, and more traditional solid state lasers.  It should emphasize that mission that contributes 
most to NPC’s overall strategy.  This is quite likely to be the antisatellite mission (because the U. 
S. is so heavily reliant on satellite technology for much of its warfighting capability).  If NPC has 
a major space launch program, then it should consider space-based HEL systems.  If NPC does 
not possess a strong capability in space (or if it cannot devote more of its budget to this sector 
because of inter-service rivalry) then it should consider ground-based or airborne HEL systems.  
Airborne systems would be more difficult to implement, but possess more versatility.  A ground-
based HEL is useful primarily as an antisatellite weapon.  An airborne HEL might be adapted to 
TBM defense, cruise missile defense, and the battlefield anti-sensor role.  An airborne system is 
also considerably less vulnerable to attack by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, transatmospheric 
aircraft, or special operations forces, because it can move from base to base. 
 
The U. S. should be as concerned about an adversary’s development of high-
energy laser (HEL) technology as an adversary should be concerned about ours.  
They will revolutionize warfare.  The U. S. should continue to investigate counter-
measures and other defenses against HELs.  Countermeasures will be more effective 
against some HEL applications than against others.   
 
In the anti-satellite role for HELs, moderately effective countermeasures exist.  
Solar panels for electric power can be replaced with radioisotope thermal generators 
that have damage thresholds many –orders of magnitude higher than solar cells.  
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Damage from general thermal overload can be delayed by incorporation of thermal 
sinks incorporating phase-change material (the laser energy is channeled into melt-
ing a solid rather than heating the entire structure).  Enough phase change material 
could delay overload for minutes, possibly long enough for the satellite to pass be-
yond range of the HEL.  If this occurs, the thermal sink can re-radiate enough of the 
absorbed energy to return to its initial state.  This would permit re-engagement time 
and again without damage.  These and similar countermeasures should be incorpo-
rated into new satellites wherever practical.  
 
In other roles for HELs the best defense may be a good offense.  If the adver-
sary develops an airborne HEL with 400-km effective range and the U. S. develops 
one with 500-km range, then the longer-range system should be capable of engag-
ing and destroying the shorter-range system.  From this perspective, the U. S. 
should make every effort to maintain the obvious lead it possesses in HEL technol-
ogy and applications.  Once adequate systems have been fielded, the U. S. should 
not rest on its laurels; it must strive to field even better systems.  Paraphrasing the 
words of Thomas Watson, former chairman of IBM, “If the U. S. stops trying to be 





ATTACK BY INFORMATION WARFARE  
 
The growing dependence of U.S. forces on network-centric warfare [88] as well as the 
growing network-dependence of the entire economy and civilian infrastructure of the United 
States makes us extremely vulnerable to information warfare (IW) [89]-[91].  A detailed dis-
cussion of information warfare can be found in Appendix J.  The efforts of a mere handful of 
youthful hackers have proven time and again that networks can be penetrated and exploited or 
damaged.  Critical hardware can be crashed.  Data and/or programs can be stolen, erased, or 
even subtly altered (the latter having the capability to produce almost any effect imaginable).  
Transportation systems, financial networks, communications systems, and utility distribution 
systems are targets whose large-scale disruption could cause unimagined havoc.  
 
 In the military, there are numerous computer-based systems that are conceivably vul-
nerable to information warfare.  Invaluable intelligence data is stored in electronic databases.  
War plans may be stored in digital format.  Logistics is controlled entirely by computers.  
Command and control flows over computerized information networks.  Self-defense weapon 
systems cannot function without computers and complex software.  Infowarriors might break 
into classified networks and steal the intelligence data, possibly compromising future intelli-
gence operations.  They might be able to covertly copy the war plans and devise strategic 
counters or ambushes for our forces.  The logistics network might be crashed at the worst pos-
sible time, hopelessly tangling the system.  Alternatively, critical supplies might be routed to 
the wrong commands.  Consider the effect of Navy 5” artillery rounds being delivered to Army 
units equipped with 155-mm howitzers, and vice versa.  The command and control network 
might be sabotaged in such a fashion that commands might be subtly garbled to result in ill-
conceived deployments and inappropriate timing for maneuvers.  The self-defense weapons 
system software might be covertly reprogrammed to intentionally miss only a particular class 
of antiship missiles emitting a particular signature.  None of these effects might become ap-
parent until after the shooting had started. 
 
Information warfare may be the most cost-effective means of attacking the United 
States.  A single, brilliant individual with a personal computer connected to the Internet, who 
is thoroughly committed to the task, has demonstrated that he can wreak havoc and cause mil-
lions of dollars of “damages” [92], [93] in a few hours time.  Imagine the effects that a well, 
trained Corps of such individuals (properly organized, led, and working in teams of appropri-
ate size) could have.   
 
The attacks need not be conducted by an organized group.  If an adversary has pa-
tience, a small number of individuals could infiltrate critical organizations and embed logic 
bombs or backdoors into critical software months if not years in advance of any attack.  This 
capability is exacerbated by the trend towards purchasing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
software.  The commercial firms seldom obtain high-level government security clearances for 
their employees.  It would be relatively trivial for a handful of programmers with loyalties to 
an adversary nation (or as suggested in the latest Tom Clancy novel, loyalty to our own gov-
ernment [94]) to be hired by a company like Microsoft, Apple, or Sun Microsystems.  It would 
easy for them to insert logic bombs or backdoors into such ubiquitous programs, such as word 
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processors, spreadsheets, or even operating systems, in the course of their normal code writ-
ing.  What if 9 out of 10 personal computers in the U. S. had an unsuspected security flaw that 
would allow an adversary to gain administrator privileges on any such machine that was con-
nected to the Internet?  Are we sure that Windows NT or Linux or MacOS are currently free 
from such malicious added code?  
 
NPC should strive to achieve technical parity with the United States in the computer, 
networking, and software arenas.  If this is the information age, NPC must be a leader, not a fol-
lower.  This is true in both the civilian and the military arenas.  Computer technology must be 
introduced into every classroom at every level.  The entire NPC society must become computer 
literate.  NPC university students should be encouraged to study computer technology and soft-
ware engineering at major U. S. universities to learn the latest in U. S. capabilities.  Study at uni-
versities in other countries leading the information revolution should also be encouraged.  After 
obtaining their degrees, a number of students should be encouraged to work for several years in 
U. S. information technology companies.  Naturally, they will be expected to learn as much pro-
prietary information as possible before their recall to NPC.  Furthermore, from time to time they 
would be expected to cooperate with NPC’s information warfare community and covertly plant 
“strings of code” in the programs upon which they worked.  NPC university faculty should be 
encouraged to take sabbaticals in the United States and elsewhere.  They should be encouraged 
to engage in cooperative research with U. S. companies.  Conversely, only a limited amount of 
U. S. students and faculty should be permitted to study at NPC schools.  Very few of these 
should be permitted to learn anything about NPC corporate technology. 
 
A fraction of NPC’s R&D effort will quite naturally be spent on computer and network 
security including studying the means of attacking computers and networks, in addition to study-
ing the means of preventing such attacks.  It is anticipated that this fraction of the program will 
be conducted under deep secrecy.  Computer “hacking” by young people under subtly-controlled 
conditions should be encouraged.  It can serve as a means of developing a cadre of information 
warfare “soldiers”, while channeling youthful energies that might otherwise be turned to “de-
structive” purposes (such as protesting for human rights).  The more adept hackers can serve as 
useful testers of computer and network security systems being developed.  The subtle control 
alluded to above should include covert automatic monitoring and recording of every keystroke 
on the hackers’ computers.  This will provide insight into any new techniques the hackers might 
discover and will warn authorities if any unauthorized activities, such as sabotaging important 
NPC systems, are being performed. 
 
NPC must beware of U. S. attempts at using information warfare against it.  What NPC 
plans to do to the U. S., the U. S. may plan to do to NPC.  Every software program imported 
from anywhere should be analyzed for obvious IW features.  Mission critical or widely distrib-
uted software programs should be reverse-engineered and studied line-by-line by IW analysts to 
determine what every command actually does.  Any unexplainable code should be deleted.  Al-
though NPC may abide by copyright and piracy agreements, this does not preclude government 





The U. S. should continue to devote significant research and development to 
the field of information warfare and defense against information warfare.  There is a 
critical need to know what can be done to computer systems, how it can be pre-
vented without destroying the usability of the computer systems, and how the sys-
tems can be fixed or ameliorated if it cannot be prevented. 
 
Of special concern is the fact that information warfare need not target military 
systems to have profound effects on military operations.  Practitioners should al-
ways keep in mind that the military has little or no control over and little or no ability 
to fix problems in the computer systems present in the civilian sectors of the econ-
omy.  For this reason, it is not clear that the high levels of secrecy currently afforded 
to information warfare developments are warranted or even desirable.  Consider an 
information attack on the traffic light system in San Diego that causes a delay in de-
ployment of a carrier battle group because needed personnel and last minute sup-
plies were stuck in monumental traffic jams.  Classified knowledge of how to prevent 
such an attack would be worthless, if that knowledge were not disseminated to the 
city agency that controls San Diego’s traffic lights in time to prevent the attack from 
occurring.   
 
This example could be multiplied a thousand-fold.  Civil sector computers 
control all aspects of transportation, communication, production and distribution of 
goods, commerce, and information exchange.  This will be exacerbated as the cur-
rent trend towards government out-sourcing reaches its zenith.  Even the military 
logistics supply line might ultimately be controlled by an overnight delivery service.  
Information attacks on the computers at the delivery service headquarters might re-
sult in the entire inventory of a critical component being shipped to a front organiza-
tion of the adversary.  From there that inventory might be destroyed or transshipped 
to the adversary after another attack was made on the computer system of U. S. 
Customs.  Everyone needs to know how to protect his system from information at-
tack, because anyone could be the weak link in a complex chain of civilian actions 
that makes a military operation possible. 
 
Special attention should be paid to the handful of software packages that al-
most everyone uses.  These would include Windows, PowerPoint, Excel, Word, 
WordPerfect, 1-2-3, and a few others for IBM compatible machines, the operating 
systems (UNIX, Linux, MacOS, etc.) for other machines, and the major anti-virus 
programs.  The U. S. should investigate these programs on a line-by-line basis to de-
termine their security.  Software companies might wish to performed more detailed 
background investigations on their employees if they wish to sell “certified safe” 





ATTACK BY ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS  
 
America depends on its superiority in space (intelligence, surveillance, navigation, and 
communications satellite networks) to fight efficiently with limited numbers of combatants.  
The trend to network-centric warfare will continue to exacerbate this dependence.  American 
satellites are not adequately hardened against any form of antisatellite weapon:  fragmenta-
tion warheads, terminally guided kinetic energy projectiles, or nuclear explosives. 
 
Fragmentation antisatellite (ASAT) weapons place thousands of small fragments in the 
path of an oncoming satellite.  A small explosive charge disperses the fragments in an expand-
ing cloud.  The explosive charge can be quite small as the fragments do not need energy from 
the explosive to provide penetration (as is required in terrestrial fragmentation warheads), the 
orbital kinetic energy is more than sufficient.  The kinetic energy of one or more fragments 
punches holes in and destroys one or more critical subsystems of the satellite (such as the so-
lar power system, the attitude control system, or the communications link).  Such weapons 
cannot be defended against after the weapon closes to within detonation range. Physical de-
struction of the attacker at long ranges before intercept is one of only two practical counter-
measures.  Early warning (minutes) of an impending attack coupled with a substantial orbital 
maneuvering capability (permitting the target satellite to escape orbital intercept with the at-
tacker) is the other.  Since the attacker will likely have at least some form of orbital maneuver-
ing capability (to permit achieving the intercept in the first place), the defending satellite must 
have an even greater capability.  Fragmentation ASAT weapons need not be very large.  The 
mass of fragments required is directly proportional to the square of the accuracy that can be 
achieved in an intercept.  Intercept accuracies of the order of 10 meters might require roughly 
10 kg of fragments, while intercept accuracies of 100 meters would require more like 1000 kg 
of fragments.  Fragmentation ASATs can be placed into orbit by any suitable launch vehicle, 
including large superguns (after they have been developed).   
 
Kinetic kill vehicles (KKV) with terminal seekers (similar to those under development 
for ballistic missile defense) can also be used in an ASAT role.  These may be placed in orbit 
for employment on command, or they may be launched via direct ascent to impact.  On-orbit 
systems will require a boost motor and orientation system in addition to the kill vehicle.  The 
additional systems are intrinsic to the launch vehicle in the direct ascent systems.  Once the 
attacking system is placed in the right orbit, its seeker acquires the target and a divert thruster 
system accelerates the kill vehicle (at right angles to the orbital energy) to achieve precision 
guidance and impact with the target.  As with fragmentation antisatellite weapons, the only 
defenses are running to a different orbit or destroying the kill vehicle before a ballistic inter-
cept trajectory can be established.  The former is difficult given the potentially high divert abil-
ity (as much as 50-100 km laterally) of a kinetic kill vehicle.  Direct ascent ASAT systems can 
be orbited with relatively modest launch vehicles.  The United States demonstrated an ASAT 
that was launched from under the wing of an F-15.  The speed and altitude of the F-15 func-
tioned as the first stage of the launch vehicle.  The interceptor was relatively lightweight.  
There is no reason it should have weighed more than 50 kg.  Numerous designs for KKVs 
weighing between 2 kg and 100 kg were developed during the peak of activity of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI).  On-orbit ASATs will be larger, probably in the 100+ kg range.  Nev-
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ertheless, a single medium launch vehicle such as Titan, Delta, or Ariane could put dozens of 
KKV ASATs in orbit in a single launch.   
 
Nearby nuclear detonations can damage the hardest electronic systems with intense x-
radiation, gamma radiation, and neutrons.  A 20-kiloton exoatmospheric detonation will illu-
minate objects with an xray fluence in excess of 1 cal/cm2 at distances over 10 km, a neutron 
fluence in excess of 1011 n/cm2 at distances over 11 km, and a gamma ray dose rate in excess 
of 109 rad(Si)/sec at distances over 14 km.  Any of these exposures is commonly assumed to be 
fatal to a typical electronics system.  The distance over which these lethal exposures can be 
produced scales as the square root of the yield, so the lethal range of a 1-megaton detonation 
is roughly 7 times larger (70-100 km depending on the radiation type).  Distant exoatmos-
pheric detonations can produce intense electromagnetic pulses (EMP) over continent-sized 
areas.  This EMP can fry unhardened electrical circuits not just on the ground but in objects 
passing over the affect region in low and medium earth orbits as well.  Furthermore, a nuclear 
explosion can cause large transient increases in the earth’s trapped radiation.  This last effect 
can cause degradation of critical circuits over periods of days to weeks, ultimately resulting in 
failure, in any satellite passing through the disturbed regions.  Even satellites that were on the 
opposite side of the earth from the detonation are not immune to this last effect.  A nuclear 
ASAT can kill unhardened satellites at extremely large distances.  Because of this, there is no 
need to actually orbit a nuclear ASAT, just get it to the approximate altitude of the satellite 
target.  Since the peak altitudes achieved by ballistic missiles are roughly 25% of their range, a 
ballistic missile with only 1000-km can place a nuclear ASAT high enough to kill satellites at 
altitudes as high as 250-300 km.  Aiming and timing are not excessively important given the 
huge lethal radii for exoatmospheric bursts.  Even geosynchronous orbit satellites can be at-
tacked with any launch vehicle capable of orbiting such satellites (a nuclear explosive device is 
much smaller than a typical communications satellite).  Satellites can be hardened against nu-
clear explosives.  However, this is extremely expensive and can be defeated by bringing the 
nuclear weapon closer before detonation.  No amount of hardening can protect a satellite sys-
tem from the detonation of a large nuclear weapon at a distance closer than roughly 1 kilome-
ter. 
 
High-energy laser systems can destroy solar power sources (by melting the solar cell 
materials and or burning off critical coatings), burn out optical sensors or optical communica-
tion systems (by vaporizing detector elements or damaging key optical components), and dam-
age internal electronics (by overheating)[95].  An intensity of 1 W/cm2 maintained for a period 
of a minute is almost certainly adequate to damage solar cells or cause serious satellite over-
heating.  The maximum incident solar radiation intensity is only 0.14 W/cm2.  If the laser ra-
diation is in-band to the sensor, then power densities at the detector will almost certainly ex-
ceed 1 MW/cm2.  Staring directly at the sun will damage almost any imaging sensor and the 
specified illumination level is almost one order of magnitude larger than the sun’s intensity.  
A one-megawatt laser can produce 1 W/cm2 over a 10-m diameter spot.  Tracking targets to a 
small fraction of this spot size has been demonstrated a number of times at ranges of practical 
interest.  Lasers of sufficient power can be easily placed into aircraft or on other satellites 
(both the Airborne Laser currently in development and the proposed Space-Based Laser are 
considerably more powerful than the nominal laser considered here).  ASAT lasers can also be 
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placed on the ground.  The MIRACL laser already in existence at White Sands Missile Range 
is also more powerful than the nominal requirement.  
  
Lasers of very modest size and power coupled to small, precision electrooptical pointing 
and tracking systems can also be to temporarily blind imaging satellites and hide all military 
activities in the vicinity (10-50 km radius) of the laser.  An incident power density of as little as 
1 µW/cm2 should be adequate to dazzle (using veiling glare) any satellite sensor that is in-band 
to the laser radiation.  A 1-watt (average power) laser operating in the visible or near infrared 
coupled to a modest 30-cm telescope can produce in excess of 1 µW/cm2 over a 10-meter di-
ameter spot at ranges well over 1000 kilometers.  Given accurate satellite ephemeris data from 
some other source and a low-light-level imaging camera at the focus of a second boresighted 
30-cm telescope, the system should be able to easily acquire the satellite and track it using the 
laser light retroreflected from the satellite’s sensor.  This will work only if the laser is in the 
sensor’s field of view.  However, if the sensor is not looking at the geographic region around 
the laser, then it cannot detect the activity the laser is trying to mask.  Such laser blinding sys-
tems can be built today without significant R&D investment [95].  They should be small 
enough to be handled by an individual and carried on small vehicles (such as a HMMWV).  
They might even be less expensive to produce than the HMMWV. 
 
Although it is relatively easy for an adversary to destroy a number of satellite assets in 
a very short period of time, it is very difficult for the United States to replace those assets.  In 
peacetime, our satellites have extremely long lifetimes.  It is not unusual for a system to have 
an operational life of many years.  This is to be contrasted to Russian satellite systems that had 
lifetimes of months. Because of the long lifetimes and high cost of our satellites, we do not 
have an inventory of replacements.  The United States neither had to place multiple replace-
ment satellites in parking orbits (to provide ready replacements when one satellite failed) nor 
to develop a rapid launch cycle time (to permit many launches in a relatively short period of 
time to accommodate frequent replacement of failed satellites).  We also do not have an inven-
tory of satellite launch vehicles.  It typically takes many months to build a launch vehicle and 
many months to several years to build a satellite.  It typically takes many weeks to mate a satel-
lite to its launch vehicle and launch that satellite.  The lack of a rapid satellite replacement 
capability coupled with our dependence on our satellite assets creates a serious vulnerability 
that we should not ignore.  
 
 If America’s space assets were destroyed, we would be unable to conduct effective mili-
tary operations.  Our cruise missiles and many other precision-guided weapons would be un-
able to hit their targets because they rely on guidance information derived from GPS satellite 
signals.  Surface ships, aircraft, and even infantry forces would lose the precision navigation 
capability they derive from GPS.  Falling back on residual celestial navigation, inertial navi-
gation, or even map-reading capabilities (if they are still available) would mean going back to 
living with position uncertainties of kilometers rather than meters.   
 
 Theater and higher level commanders rely on imaging intelligence from satellites to 
provide early warning of troop buildups or maneuvers).  Without such intelligence, we are 
open to tactical and strategic surprise.  The same intelligence is used to develop targeting in-
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formation for air and missile strikes and artillery fires.  Even if the guidance of those weapons 
were not degraded by absence of GPS, the lack of high-quality targeting information reduces 
their utilization to Vietnam era quality and results.   
 
 Our command and control system relies on wide bandwidth data communication.  Loss 
of communication satellites means that only line of sight communications, line of sight com-
munications relayed by airborne assets, or low bandwidth HF communications will remain.  
Unit commanders will be reduced to communicating only with direct superior and subordinate 
commands.  Calls for assistance from or coordination with other units will require tedious and 
time consuming routing up and down multiple levels of command.  Even the quality of life 
benefits of modern technology will disappear.  Contact with families over the Internet will dis-
appear for deployed forces.  Even telephone communications with land forces will be de-
graded.  Television broadcasts may be terminated if the retransmission satellites are knocked 
out.  Loss of satellite-based Internet service will also cut off deployed administrators from re-
mote databases, maintenance technicians from factory support personnel, and health care 
workers from telemedicine support.   
 
 Commanders will even lack short-term weather forecasts.  Images of storm systems will 
be unavailable.  Thus ships at sea will have limited knowledge of the existence or courses of 
major storms.  Commanders will be unable to determine in advance when conditions will be 
favorable to aircraft operations and when they will no.  Essentially, they will be reduced to 
forecasting the weather based on the appearance of the sky and whether the barometer is ris-
ing or falling.   
 
 An extended campaign against space assets might even knock out our missile launch 
warning satellites.  Without these satellites the U. S. would be vulnerable to a surprise attack 
by nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs.  We would furthermore lack any immediate indication of the 
use of theater ballistic missiles.  Although we have often rhetorically stated that such attacks 
on the warning satellites would trigger nuclear retaliation, it is unclear whether we would ac-
tually carry out such threats.  Against a fully nuclear capable adversary, the threat of mutual 
assured destruction still exists and without a demonstrated nuclear attack, it is doubtful if our 
government would trigger a mutually destructive nuclear exchange.  If the adversary were not 
a nuclear power, then our own formally declared policy is that the U. S. will not use nuclear 
weapons against any non-nuclear State Party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that has 
abided by that treaty.  Should a non-nuclear power disable our early warning satellites, it is 
doubtful that the U. S. would retaliate with nuclear weapons. 
 
 In short, in the face of a dedicated attack on U. S. and allied space assets, U. S. forces 
would be knocked back to Vietnam era fighting capabilities.  Our forces would be no better 
than the forces available to any third world country.  Maneuver warfare would once again be 
replaced with attrition warfare with its high death tolls and emphasis on numerical superiority 
without force multipliers.  It would take years to replace any significant loss in our space as-
sets.  Almost any conflict that involved ASATs would be over before we could recover. 
 
NPC should develop extensive ground-based laser and space-based laser antisatellite 
weapon capabilities with the goal of being able to destroy even geosynchronous satellites.  As a 
 81
backup, it should develop more conventional fragmentation or kinetic energy impact antisatellite 
weapons.  A coherent and cautious strategy should be developed for employing these weapons.  
If the U. S. believes NPC to possess enough ICBMs to give NPC a mutual assured destruction 
capability, then destruction of U. S. space assets might trigger a massive nuclear retaliation.  This 
was stated as a likely response to Soviet destruction of our space assets had it occurred during 
the Cold War.  On the other hand, it is doubtful that the U. S. would have actually launched a 
first strike (and thereby initiated mutual assured destruction) merely because our satellites were 
attacked, even if it were the ballistic missile launch early warning satellites.  Rhetoric is one 
thing, suicidal action is another.  If the U. S. does not believe the NPC ICBM threat to be over-
whelming, then U. S. space assets could be attacked with very little fear of instant massive nu-
clear retaliation.   
 
If space attack is not ruled out, then antisatellite assets should be employed in a manner 
to deny the U. S. specific targeting information at the most critical moments.  That is, the attacks 
on U. S. imaging satellites should be timed to occur at the precise moments that U. S. forces en-
tire the denial area.  Premature employment gives the U. S. a capability to launch limited re-
placements for its destroyed satellites.  As it will likely take at least a week for a satellite to be 
mated to a launch vehicle and readied for launch even under emergency conditions, optimum 
attack timing can have a profound impact on U. S. warfighting capabilities.  Given the U. S. reli-
ance on GPS, it is clear that at least half of the GPS satellites should be destroyed.  Other space 
assets such as communication satellites or weather satellites should also be considered as poten-
tial targets.  A detailed plan for space warfare should be developed.  This would establish the 
space targets to be attacked, the priority placed on each target, the prerequisites for initiating an 
attack on each target, and the sequence and timing of probable attacks.  This plan would also 
provide guidance for the development of the attack forces.  For example, how many laser ASATs 
versus how many missile ASATs are needed and where should they be deployed. 
 
The use of nondestructive laser blinding systems can deny tactical imaging information 
without much chance of triggering a nuclear response.  Radar and ELINT satellites would be un-
affected by laser blinders, so intelligence denial is not complete.  NPC should consider building 
and deploying enough laser satellite blinders to cover all ground and naval forces.  NPC should 
also consider developing laser antisensor capability for use against unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), as these will form the major form of in-theater reconnaissance employed by the United 
States.  A laser antisensor weapon would combine a highly-sensitive target acquisition system 
(most probably based on infrared search sensors and/or laser radars) for detecting the presumably 
stealthy, high altitude UAVs and a medium-power laser for damaging the UAV sensor systems.  
Such devices could be evolved from the satellite blinders.  A high-power microwave system 
might also be included to destroy any electronic intelligence or synthetic aperture radars that the 
UAVs might carry. 
 
The U. S. will undoubtedly develop its own antisatellite weapons.  To the extent that 
NPC relies on its own space assets, it must develop capabilities to protect the functions provided 
by those assets.  NPC should invest in an inventory of spare satellites and launch vehicles.  Some 
of these may be placed in parking orbits and kept inactive.  Others should be kept in a ready con-
dition for rapid launch.  NPC should attempt to develop automation technologies that would 
minimize the time required to prepare and launch each satellite.  NPC should study protection 
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technologies for on-board systems.  It might consider using radioisotope thermal generators for 
power rather than fragile solar cell systems.  It should incorporate nonlinear optical limiting fil-
ters in its imaging systems. It should devote a significant fraction of the weight budget to thermal 
control of satellite systems.  These will prevent medium-power antisatellite lasers from having 
significant effects and may reduce vulnerability to other antisatellite technologies.  
 
The U. S. cannot afford to lose a significant fraction of its space assets.  How-
ever, this is what will almost certainly happen if an adversary develops a viable anti-
satellite capability.  The U. S. needs to evaluate what technologies might prove ef-
fective as countermeasures to an anti-satellite weapon.   
 
 We should incorporate known protection technologies for on-board systems 
and study new protection technologies.  We might consider using radioisotope 
thermal generators for power rather than fragile solar cell systems.  This will provide 
a significant improvement in survivability against any ASAT technology.  We should 
incorporate nonlinear optical limiting filters in our imaging systems.  We should de-
vote a significant fraction of the weight budget to thermal control of satellite sys-
tems.  These will prevent medium-power antisatellite lasers from having significant 
effects.  The outer surfaces of satellites should be coated with lightweight xray 
shielding and radiation protection circuits should be incorporated.  These latter de-
vices sense excessive radiation levels, store the current state of electronic systems 
in hardened memories and instant shut off power to the system.  As soon as the ra-
diation level subsides, the circuit initiates a restart using the stored information as a 
starting point.  Function is temporarily halted, but neither function nor data are lost.  
In addition, the entire package should be analyzed and hardened against both EMP 
and high-power microwaves.  These will provide improved protection against nu-
clear ASATs.  Many such measures were planned for implementation in current 
generations of satellites.  It is unfortunate that in the 1990’s a fit of post-Cold War 
budget cutting forced their elimination on the grounds that they were unnecessary.  
All critical satellites should be provided with larger orbital maneuvering capabilities 
than their normal missions require.  This will permit the satellite to actively evade 
some of the ASAT threats.  It may be worth coupling a collision detection radar sys-
tem that can track all objects within a nominal range (100 km?) and automatically 
trigger the maneuvering system if an object appears on a collision trajectory.  This 
would negate the possibility that the adversary might be able to interfere with con-
trol from an earth station during the critical moments before intercept. 
 
As a complement to, or at least an alternative to hardening, the U. S. should 
consider redundancy by placing systems with comparable capabilities into grossly 
different orbits.  Reconnaissance satellites using low earth orbits could be back-
stopped by a few larger satellites in medium earth orbits.  Geosynchronous satellites 
could be backstopped by a larger number of smaller satellites in Molniya orbits.  
Such redundancy would force an adversary to develop multiple kinds of anti-satellite 
weapons in order to ensure that any specific U. S. capability could be eliminated.   
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Another option is reconstitution of satellite losses.  This is a costly option that 
requires multiple spare satellites held in storage and a substantial number of launch 
vehicles kept in ready reserve.  When a critical space asset is destroyed, a replace-
ment is removed from inventory, placed on a waiting launch vehicle, and launched 
as quickly as orbital timing permits.  This option could be made somewhat less 
costly by designing cheaper satellites that have very short expected lifetimes.  
Knowing that they would have to be replaced in three months regardless, there are 
always multiple satellites and launch vehicles in the production line, with at least one 
being readied for launch.  Although they did not do this intentionally, this was the 
path the Soviet Union pursued with its intelligence satellites.  Had the U. S. ex-
pended an anti-satellite weapon to shoot down a Soviet satellite, the advantage 
would have been much shorter-lived than if the Soviets had downed a U. S. satellite.  
Because we design our satellites to have lifetimes of years, there is seldom a spare 
available.  When a launch fails, we must sometimes contract for a whole new satel-
lite to be constructed from scratch, and wait months for it to be completed and read-
ied. 
 
Another option is to backstop certain space assets with unmanned, high alti-
tude and endurance (HAE) aerial platforms.  For example, in-theater non-line-of-sight 
communications could be relayed by several HAE vehicles.  These vehicles would 
never have to come into range of the anti-satellite systems (whether ground-based 
missile launchers or ground-based laser systems).  Aerial reconnaissance satellites 
could be backstopped by planned HAE reconnaissance platforms.  In-theater 
weather measurements could also be performed by several HAE platforms if the U. 
S. weather satellites were destroyed. 
 
 A last alternative is the development of anti-ASAT weapons.  The same boost 
phase defenses envisioned during the heyday of SDI:  Space-Based Laser (SBL) or 
Brilliant Pebbles (BP) can defend against ASAT launches just as they can defend 
against ICBM launches.  In addition, both types of devices should have reasonable 
effectiveness on weapons that have already achieved orbital velocity and pass 
within relatively short distances.  Having a terminally guided, maneuvering, kinetic 
kill vehicle, a BP system should be capable of killing ASATS, post-boost vehicles, 
and even adversary satellites.  Although SBL would not be capable of killing an 
ASAT after boost at it maximum ranges, if the ASAT passed close enough to the 
SBL it could nevertheless be damaged or destroyed.  An SBL would also be capable 





RELIANCE ON LONG-RANGE AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE  
 
The United States requires long-range airborne surveillance assets to detect incoming 
aircraft and missile threats and to keep track of the ground battle.  Satellite-based sensors 
cannot adequately perform these functions.  Without AWACS (Air Force) and E-2C early 
warning and tracking aircraft [96], [97], the airborne forces would not be able to conserve 
their strength, and use maneuver warfare to gain superiority in only those regions where su-
periority is required.  Aircraft would be required to remain airborne on continuous air patrol 
in order to intercept incoming raids.  The continuous stress on the systems (machine and hu-
mans) would soon lead to total breakdown of effectiveness.  The J-STARS ground surveillance 
aircraft allow all vehicular traffic to be monitored in an entire theater of operations [96].  This 
knowledge allows U. S. forces to prevent the enemy from effectively employing maneuver war-
fare against the U. S.  Without J-STARS United States forces are vulnerable to surprise attack 
and/or tactical deception.  Despite their importance, the United States has a limited number of 
these airborne assets.  The on-board sensor suites are enormously expensive, so the U. S. is 
not been able to procure as many of these specialized aircraft as some would like.   An aircraft 
carrier has only enough E-2C aircraft to keep one aircraft airborne and fully operational at 
all times (given standard equipment failure rates).  This is due both to cost and to lack of deck 
space to accommodate too many spare aircraft.  Theaters are also severely limited in the num-
ber of AWACS and J-STARS aircraft available to the commander.  Here too the allocation is 
typically just enough to keep one (or two, if the theater is geographically large) aircraft of 
each type in the air at all times.  Heroic maintenance efforts might permit the number of 
available aircraft to be temporarily increased, but this cannot be supported for long cam-
paigns.  In general, there is not a large pool of reserve aircraft back in the United States to 
draw upon if losses become heavy.  
  
Typically, the long-range surveillance aircraft are unarmed (with the exception of elec-
tronic warfare assets) and are kept as far away from the enemy as consistent with performing 
their missions.  There are often two or more fighter aircraft assigned to provide cover for each 
surveillance aircraft, although the covering aircraft may not be dedicated escorts.  There may 
also be an Airborne Laser aircraft assigned to provide missile defense to the surveillance as-
sets.  Despite these precautions, the surveillance aircraft can be attacked and shot down.  Sup-
pose that the enemy concentrated its “air superiority” efforts early in a campaign on destroy-
ing or damaging as many of the long-range surveillance assets as possible.  Concerted attacks 
by large fleets of aircraft might be successful especially if the attack were disguised to look like 
an attack on other obvious high-value targets.  Attacks by ballistic missiles with anti-air sub-
munitions might also prove successful.  If the attacks were only marginally successful and 
downed only one AWACS or E-2C aircraft, then after enough time has passed, it will be likely 
that airborne surveillance will be missing for at least some part of each day.   If two or more 
were downed, loss of continuous coverage would be almost immediate and substantial.  If a J-
STARS aircraft were downed then control of the ground war would revert to Korean War vin-
tage techniques (radio links connecting reconnaissance patrols with a coordinating headquar-




 NPC should devote a fraction of its air force budget to systems capable of negating U.S. 
long-range surveillance aircraft.  Long-range (>200 km range), high-speed (>Mach 5) air-to-air 
missiles with advanced dual mode (RF/IR) countermeasure-resistant guidance should be devel-
oped specifically to target high-value air targets.  Several teams from each air group should be 
dedicated to this critical mission.  They should develop tactics that will permit maximum sur-
prise and minimum reaction time in the attack.  These aviators should be given first rate aircraft 
to optimize their chances of success.  Thought should be given to developing surface-to-air mis-
siles with capabilities comparable to the air-to-air missile, and employing them in a coordinated 
attack.  Long-range ballistic missiles with anti-air submunitions might also be used.  If properly 
thought through, the tactics and weapons used in this attack might also be able to attack the U.S. 
Air Force’s Airborne Laser aircraft (denying the U.S. a critical facet of its short- and medium-
range ballistic missile defense capabilities).  At the outset of any open hostilities, NPC should be 
prepared to immediately implement the counter-surveillance strike.  NPC forces should strike 
these assets early and decisively, because as long as those assets are in place, they are major 
force multipliers for U.S. forces.  Once destroyed, it will take the U. S. years to replace those as-
sets.  
 The U. S. needs to recognize that its long-range surveillance assets are not 
only vulnerable to attack by a creative and determined adversary, but also very at-
tractive targets to such an adversary.  Better protection needs to be afforded to 
these assets.  Consideration should be given to adding improved self-protection 
equipment – state-of-the-art, dc-to-light, electronic warning, jamming, and decoy 
systems – to those platforms that do not already have them or comparable capabili-
ties.  Consideration should also be given to providing each of these assets with 
dedicated fighter escort. Finding new tasks for already overtasked forces is not 
pleasant to contemplate.  Comparable levels of protection should be given to our 
limited aerial refueling assets.  Loss of enough tankers will cause the surveillance 
platforms to land in order to refuel.  This will significantly reduce the availability of 
these assets to such a degree that an additional aircraft may be required.  Assigning 
two or four fighters to escort every AWACS, JSTARS, E-2, KC-10 tanker, etc. will 
mean that other vital tasks cannot be performed.  On the one hand, it makes no 
sense to have targets, if you have no aircraft to attack them.  On the other hand, it 
makes equally little sense to have aircraft, if you cannot provide them with targets to 
attack.  However, it must be remembered that the roughly $500 million replacement 
cost for a new 767-based AWACS or a JSTARS could procure a dozen F-15s or two 
dozen F-16s, and the loss of these surveillance assets could be catastrophic to our 
new “network-centric” concepts of warfighting.  The calculations should be refigured 
with this new vulnerability (and an assessment of its likelihood of exploitation) firmly 
in mind.  The same kind of analysis of alternatives should be repeated for any of the 
instances (in the following sections of this report) where escorts of one kind or an-




SUSCEPTIBILITY TO STRATEGIC DECEPTION  
 
U. S. intelligence efforts are dominated by satellite-based systems for imagery and elec-
tromagnetic signal interception.  Satellite-based intelligence (Satint) is exceedingly susceptible 
to negation by moving the activities underground.  Witness the success of the North Koreans 
in hiding the exact extent and nature of their nuclear programs.  Virtually any activity of any 
size can be hidden underground, if it is sufficiently important to warrant the expenditure of 
resources.  Submarine bases, factories, infantry barracks, small cities, and even airfields can 
be constructed underground.  Corregidor, Gibraltar, and Cheyenne Mountain among many 
others are examples of massive military facilities that were located almost entirely under-
ground, although the underground basing was selected for physical protection not secrecy.  
Satint is also notoriously dependent on the availability of satellite coverage of any region of 
interest.  Frequent observation of one region precludes observation of many others.  Over 
time, continuous observation of underground facilities can yield limited information.  How-
ever, this is at the expense of failing to observe many other facilities. The U. S. intelligence 
community has limited human intelligence capability.  Humint is the only form of intelligence 
capable of penetrating buried facilities to uncover secret programs with reasonable expendi-
ture of effort and resources.   
 
The common reclama against hiding facilities underground is that secret weapons de-
velopments cannot be employed without extensive training and this training must be carried 
out in the open.  This is the territory of strategic deception [98].  It wasn’t possible to hide the 
massing of several million men and equipment in England prior to the Normandy invasion; it 
was possible to deceive the Germans as to where and when the invasion would occur [99].  
The United States hid the deployment of the Corona spy satellites under the guise of Discov-
erer scientific missions [100].  Laser weapons tests were routinely conducted when there 
would be no known foreign spy satellites overhead.  The same was true of the ground phases 
of every stealth aircraft program.  Takeoffs and landings were timed to occur at night and 
when satellite coverage was non-existent.  At all other times the airplanes were either hidden 
by the enormity of the airspace of the western U. S. or hidden by hangars.  The windows of 
opportunity ranged from many minutes to many hours.  Plausible alternative activities con-
ducted in parallel with the actual secret activities coupled with disinformation (believable 
cover stories) can lead any observers to miss the secret activity or ascribe any of its detected 
characteristics to the plausible alternative. 
 
Large unit training can be disguised by consecutive training of smaller units and dis-
guising the exchange of units between training cycles.  Training for one form of warfare may 
be disguised as training for another form.  For example, amphibious operations training (as-
sumed to be provocative and suggestive of offensive intent) can be disguised as river-crossing 
operations training (which are essential for even a defensive Army).  Special operations train-
ing (clearly offensive) might be disguised as counter-terrorism training (necessary for any 
country in today’s terrorist-filled world).  Prior to March 1935, when the ban on German re-
armament was still officially in effect, the German “Air Force” maintained a cadre of basic 
flight-qualified personnel through a proliferation of soaring clubs – soaring was a German 
national sport in the ‘20’s and ‘30’s.  It subsequently converted the most-promising young 
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glider pilots into fully qualified pilots through the German Air Line Pilots School (which not 
too surprisingly was run more like a military academy than a pilot training school).  Gradu-
ates of this school nominally worked for Lufthansa but many were sworn into the “Black 
Luftwaffe” as officers and trained to fly fighter aircraft [101].  This subterfuge was known to 
Allied intelligence organizations because the Nazi leadership could not help boasting about 
how many advances the Third Reich was making, but it served admirably to support the fiction 
of “Peace in our time” favored by pacifist politicians such as Chamberlain. 
 
NPC should conceal all of the more provocative aspects of its military buildup under 
some form of deception or camouflage.  When possible, development facilities should be con-
structed underground.  Wherever practical, operational military bases (or their critical parts) 
should be located underground.  Submarine bases should excavated into cliff faces with under-
water ingress and egress.  Aircraft test facilities should follow the Groom Lake model [102].  
Operational airfields should always store aircraft in hardened, covered revetments or in caves or 
tunnels in nearby hills (so as to make counting the number of deployed aircraft difficult).  If cov-
ered structures are used, but some are used only as decoys to confuse counting, activities (heat-
ing, air conditioning, communications, power usage, etc.) at the decoys should those of the non-
decoy (in use) structures.  Tunnels complexes that might or might not be used to house military 
equipment (such as artillery batteries or missile launchers) should be built throughout the coun-
try.  Those complexes not actually used should be maintained as if they will be used in the near 
future.  In strategic deception, the devil is in the details. 
 
Provocative training exercises should be structured so they look like less-provocative 
training exercises.  Specialized training should be done in small groups on a continuous basis 
rather than large groups on a one-time basis.  Embedded training, virtual reality, and netted train-
ing should be emphasized.  When entire divisions can simultaneous exercise in interconnected 
simulators, all aspects of command, control, and coordination can be rehearsed without any out-
side knowledge of large-scale exercises taking place.  When essential to exercise in the open, 
cover stories should be developed (beginning years in advance).  If NPC intends to invade a 
neighboring country and a large force buildup is required near the border, then such large build-
ups should be conducted on a regular basis for at least 5 years prior to the actual invasion. 
 
The U. S. needs to address its failures in obtaining adequate human intelli-
gence, that leave us susceptible to strategic deception on a grand scale.  The intelli-
gence communities should spend less effort on creating “national technical means” 
and spend more effort on gathering human intelligence and more effort in analyzing 
the intelligence (technical and human) that it does gather.  Resources should be real-
located on the basis of potential likelihood of conflict and low degree of “presence” 
in a region, rather than on “the number of nuclear weapons the country possessed”, 
that appears to be the dominant Cold War criterion.  Human intelligence efforts 
should be expended inversely with the degree of transparency the adversary gov-
ernment exhibits.  In analyzing technical intelligence, analysts should be trained to 
consider the potential of strategic deception and concealment on the part of the ad-
versary.  Lastly, the various intelligence agencies need to better coordinate their ef-
forts.  Each organization has its own “rice bowl” and has little desire to share intelli-
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gence and analysis that make help another organization to increase the size of the 
other organization’s rice bowl. 
 89
EXCESSIVE INTELLIGENCE-RESPONSE LATENCY   
 
High-value targeting relies on the flow of information from intelligence assets such as 
National Technical Means through the collection agencies to field commanders to the local 
units that conduct the actual attacks.  Historically, it has taken inordinately long times for in-
telligence information on critical targets to flow down to the organizations that needed it.  It 
might take hours or days for photo-interpreters to locate and identify a specific target of inter-
est.  It might take even longer before that information was transmitted to decision-makers and 
planners.  Even after the information was incorporated into a targeting plan, it takes an ex-
tended period of time for an individual weapon to be brought to bear against that target.  As a 
result of the inability of Coalition forces to destroy Iraq’s Scud missile launchers, many new 
initiatives were launched.  The whole concept of Network-Centric Warfare is aimed at reduc-
ing time delays between acquiring target data and delivering weapons on that target.  Unfor-
tunately, no matter how well these concepts are implemented, until speed-of-light weapons are 
used to perform the actual engagement, there will always remain latency periods of at least a 
few and possibly many minutes between detection and destruction.  This inherent latency can 
and often is exploited by our enemies. 
 
 NPC should make as many of its high-value targets as mobile as is practical.  ICBMs and 
most shorter-range missiles should be mounted on mobile launchers (either truck- or rail-based).  
Careful design consideration should be paid to minimizing the time a launcher must be stationary 
to prepare for launch, launch a missile, and pack up for relocation.  A maximum of ten minutes is 
desirable.  If possible, designs should allow shoot on the move.  Launcher designs should allow 
them to be camouflaged to look like any of a large number of civilian targets, (e.g., like gasoline 
trucks, milk tankers, refrigerated semi-trailers, or freight cars), so that while in motion they can-
not be readily identified.  Similar considerations should be given to artillery and air defense 
weapons.  Given the ability of counter-battery fire to have return fire in the air before the initial 
rounds have impacted suggests that future artillery should be designed to fire on the move.  
Fixed site surface-to-air missile unites will be quickly identified and destroyed in the opening 
moments of a high-intensity conflict.  NPC should design all of its air defense weapons to be 
both highly mobile and to be able to shoot on the move.  Fixed site systems such as ground-
based lasers that cannot be made mobile should be designed so that most of the target is deeply 
buried and protected.  Redundancy in the critical beam direction components as well as improvi-
sation of special protection mechanisms should be employed to permit those sites to be surviv-
able even after initial targeting. 
 
 At the same time NPC should devote considerable effort to the study of the United 
States’ Network-Centric system.  It should develop a detailed process model that will allow NPC 
planners to understand the latency between the creation of a piece of information and its end use.  
These planners should determine the critical network nodes, whose loss would further exacerbate 
latency problems.  Special weapons or special means of attacking these network nodes should be 
developed.  At any point in the conflict where it appears that the U. S. is operating inside NPC’s 
decision loop, NPC should act to slow the cycle down and should attack those critical nodes. 
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Intelligence-response latency is best addressed by eliminating as much as 
possible at the source.  Some latency could be reduced almost to zero by directly 
relaying the satellite imagery to the user.  When any competent physicist from any 
country in the world can unquestionably calculate to within 25% accuracy what the 
performance capabilities of a given satellite are (without resorting to any information 
that is not available in the open literature), there is little rationale for continuing to 
place codeword restrictions on access to raw satellite images.  Missile launch indica-
tions should not take more than a few seconds to be forwarded to ballistic missile 
defense units.  Intelligence community sensitivities should be overridden in these 
areas in order to facilitate the rapid sensor-to-shooter communication envisioned by 
network-centric warfare.  Latency at the shooter end can be reduced either by de-
veloping weapons with faster times of flight (hypersonic cruise missiles versus sub-
sonic cruise missiles) or by deploying the shooters closer to the target.  There are 
advantages and disadvantages to both approaches.  Thus, both should be investi-
gated and pursued where it can be shown to be more advantageous.  Latency in the 
middle (the decision process) can be minimized by a priori delegating firing authority 
down to the lowest level.  The U. S. military prides itself on the initiative exhibited at 
all levels of the chain of command.  This is one area where pride in the fact not just 
the promise is not only desirable but also essential. 
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CHAPTER 7.  UNCONVENTIONAL METHODS OF ATTACK 
 
 
ATTACK BY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES   
 
All aspects of the United States military and civilian sectors are vulnerable to enemy 
special operations forces (SOF).  This vulnerability results from several factors.  Few senior 
U. S. military leaders appreciate the impact that special operations closely coordinated with 
conventional operations can have on the outcome of a campaign.  For example, during the 
Persian Gulf war, Gen. Schwarzkopf only grudgingly permitted limited participation by 
American special operations forces [103].  Conventional American forces seldom train to de-
fend against SOF attacks.  Remember the dictum “Train like you fight!  Fight like you train!”  
Furthermore, U. S. forces in rear areas typically exhibit a complacency that invites attack by 
SOF (“that can’t happen here”).  This is borne out by the repeated havoc that a single platoon 
of SEALs was able to inflict on military base after military base during Red Cell security in-
spections [104].  It is reinforced by the general public perception that “it can’t happen here”.  
Remember that the continental United States has not been attacked by a foreign power since 
the War of 1812 (if you discount Pancho Villa’s “banditry” on the Mexican border [105] and 
the half-hearted Japanese submarine-based artillery shelling of oil storage tanks near Santa 
Barbara [106] and “fire-bomb balloon” attacks on the Pacific Northwest [107] during WW 
II). 
 
Although the public is aware of and somewhat enamored of the almost unbelievable 
capabilities possessed by U. S. Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs, few members of that 
public know that highly capable special operations units are possessed by almost every major 
military power.  They cannot bring themselves to imagine that comparable capabilities might 
be directed against themselves by a foreign power.  Consequently, they are not adequately pre-
pared (physically or mentally) to deal with attacks by special operations forces.  However, with 
relatively little investment any peer competitor could possess special operations forces that are 
almost the mirror image of those of the United States (although the U.S. might retain a slight 
edge in high tech gadgetry for equipping those forces).  Any mission that the U. S. has envi-
sioned to be performed by our own special operations forces could just as easily be performed 
against us by enemy special operations forces.  Sabotage, assassination of key political or mili-
tary figures, neutralization or destruction of critical facilities, intelligence gathering, deep re-
connaissance, capture of ships, offshore platforms, or other critical facilities, or diversionary 
raids can be directed against us just as we have envisioned using them against our own ene-
mies. 
 
There is the additional possibility that terrorists (both foreign and domestic) might be 
enlisted to conduct attacks against U. S. assets at home or abroad.  This would not entail any 
significant effort or cost on the part of an adversary.  Nevertheless, perhaps the only things 
that would distinguish terrorist attacks from special operations forces attacks are the profes-
sionalism and consideration for limiting collateral damage that special operations forces 
would exhibit.  All U. S. forces have proven themselves vulnerable to terrorist attack time and 
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again.  The bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, the bombings of nightclubs in Ger-
many frequented by U. S. soldiers, the bombing of the Khobar Towers apartments, and the 
bombing of the U. S. S. Cole. 
 
This last incident points out a serious SOF/terrorist threat to U. S. naval forces.  Many 
navies are moving away from large blue-water ships like destroyers and cruisers towards pa-
trol boats and even modified pleasure craft.  A boat the size of a large cabin cruiser (such a 
WWII PT boat) can carry several antiship missiles or 2-4 torpedoes and one or more guns as 
large as 40-mm.  The addition of several handheld missiles (such as Stingers) can provide a 
credible air defense.  Any of these craft is capable of sinking a destroyer or a cruiser.  Fur-
thermore, several dozen might be acquired and armed for the cost of acquiring a single Aegis 
cruiser or destroyer.  Fighting several dozen missile- and torpedo-armed patrol boats is con-
siderably more difficult than fighting a few destroyers.   
 
Even smaller boats can be equipped with crew-served anti-armor weapons.  A TOW 
missile launcher (chosen because at least 36 countries currently have this weapon – the 
French, Swedish, Russian, or other equivalents are equally serious threats) can be mounted 
on craft as small as an inflatable boat such as a Zodiac.  One could easily be mounted and 
concealed on any small fishing boat, coastal trader, or pleasure boat.  Nevertheless, the missile 
could be launched at ranges up to 4000 meters and precision-guided to seriously damage any 
warship.  The warhead of a TOW missile could:  destroy the bridge of a destroyer, damage 
half the faces of a SPY-1 radar, completely destroy any other radar or electro-optical sensor 
system, put a large caliber gun out of commission, damage the steering mechanism of many 
ships, or incapacitate an aircraft elevator on an aircraft carrier.  In ten seconds an innocent 
fishing boat could transform itself into a gunboat and fire a small missile at a passing war-
ship.  Any boat even a dinghy can carry enough high explosive to blow a large hole in the side 
of any warship.  In littoral waters it is difficult to avoid having small boats come too close for 
safety.  Many Asian fishing boat captains play “tag” with larger ships.  It is considered good 
luck if one can successfully cut across the bow of a larger vessel.  The act reputedly stops de-
mons from following the smaller boat.  Such acts could only be prevented by firing on the 
boats (and except in wartime this would not be permitted under international law).  Sooner or 
later, one of the crews of these boats will be consist of terrorists or special operations forces, 
and one or more warships will be damaged, and possibly put out of action. 
 
NPC should expend every effort to create a substantial & credible special operations 
force with global reach.  These forces should be capable of performing a full spectrum of special 
operations.  They should include components capable of sea, air, and land operations.  The SOF 
should be equipped and trained to be the equals of U. S. Special Forces or SEALs.  The NPC 
military leaders should develop a doctrine that recognizes the importance and advantages of SOF 
while also appreciating their limitations.  That doctrine should permit the use of SOF with con-
ventional forces in a fully coordinated fashion whenever possible, while retaining the option and 
capability for independent SOF operations.   
 
Creation of a first-rate special operations force cannot be accomplished in a few days or 
even a few years.   However, if NPC is willing to devote adequate resources and the better part 
of a decade to the attempt, then the path to success is straightforward.  It requires continuing and 
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unrelenting emphasis on mental and physical conditioning, teamwork and unit cohesion, and re-
alistic mission training.  The following hypothetical course of action is only suggestive of how 
NPC might develop its special operations forces. 
 
NPC might begin by assembling a moderate but manageable number (approx. 100) of 
volunteer career officers and senior enlisted personnel.  This unit should undergo extensive 
physical and psychological toughening under the direction of experienced former special opera-
tions personnel.  There is no shortage of retired Special Forces, SEALS, SAS, GSG-9, Spetsnaz, 
etc., personnel who could be hired to provide the initial training required.  An extended severe 
mental and physical test (such as Hell week, the “crucible”, etc.) is important to both the selec-
tion process and to team building.  After the first few months of conditioning, basic special op-
erations skills (shooting, unarmed combat, silent movement, etc.) may be added to the training 
regime.  After six months to a year of this training to weed out those without the physical and 
mental stamina for special operations, the NPC personnel should become part of the training 
cadre.  Additional forces may then be sent through the training regime.  After several training 
classes have been graduated, the first advanced training units may be established.  Such units 
should be small (8 to 14 enlisted with 1 to 2 officers) with officers that are treated little differ-
ently from enlisted.  The total organization should be horizontal with a minimum of military 
formality and hierarchy.  Unit personnel should only be shuffled if required due to casualties or 
dropouts.  After an extended period of advanced training it is envisioned that these units would 
become operational. 
 
The advanced training units should continue training under the outside special operations 
experts.  Weapons, tactics, demolitions, close quarters battle, parachute training, and underwater 
operations are logically part of the training schedule at this level.  Unit training must be as realis-
tic and as intensive as possible.  NPC must not balk at providing its SOF units with all of the 
weapons and ammunition that they can possibly use.  After a minimum of six months at the unit 
level, the unit may be considered for conversion to operational status.   
 
Operational units should continue advanced training on their own.  Oversight by foreign 
mercenaries should not be necessary nor desirable at this stage.  For the first few years, opera-
tional units should be given operational missions sparingly.  Each mission needs to be carefully 
considered beforehand based on the degree of secrecy planned for the operational forces as a 
whole.  It is also relatively important to have more early successes than failures.  Special weap-
ons & equipment and extensive rehearsal must be provided for any operation mission.  It is dur-
ing this period of initial operations that an overall strategy of SOF employment can be developed 
and evaluated.  After two to three years on operational status, individuals in the unit should be 
rotated back into the training cadres and into newly formed units to facilitate the spread of opera-
tional knowledge throughout the force.  If the training input is large enough to guarantee more 
“graduates” than the force loses through attrition, then the number of operational units will stead-
ily increase.  No sooner than four or five years into the process, a “publicly acknowledged” force 
might consider attempting cross training with SOF forces of other countries to provide independ-
ent evaluation of the acquired skills.  Over time, the more highly skilled members of the earliest 
classes can replace the mercenary training cadre.  After a decade or so, a large well-trained and 
self-sustaining force will have been created.  Attaining proficiency comparable to U.S. special 
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operations forces will require many years of continual training in all operational skills and dedi-
cated support on the part of the rest of the military forces. 
 
If the existence of these forces is not intentionally kept secret (a difficult but possibly 
very desirable undertaking) then those forces should actively cross train with U. S. special opera-
tions forces.  This would help to guarantee maximum readiness, access to the latest techniques, 
technology, and equipment, and better preparation to counter the U. S. forces when conflict 
comes.  To facilitate U. S. willingness to permit cross training, all externally visible training and 
preparation should emphasize “acceptable” and “peaceful” roles such as counter-terrorism, hos-
tage rescue, anti-piracy, or drug interdiction, rather than uniquely military operations.  Training 
for the uniquely military missions should be done in a fashion that gives the U. S. minimum in-
formation on those missions and SOF’s ultimate capabilities.  
 
At the onset of hostilities NPC should employ its SOF (in concert with any other intelli-
gence or fifth column assets in place) to disrupt the U. S. military machine and its preparations to 
the maximum extent possible.  Using conventional or special weapons (as NPC’s policy per-
mits), they should attempt to disrupt embarkation of troops and materiel at critical ports and air-
fields.  They should disrupt our command and control infrastructure by damaging or destroying 
communications nodes or computer systems.  They should attempt to destroy irreplaceable pre-
positioned equipment depots or ships as well as logistics support ships such as ammunition ships 
and oilers and airborne refueling assets.  They should attempt to destroy or damage as much of 
the America’s critical sealift and airlift assets as possible.  In short NPC should use its SOF to 
make it as difficult as possible for the U. S. military to conduct business as usual. 
 
NPC should attempt to establish contact and ultimate liaison with anti-American terrorist 
groups.  In the case of foreign terrorists, this contact may be direct. Overt ties might lead NPC to 
being branded as a terrorist or rogue state, with consequent trade embargoes, and should be 
avoided.  Contact with U. S. domestic terrorists should be done in ways that do not reveal the 
principals.  Militia groups might be convinced to perform specific acts of sabotage and other dis-
ruptive activities.  However, they would likely refuse to do so if they knew that a foreign gov-
ernment was behind the requests.  Terrorist groups may be considered as adjuncts to any special 
operations forces NPC may possess and should be incorporated into overall planning.   
 
Prior to the initiation of open hostilities, NPC may wish to employ some of its SOF to act 
like terrorists.  Bombings and/or “random” attacks by small boats on naval forces around the 
world could serve to weaken U. S. forces just at those times when the U. S. needs to be strength-
ening its capabilities.  Whether the attacks fail or succeed, NPC can deflect any blame and suspi-
cion onto other known adversaries of the U. S. 
 
The United States should increase its readiness to defend against adversary 
Special Operations Forces.  Such readiness will as a direct consequence increase 
our ability to protect our forces and facilities against terrorist operations.  Opposing 
Forces (OPFOR) activities should include a SOF element.  Training exercises for units 
of all types and sizes should include scenarios that require defense against SOF.  
The Department of Defense should consider using elements of U. S. Special Opera-
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tions Forces to test the defenses of our military facilities on a regular basis.  This ac-
tivity could conceivably be incorporated into the normal SOF training regime.  If this 
is not deemed practical, then separate SOF units should be established (re-
established, actually) to systematically review and test security forces, security 
equipment, and security procedures at U. S. facilities around the world.  Such activi-




LIMITED ADVERSE WEATHER OPERATIONS CAPABILITY   
 
Weather can be a powerful, though fickle, ally.  Allied forces took advantage of one-
sided knowledge of a break in the stormy weather in the English Channel to successfully 
launch the Normandy invasion [108].  German forces had one-sided knowledge of an ex-
tended period of dense fog (grounding the Allied air forces) when they initiated the Battle of 
the Bulge [109].  Any adversary that has good knowledge of regional weather conditions will 
find occasions when it can use good weather or adverse weather to its advantage. 
 
Currently U. S. naval forces do not conduct normal operations in sea states greater 
than 5 (Beaufort Force 6 [110]).  They struggle to survive in sea states greater than 7 (Beau-
fort Force 10).  U. S. forces will avoid sailing into hurricanes and typhoons if at all possible. 
Timing a military provocation to coincide with the presence of a violent storm between the lo-
cation of the provocation and the nearest battle group will add significant delays to the on-
station arrival of that battle group.   
 
Adverse weather does not affect both sides of a conflict equally.  Sensor systems using 
different signatures (e.g., thermal imaging versus television) will be degraded in different de-
grees as the weather worsens.  Different platforms will have different mobilities as weather 
conditions change.  Wheeled vehicles may be bogged down by mud that would not bother 
tracked vehicles.  Rivers that were easily forded at one time may preclude crossing by all but 
amphibious vehicles after heavy rains cause them to rise.  A helicopter assault may be pre-
vented by strong winds that would have little effect on an equivalent armored vehicle assault.  
Detailed knowledge of weather conditions can allow an adversary to employ its assets in opti-
mal fashion [111], [112].  If at the same time the U. S. lacks adequate weather knowledge, we 
would be forced to guess how to optimally employ our own assets.  Even if both sides have 
equal knowledge, the side on the offense can choose to employ those assets and tactics that 
favor the offense given a known weather state. 
 
Undersea warfare is one warfare area that is asymmetrically affected by adverse 
weather.  High winds and correspondingly high sea states produce high underwater acoustic 
noise levels.  This makes it difficult to detect submarines.  High winds hinder flight operations 
(both fixed and rotary wing), restricting the scope of antisubmarine sweeps to surface vessels 
(and submarines) only.  However, nuclear submarines are almost totally unaffected by surface 
weather conditions.  The high acoustic noise will make it somewhat harder to detect surface 
targets, but not drastically.  Thus, submarines could be used with much better effectiveness 
against our forces in adverse weather than in fair weather.  Offensive mine warfare has simi-
lar asymmetries with respect to adverse weather.  
 
U. S. knowledge of and ability to predict global weather is good [113] and will get better 
as more and better weather satellites are launched.  However, the “goodness” in the Western 
Pacific is much worse than over the Continental United States, because satellite coverage is 
reduced.   Much of the current quality in WestPac is due to international cooperation with Ja-
pan and other states that share land-based and sea-based weather measurements.  If a conflict 
were to eliminate the sharing of weather data, U. S. prediction accuracy would fall dramati-
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cally.  It would fall even more dramatically if antisatellite weapons destroyed one or more of 
the few U. S. (or friendly) weather satellites.  If an adversary can preserve its weather predic-
tion capability while the U. S. loses its ability, then U. S. forces can be at a severe disadvan-
tage.  Not only will U. S. combatants be unable to predict local weather for military operations, 
but also logistics operations will be considerably less efficient and more hazardous when airlift 
and sealift platforms are no longer able to route their paths to avoid severe weather. 
 
NPC should develop its own highly capable “Weather Service”.  It should deploy its own 
weather satellites (concentrating on NPC’s landmass and its nearest ocean regions).  These satel-
lites should make maximum use of laser radar technology (for high-resolution 3-dimensional 
mapping of the temperature, pressure, humidity, and wind speed/direction -- the major drivers of 
weather change) [114].  NPC’s Weather Service should develop and procure the infrastructure of 
computers and software models that will enable it to make long-term weather predictions at least 
as good as those of its U. S. rival.  It should make every effort to incorporate the satellite laser 
radar data into those models.  It should expend considerable basic R&D in the areas of basic me-
teorology and be an active participant in global meteorological studies.  Emphasis should be 
placed on understanding the fundamental drivers of weather change with an eye to ultimate con-
trol of the weather.  To ensure its superiority in forecasting the weather, NPC should plan on 
eliminating U. S. weather satellites (including those covering the U. S. itself) at the onset of a 
conflict.   
 
Adverse weather should be considered as a possible tool to assist military operations.  
Military planners should be educated in the essentials of meteorology to facilitate that use. Any 
development in technology or use of asymmetric tactics that permits NPC to operate in adverse 
weather in which the U. S. cannot operate gives NPC a distinct advantage.  This advantage is 
magnified if NPC has weather prediction capabilities accurate enough for it to plan to engage 
only during adverse weather.  For example, NPC should develop its mine capability and subma-
rine force with an eye to operation in adverse weather.  Mines and submarines are not subject to 
the same wind & wave forces as surface ships.  In addition, helicopter-borne mine warfare sys-
tems and anti-submarine warfare systems cannot be employed in adverse weather, although at-
tacks with mines and submarines should be possible in all but the worst weather.  Thus, if NPC 
sowed mines directly in the path of a battle group and simultaneously attacked the battle group 
with submarines during a full-blown tropical storm, the battle group would be at its most de-
fenseless, while NPC’s weapons would be minimally affected.  NPC should also investigate 
technology developments facilitating adverse weather air and land operations.  Covert terrain 
following/terrain avoidance sensors and precision bad weather landing systems can reduce the 
periods of time when air power is limited.  Improved traction/suspension systems can improve 
mobility over adverse terrain such as steep, muddy slopes or deep dust/sand pits.  Proper atten-
tion to these concepts could turn the weather from a neutral factor into an ally.  
 
As knowledge of weather cause and effect improve, due to R&D advances, it may be 
possible to affect the weather directly.  Causing devastating storms to strike some countries and 
not others, modifying rainfall patterns to ruin agricultural yields, and disrupting the normal flow 
of goods and services are ways in which weather can be a powerful strategic weapon.   
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Weather modification on a local scale has been attempted with varying degrees of suc-
cess for many decades.  Seeding of clouds with silver iodide crystals has been proven to increase 
local precipitation.  It has also been proven to be incapable of significantly increasing precipita-
tion if the proper conditions for such precipitation are not already in place.  That is, cloud seed-
ing cannot make it rain.  It can only make it rain harder or rain sooner or rain longer than would 
normally occur.  Nevertheless, considerable effort was expended on Project Popeye (initiated in 
1966 and continued through 1972) to seed clouds in Southeast Asia.[112]  The intent was to in-
crease the magnitude and duration of monsoon rains along the Ho Chi Minh trail in the hopes 
that the increased muddiness of trails would slow the flow of war materials into South Vietnam.  
Although the results are equivocal, many believe the program had a major effect on North Viet-
nam’s logistics abilities.  The use of carbon dust to increase water vapor evaporation from bodies 
of water has also been demonstrated.  Used together on a large scale, cloud seeding and evapora-
tion acceleration might produce substantial modification to normal rainfall patterns.  The disper-
sal of fog has also met with limited success.  Large thermal generators can clear fog from air-
ports, but the energy and equipment expenditures are seldom worth the results produced.  Heat-
ing selected portions of thunderstorms with microwaves could prevent the formation of torna-
does.[115]  Although technologically feasible, the expense of building a demonstration system 
(probably ten times the cost of the international space station) has prevented significant progress. 
 
Weather modification on a grand scale is an enormous undertaking that is still science 
fiction today.  The power dissipated in simple thunderstorms ranges from less than 1010 W for 
small highly localized storms to well over 1011 W in a large storm.[115]  Total stored energy in 
thunderstorms are in the range of 1013 to 1015 J.  The energy contained in a typical hurricane 
(1018-1020 J) is comparable to that which would be released by 10,000 thermonuclear explosions 
(hydrogen bombs) [116].  The power dissipated by such a storm is of the order of 1013-1016W.  
Modifying such a weather event in real time would involve an expenditure of energy that was at 
least a substantial fraction of the total energy content at a power that was comparable to the dis-
sipation rate.  At a minimum we might expect that required powers of 10% and total energies of 
1% would be needed.  For a thunderstorm this implies gigawatts of power applied for many min-
utes (yielding a total delivered energy of the order of a terajoule).  For a hurricane this implies 
terawatts of power applied for many hours (yielding a total delivered energy of many petajoules). 
 
Exajoule energies at terawatt to petawatt powers (many terawatts for hours of cw opera-
tion) are beyond current human control (except in nuclear weapons, if they can be said to be con-
trolled).  However, the progression of time has given man the power to produce and use increas-
ingly large energies and powers.  Current technology in directed energy devices can produce gi-
gajoule energies at megawatt powers (in cw systems operating for minutes).  If sufficient justifi-
cation were provided, current technology could be pushed by brute force to build microwave sys-
tems with gigawatt powers that could operate more or less continuously.  A few decades ago we 
were capable of gigajoule energies at kilowatt powers (in cw systems capable of operating for 
months).  In 50 years it is entirely possible that those pursuing the technology may be able to 
wield the requisite powers and energies needed to control the weather.  As our understanding 
improves concerning the means by which large storms arise and how weather dynamics affect 
them, we may be able to trigger the occurrence of such storms or counteract their formation by 
appropriately modifying the initial conditions.  This should require somewhat less power and en-
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ergy than that required to control an existing storm.  We may be able to substantially modify fu-
ture weather long before we can control today’s weather. 
 
The Environmental Modification Convention prohibits offensive weather warfare [117].  
The United States and many countries have signed this convention.  However, it is likely that our 
NPC will not be a signatory to this convention.  Several potential NPCs are not yet signatories.  
If NPC developed weather warfare capabilities, it would not be bound by treaty from employing 
it.  Since the United States and most western powers are signatories, retaliation in kind for NPC 
use of weather warfare is effectively prohibited. 
 
The U. S. should take steps to maintain its lead in weather prediction re-
search.  It should also invest in the improved weather satellites and other sensor that 
can facilitate improved weather prediction.  The next generation of weather satellite 
might have several lidars and thermal sounders for 3-D measurement of wind veloc-
ity, temperature, pressure, humidity, aerosol content, and selected trace gas 
concentrations.  The U. S. should orbit enough of these satellites to guarantee twice 
daily coverage of the whole earth even if satellite malfunctions or is destroyed.  Re-
search should also continue into understanding the causes and dynamics of the 
weather.  This will not only improve our prediction abilities but also lay the ground-
work for future weather modification efforts. 
 
The U. S. should also have a program of regularly evaluating whether tech-
nology has progressed to the point that weather control is becoming possible.  At 
the earliest evidence of near-term feasibility, the U. S. should institute programs to 
convert the feasibility into reality.  The U. S. cannot afford to let an adversary gain a 
monopoly on weather control. 
 
The U. S. should also consider new designs for its military platforms that in-
corporate increased adverse weather capability.  For example, there is no funda-
mental reason why aircraft cannot regularly operate safely in “zero-zero” conditions 
(zero visibility, zero ceiling) or in gale force winds.  There is no fundamental reason 
why amphibious operations cannot safely be undertaken in Sea State 8.  There is no 
fundamental reason why a missile attack cannot be safely initiated and executed in 
the worst stages of a tropical cyclone.  Radical new approaches and designs would 
be required, but the payoff of insensitivity to weather would negate any adversary 
attempts to use the weather as a tactical weapon against us. 
 
The U. S. should also pay attention to the principle of “weather complemen-
tarity” when it acquires and deploys its systems.  If one component of a military 
force is severely limited by one form of weather, then an ancillary force component 
should be included that is not limited by that form of weather.  For example, since all 
surface combatants are limited by sea states greater than 6, carrier battle groups, 
deployed in situations where such sea states might be encountered and used as an 
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advantage by an adversary, should be accompanied by a substantially increased 




ATTACK BY NONLETHAL WEAPONS 
 
 An adversary may choose to employ nonlethal weapons in some of his access denial 
operations.  See Appendix K for a technical discussion of nonlethal weapons.  In all likelihood, 
these weapons would be used by “civilian” entities.  In the late stages of a crisis or early stages 
of open hostilities, the adversary will wish to delay the arrival of U. S. military assets into the 
trouble spot.  Nonlethal weapons could effect this result without necessarily resulting in esca-
lation.  For example, early in a crisis situation an adversary employs nonlethal weapons in an 
attempt to delay our forces from arriving in theater at a specific time.  Adversary-sponsored 
“civilian protesters” using a fleet of small ocean-going craft confronts a battle group at a 
choke point with anti-mobility weapons (propeller fouling nets or turbine-fouling polymer 
aerosols) and/or anti-materiel weapons (non-nuclear EMP devices or metal embrittlement 
agents).  If the adversary action is successful, a significant fraction of the battle group may be 
incapacitated for one or more days.  The entire battle group will likely be forced to delay until 
damages can be repaired. 
 
The problem for U. S. forces is how to respond?  Do they use lethal force to quickly ne-
gate the threat and resume progress toward the area of conflict (and face near-universal pub-
lic condemnation and possible future charges of war crimes)?  Do they change course to avoid 
the protesters (and add many hours to the arrival time – allowing the adversary to achieve his 
objective of delay)?  Do they maintain position and await the arrival of forces more suited to 
police action (again allowing the adversary to achieve his objective of delay)?  Do they sail 
into the civilian force and hope that the “civilian” tactic was a bluff?  If it wasn’t and the 
nonlethal weapons effectively disable a number of ships in the battle group, how do the U. S. 
forces respond?  Do they take retaliatory action?  Do they let the “civilian” fleet retreat and 
remain able to repeat the confrontation in the future?  How do they repair the damage, and if 
possible, get the group underway again in a timely fashion?  How do the answers to the above 
change if there is no crisis situation (and the confrontation is merely a test of will), or if the 
crisis situation has escalated to hostilities, or if general war has been declared between the U. 
S. and the adversary. 
 
In another scenario, a civilian aircraft discharges a cloud of super-lubricant mixed 
with graphite fiber chaff, in front of the battle group.  As the cloud passes over the battle 
group, the decks and superstructures become thoroughly contaminated.  Countermeasures 
washdown systems (if activated at all) force immediate abort of all deck operations and are not 
100% effective in either their coverage or their removal of the larger particles composing the 
cloud.  The super-lubricant makes it unsafe to conduct any operations above deck.  Personnel 
cannot walk safely on any combatant.  Aircraft cannot be safely maneuvered on flight decks 
(especially the one on an aircraft carrier).  The graphite chaff immediately shorts out some 
antennas with high field strengths.  Over time the smaller graphite fibers find their way into 
the interiors of electronic boxes and short out critical components.  The super-lubricant makes 




What sort of response is practical in this scenario?  Shooting down the civilian aircraft 
is an option (but only after the attack has begun) and may be nothing more than an act of re-
venge (the attack may be over before shootdown occurs).  However, it may not be possible to 
unequivocally determine that an attack is taking place.  Furthermore, since the attack is non-
lethal, shootdown is probably not an option for subsequent attacks.  Lethal response to an 
attack with known nonlethal consequences would likely be deemed unacceptable.  Maneuver-
ing away from the cloud would delay arrival, an acceptable outcome for the adversary.  What 
tools are available for remediation?  Nothing but water and elbow grease. 
 
Consider another scenario in which a peacekeeping force is “attacked” with malodor-
ants (stink bombs), riot control agents (such as tear gas), or calmative agents, thrown from a 
crowd, from windows and roofs overlooking streets, or from behind fences.  The peace-
keeping force would be forced to go to MOPP 4 (full chemical protective gear).  Repeated at-
tacks can prolong this state indefinitely causing the peacekeeping force to restrict its activities 
to avoid overheating.  Patrols become more limited.  Even encampments are not safe from 
wind-carried agent attacks.  Peacekeeping force presence in the region is reduced to levels that 
ultimately lead to failure of the peacekeeping process.  How does the peacekeeping force re-
spond to this threat?  Lethal force would not be justifiable.  Employment of U. S. nonlethal 
weapons is an option but may not prove to be an effective countermeasure.  Improved protec-
tive systems are not readily available. 
 
Consider a third scenario in which a coup threatens stability in a third world country 
and a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) is undertaken.  As helicopters land security 
forces in obvious staging locations, the helicopters are disabled by EMP guns, preventing 
timely withdrawal.  Super-lubricants, sticky foam, or nets hidden in aqueous foam entrap or 
otherwise prevent the security forces from moving to accompany the non-combatants and pre-
vent the non-combatants from moving to join the security forces.  Another set of microwave 
weapons is used to cause overheating in the security forces, further their ability to resist.  One 
set of potential hostages has thus been joined by a second.  What can be done to prevent such 
a scenario?  Again use of lethal force is neither justifiable nor even practical.  Hardening of 
equipment against EMP is expensive and seldom done thoroughly.  Tools for breaching “non-
lethal” barriers are not available. 
 
The last two scenarios are not really access denial scenarios.  However, effective anti-
power projection capabilities indirectly support access denial by forcing limited resources to be 
spent addressing them that could otherwise be spent on countering access denial systems.  
Furthermore, any vulnerability of our forces is still a vulnerability even if it does not directly 
impact access denial. 
 
The lack of serious discussion of these possibilities and of potential courses of action 
indicates that the U. S. does not have (or has not promulgated) definite policies on how to re-
spond to such unconventional attacks.  It also lacks tools to address these new weapons and 
modes of attack.  All of our military forces (land, sea, and air) generally lack nonlethal weap-
ons to counter forces employing nonlethal weapons against them.  Those forces generally lack 
defenses against such weapons (you don’t develop defenses against threats that have not yet 
been recognized as being serious).  The forces also lack remediation measures against these 
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threats.  For example, if the enemy were to employ turbine-fouling polymer aerosols, solvents 
capable of rapidly dissolving or neutralizing the polymer are almost certainly not carried on 
board the target vessels.  The fact that nonlethal weapons are not likely to be used against U. 
S. forces in a full intensity conflict does not mean that they are not significant threats in any 
situation short of lesser intensity conflict. 
 
 NPC should consider the development and deployment of nonlethal weapons technolo-
gies.  It should concentrate on those weapons with military applications, unless internal political 
stability requires the development of improved crowd control and riot control agents.  To employ 
the militarily significant NLWs, NPC should create a “civilian” front organization that could le-
gitimately justify possession and use of such weapons.  Civilian use of NLW is more likely to 
cause ethical problems for the U. S. commanders than military use of the same NLW.  NPC 
should ensure that sympathetic individuals from the world media are present at all events staged 
by the civilian front.  The front organization should be staffed to adequate levels, militarily 
trained, and supplied with appropriate platforms (fishing boats, pleasure craft, coaster trade ves-
sels, etc.) for deploying the NLWs.  The front organization should occasionally engage in activi-
ties that would publicly justify its existence and solidify its “legend”. 
 
NLWs of potential access denial significance include: 
• entanglements (such as steel reinforced nets towed between small craft),  
• filter clogging agents (aerosols dispensed from spray tanks or mortar-fired airburst 
projectiles),  
• biological fuel-eaters (aerosols dispensed from spray tanks or mortar-fired airburst 
projectiles), and  
• anti-materiel agents (also dispensed as aerosols from spray tanks or mortar-fired air-
burst projectiles).  Among the potential anti-materiel agents are metal embrittlement 
agents, superacids, and polymer modification agents, all of which would degrade 
shipboard equipment to unusable states.    
• anti-personnel agents (also dispensed from spray tanks or mortar-fired airburst projec-
tiles).  Among the potential anti-personnel agents are calmative agents, irritant agents 
(riot control gases), and malodorants.  Anti-personnel agents are most likely to be 
useful in a harassing role.  Ships would be forced to activate collective protection sys-
tems.  Personnel in unprotected areas would be forced to wear chemical agent protec-
tive gear.  
• Anti-traction agents (also dispensed from spray tanks or mortar-fired airburst projec-
tiles) could make it unsafe to conduct any operations above decks. 
NPC is likely to find useful NLW applications in areas other than access denial.  These should 
also be investigated. 
 
 The U. S. has explicit doctrine governing use of nonlethal weapons by our 
military against civilian and military forces of other nations [118] and it continues to 
refine both doctrine and tactics in this area.  However, it needs to develop doctrine 
addressing adversary employment of nonlethal weapons against U. S. forces.  The 
possibility of such use should be included in contingency planning.  The U. S. 
should treat significant NLW developments in the same fashion as conventional 
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weapon developments.  Intelligence should be acquired concerning potential NLW 
deployment.  Tactics for making NLW employment more difficult need to be devel-
oped.  Defenses should be developed against the more serious NLW developments, 






CHAPTER 8.  ATTACKS ON LOGISTICS RESOURCES 
 
 
LIMITED STRATEGIC SEALIFT/AIRLIFT CAPABILITY  
 
The United States lacks the sealift and airlift capability to rapidly deploy an over-
whelming force.  At best, one light division of airborne troops, one battalion of marines, one 
carrier battle group, and/or one composite air wing can be deployed and in combat within a 
few days.  Few follow-on forces could be employed in combat without at least a one-month no-
tice.  Many would require several months notice.  The primary reasons for this are deficiencies 
in numbers of fast sealift ships and heavy airlift aircraft.  Should something affect the readi-
ness or survivability of these assets, the U. S. ability to project ground forces would be seri-
ously degraded.  Both sealift and airlift capabilities are limited by numbers of platforms. Every 
cargo ship or aircraft that can be made non-operational is effectively irreplaceable.  The plat-
forms themselves thus become high-value targets.  When loaded with critical war materiel, 
they are even higher value targets.  These high-value targets nevertheless rate near the bottom 
of the priority list in receiving aircraft survivability equipment (such as radar warning receiv-
ers, self-protection jammers, and flare and chaff dispensers).  As a consequence they are vul-
nerable to shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) during both takeoffs and landings (at 
every airport) and to interdiction by long-range SAMs and fighter aircraft in the theater of op-
erations.  They are also vulnerable to sabotage and special operations force attacks on airfield 
facilities. 
 
In theory the U. S. can augment its air transport capability by exercising its Civil Re-
serve Air Fleet (CRAF) contracts with commercial carriers [119].  This can provide a large 
quantity of troop transport aircraft and cargo aircraft by “drafting” civilian airliners into mili-
tary use.  However, if a major conflict were to erupt overseas, the need to transport the major-
ity of our armed forces overseas in the shortest possible time would require calling up every 
available aircraft.  As more passenger aircraft are withdrawn from air charter flights and ul-
timately scheduled airline service, the American public will be more and more severely af-
fected.  Business and pleasure travelers may be forced to wait days for flights because the 
American flag carriers have all of their long-haul airliners diverted to carry troops.  Busi-
nesses will not get their accustomed overnight package delivery because the express air carri-
ers are transporting military equipment.  These acts will ripple through the civilian sector, af-
fecting producers, retailers, service providers and their employees alike.  The economy will 
suffer and public opinion may significantly shift away from support of the military operations.   
 
The civilian assets that are drafted into service will not have even the minimum defen-
sive assets possessed by military airlift aircraft.  A C-5 or C-17 may be provided with flare dis-
pensers to protect against shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and their pilots may 
be trained in evasive maneuvering; commercial aircraft will not have flare dispensers and 
their pilots may have not received missile attack training.  They will be much more vulnerable 
to air and surface-to-air missile attacks when they arrive in theater.   
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The whole augmentation scheme can be co-opted by a pre-meditating adversary.  It is 
possible for adversary “companies” to book large numbers of charter aircraft for the time 
frame when the adversary anticipates starting hostilities.  The charters would be flown over-
seas on valid prepaid contracts and simply be unavailable and untouchable when the U. S. 
government needed to commandeer them.  The same preemptive actions could be taken with 
commercial cargo aircraft.  The net effect would be to hasten the need to commandeer sched-
uled airline and express delivery assets, with the attendant disruptions of the American life-
style and economy.  American Merchant Marine ships can be pre-empted in a similar fashion, 
reducing the availability of secondary sealift assets.   
 
Any surge in strategic sealift and airlift requires more than just available aircraft and 
ships.  Ports and airfields are required at both ends of the logistics chain, trained personnel 
are required to load and unload the ships and airplanes, and fuel to run those ships and air-
planes is needed at specific critical locations.  An adversary can reduce America’s strategic lift 
capability by striking at any of these requirements.  Ports and airfields can be attacked with 
missiles, special operations forces, or weapons of mass destruction.  Longshoreman can be 
kept from working by chemical or biological weapons.  A simple outbreak of virulent influenza 
might never be traced back to the adversary, but could cut throughput in half.  Fuel supplies 
can be destroyed, or contaminated so that all fuel must be laboriously checked before use.  
Fuel supplies can also be adversely affected by preemptive actions.  Consider oil supplies at a 
critical overseas port.  In the weeks before the conflict adversary merchant ships in large 
numbers visit the port and draw off as much fuel as they can hold.  They pay top dollar for the 
extra fuel consumption.  At the same time, other adversary companies conclude lucrative deals 
with the major fuel suppliers to that port that result in “temporary” reduced fuel deliveries and 
delays in fuel deliveries – premium prices are paid for priority deliveries to ports unimportant 
to the coming conflict.  Increased demand and decreased supply results in a major drawdown 
of stored reserves.  When the conflict starts, this port can no longer support the rate of opera-
tions needed by U. S. strategic sealift.  
  
Unless NPC has the ability to negate the strategic sealift and airlift capabilities of the 
United States, then NPC should undertake no military action or sequence of military actions that 
cannot be brought to a satisfactory and definitive conclusion within four to six weeks.  If such 
brief yet definitive operations are not deemed practical, then NPC must investigate and develop 
capabilities to interfere with the U.S. sealift and airlift capabilities.   
 
Options for disruption of strategic lift include sabotage (of individual platforms or load-
ing/embarkation facilities), disruption via information warfare (viruses or semantic attack), and 
in-transit interdiction (via submarines, surface action groups, long-range aviation with in-air re-
fueling capability, or theater aviation).  Other options include denial of secure landing and/or de-
barkation facilities (via airfield or port destruction, WMD agent contamination, or capture), pre-
empting of civilian assets (via pre-meditated charters and relocation), terrorist/special operations 
attacks (with short-range anti-armor or anti-aircraft missiles), and reduction of strategic fuel sup-
plies (by preemptive redirection, direct attack, or contamination).  In all likelihood, NPC will 
need to pursue several of these options.  The choice should be coordinated with NPC’s grand 
militarization strategy to maximize the procurement of multiple use assets (such as long-range 
aviation or submarines).   
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With the exception of preemptive activities, disruption of U. S. strategic sealift and airlift 
should be carried out on the same time schedule as the lift activities themselves.  The most ag-
gressive and massive attacks should occur when the most lift assets and cargoes are at risk.  
Every attempt should be made to force maximum reliance on CRAF and Merchant Marine as-
sets.  Such reliance will have adverse effects on the American economy and public opinion. 
 
The U. S. has a definite shortage of heavy lift aircraft and sealift ships.  It 
should pursue acquisition of further quantities of heavy lift aircraft such as the C-17 
or its potential follow-on.  It should actively pursue the development and acquisition 
of a number of high-speed, large gross displacement, roll-on/roll-off cargo ships.  A 
reasonable objective might be the acquisition of enough strategic lift assets to per-
mit rapid deployment of one next-larger military unit than each element is current 
capable of deploying.  For example, if we currently have the ability to airlift one light 
division into a theater within 48 hours, then we should acquire the assets to permit 
deployment of an armored division (or a corps of several light divisions) in the same 
time frame. 
 
The U. S. needs to take measures to assure the survival of its airlift and sealift 
assets.  Military aircraft should be provided with state-of-the-art electronic warfare 
systems including active jammers and decoys in all portions of the electromagnetic 
spectrum.  Civilian aircraft drafted for airlift purposes should at a minimum have de-
coy dispensers.  Given the growing threat to civilian airliners from handheld surface-
to-air missiles (SAMs, such as SA-7, SA-14, SA-19, Stinger, etc.) wielded by terror-
ists, the U. S. should give some thought to placing missile launch warning detectors 
and flare dispensers on all civilian transport aircraft, even in peacetime.  In the pe-
riod from 1978 to 1993 there were 28 attacks in third world countries on civilian air-
craft by terrorists using hand-held SAMs.  It is only a matter of time before such ter-
rorism invades the borders of the United States.  Whenever, large flights of transport 
aircraft are underway in the same region, consideration should be given to providing 
them with fighter escorts.  Aggregates of strategic airlift assets might make attractive 
and high-priority targets for adversary air forces (even those with limited numbers of 
combat aircraft).  Perhaps a convoy system should be employed for air transport. 
 
Sealift assets also need protection.  If a potential adversary has a significant 
submarine force with some blue water capability, sealift assets could be at risk from 
the moment they leave port.  Escorts and convoying clearly need to be considered.  
Any ships used for escort duty should have organic minehunting capabilities.  Lim-
ited missile and torpedo defenses might also be in order.  Electronic warfare sys-
tems can be packaged in containers that could be lashed to the decks of transports 
to provide detection and jamming.  Defensive missile systems such as SeaRAM 
could be similarly packaged in self-sufficient units that could be loaded on-board 
prior to departure, as could towed anti-torpedo decoys. 
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Facilities that service the airlift and sealift assets should be protected against 
attack by special operations forces or weapons of mass destruction among other 
threats.  Adequate facilities and expendables need to be available for rapid neutrali-





RELIANCE ON LIMITED OVERSEAS BASING  
 
In the latter half of the 20th Century, the United States enjoyed a luxury of having mul-
tiple overseas bases in more than a dozen countries.  A large part of our armed forces were 
stationed in the regions where it was anticipated that they would fight their next battles.  The 
changing world environment is now forcing the United States to withdraw more and more of 
its military forces from its overseas bases.  Some bases (and countries) have been abandoned 
entirely, either because they are no longer needed, because we can no longer afford to main-
tain them, or because the United States military is simply no longer welcome there.  The ma-
jority of these former bases are now unavailable for future U. S. use.  Despite this the United 
States still has a number of critical overseas military installations, although some reductions 
will continue for many years.  Negotiations for closure or partial withdrawal are far more 
numerous than negotiations to open new overseas bases.  The United States military is not 
equipped to mount all of its military operations from bases restricted to the United States 
proper or its territories.  Every overseas base surrendered or abandoned reduces the combat 
effectiveness of the United States in that region of the world.   
 
Some of the most critical bases (e.g., Guam and Diego Garcia) are weakly defended.  
They are isolated with no nearby bases to offer mutual defense (Guam and Diego Garcia are 
on remote islands).  They have limited permanently assigned air, ground, and naval defensive 
forces with limited air defense and no long-range ballistic missile defense.  It is not unreason-
able to assume that these bases could be quickly neutralized by ballistic missile strikes, cruise 
missile attacks, airborne assaults, amphibious invasions, harbor mining, or combinations of 
the above.  Several potential competitors are developing ballistic missiles with sufficient range 
to strike these bases.  Critical facilities at these bases could be easily destroyed in attacks by 
special operations forces.  Even worse would be direct occupation by adversary airborne as-
sault or maritime assault forces.  Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, a single battalion of as-
sault forces would probably suffice to subdue the local defense forces at many of these bases.  
In adversary hands, Guam and Diego Garcia could provide outposts allowing extension of ac-
cess denial capability far beyond the nominal 1000-2000 km range.  Additionally, bases lo-
cated in stable, friendly countries (e. g., Yokosuka, Japan or Incirlik, Turkey) are not so 
strongly defended that they are immune to devastating attack.  Even bases in the United States 
are not completely secure, although the same long distances that force the U. S. to have over-
seas facilities make bases in CONUS somewhat less vulnerable to attack. 
 
 NPC should make every attempt to eliminate any U. S. overseas bases that could be of 
use against it.  It should exert diplomatic and economic pressure on governments that permit U. 
S. basing.  Economic incentives including investment, direct foreign aid, and bribery should im-
mediately flow from NPC to any country in the region that rejects U. S. basing when requested 
or evicts U. S. forces from existing bases.  NPC should support insurgent groups in countries 
permitting U. S. basing with the proviso that those insurgent groups make U. S. presence one of 
their political issues.  In the United Nations and other world forums NPC should protest U. S. 
overseas basing as being anachronistic imperialism and totally unnecessary in the new world or-
der.  NPC should make it clear to all offending governments that if hostilities arise, the overseas 
bases and the countries in which they are located will become priority military targets.   
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The NPC military should develop plans to neutralize (with any appropriate weapons) all 
U. S. bases located within its denial areas.  This should include not only permanent bases but 
also any temporary facilities usage.  Bases outside the denial area but close enough to support 
rollback operations should also be targeted.  Especially critical bases such as Guam and/or Diego 
Garcia should be attacked with sufficient force to deny their use to the U. S. for the duration of 
the conflict.  Ports and bases located in countries friendly to the U. S. but within the denial areas 
should be similarly destroyed, even if it strains relations with relatively strong countries such as 
Japan or Italy or Germany.  Such base destruction should be conducted as soon as possible after 
the beginning of hostilities.  However, any appearance of another Pearl Harbor should be 
avoided.  Designated and proclaimed denial areas should extend at least as far away from any 
NPC territory as the range of a Tomahawk missile, and possibly farther.   This will force any and 
all retaliation on NPC to be initiated from mobile platforms or extremely distant bases. 
 
The U. S. should enter into whatever negotiations are required to reverse the 
trend of reductions in overseas basing.  It should strive to have adequate basing in 
at least two different countries in any major geographic region.  This will prevent a 
single change of heart on the part of a basing partner (as happened in the Philip-
pines) from denying the U. S. any bases in a key geographic region.  On a regular 
basis, every potential trouble spot should be reviewed to determine the suitability 
and adequacy of forward basing in the region.   
 
The defenses at all overseas bases should be bolstered.  All aspects of physi-
cal security should be addressed.  Air and missile defenses should be increased to 
where they are capable of blunting the largest credible attack.  Garrison forces 
should be increased to a size capable of repelling a major airborne or amphibious 
assault.  Availability of NBC defensive measures should reflect the high probability of 
attack associated with such weapons.  Increased defensive capabilities will reduce 
the possibility of terrorist attacks and will also reduce the likelihood of crippling at-





RELIANCE ON PRE-POSITIONED EQUIPMENT   
 
It is easier to rapidly transport personnel and their personal gear from U. S. bases to 
crisis areas overseas than it is to transport the heavy equipment, ammunition, and pre-
packaged rations needed by those personnel after they arrive.  Coupled with the previously 
mentioned deficiency in strategic lift, this is forcing the United States military into becoming 
more reliant on pre-positioned equipment to support its readiness objectives.  A large fraction 
of the U. S. Army’s heavy equipment is pre-positioned at land bases in areas where the prob-
ability of conflict is (or was) very high (Europe, Korea, and Persian Gulf) [120].  It is antici-
pated that by 2003 all of the equipment for eight heavy combat brigades of the United States 
Army will be deployed on 15 pre-positioned ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans [121].  
These ships constitute the Army Pre-Positioned Set-3 (APS-3).  Most of the equipment for the 
Marine Corps’ expeditionary brigades is already pre-positioned in this fashion.  The U. S. Ma-
rine Corps currently has 13 (to be increased to 16) pre-positioned ships organized into three 
active squadrons (MPSRON 1,2 & 3 each with equipment for a Marine Expeditionary Bri-
gade) [59].   
 
Although pre-positioning cuts weeks off of deployment times, it creates a significant 
vulnerability.  This critical warfighting materiel is transported on what are essentially mer-
chant cargo ships that are crewed by contract mariners (although there is a small naval de-
tachment aboard each ship).  In peacetime these ships are either anchored offshore at some 
port within their forward deployment area or they sail around that forward area with mini-
mum security, no self-defense weaponry, and no naval escort.  Even the most inept submarine 
crew or missile boat crew could sink a number of these ships in a single engagement.  A cell of 
well-trained terrorists could board any of these ships (in port or at sea), overcome the crew, 
and either scuttle the ship and its equipment or hold it hostage.  Once hostilities appear immi-
nent, the ships will deploy toward friendly ports near the potential conflict area.  This transit 
towards hostilities may or may not be escorted by warships.  However, it would be surprising if 
such an escort exceeded more than a couple of destroyers per squadron.  If present, an escort 
might discourage an attack by a patrol boat or a single submarine, but a devastating attack is 
still not ruled out, especially if the attacking force is substantial.  In peacetime, the land-based 
pre-positioned supplies are typically guarded by small, lightly armed forces that are not at the 
highest state of readiness.   Any competent special operations force could overwhelm these 
guard forces and destroy or sabotage much of the stored equipment.  After hostilities have 
commenced, despite increased alertness, the size of the protective forces would not be large 
enough to prevent a successful attack by a company-sized unit of paratroops (although the 
survival of the attackers could not be assured).  Nor could any reasonable protective force pre-
vent destruction of the equipment by an air or missile raid.  
 
The trend towards increased pre-positioning will reduce the overall significance of the 
cargo of any one ship or storage facility.  However, we will undoubtedly increase pre-
positioning at the expense of having substantial reserves of equipment at home.  Thus, the pre-
positioned equipment will be irreplaceable on any time-scale shorter than many months.  Loss 
of a substantial amount (20-40%?) of equipment from a single squadron could prevent an en-
tire brigade from joining the fighting for weeks, if ever.  Some of the component units (those 
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whose equipment was not lost) might be reorganized into one or two ad hoc battalions or could 
be attached to other brigades, but this will take time and full combat effectiveness will seldom 
be achieved.  Making up the equipment loss by shifting the deployment of another squadron 
will take weeks at a minimum, and will reduce military options in the theater to which that 
squadron was assigned.  Any attempt to increase the security of these ships by routinely as-
signing them naval escorts will further tax an overextended surface combatant force.  If im-
plemented only in times of crisis this would likely slow down deployment times by the amount 
that the prepositioning ships must wait for the escorts to arrive from their prior assignments. 
 
 NPC should develop forces capable of targeting and destroying the prepositioning ships 
located in its geographic region.  Submarines, motor torpedo boats, missile patrol craft, aircraft 
armed with antiship missiles or gravity bombs, special operations forces, or even small trading or 
pleasure craft dispensing mines could accomplish the destruction.  It is entirely possible that the 
prepositioning ships can be attacked as just one more type of mission for assets that are acquired 
for other purposes.  This mission should be considered when total force structure requirements 
are determined. 
 
NPC should establish a doctrine that these ships will be attacked at the onset of any hos-
tilities between itself and the United States.  NPC may also wish to consider a long-term program 
of covert or surrogate action against these ships.  Sinking one ship with an untraceable WWII-
vintage mine, crippling another in a terrorist attack several months later, damaging or even sink-
ing a third in an “accidental” collision with another merchant ship a few months after that, losing 
a fourth to a hijacking by armed “pirates” in an area known for this kind of activity, sinking a 
fifth by sabotage in the port of a nation friendly to the United States, and so on, could severely 
limit the future warfighting capability of the United States without incurring any significant risk 
to NPC.  Every ship lost would take years to replace without major military budgets increases 
specifically aimed at their replacement.  The equipment lost would take similar lengths of time to 
replace. 
 
If neighboring states have permitted pre-positioning of U. S. military equipment on their 
territories, then NPC should plan to attack and destroy the pre-positioned equipment storage fa-
cilities and their contents.  One option is to attack these sites immediately prior to commencing 
hostilities by using special operations forces.  These forces may destroy the stored equipment or 
may sabotage them in a fashion that would inflict great damage to any force that attempted to use 
it.  Another option is to target the sites for air strikes or missile attacks.  A final option is infil-
trate a small special operations force during peacetime to attempt to destroy some or all of the 
facility while making that destruction look like an accident or the work of a local terrorist group.   
 
It is doubtful that the U. S. can eliminate its reliance on pre-positioned equip-
ment.  Defenses at the land-based pre-positioning sites are almost certainly in need 
of significant enhancement.  The defenses should be capable of surviving ballistic 
missile and/or cruise missile attacks, including use of chemical or biological weap-
ons.  They should also be capable of surviving at least company-sized attacks by 
special operations forces or paratroops.  If pre-positioning compounds are not cur-
rently under the protection of corps-level ballistic missile defenses and air defenses, 
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then provision should be made to increase protection to those levels.  Garrison 
forces protecting the compounds should be at least company strength, should be 
housed within the protected compounds and have the ability to obtain company-
sized reinforcements within minutes. 
 
Critical mobile assets such as the pre-positioning ships also deserve protec-
tion.  At a minimum, they should be provided escorts at all times.  Such escorts 
could be destroyers or they could be attack submarines.  In either case, more ships 
are required in the active fleets to be able to spare ships for escort duties.  Consid-
eration should also be given to providing the pre-positioning ships with minimal self-
defense capabilities against missile and torpedo attacks.  Electronic warfare suites 
including active jamming coupled with two or more Rolling Airframe Missile launch-
ers might suffice for missile defense.  Towed and expendable decoys might suffice 
for torpedo defense.  It is recognized that such defenses would require increases in 
the size and changes in composition of the permanent Navy detachments aboard 
each ship.  This would be a small price to pay to preserve the irreplaceable cargo 





RELIANCE ON UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT   
 
Carrier battle groups consume enormous quantities of fuel, food, and ammunition.  
When conducting combat operations the consumption rates increase significantly.  For exam-
ple, during combat force projection operations a Nimitz-class carrier can expend its entire 
stores of ammunition and aviation fuel in 2-3 days.  Most combatants will require refueling 
after transiting at high speed from their homeports.  The United States has only a small num-
ber of ammunition ships and oilers.  Currently the United States has 4 active duty and 6 MSC 
ammunition ships (AE); 5 active duty and 15 MSC replenishment oilers (AO); and 8 active 
duty (plus 4 under construction) combat support ships (AOE) [59].  There is nominally only 
two active duty ships (1 AE + 1 AO or 2 AOE) plus one or two assigned MSC ships for each 
deployed carrier battle group and/or amphibious ready group.  Each replenishment ship sup-
ports several combatants.  Since these ships are lightly armed and transit unescorted between 
resupply depots and replenishment points, they too represent an extreme vulnerability. 
 
One submarine could hypothetically eliminate all of the replenishment capability 
available to a theater of operations.  The loss of any one of these ships can reduce the sustain-
able operations rate of a battle group by as much as 25-33%.  The loss of several replenish-
ment ships in a given theater of operations could result in almost complete operational shut-
down.  Without replenishment of fuel and ammunition, not only are offensive operations 
threatened, but also the ability of the battle group to defend itself becomes questionable.  Air-
craft without aviation fuel cannot fly combat air patrols (CAP) to screen the battle group from 
air attack.  Ships without bunker oil cannot maneuver to prevent submarine attacks.  Re-
placement of losses by further drawing from the MSC fleet is possible but would likely take 
many days to achieve.  Besides, the MSC fleet assets are as limited in number as the active 
fleet.  Replacement of lost replenishment ships out of the MSC fleet will prevent their use to 
support follow-on force deployments. 
 
NPC should develop a strategy for targeting and attacking the replenishment fleet of the 
United States.  The replenishment fleet should be among the first U.S. assets targeted.  Any Mili-
tary Sealift Command ships or ships taken up from trade (STUFT) to replace damaged U. S. re-
plenishment assets, should also be made priority targets.  At the very least, this would force the 
U. S. to devote a substantial fraction of its limited combatant forces to escort duty, weakening 
battle group strength.  Risk to NPC forces would be small at best.  It might also be desirable to 
use covert operations similar to those described in the section on pre-positioned forces.  “Acci-
dental” loss of a small number (3-5) of replenishment ships in the months before hostilities begin 
will place added strain on an already weak system.  The low priority placed on logistics ships 
relative to combatants may preclude replacement shipbuilding programs from being instituted in 
a sufficiently timely fashion. 
 
An extremely viable option for destroying the replenishment fleet is the development of 
nuclear attack submarines that are capable of independent hunter-killer operations in blue water 
anywhere from the resupply depots to the replenishment points.  Diesel submarines supported by 
submarine tenders could be used to block traditional choke points.  Alternative options for at-
tacking the replenishment fleet include traditional sabotage, chemical/biological attack, or mer-
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chant ships flagged to neutral countries and equipped with simple radars and multiple short-
range antiship missiles, or better yet, torpedoes.  A complete missile or torpedo launching and 
fire control system could be hidden inside a standard shipping container.  In the case of using 
torpedoes, the launch would go completely undetected and the cause of the sinking might never 
be discovered.  The SLQ-32 electronic warfare suites on board the replenishment ships would 
probably give early warning of a missile attack, although if three or four missiles were launched 
simultaneously, the probably of the ship’s defensive weapons defeating them all is very small.   
 
The U. S. cannot eliminate its reliance on underway replenishment.  The de-
sign of ships capable of operating without support for months would be impractical.  
Although we have done so for submarines, there are cost penalties such as reliance 
on nuclear propulsion.  Furthermore, even a nuclear attack submarine must obtain 
replacement ordnance on a regular basis if it is actively engaged in a large-scale 
shooting war. 
 
Since it is not practical to eliminate underway replenishment, the U. S. should 
take actions to preserve an underway replenishment capability.  More oilers and 
ammunition ships are needed to act as replacements for combat losses.  Reserves 
should be capable of replacing almost every deployed ship at least once.  To avoid 
the delays associated with activation of reserves, the number of active duty replen-
ishment ships should be increased.  Critical assets such as the replenishment ships 
deserve protection.  At a minimum, they should be provided escorts to and from the 
forward areas and resupply ports.  Such escorts could be destroyers or they could 
be attack submarines.  In any case, more ships are required in the active fleets to be 
able to spare ships for escort duties.  The replenishment ships should be given 
minimal self-defense capabilities against missile and torpedo attacks.  Electronic 
warfare suites including active jamming coupled with two or more Rolling Airframe 
Missile launchers might suffice for missile defense.  Towed and expendable decoys 
might suffice for torpedo defense.  It is recognized that such defenses would require 
increases in the size and changes in composition of the permanent Navy detach-
ments aboard each ship.   This would be a small price to pay to preserve this essen-






CHAPTER 9.  ATTACKS ON SOCIETAL VULNERABILITIES 
 
 
CIVILIAN INTOLERANCE OF CASUALTIES  
 
In the minds of the American public, the 1960’s, 1970’s, and early 1980’s military op-
erations in Vietnam, Lebanon, and elsewhere, produced high levels of casualties in conflicts 
of questionable merit.  This can be contrasted with the successful operations of the late 1980’s 
and 1990’s.  Many people believe that the “pointless loss of life” in Vietnam contrasted with 
the “almost bloodless” Gulf War has left the American public with an expectation of low 
casualties and a consequent intolerance of any casualties at all in military operations.  It is 
perceived that public support for a military operation tends to fall with each casualty.  If an 
operation incurs too many casualties in a cause that is not universally acclaimed as being in 
the vital interests of the nation, it will likely be abandoned before successful completion.  At a 
minimum, public opinion will be turned against the military, and will result in decreased sup-
port for future operations and sustained military budgets.   
 
 The truth of this perception will not be argued here.  However, the existence of the per-
ception tends to produce self-fulfilling prophecies.  As casualties mount in an operation, the 
press will dwell on the carnage, predict more casualties in the future, and raise the issue of 
whether it is in our best interests to continue the fight in light of the casualties.  The self-doubt 
this in turn raises in ourselves will make us less tolerant of additional casualties, unless our 
moral certainty in the correctness of our cause is equally reinforced.  Most of the press reports 
will emphasize the casualties, not the morality of our cause.  Some will question the morality 
of the cause if it leads to warfare, regardless of the true nature of the cause.  Ultimately, we 
will tire of the strife and call an end to things unless victory is in sight.   
 
Both moral certainty of the need to fight and the probability of ultimate victory are 
necessary to sustain our motivation to fight.  No one questioned the moral aspects of World 
War II, even when the war was confined to Europe and China.  America opted not to fight un-
til after it was directly attacked by Japanese armed forces.  Our need to join the fighting was 
not viewed as sufficiently strong.  In World War II, victory in the Pacific was perceived as in-
evitable by many as early as June 1942 (after the massive defeat of the Japanese navy at Mid-
way – success on Guadalcanal later in the year served to reinforce that conclusion).  In the 
European Theater, the success of the North African landings pointed the way to ultimate vic-
tory over Germany at almost the same time.  For most (at least 2½ years out of 3½ years total) 
of the American segment of WW II, ultimate victory was viewed as inevitable.  This made it 
possible to continue fighting even though the losses became heavier as the war neared a con-
clusion.  In Korea, after the Chinese entered the fight on the side of the North Koreans, the 
war stagnated into repeated bitter fighting over small pieces of territory.  As the likelihood of 
ultimate victory diminished, American public opinion turned to accepting a stalemate main-
taining a divided Korea.  In Vietnam, the actions of the U. S. government soon made it clear 
that we were fighting to maintain a status quo, not to achieve victory.  The inability to see a 
successful conclusion to the fighting led to the cascading concern over pointless casualties.  
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Any adversary that can inflict heavy casualties on U. S. forces and deny us any clear-cut path 
to victory, will in all likelihood be able to force a stalemate, if not obtain a nearly complete vic-
tory. 
 
The American public aversion to casualties is especially strong if those casualties are 
caused by “friendly fire”, that is, fratricide [122], [123].  Historically, fratricide has accounted 
for 10-25% (average of 12%) of all casualties in every major engagement since World War II.  
In Desert Storm, fratricide accounted for 24% of American fatalities and 15% of all wounded 
[123].  Despite foreknowledge that fratricide is commonplace on the battlefield, every major 
fratricide incident seems to lead to a public hanging of the “guilty” party.  Americans also 
have an aversion to causing casualties (even unavoidable ones) among “innocent” civilians.  
This aversion is almost as strong as that to fratricide.  The general results of fratricide and 
civilian casualties are very restrictive rules of engagement.  The effects of such rules are dis-
cussed in the next section.   
 
NPC’s basic strategy should exploit America’s intolerance for casualties.  Any selective 
transparency into NPC military capabilities should make it obvious that any military intrusion 
into NPC affairs will result in substantial U. S. casualties.  The continued, visible existence of a 
massive, capable land army in China unequivocally demonstrates the potential success of this 
strategy.  The continued strength of the Chinese army coupled with the U. S. experience in the 
Korean conflict and Vietnam has led to the current military dogma that the United States will 
never again become involved in a land war in Asia (outside of fighting to maintain the status quo 
in Korea).  NPC strategy should also ensure that early confrontations with the U. S. should pro-
duce either no casualties or major casualties.  Zero casualties gives each side the ability to disen-
gage with honor.  Major casualties may trigger the public reaction that would force U. S. with-
drawal.  The NPC should not wait until U. S. forces have deployed on station to initiate casualty-
producing actions.  At this point, withdrawal may be considered more dangerous than continued 
engagement.  This was one of the factors that delayed the ultimate U. S. pullout from Vietnam.   
 
The strategy should also deny the U. S. any visions of a quick victory, and if possible, of 
any sort of victory.  Early in the conflict, any casualty-producing engagement between U. S. and 
NPC forces should result in an overwhelming NPC victory.  This will serve to deny the Ameri-
can public any vision of ultimate victory.  It will make the mere fact of casualties more devastat-
ing than their actual numbers dictate and will diminish America’s willingness to accept future 
casualties.  The early engagements must therefore be carefully planned and replanned, allowing 
for any and all contingencies.  Sufficient forces must be allocated to guarantee success.  Follow-
on actions and contingency actions must also be planned for success.  America must not be given 
any sign that it can be victorious during the early stages of the war.  They cannot be allowed to 
conduct the equivalent of Jimmy Doolittle’s bombing of Tokyo (on 18 April 1942) only four 
months after Pearl Harbor [124].  America cannot be allowed to follow its battle plan unchal-
lenged.  The equivalent of the lengthy and orderly buildup of Coalition forces prior to Desert 
Storm cannot be allowed to proceed successfully.  A successful Iraqi capture and occupation of 
Khafji (instead of the unmitigated disaster it turned into) followed up by additional successes 
might have altered the outcome of the Gulf War [125], [126].    
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However, NPC must make every effort to avoid too much surprise.  The U. S. will react 
to another Pearl Harbor with just as much moral indignation and desire for vengeance as it did 
fifty-eight years ago.  When NPC decides to initiate the hostilities (it can be reasonably assumed 
that NPC will be the aggressor), it must pay careful attention that the United States Government 
and its people know in advance that those hostilities are imminent.  Tactical surprise can be 
maintained, but the potential for a declaration of war, and the specific actions which will bring 
such a declaration into being need to be communicated in advance, in clear and simple language.   
 
Actions should be taken ahead of time to call the motives of the U. S. Government into 
question with regard to the topics of potential NPC-U.S. conflict.  NPC should try to justify that 
it has the moral high ground in any conflict.  It should take any action within its power (that does 
not violate NPC fundamental policies) to reinforce its supposed moral superiority.  Any instance 
of American moral turpitude that can be found (or manufactured) to degrade America’s claim to 
the moral high ground should be paraded before the United Nations and the world press. 
 
The U. S. Government should make every effort to ensure that its military 
forces are placed in harm’s way only when vital national interests are involved.  In 
such situations the civilian population is somewhat more tolerant of casualties, al-
though excess is deplorable no matter how important the cause.  However, the au-
thor recognizes that society does not always engage only in “righteous wars”, such 
as World War II, and occasionally situations will arise in which military forces are 
employed without full support of the general public.  In such situations, the U. S. 
military should recognize that adversaries might attempt to use massive casualties 
as a strategic weapon.  Forces should never be sent into a crisis or conflict situation 
without consideration that the adversary might be planning a trap or pre-emptive 
strike against those forces (with the adversary’s primary goal being the infliction of 
unacceptable levels of casualties).  Some adversaries might even be willing to suffer 
greater losses or cede tactical advantages to the U. S., if the level of U. S. casualties 
ultimately gives them a strategic advantage.  The 1968 Tet Offensive was a tactical 
defeat of catastrophic proportions for both the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese 
Army, yet it so turned the tide of public opinion in the United States that it was a 
strategic victory.  Pre-mission intelligence gathering should pay attention to this 





RESTRICTIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
 
A rule of engagement is an order from higher command to subordinate warfighters 
outlining what targets may be engaged, under what conditions they may be engaged, and with 
what degree of force they may be engaged.  “Don’t fire until you see the whites of their eyes” 
is a rule of engagement.  The United States is very solidly in favor of maintaining the moral 
high ground and obeying the rule of law.  As seen in the previous section the American mili-
tary also strongly wishes to avoid fratricide.  Since the U. S. military is an instrument of U. S. 
foreign policy, that policy also imposes limits on what we can or cannot do.  Thus, military 
commanders issue rules of engagement that attempt to keep the moral high ground, obey the 
Laws of War [127], satisfy foreign policy objectives, and minimize fratricide. 
 
To keep the moral high ground we generally:  
• Avoid bombing or shelling residential areas of cities (although in World War II and 
Korea, we did not always follow this rule – as the residents of Hamburg and Dres-
den could attest [128]. 
• Avoid bombing or shelling sites of great cultural, religious, historical, or 
archaeological interest. 
• Avoid bombing or shelling schools and hospitals even when the enemy uses those 
facilities for key military purposes (many North Vietnamese hospitals had air de-
fense weapons mounted on their roofs or sited in their courtyards). 
• Avoid bombing or attacking civilian air raid shelters if these can be identified 
• Avoid shooting or otherwise injuring unarmed civilians. 
• Avoid attacking passenger aircraft and ships. 
• Avoid attacking any commercial craft without verifying its registry. 
• Avoid destroying key facilities (such as dams or nuclear reactors) whose destruc-
tion would have catastrophic effects on the civilian population. 
 
In the realm of foreign policy, we may opt to: 
• Avoid firing the first shot, unless unequivocal intention that a threat intends to at-
tack U. S. assets can be determined. 
• Avoid any military action that might upset a Coalition member or a “neutral” 
country (In the Gulf War we prevented Israel from participating to foster the Coali-
tion with the Arab states;  In Korea and Vietnam we refrained from using nuclear 
weapons to avoid a possible nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union) 
• Conduct a military action with a minimum of forces or a minimum level of force to 
avoid the appearance of “beating up” a weaker opponent. 
• Respect the wishes and national sovereignty of non-participant states (such as not 
overflying their territory with military aircraft during deployments or strike mis-
sions). 
 
To minimize fratricide or accidental losses, we may: 
• Avoid firing on any target we cannot positively identify as hostile (this often trans-
lates to requiring visual identification of the target, and precludes the use of long 
range standoff weapons at their maximum ranges). 
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• Avoid firing at hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces. 
• Require friendly forces to carry devices or markings that aid in their positive identi-
fication (such as the black and white stripes on the wings of Allied aircraft partici-
pating in the Normandy invasion). 
• Prohibit flight training at minimum altitudes (even though those minimum alti-
tudes will be violated in combat). 
 
To obey the Laws of War, we will (among other things): 
• Treat prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention. 
• Avoid the use of torture during interrogation. 
• Avoid the use of excessive force. 
• Avoid the use of chemical and biological weapons. 
• Observe the rights of neutral states. 
• Avoid looting or pillaging of occupied territories. 
• Observe the civil rights of civilians in occupied territories. 
• Avoid unnecessary destruction of private property in occupied territories 
 
The restrictive nature of a rule of engagement may increase the vulnerability of U. S. 
forces.  For example, a policy of “don’t fire the first shot” will lead to casualties in situations 
where “he who fires first, wins” as was often the case in armored combat (the lethality of tank 
weapons exceeded the protective capabilities of their armor).  The policy of requiring positive 
visual identification of an air target before firing totally negates the benefits of having long-
range missiles such as Phoenix or AMRAAM.  Observing no-overflight requests from a nation 
may force a strike force to fly hundreds of miles farther and subject itself to earlier detection 
when performing a strike mission.  The extra pilot fatigue, increased opportunity for compo-
nent failures, and advance warning to the enemy may easily result in increased casualties. 
 
The author recognizes that many rules of engagement must be followed.  Nevertheless, 
this does not alter the fact that they may increase the vulnerability of our forces.  Unnecessary 
rules of engagement should be avoided.  It is possible for the enemy to exploit vulnerabilities 
created by those rules of engagement. 
 
NPC should make every effort to understand the rules of engagement under which the U. 
S. forces will operate.  It should take every opportunity to exploit any vulnerability that those 
rules may create.  If NPC places a lower value on human life than the U. S. then it should exploit 
our dislike of producing civilian casualties.  They should co-locate critical military facilities such 
as command, control, communications, intelligence, and surveillance facilities with schools, 
churches, hospitals, orphanages, playgrounds, or day-care facilities.  Even better, they should 
bury their critical military facilities underneath such civilian facilities.  Air defense sites should 
be located on top of such facilities.  Barracks and military housing might be fully integrated into 
civilian housing areas ringing military facilities. 
 
NPC may wish to consider staging events that will cause tightening of the rules of en-
gagement.  For example, it might recreate a “Vincennes incident”, in which a U. S. warship 
might shoot down a civilian airliner [129].  This might be done by having a stealth platform fly 
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above and behind a civilian airliner on a flight path that would carry the airliner directly over the 
warship.  By replying with military IFF codes when the airliner was interrogated by the warship 
and transmitting messages to ground control on military frequencies, the stealth platform would 
give a false identity to the airliner.  Sensors on board the warship would be unable to detect the 
stealth platform and would see no azimuth or elevation angle difference between the radar return 
from the airliner and the signals picked up by the ESM and the IFF systems.  At an appropriate 
range, the stealth platform could first radiate search radar signals, then tracking radar signals, and 
finally missile guidance signals.  The U. S. warship might justifiably believe it was under attack 
and retaliate by shooting down the obvious source of the threat (the airliner).  NPC would have 
to be willing to sacrifice civilian lives for military purposes, but many potential adversaries have 
demonstrated just such willingness.  If unwilling to do so, it would not be difficult for NPC to 
outfit the airliner to be remotely piloted.   
 
With appropriate cunning, planning, and preparation it should not be difficult for NPC to 
stage one or more incidents of “fratricide”.  Captured U. S. units might be covertly relocated to 
areas near the front, which are almost certain targets for artillery or air strikes.  With widespread 
tactical communications jamming, it is almost a certainty that some units will become “lost” to 
the command and control network.  If such units suddenly where no friendlies are supposed to be 
and known hostiles are expected to be, they will be attacked without much hesitation (the first 
time).  After a quick policing of the site after the attack to guarantee a lack of survivors who 
could tell what really happened, U. S. forces which later captured the site could only report their 
discovery as an example of friendly fire.  Similar incidents involving units from different allied 
nations might be used to spread distrust among Coalition members.  NPC might also commit 
atrocities (a la the My Lai massacre) using special operations forces wearing U. S. uniforms, car-
rying U. S. equipment, and speaking English.  The results of multiple events such as those de-
scribed above would likely be a severe tightening of several rules of engagement.  The tightening 
will almost always cause delays in responding to an attack or in pressing home an attack that are 
advantageous to the adversary. 
 
No professional military force can operate without rules of engagement.  Most 
of those imposed are well justified by the political situation and by international law.  
However, senior commanders (including the President) have a duty not to make the 
rules of engagement overly restrictive.  Furthermore, they need to be aware that a 
clever adversary might try to exploit those rules to his own advantage.   
 
One action that can be done by U. S. forces prior to the exploitation is plan-
ning.  This planning is essential to minimize the advantage that an adversary might 
gain.  It should include reactive and retaliatory response options.  Forces and 
equipment necessary to effect those options must be kept unallocated to other 
tasks.  Should an event occur that threatens to cause tighter rules of engagement to 
be imposed, that event should be thoroughly researched and dissected to guarantee 
that the event was not staged deliberately to provoke an overreaction.  
 
The U. S. also needs to develop weapons and equipment that can relax the 
rules of engagement.  Improved warning systems are one such development.  The 
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earlier a potential threat can be detected and the more attention that can be devoted 
to assessing whether the potential threat is an actual threat or not, the less restricted 
are the engagement options when the time for engagement actually arrives.  The 
warning system might also provide improved information needed to correct a bad 
situation.  For example, a bullet-tracking sensor might detect a single shot from a 
sniper and indicate the window from which the bullet was fired.  An immediate re-
sponse would probably catch the sniper red-handed.  Without the sensor, the alter-
natives include:  leaving the area and sacrificing the mission, returning massive 
amounts of unaimed fire for each sniper shot (and possibly injuring many innocent 
people), or possibly suffering days of sniper attacks leading to excessive nervous-
ness and irritability on the part of the troops that might flare into a subsequent war 
crime (such as My Lai). 
 
Effective nonlethal weapons are another potential development.  If an individ-
ual (hostile or otherwise) can be soundly deterred from closing to threatening 
ranges, questionable situations might never arise.  Should a questionable situation 
arise, then the ability to “shoot them all” without having to let “God sort the good 
from the bad afterwards” allows for defensive actions to be taken that cannot have 
potentially unacceptable repercussions.  With nonlethal weapons available, then the 
U. S. forces could shoot first in a threatening situation, but would not have the po-
tential drawback of dead or wounded noncombatants or innocent bystanders.  If a 
small boat appeared to threaten a U. S. warship by attempting to get too close, then 
a nonlethal weapon might incapacitate that small boat at a safe distance, allowing a 






CIVILIAN INTOLERANCE OF UNNECESSARY HARDSHIPS  
 
Americans are willing to tolerate almost anything as long as it does not affect them di-
rectly.  However, when an action directly limits the lifestyle or behavior of an individual, that 
individual is resentful, unless he can be convinced that the limitation is necessary.  If a con-
flict can be conducted with little or no impact on the average American, that average Ameri-
can will probably not pay much attention (beyond that imposed on him by the media).  If on 
the other hand, that average American’s ability to pursue life, liberty, and happiness is limited 
because of a conflict, the average American will demand reasons that such limitation is neces-
sary.  Fear for the safety of self or family is one of the strongest of such reasons. 
 
 Past conflicts have imposed a variety of hardships or lifestyle limitations on the Ameri-
can public.  Until the 1970’s American youth was subject to the “draft”, the Selective Service 
System.  A lottery was used to provide enlisted personnel for the armed forces.  Although de-
ferments could usually be obtained for college education and employment in critical fields 
(such as defense technology), the draft meant a potential for a young person’s life to be di-
verted from his planned course for several years.  In the 40’s, 50’s, and 60’s, this diversion 
was accepted because the fear of attack by real enemies (Germany and Japan in the early 40’s 
and the Soviet Union in the succeeding 25 years).  By 1970, the fight against Communism in 
Vietnam was viewed as unnecessary by so many youth that draft cards were burned at public 
rallies and more than a few that were drafted fled to Canada to avoid service.  The move to 
volunteer armed forces eliminated the Draft (although in the 1990’s the unattractiveness of a 
military career may force its reinstatement).   
 
In World War II there was food and gas rationing.  The righteousness of WW II made 
these hardships tolerable.  When a “political conflict” led to the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973 
with its long lines at gas pumps and restricted purchase of gasoline on alternate days. The in-
convenience was significant (increased prices and hours wasted by everyone with an automo-
bile) but the threat was low.  There was local violence and serious questions thrown at gov-
ernment representatives.  Many people believed that the gasoline shortages were orchestrated 
by the oil companies to raise prices.  The Gulf War led to heightened “security” at airports and 
delays in boarding flights.  The public was inconvenienced, but not excessively.  Most people 
accepted the inconvenience because they were afraid of the terrorist acts of violence that Sad-
dam Hussein had promised. 
 
If the U. S. enters a major conflict with a near peer competitor, there will be hardships 
imposed on American citizens.  The call-up of reserve forces will inflict financial hardship on 
many families (the civilian jobs of many reservists pay 2-3 times what the reservists earn on 
active duty).  Airport security will be further heightened.  If the buildup of forces abroad re-
quires exercising the CRAF option on a large scale, then the resulting shortage of passenger 
aircraft will require many business and pleasure travelers to forego their travel.  If the conflict 
is high-intensity and lasts for more than a month, our reserves of fuel oil and gasoline may be 
sufficiently depleted that gasoline rationing may need to be instituted.  The threat of terrorist 
violence may cause a declaration of a state of emergency with the imposition of martial law. 
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The American public may or may not tolerate these hardships.  If the CRAF option 
prevents families from going home for Christmas or puts some firms out of business because 
their employees cannot travel or their products cannot be delivered in a timely fashion, then 
the U. S. government had better have done a good job of convincing the public that the con-
flict and the hardship actions are necessary for national survival.  Protecting the sovereignty 
of some small nation with no vital resources and limited market for trade may not be sufficient 
justification.  The same is true of gasoline rationing.  If the threat of terrorist action forces the 
imposition of martial law, that threat had better openly manifest itself and directly threaten the 
wellbeing of the general public.  If it only threatens the military, many citizens will not be will-
ing to tolerate frequent police challenges, curfews, travel restrictions, and searches and sei-
zures.  In fact, the “unjustified” imposition of such measures may provoke a “militia” back-
lash far more destructive than the original terrorist threat. 
 
In short, the American public will tolerate any hardship if they are convinced of its ne-
cessity or if they are fearful for life or property.  If they are not fearful for life or property and 
they have not been convinced of the necessity of a hardship, they will not tolerate that hard-
ship for long.  They will blame the Government that imposed that hardship, not some faceless 
overseas adversary.  They will either remove their elected representatives at the next election 
or they will openly violate the restrictions. 
 
NPC should attempt to create situations in which the U. S. will impose hardships on its 
own citizens.  They must take care not to directly threaten the civilian population when they cre-
ate those situations.  NPC special operations forces might conduct a series of “terrorist” attacks 
on government and military equipment and facilities around the United States.  Military casual-
ties should be minimized and civilian casualties should be scrupulously avoided.  The end goal 
would be the imposition of martial law in the United States proper.  Deliberate attacks on a few 
senior governmental and military officials might be the most effective at provoking this response 
without provoking significant fear in the general public.   
 
NPC could also attempt to disrupt those sectors of the American economy that impact the 
most members of the American public.  For example, NPC could disrupt air travel by forcing the 
CRAF to be drafted for military use or by infecting the air traffic control system with a virus.  
NPC could curtail automobile travel by arranging for temporary shortages of oil and gasoline 
supplies.  By staging accidents (fires or explosions) at a number of oil refineries during the 
month or two preceding any hostilities and by outbidding competitors for crude oil supplies on 
the spot market during the same period, NPC could arrange for a temporary shortage of refined 
fuels in North America.  By itself this might only cause increases in gasoline, diesel, and heating 
oil prices.  But coupled with the U. S. Government exercising priority over the fuel supplies to 
support the massive sealift and airlift requirements associated with power projection, serious ci-
vilian automotive fuel shortages would arise.  Gas lines would become regular occurrences and 
rationing might become necessary.  If the conflict occurs in the late fall, winter, or early spring, 
then many citizens in colder part of the country will suffer from shortages of heating fuel.  Other 
inconveniences that might be inflicted on the public include shortages of meat, milk, or other 
specialty foods, shutdown of cellular telephone traffic, and loss of key television services. 
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The U. S. Government should make every effort to ensure that its military 
forces are placed in harm’s way only when vital national interests are involved.  In 
such situations the civilian population is somewhat more tolerant of inconveniences.  
In situations in which military forces are employed without full support of the gen-
eral public, the U. S. military should recognize that adversaries might attempt to use 
civilian disruption and inconvenience as a strategic weapon.  If military actions such 
as calling up the Civil Reserve Air Fleet appear to be necessary, the likelihood that 
this might be part of an adversary’s strategy should be included in the deliberations 
and planning.   
 
Homeland Defense studies should focus part of their activities on this topic.  
The full spectrum of possible “disruption and inconvenience” activities should be 
identified.   A few are described above, but there are many more.  For every “incon-
venience” identified, prevention strategies, defensive measures, and remediation re-
sponses should be developed.  If new research and development initiatives are re-
quired, they should be incorporated into the funding priorities of the appropriate de-
velopment agencies. 
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NEED FOR COALITION SUPPORT  
 
In the past decade the United States has shown an increasing tendency to require in-
ternational agreement on, international cooperation with, and often direct international par-
ticipation in its foreign military operations.  Many (if not most) Americans do not believe that 
we can afford (either financially or politically) to act unilaterally.  The progressive reduction 
in U. S. overseas presence manifested by the closure of some U. S. overseas military bases and 
the loss of other permanent bases due to changes in host country politics will also cause in-
creased needs for international cooperation.   
 
Many factors can affect whether or not that cooperation or participation is received.  
In the case of joint participation in military operations, it is important to establish that our al-
lies national interests are at stake not just those of the United States.  Potential adversaries can 
use propaganda, disinformation, economic or other political negotiations (offering highly de-
sirable incentives or seriously punitive sanctions), extortion, or even threats of military action 
to adversely influence the perceptions of our allies.  In the case of use of overseas bases, the 
host country must decide that cooperation with the U. S. will not harm it in the long run.  
Their perception of U. S. intentions in using these bases must be consistent with their own re-
sulting long-term benefit.  However, the perception of true U. S. intentions can be influenced 
by propaganda from potential adversaries or their allies.  A potential adversary can apply or 
support both external and internal threats to the integrity of a host government.  These will 
almost always affect the host’s willingness to cooperate.  Economic relations and standing po-
litical alliances are other significant factors.   
 
Through any or all of these means, an adversary might prevent the United States from 
getting access to foreign port facilities or airfields.  It might cause withholding of rights of 
passage through foreign territorial waters or overflight by U. S. forces.  It might cause de-
creased “coalition” commitment of troops, monetary support, or logistics support.  It might 
even enlist open military action against U. S. forces by a former neutral or weak supporter.  
Any of these actions will cause significant alteration in the way the U. S. has planned to con-
duct the military operations.  They will also reduce the effectiveness of U. S. forces in conduct-
ing those military operations and may increase both the monetary costs and the casualty costs 
of those operations.    
 
NPC should make every effort to establish friendly political and strong economic rela-
tionships with all of the countries that might be of military use to the United States.  Some of 
these relationships may be based on substantial, but covert bribery of key government officials.  
Using any and all of these relationships, pressure should be continually exerted on these other 
countries to reduce their political and economic ties to the United States.  In time of hostilities, 
NPC should be willing to adversely terminate any or all of the relationships with any country that 
sides with the U. S.  An attempt should be made to establish a regional defense alliance (exclud-
ing the United States) with all of those same countries that belong to the region of interest.  NPC 
should use this regional alliance to attempt to resolve any and all disputes.  By judiciously pursu-
ing (and occasionally losing a few unimportant) claims before this alliance, NPC can establish a 
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precedent for excluding the U. S. from deliberations.  This will weaken any support the U. S. 
might expect from the United Nations. 
 
Every attempt should be made to establish or at least portray the United States as the ag-
gressor in any confrontation with NPC.  Such attempts might include strategic deceptions and 
disinformation campaigns orchestrated to provide alternative explanations for any hostile NPC 
move.  These deceptions should be maintained over time despite any transparency that may oc-
cur.  Effective and visible threats should be developed that can be held over any country of mili-
tary use to the United States that does not accept close political and economic ties with NPC.  
These threats might be military or economic in nature.  They should be orchestrated well in ad-
vance, so that both NPC and the threatened country are fully aware of their existence, and of 
NPC seriousness in carrying them out. 
 
Although coalition warfare is preferable from public opinion and cost perspec-
tives, the requirement for a coalition creates a vulnerability.  The U. S. military 
should be capable of unilateral action wherever and whenever necessary.  It should 
not be deficient in critical capabilities (such as mine warfare) that absolutely require 
cooperation and participation of one or more key allies to alleviate.  In the event of a 
“righteous” World War III, where coalition warfare will be essential to national sur-
vival, the needed coalition will form naturally, a la NATO, and be reasonably robust.  
In lesser crises and conflicts, coalition warfare should never be a requirement, only a 
desired mode of operation.  With respect to actions designed to weaken a coalition, 
the U. S. should anticipate them wherever possible, and take counteractions, if rea-
sonable.  For example, if an adversary is holding a coalition partner hostage to ballis-
tic missile attacks, the U. S. needs to be prepared to supply ballistic missile defense 
(whether complete forces or only required items of equipment) to that partner.  The 






UNEQUAL SOCIETAL TRANSPARENCY   
 
The United States is a remarkably open society whose actions are usually transparent 
to all outside observers.  This openness is one the major strengths of American democracy.  It 
also has a flip side in that it is relatively easy to determine what actions the United States is 
taking and why.  We have few true secrets and are relatively predictable in our responses to 
external stimuli.  Societal complexity prohibits an enemy from perfectly predicting our actions, 
but the observant enemy will be right more often than he is wrong.  In peacetime we are will-
ing to share virtually all knowledge including military knowledge (but excluding truly classi-
fied information) with almost anyone who is not an actively avowed enemy.  Military students 
from dozens of foreign countries study at our military academies and war colleges.  They learn 
the doctrine and tactics that the U. S. will use should it go to war.  They make friends with 
their American officer peers and learn how these future military leaders think.  More senior 
allied officers often serve exchange tours with U. S. units.  They participate in operations and 
in exchange offer insights and analyses of how those operations might work in a coalition 
warfighting effort.  Other officers routinely serve as military attaches in their embassies in 
Washington.  Although the U. S. sends its share of officers to serve with other militaries in 
these exchange programs and possesses its own cadre of military attaches overseas, we do not 
send our junior officers to study at foreign military academies.  Their careers are too filled 
with required tours of duty to “waste” any time studying overseas. 
 
Civilian students from virtually every country in the world attend major U. S. universi-
ties.  Here they study all aspects of our culture, society, government, industry, and especially 
our technology.  Foreign workers are accepted to work in almost every major industry, with 
limited exceptions at defense contractors.  In some critical areas in the electronics and soft-
ware industries we actively recruit these foreign workers.  We know little about how many of 
these are actively aiding the intelligence agencies (or perhaps the industrial organizations) of 
their home countries.  To gain the economic benefits of increased foreign trade, U. S. compa-
nies are willing to enter into co-production agreements that serve to transfer critical technolo-
gies and intellectual capital to the foreign firms.  When these technologies are dual-use, the 
foreign firms show little reluctance (despite any agreements to the contrary) to adapt the newly 
acquired American technology to improve their own military forces. 
 
Although the interactions with foreign students, civilian workers, military officers, and 
government officials do act to strengthen the United States, the transfer of knowledge clearly 
helps our adversaries as well.  It is likely that more knowledge and information are exported 
than imported.  This is a vulnerability that we cannot eliminate.  We need to avoid the isola-
tionism of the past.  Our economy is too deeply involved with those of other countries.  How-
ever, we should be aware of the problem of unequal societal transparency and attempt to 
eliminate one-sidedness whenever possible. 
 
 NPC should make maximum use of the transparency of U. S. society.  A large fraction of 
NPC’s university students should be encouraged and subsidized to study at U. S. universities.  
These students should be further encouraged to study vital technologies and any aspects of U. S. 
society, culture, and government that would aid in predicting U. S. policies and responses.  Some 
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of these “students” should be drawn from the intelligence community.  These will be allowed to 
remain in the United States after their formal education is completed.  They will act to insure that 
NPC is kept abreast of all major technology and cultural developments occurring in the U. S.  
Students not willing to work in intelligence capacities after graduation should be strongly en-
couraged to return to NPC to work in the growing scientific and industrial complexes being de-
veloped.   
 
NPC military officers should be encouraged and subsidized to attend advanced military 
schools (such as the Air University, War College, Naval War College, and Naval Postgraduate 
School).  The officer students should learn to read, write, and speak English.  They should be-
friend their American counterparts, and where possible they should maintain some sort of contact 
after they return to NPC.  This not only facilitates access to information but also its flow.  It also 
establishes a number of back channels for communication that may prove useful in times of cri-
sis.   
 
Every attempt should be made for select units to be posted to the U. S. to undergo joint 
training or exercises.  Exchange programs involving individual officers should be instituted.  Of 
course, the reciprocal exchanges will not be on a true parity basis (although they will be de-
scribed as such in all communications) in order to ensure that the flow of information is as close 
to one way as possible.  A senior NPC naval officer might be assigned to a Fleet command, but 
his U. S. counterpart might be stationed at a military shipyard or a logistics depot.   
 
NPC companies should establish cooperative development programs with U. S. compa-
nies to effect one-way transfers of critical technologies or to build up industries and industrial 
capabilities of strategic importance to NPC.  Dual use technologies should be emphasized in 
these programs although the military aspects should be avoided in all external communications.  
These programs should be subsidized to make sure that they are profitable to the U. S. companies 
(at least in the short term) so that those U. S. companies are eager to repeat the process and join 
in even more technology-transferring ventures.  Products that NPC companies have developed 
should be actively exported to gain foreign exchange credit, but technologies and inventions that 
permitted the development of those products should not be transferred unless dual use can be 
ruled out. 
 
The United States is a democracy that has retained that status because it 
maintains a high degree of societal transparency.  The U. S. should not take any ac-
tions that severely reduce its own transparency.  This does not imply that we should 
pay less attention to espionage and intelligence operations on the part of any adver-
sary.  Counterintelligence should be a high priority.  Fewer foreign nationals should 
be allowed access to critical facilities such as military bases and national laborato-
ries.  U. S. corporations should be encouraged to employ U. S. citizens in sensitive 
high technology positions, rather than rely on importing foreign scientists and engi-
neers, who will work for lower pay.   
 
The U. S. should consider taking a number of actions to increase the trans-
parency of potential adversaries.  On-site inspections should be a mandatory part of 
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any arms control agreement.  When U. S. dignitaries visit foreign facilities, if they are 
given meaningless tours, then dignitaries from that country should be given equally 
meaningless tours and make it known that such treatment is tit-for-tat.  For example, 
if the U. S. Secretary of Defense visits a country and asks to visit his counterpart’s 
headquarters, and instead is met in the office of a trade delegation, then when that 
counterpart visits the United States, he should be received in the office of a District 
of Columbia bank, rather than in the Pentagon.  If an officer exchange program is es-
tablished, then the quality of assignments given to the foreign exchange officers 
should match the quality of assignment given to their U. S. counterparts.  Human 
rights, especially freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of move-
ment should remain key aspects of any and all economic negotiations with potential 
adversaries.  Favored treatment should be withheld until noticeable improvement in 




 The United States is party to numerous treaties that place limits on allowable military 
actions and equipments.  See Appendix L for a comprehensive examination of arms control 
treaties, their signatories, and the limitations they impose.  The United States is known for the 
fact that it honors its treaty obligations.  Some potential adversaries are not parties to critical 
treaties.  Other potential adversaries have histories of less than strict compliance with provi-
sions of the treaties they have signed.  Any treaty with militarily-limiting provisions to which 
the United States is a signatory, but to which any potential adversary is either not a signatory 
or whose provisions it ignores, creates an asymmetric military situation in which the United 
States is at a distinct disadvantage. 
 
 For example, if the United States ratifies the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 
it will be unable to test the reliability of any of its existing nuclear warheads.  Since warhead 
production facilities have already been shut down as a consequence of warhead reductions 
required by the START treaties, new warheads (of old designs) cannot be assembled to replace 
aging warheads.  As a result, the ability of the United States to rely on its nuclear arsenal to 
work as designed will diminish with each passing year.  At some point, the United States will 
have no confidence in its nuclear arsenal and it will be more of a liability than a deterrent.  If 
any nuclear power fails to ratify and abide by the CTBT, then it will be able to test its existing 
weapons as well as to develop improved warhead designs.  Such concerns are one reason the 
U. S. Senate has refused to advise the President to ratify the CTBT. 
 
 If any nuclear power clandestinely decides to violate the Outer Space Treaty and place 
nuclear warheads on orbiting platforms, the United States could be subjected to decapitating 
nuclear strikes with at most a few minutes warning (and possibly no warning).  Evacuation of 
National Command Authority and other major Government elements to secure locations or 
shelters would probably not be possible.  It is also possible (although unlikely) that we would 
be unable to attribute the strike to any particular adversary.  Given that it was debatable that a 
reasoned response could be developed even with the 30-minute warning to which we were ac-
customed during most of the Cold War, it is almost certain that no response would be forth-
coming from the highest command levels before they ceased to exist.  
 
 Many treaties might be exploited in some way to provide a military advantage to a po-
tential adversary.  Foremost among these include the following: 
• Non-Proliferation Treaty 
• Chemical Weapons Convention 
• Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention 
• Outer Space Treaty 
• Antarctic Treaty 
• Seabed Treaty 
• The Test Ban Treaties 
• The Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Agreements 
• The SALT and START Treaties 
• Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty 
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• ABM Treaty 
• Open Skies Treaty 
• Nuclear Material Treaty 
• Fissile Material Production Cut-off Treaty 
The contents and characteristics of these treaties are summarized in Appendix L. 
 
 NPC should attempt to create asymmetric military situations advantageous to itself either 
by selective non-compliance with treaties to which the United States is a State Party or through 
failure to sign and ratify treaties that the United States is likely to ratify.  However, any non-
compliance must be done selectively, and to the extent possible, done clandestinely.  Secrecy or 
at least discretion is required because blatant non-compliance will focus U. S. attention on NPC 
and its possible future actions.  This may result in U. S. development of counters to the NPC ac-
tions and possibly military intervention to preempt any situation that the U. S. feels has become 
untenable. 
 
 Failure to ratify a treaty should only be pursued after careful weighing of the military ad-
vantages that might accrue against any disadvantages that might accrue. in the form of economic 
sanctions or political “ill will”.  The intent is to establish a net advantage relative to the U. S.  
However, this advantage must consider factors beyond military power.  Failure to ratify a treaty 
might result in economic sanctions.  For example, failure by NPC to ratify the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and negotiate an IAEA Safeguards agreement would prohibit NPC from obtaining 
fissionable material in any form from any country that had signed the NPT.  Failure to ratify 
might also create increased ill will between NPC and potential adversaries, quite likely including 
the United States.  Those adversaries might respond by increasing their military preparedness, 
leaving NPC at a net disadvantage.  The response might take the form of strengthening alliances 
between several potential adversaries to NPC, also producing a net disadvantage. 
 
 The United States must take a leadership role in international politics.  As a 
consequence, it cannot avoid entering into treaties and other arrangements that limit 
its military power or options.  Most of the treaties that are ratified by our Govern-
ment provide net benefits to the United States.  Nevertheless, they provide opportu-
nities to ruthless or dishonorable adversaries.  We need to find ways to limit those 
opportunities without either reneging on our agreements or failing to participate in 
international negotiations.  It is important that any treaty to which the U. S. becomes 
a party must include viable provisions for compliance verification and serious, en-
forceable penalties for failure to comply or violation of any treaty provision.  The 
treaty must not contain loopholes or language subject to misinterpretation that 
would permit one party to engage in preparations towards a treaty violation without 
sanctions being enforced.  Wherever possible, prohibitions should be absolute to 
minimize loopholes.  For example, a treaty should not ban long-range missiles with-
out banning short-range missiles as well.  Short-range missiles are too easily con-
verted into longer-range missiles by simple improvements in technology that are dif-
ficult to detect via verification procedures. 
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 The United States should review the major militarily-limiting treaties to which 
it is a party and evaluate the ratification status and compliance histories of potential 
adversaries with respect to those treaties.  It should determine what benefits could 
accrue to those adversaries should they fail to fully comply with treaty provisions.  
The U. S. should examine plans to counter those accrued benefits.  The counters 
might include developing new tactics, changing existing force structures, altering 
planned deployments of those forces, hardening existing military equipment and fa-
cilities, or developing new equipment and facilities.  The U. S. should also task its 
intelligence apparatus to improve its monitoring and compliance verification activi-
ties related to those treaties and those potential adversaries.  
 
 During future treaty negotiations (before the treaties are signed), the U. S. 
military should evaluate the effects of proposed treaty limitations.  It should assess 
the likelihood that one or more potential adversaries will exploit those limitations, 
determine the manner in which exploitation is likely to manifest itself, and make con-
tingency plans to develop counters to the exploitation.  This assessment should be 
made available to the Cabinet, the treaty negotiators, and Congress prior to critical 
decisions/concessions being made.  
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CHAPTER X.  TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE  
 
 The world is becoming more technologically complex with each passing day.  The 
technological half-life of the average technology is roughly 15 years.  In some fields it is two 
years or less.   In one technological half-life, a body of new knowledge, new techniques, new 
theories, new inventions, etc., is “created” that is as large as all of the knowledge, etc., that 
has been discovered in all of prior history.  For every major field of endeavor, after one tech-
nological half-life there is likely to be a second uniquely different major field of endeavor.  
Consider the roughly sixty-year period since the start of World War II.  At the start of this pe-
riod (1939) UHF/VHF radar had become a practical tool (the CHAIN HOME system).  A few 
years later (1943-45) it had been replaced by microwave radar in the majority of applications.  
Perhaps a decade later (circa 1955), the foundations of synthetic aperture radar had been es-
tablished.  Another decade later (circa 1965) laser rangefinders had come into practical use.  
After yet another decade or so had passed (circa 1975), serious work on over-the-horizon ra-
dars had started.  By the mid-1980’s true radars operating at laser wavelengths were searching 
for deployable applications.  Finally, at the end of the century, netted multistatic radars were 
beginning to be considered as serious contenders for counterstealth applications.  Each of 
these inventions, occurring roughly once a decade, opened military possibilities undreamed of 
previously. 
 
Given the rapid rate of technological change, any country is open to technological sur-
prise.  No country can afford to give priority funding to every possible technology.  It doesn’t 
matter whether the funding comes from commercial or government sources, some technology 
areas will not be adequately funded.  However, many other countries look for niches that they 
can occupy and compete with the industrial giants.  A technology area that one country fails to 
diligently pursue is likely to be pursued by a competitor.  If an adversary country invests in an 
area that produces a militarily significant breakthrough and can keep it secret (or at least 
make it appear unimportant) during development and deployment, then that adversary has a 
significant window of relative superiority that it can exploit.  It may even be the equivalent of a 
“technological Pearl Harbor”.  If the U. S. has not kept pace technologically, it will take a 
substantial passage of time to close that window of vulnerability. 
 
It is considerably more difficult to effect a significant degree of technological surprise, 
if both sides have roughly comparable levels of expertise in a subject.  In addition, the dura-
tion of any window of vulnerability will certainly be shorter, if the surprised party is only a 
short way behind the surprising party in the relevant technology.  The U. S. will become more 
vulnerable to technological surprise as it relinquishes it leadership in more and more tech-
nologies (a trend that also creates a second distinct form of vulnerability in the form of tech-
nological atrophy).   
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 NPC should attempt to achieve technological surprise over the United States and/or other 
adversaries whenever possible.  It should invest heavily in research and development activities in 
many fields.  Such investment will serve three purposes.  First, it will provide incentives for 
NPC’s youth to enter scientific and technological fields of endeavor.  Second, it will provide a 
plethora of new discoveries that will fuel NPC’s economic development in the same way that the 
U.S.’s leadership in research in the 60’s, 70’s, and 80’s kept the U. S. economy dominant in a 
world market.  Third, it will provide opportunities for technological surprise.  How much in-
vestment should NPC make?  The author believes that it should be as much as the economy will 
tolerate.  It is one form of “arms race” that one cannot lose by spending too much.  Every dollar 
invested in research will do nothing but aid the economy in the long run.  NPC can only ensure 
opportunities for technological surprise if it is willing to outspend the U. S. in research and de-
velopment. 
 
 Despite this, NPC should exert some form of strategic control over its research and de-
velopment activities.  Strength against strength is seldom a good military practice.  NPC should 
not try to outspend the U. S. in those areas in which the U. S. has a clear lead.  It cannot ignore 
those areas, but it should spend only enough to be able to respond quickly to critical U. S. devel-
opments.  Instead, NPC should identify those technology areas where the U. S. is weak and de-
vote the lion’s share of resources to funding those technologies. 
 
 NPC should attempt to control the flow of information from its research and development 
activities.  This is a tricky process.  Enough information must flow out to insure that NPC is 
taken seriously as an R&D state.  This information will aid in the sale of products on the interna-
tional market and aid in the penetration of foreign R&D activities.  However, technological sur-
prise is not possible if all information is freely shared.  Critical results must be hidden or at least 
delayed.  This must be done without altering the apparent external flow of information.  When 
researchers suddenly stop publishing on a subject, it is an immediate cue to an aware intelligence 
organization that one of two things has happened:  the group has stopped publishing because a 
researcher has died, his funding has been cut off, or his group has been disbanded; or the re-
search has suddenly become classified. 
 
 The United States should revise its research and development strategy in or-
der to minimize the prospects of technological surprise.  No country today can be 
the leader in every field of technology development.  However, it is important to be 
a credible player in every field.  Failure to do so can lead to technological surprise.  
The actions that the U. S. should take to prevent technological surprise are essen-
tially the same as those needed to avoid technological atrophy.  We will discuss 
them at the end of the next section. 
 




 During much of the 20th Century the United States has been a leader in the develop-
ment of advanced technology.  However, it has not always been so and there is reason to worry 
that it may not remain true much longer.  A smaller percentage of the population is being 
educated in technological fields.  Few high school students take more than one science course 
or three math courses.  Few take advanced placement courses in math or sciences.  Thirty 
years ago, it was common for any “college prep” student to take at least three years of science 
and four years of math.  Every school had a dozen or more students taking one or more ad-
vanced placement courses.  High schools often have teachers teaching math and science 
classes who did not themselves major in or even specialize in math or science.  Teams from the 
United States regularly fail to place anywhere in the top 10 in international high-school level 
science and math competitions.  Scores on graduate record examinations for U. S. students 
have fallen during the last decades of the 20th Century. 
 
 Today, science, engineering, mathematics, and computer science/programming courses 
represent a smaller fraction of the total number of courses taught at a typical college than in 
past decades.  Although most college graduates are highly computer-literate, few are technol-
ogy-oriented.  They use computers as tools for business or other purposes, but do not know 
how computers are built or software is generated.  Roughly half of all graduate students in 
science and engineering at U. S. universities come from foreign countries and the percentage 
is rising.  Although the number of U. S. citizens pursuing college educations is increasing and 
expected to soar in the next decade, total enrollments in science and engineering graduate 
programs are still decreasing.  This decrease is occurring in spite of increased foreign student 
enrollments.  The total number of engineering degrees granted in the U. S. declined 17.8% 
from 1986 to 1996.  The number of computer science/mathematics degrees awarded declined 
35.8% over that same period.  During the period 1975 to 1997, the fraction of the 24-year-old 
population with degrees in science and engineering in the U. S. rose 35% from 0.04 to 0.054.  
However, in most industrialized countries, the percentage increase ranged from 50% to as 
high as 450%.  In Britain, the fraction rose from 0.029 to 0.094;  in South Korea, the fraction 
rose from 0.020 to 0.090;  in Germany, the fraction rose from 0.033 to 0.081;  in Japan (our 
biggest technological rival), the fraction rose from 0.047 to 0.072; in Taiwan, the fraction rose 
from 0.026 to 0.068; and even in mostly agricultural China, the fraction doubled from 0.004 to 
0.008. [236] 
 
 Every year, businesses in Silicon Valley and elsewhere plead for visa for hundreds of 
thousands of foreign scientists/engineers/programmers.  There are not enough U. S. citizens 
or immigrants with permanent resident visas with the desired skills to fill the personnel re-
quirements of those businesses.  There is also no sign that the U. S. is taking adequate steps to 
produce an adequate number of educated residents to fill the open positions.    
   
 In the 50’s and 60’s there was active governmental interest in increasing enrollments 
and interest in science and technology.  The Space Race and the Cold War were both at their 
heights.  Most of the author’s older scientific and engineering acquaintances, almost all of 
whom grew up during this period had science or mechanics as a hobby.  Many had chemistry 
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sets or access to chemistry laboratories through their high school where they could make just 
about any readily synthesized chemical, including highly poisonous and/or explosive com-
pounds.  More than a few made homemade explosives.  Some distilled their own high-test 
“moonshine”.  The mechanically oriented made their own “go-carts” and raced them on the 
back streets of the suburbs.  Others built and launched homemade rockets (not the super-safe 
kind you can buy at hobby stores, but large ones using exotic propellants).  Some just played 
with commercial explosives out in the woods or hills.  This was an era when farmers could still 
buy dynamite (for clearing stumps and rocks from fields) by the box at the local hardware 
store without a federal permit.  Today “educational” activities such as those described would 
land the students in juvenile detention centers.   
 
 The “Rocket Boys” in the true-life movie October Sky, [130] through a series of ex-
periments that often destroyed property and endangered the lives of innocent passersby, yet 
continually encouraged by their high school science teacher, developed the technology to 
launch man-sized rockets more than two miles straight up.  Their description of these experi-
ments took first prize at the National Science Fair.  They would almost certainly have been 
jailed as terrorists (or at least dangerous youthful offenders) if they had conducted the same 
experiments today.  Furthermore, their teacher would have been dismissed if not arrested for 
contributing to the delinquency of minors.  Nevertheless, those experiments got all of the 
Rocket Boys out of mining town poverty (by guaranteeing them college scholarships) and led 
two of them into engineer careers.  As a high school student in the sixties, the author could 
legally buy any chemical (including poisons, oxidizers, fuels, corrosives, and/or biological 
growth media) in any laboratory-scale quantity (typically decaliters of liquids and kilograms of 
solids) except for controlled substances (narcotics).  Today, with a Ph.D. in applied science 
(but essentially chemical physics), few of the major chemical supply houses will sell him any 
quantity of even relatively benign chemicals, unless he purchases them through his institution, 
for fear of the supply houses being prosecuted as abetting potential terrorists or designer drug 
makers.  A high school kid pointing a pocket laser pointer at a police officer can be (and has 
been) charged with assault.  Pointing it at a police helicopter at night can lead to charges of 
assault with intent to kill.  America’s quest for “safety at any price” has closed many of the 
avenues that created and nurtured interest in science and technology in past generations. 
 
 Science and technology have also lost much of the respect they once held.  Progress, 
facilitated by scientific discoveries, has often led to large-scale problems that the scientists had 
not foreseen.  The widespread use of DDT to control insects led to the near extinction of many 
species of birds.  The overuse of antibiotics has led to resistant strains of disease.  Nuclear 
power is a dying industry because poor safety practices in the past have produced a few disas-
ters.  The use of chlorofluorocarbons is now destroying the ozone layer.  The burning of fossil 
fuels is threatening the planet with global warming.  Science and technology are convenient 
scapegoats on which to blame the continually emerging problems.  The tendency of science 
and technology to be associated with such problems is condemned much more than their abil-
ity to solve those same problems and to increase the standard of living of mankind is praised. 
 
The United State Government is spending a smaller fraction of its budget on research 
today than it has during the last 5 decades.  It is expecting industry to pick up and fund what it 
does not.  However, industry spends very little money on basic research.  Companies need to 
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make a profit and make that profit quickly or they go out of business.  As a result, industry 
funds only those research areas that are almost certain to generate new products within a few 
years.  Basic research is left to the government to fund and government funding is decreasing, 
even though the number of fields in which basic research should be performed is increasing. 
 
The degree statistics cited earlier indicate that many nations already have a larger per-
centage of their adult populations educated in technical specialties than does the United 
States.  This in and of itself should hint that U. S. technological superiority may be slipping.  
However, the results of a recent study of scientific output (as measured by numbers of techni-
cal publications) are even more shocking.  A comprehensive study of technical publications 
for the years 1991 to 1998 indicates that the United States is no longer the dominant source of 
scientific discovery and technological innovation.[247]  Based on the data in Reference 247, 
Figure 10-1 shows the fractional contribution to the total annual output of technical publica-
tions of North America (essentially the U. S.), Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, and the 
Third World over the period from 1980 to 2020.  Data for 1991 to 1998 are study data.  Results 
prior to 1991 and after 1999 are extrapolations from the study data.  Based on this analysis, in 
1980, almost half of all technical publications originated in North America.  By 2000, this 
fraction has fallen below 30% and by 2020 (barring no changes in the trends) will have fallen 
below 15%.  The behavior of scientific output in Western Europe is almost the mirror image of 
the United States.  By 2020 more than half of all technological innovation will be coming from 
Europe.  This prediction is almost certainly an underestimate.  The output of Eastern Europe  
 
 
Figure 10-1.  Percentage of global annual technical papers published by region. 
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fell during the 1990’s because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.  Re-
sources previously spent on technical research were transitioned to subsistence of the popula-
tion.  As the economies of Eastern Europe recover, which they almost certainly will by 2020, 
technical publications will rebound as well.  The total output of a united European Economic 
Community will likely exceed the extrapolations shown here.  Even more shocking is the pre-
diction that Asian contributions will be one-third larger than American contributions by 2020 
that even the Third World (Latin America, Africa, Mideast, and Oceania) will have surpassed 
the United States in technical output.  Unless drastic steps are taken to invalidate these ex-
trapolations, America may find that it has become a technological second class citizen.  
 
As we have shown, the technological superiority that kept the U. S. a superpower dur-
ing much of the 20th Century is disappearing.  Complacency, poor policy decisions, deteriorat-
ing educational systems, and the lack of a national vision of the future, to name a few of the 
factors, have combined to produce conditions where our national technological might has be-
gun to atrophy.  The United States will be responsible for a continually decreasing percentage 
of technological innovations.  Since our economy is strongly dependent on developing new 
technologies, a relative decrease in percentage of new innovations will result in declining eco-
nomic strength.  Furthermore, potential adversaries will be making an increasing percentage 
of those innovations.  The majority of innovations will be made by countries over whose ex-
ports the United States has no control and little influence.  It is also possible, if not likely, that 
many of the decreasing U. S. innovations will be made by citizens of adversary countries, who 
will return home to those adversaries after a few years, taking complete knowledge of those 
developments with them.  They might also subtly sabotage their U. S. host organizations before 
they depart.  With proportionately fewer scientists and engineers available, the United States 
will be less able to respond to technological developments made and/or exploited by an adver-
sary.  Our status as technological leader of the world could decline until we were no longer 
even in the top ten.  It is likely that our recognition as a world power will decline proportional 
to our atrophy in technological innovation.  If things decay to a state where other countries 
are developing the cutting edge weapons, then our military will no longer possess the techno-
logical force multipliers on which we have grown to rely.  Loss of these multipliers coupled 
with our diminished manpower means we will be unable to fight and win those battles deemed 
critical to our national security.  We may become the weak sister in the North Atlantic alli-
ance, just as we were the weak sister to Great Britain and France in World War I. 
 
 NPC should attempt to capitalize on U. S. technological atrophy as well as exacerbate 
that atrophy.  It must build its own technological infrastructure by building world-class universi-
ties and national laboratories.  Despite this, it should send as many students as practical to U. S. 
universities.  If U. S. schools can fill their enrollments with foreign students, there will be less 
need to offer incentives to U. S. students.  As NPC universities become better and more numer-
ous, the better students might be kept home and poorer-performing students could be sent.  If 
earlier NPC students were able to set the standard for learning and through their requests and 
comments were able to affect the curriculum, then a gradual reduction in student quality might 
produce a gradual reduction in overall quality at the U. S. schools.  Thus, the few U. S. students 
who do attend the U. S. universities would receive a proportionately poorer education.   
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 Through its substantial population of NPC citizens resident in the U. S., NPC should 
strive to keep the elementary and high school educational systems of the U. S. weak.  For in-
stance, they might demand that money be spent on bilingual education.  Money spent in this area 
enriches the children of the NPC community while doing nothing for the rest of the school popu-
lation.  It clearly will not be available to improve the technological education of U. S. students.  
They might also demand more focus on the NPC cultural heritage.  Again money spent on teach-
ing NPC culture and the history of the NPC emigrants in the U. S. is money that cannot be spent 
on science and technology.  The NPC families would not be permitted to stay in the U. S. more 
than five or six years, so that their children would not be too adversely affected by the poor cali-
ber of education they received here.  NPC students might be encouraged to form racial-oriented 
cliques and gangs.  The exacerbated racial tension would detract from the general educational 
environment.  Vandalism from these gangs aimed at the schools and the increased security to 
control it could further deplete school budgets. 
 
 NPC activism should target science and technology as modern bug-a-boos.  The NPC 
community should emphasize environmental activism of the radical kind (vice the scientific 
kind).  Even if they cannot vote, they should demonstrate for candidates whose agendas favor 
socialist projects (welfare, social security, Medicare, civil rights, and other big government ac-
tivities) over those who favor increased support of science and technology. 
 
 The United States should reform both its educational system and its research 
and development infrastructure.  Schools need to dramatically increase both the 
quantity of science and mathematics being taught at all levels, but also the “quality” 
or depth of what is being taught.  Teachers trained in science and math should be 
the only ones permitted to teach those subjects.  In order to guarantee an adequate 
supply of trained teachers, school districts need to double or triple salaries of teach-
ers in those fields and increase the salaries of all teachers.  However, there is no jus-
tification for a high school football coach to be paid more than a science teacher, a 
math teacher, or even an English teacher.  School laboratories need to be recapital-
ized with up-to-date experiments and demonstrations.  We probably cannot reverse 
our societal preoccupation with safety, despite the net benefits this might bring, so 
these modern labs must emphasize exciting results while maintaining an adequate 
degree of safety.  Elementary schools must not be allowed to graduate or pass on 
students that cannot read, write, and do arithmetic.  High schools should not gradu-
ate students that cannot critically read a novel or nonfiction book, write an intelligent 
discussion of that critical reading, perform all kinds of arithmetic and solve algebraic 
problems, and understand and adapt the fundamental concepts in the fields of phys-
ics, chemistry, and biology. 
 
 Incentives are needed to encourage the nation’s youth to study science, 
mathematics, and engineering at the university level.  These might include more 
merit-based scholarships usable only for science or engineering educations, in-
creased job opportunities for U. S. students (perhaps by reducing the number of 
foreign visas granted to scientists and engineers), and increased graduate-level edu-
cation opportunities.   
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 The reputation of science and engineering as desirable fields needs to be re-
built.  This might be achieved in several ways.  The government might fund talented 
writers and historians to popularize science and engineering accomplishments and 
the individuals who accomplished them.  These works should be made available via 
multimedia such as the Internet and commercial television (the Government should 
buy the time to air them or make the stations air them as part of their public service 
commitment).  National prizes with substantial monetary awards should be estab-
lished in all fields not just the few that currently exist.  Meritorious service awards 
should be given to all individuals who make major contributions to science and 
technology (not just to civil servants who are about to retire).   
 
 The government should get back into the basic research business.  Basic re-
search budgets at the NSF, DoD, DoE, NIH, etc. should be increased back to frac-
tional levels comparable with their heydays of the 1960’s or 1970’s (whichever is lar-
ger).  The government should practice what it preaches.  Technological degrees 
should be required for those with oversight of technological enterprises, all the way 
up to Cabinet level.  Civil service employees should be encouraged to obtain ad-
vanced technical degrees.  All military officers at or above the level of O-4 should be 
required to have advanced degrees and the majority of those should be in techno-
logically oriented fields.  The government should incentivize industry to become in-
volved in science and technology education and training by not permitting large 
quantities of foreign scientists, engineers, and programmers to obtain visas to either 
study or work here.  We should strive to attract and let in only the best of the best of 
the foreign candidates.  This will force improvements in the internal supply of candi-
dates and reduce the number of individuals in which we invest in training merely to 
later compete against us. 
 
 The United States cannot afford to let its technological superiority atrophy.  If 
we become a second-rate producer of technology, we will become a second-rate 
power.  If we become a second-rate power, there are too many adversaries who 
would be willing to and capable of attacking and defeating us militarily and altering 








 In the commercial world disruptive technologies are typically low-end technologies that 
lack capabilities required by major customer segments (and provided by mainstream technolo-
gies) but nevertheless find small niche markets. [131]  See Appendix M for a more detailed ex-
amination of potential disruptive technologies.  The initial niche markets may have little or no 
overlap with the major customer segments and the initial capabilities of the technology may 
not be recognized as having any relevance to the requirements of the major customer seg-
ments.  However, over time these low-end technologies develop more and more capabilities 
until they rival the capabilities provided by the mainstream technologies and offer significant 
additional benefits (usually reduced costs, but possibly new capabilities such as portability).  
The disruptive technologies then rapidly displace the mainstream technologies in the major 
consumer segments.  The rapid displacement of “mainframe” computers by personal com-
puter networks in many corporate applications is a clear example of a disruptive technology at 
work.  Many (such as DEC) in the computer business scorned personal computers until those 
personal computers had eaten away most of the market for the mainframes that DEC pro-
duced.  
 
Disruptive technologies are technologies that completely disrupt the status quo.  They 
may be slow to develop.  They may have little impact as they become established, except in 
niche areas, but in a military context, they have the potential to change almost every aspect of 
how wars are fought.  For example, the tank, once its function had been truly appreciated, 
transformed land warfare from “attrition warfare” (defense-oriented trench warfare) to “ma-
neuver warfare” (offense-oriented blitzkrieg).  U. S. military forces invest so much effort and 
capital in expensive yet evolutionary high technology equipment and extensive doctrine and 
training at all levels in the use of that equipment, that they often cannot respond quickly when 
disrupting technologies arise.  Leaders proficient at the old style of warfare often find it diffi-
cult to assimilate and internalize the new style.  Forces trained using the older equipment may 
be reluctant to accept new and “untried” equipment and tactics.  It may take several years be-
fore individuals become truly proficient in the new technology.  Potential adversaries that are 
quicker to adapt to disrupting technologies can exploit this potential vulnerability in U. S. 
forces. 
 
 In the military arena we can consider any technology that has the potential for provid-
ing revolutionary new capabilities or quantum leap improvements in old capabilities to be a 
potential disruptive technology.  The disruptive technology need not be developed initially for 
military applications.  Commercial breakthroughs will become “militarized” at an exceeding 
rate in the future.  Witness the fact that computer technology was initially driven by military 
needs (the first computers were used for cryptography, generation of ballistic tables for artil-
lery, and calculation of nuclear weapon designs) yet today it is the consumer segment that is 
pushing microprocessor technology to ever-increasing performance. 
 
 The United States military forces are vulnerable to disruptive technologies, as are vir-
tually all other military forces.  Vulnerability to disruptive technologies is a transient process.  
It begins whenever an adversary develops or deploys a new capability first and ends when we 
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respond by matching deployments of similar capability or deployment of an effective counter-
measure capability.  The duration of the “window of vulnerability” depends on our ability to 
respond effectively, which often depends on where we were positioned in the race to develop 
the disruptive technology.  Our existing force structure, doctrine, and traditions may make it 
difficult for us to develop or exploit such technologies when given the opportunity.  For exam-
ple, consider an adversary’s development of artificial intelligence for replacing pilots in air-
craft with computers.  This was discussed in an earlier section of this work.  If the adversary 
exploits this technology, then that adversary can gain an aviation capability that is as far 
ahead of today’s U. S. aircraft capability as the aluminum monoplanes of WWII were ahead 
of the wood-and-fabric biplanes of WWI. The U. S. is among the leaders in both aircraft and 
computer technologies.  By all rights, the U. S. should be the first to develop pilotless (or at 
least remotely piloted) combat aircraft.  However, not surprisingly, former aviators dominate 
the leaderships of the U. S. military aviation development communities.  Few attempts to 
eliminate pilots (and thus both the source of their own successes and the source of future mili-
tary aviators) from combat aircraft are vigorously pursued by these ex-aviators.  Because we 
are not aggressively pursuing our own development, we are offering an opening to potential 
adversaries, and may also be significantly lengthening the window of vulnerability that would 
result if an adversary pursued that opening. 
 
 In Table 10-1 we list a number of potential disruptive technologies.  The table also pre-
sents an initial risk analysis of each technology.  A probability of occurrence (Low/Medium/ 
High) is assigned to each technology.  A consequence of occurrence (or impact) was similarly 
assigned.  The author attempted to limit the scope of impact assessment to militarily-related 
activities (although in modern society this is difficult if not impossible to do).  Both of these 
probabilities were estimated by the author, and are obviously highly subjective.  Nevertheless, 
the estimates were made only after careful evaluation of the current state of the art and exist-
ing trends in scientific research.  The reader should feel free to assign his own probabilities to 
any technology with which he is intimately familiar.  A subjective risk to the U. S. military was 
obtained by using the standard risk categorization matrix shown in Table 10-2. 
 
 Two time frames were analyzed.  The first time frame was 2015.  The fundamental as-
sumption was that the technology would have matured to such an extent by this date that, at a 
minimum, an initial military operational capability would exist.  Note that the initial opera-
tional capability might exist in an adversary’s armed forces rather than in U. S. forces.  Re-
gardless of who implements a disruptive technology, the results will still be disruptive.  Never-
theless, some countries will be able to implement disruptive technologies faster than others.  
The long development times associated with U. S. military equipment means that for an opera-
tional capability to exist in 2015, the key technology concepts and scientific breakthroughs 
must occur before roughly 2005.  In other cultures, these breakthroughs might occur as late 
as 2010 and still permit an operational capability in 2015.  A second time frame around 2030 
was also analyzed.  This time frame is far enough in the future that key technology break-
throughs need not occur for a couple of decades. 
 
 Appendix M discusses the potential military impact of each of these potential disruptive 
technologies.  The technologies marked with an asterisk in Table 10-1 have already been dis-
cussed in earlier sections and are not discussed in detail in Appendix M.  In the remainder of  
Table 10-1.  Potential Disruptive Technologies 
 
          2015        2030 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY   LIKELIHOOD IMPACT  RISK  LIKELIHOOD IMPACT  RISK  
 
*Artificial Intelligences    MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  VERY HIGH VERY HIGH VERY HIGH 
*Trans-Atmospheric Vehicles   LOW  HIGH  MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
*Directed Energy Weapons   LOW  HIGH  MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
*Terminally-Guided Ballistic Missiles  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  VERY HIGH VERY HIGH 
*Weather Control    LOW  MEDIUM LOW  MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Advanced Algorithms    MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
Target Recognition/ID/Discrimination  MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  VERY HIGH 
Micro-Electromechanical Systems (MEMS)  HIGH  MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
Z-Plane Electronics    MEDIUM LOW  LOW  HIGH  MEDIUM HIGH 
Scalable Neural Network Chips   LOW  MEDIUM LOW  MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH 
Direct Mind-Computer Interfaces   LOW  MEDIUM LOW  MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH 
Very Energetic Materials    MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH  MEDIUM HIGH   
Electromagnetic Launch    MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
High Energy Density Power Supplies  LOW  MEDIUM LOW  MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Bionic Augmentation    MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH  MEDIUM HIGH 
Ultrastrong Fibers     MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
High-Temperature Superconductors  MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
Cold Fusion Power Supplies   LOW  HIGH  MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  
Deep Diving Submarines     MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH  MEDIUM HIGH 
Quantum Computers    MEDIUM LOW  LOW  MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH 
Passive Coherent Location   MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  VERY HIGH HIGH  VERY HIGH 
Ultrasensitive Magnetic Detectors   HIGH  MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
Ultrasensitive Gravitational Detectors  MEDIUM LOW  LOW  HIGH  MEDIUM HIGH 
Active Element Conformal Arrays   MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  VERY HIGH VERY HIGH 
Nanotechnology     VERY LOW MEDIUM LOW  LOW  HIGH  MEDIUM 
Nanites      VERY LOW HIGH  LOW  VERY LOW HIGH  LOW 
Genetic-Engineered/Cloned Warriors  LOW  LOW  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
Fusion Power Plants    LOW  LOW  LOW  MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Nuclear Catalysts    VERY LOW MEDIUM LOW  MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Matter-Antimatter Reactors & Weapons  LOW  HIGH  MEDIUM HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
Tectonic Weapons    LOW  LOW  LOW  MEDIUM LOW  LOW 
Gravity Control      VERY LOW MEDIUM LOW  VERY LOW MEDIUM LOW 
“Warp” Drive     VERY LOW HIGH  LOW  VERY LOW HIGH  LOW 
Psychic Weapons     MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Space Colonies      LOW  MEDIUM LOW  HIGH  MEDIUM HIGH 
 
* Discussed in detail in earlier chapters. 
Table 10-2.  Risk Categorization Matrix 
 
 
                IMPACT OF OCCURRENCE 
      
                    LOW             MEDIUM             HIGH             
     | 
             LOW |    LOW     LOW  MEDIUM 
 PROBABILITY   | 
 OF            MEDIUM |    LOW  MEDIUM   HIGH 
 OCCURRENCE   | 




this section we discuss how disruptive technologies might be exploited by a competitor and 
how the U. S. should respond to minimize the impacts of such exploitation.  
 
 The reader should note that many of these disruptive technologies sound like science 
fiction.  In truth since few of them are currently practical, they are science fiction.  However, 
the reader is reminded that atomic weapons and nuclear submarines and space flight were all 
science fiction for decades before they became science fact (and military reality).  None of the 
technologies listed below unequivocally violate the basic laws of physics (although one or two 
might prove impossible as our understanding of physics improves.  A number are likely to be-
come practical and well established within one or two decades.  Most will be realized before 
the 21st Century is half over. 
 
 NPC should attempt to identify those technologies that are becoming or have the poten-
tial to become disruptive technologies.  This will require a strategy of investment across the en-
tire breadth of known technologies.  NPC must participate in the development of those technolo-
gies that are potentially disruptive.  It cannot take advantage of a disruptive technology if it is not 
proficient in that technology.  NPC must emphasize science and technology education at all lev-
els if it is to have a workforce capable of pursuing new technologies and capable of industrially 
exploiting any resulting technological developments. 
 
 A strategy of substantial investment in science and technology is probably a wise move 
for NPC in any event.  Almost all technological developments have positive economic benefits.  
An educated population is necessary in any superpower.  Even if military conquest is not one of 
NPC’s goals, it can advance towards global economic power by exploiting disruptive technolo-
gies in the commercial arena. 
 
NPC must determine the future course of each potentially disruptive technology and the 
probable timing of key developments.  It should establish, in advance, the infrastructure that will 
make adoption and insertion of the “disruptive technology” as painless as possible.  These ac-
tions should be disguised and dissociated from the disruptive technology to the maximum degree 
practical, in order to prevent the U. S. from also recognizing and responding to the disruptive 
technology.  It should also strive to effect the adoption of the disruptive technology as soon as 
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possible.  Those countries that are masters of the disruptive technology will assume leadership 
positions during the transitional period. 
 
 The United States must change its military acquisition system.  The current 
system favors evolutionary development rather than revolutionary change.  Disrup-
tive technologies represent revolutionary changes rather than evolutionary devel-
opments.  Equipment acquisition times must be reduced from decades to years.  It 
is best to keep up with, if not lead, the revolution.  Lagging behind the revolution 
provides the most vulnerability.  This will entail the taking of significant risks by pro-
gram management.  The system must not punish those who fail, when they take 
reasoned risks, or their successors will not take those risks when required.  The sub-
ject of acquisition reform has been the subject of many books, and deserves to be 
the subject of many more, as little positive change has been observed in the last 
thirty years.  We will not address this problem further, other than to reiterate that 
acquisition must be done better in the future than it is today. 
 
 It is also essential to increase the technological sophistication of the military, 
especially the officer corps.  If senior military leaders do not demand that new dis-
ruptive technologies be exploited, then the acquisition system guarantees that they 
will not be exploited.  Even if the need for a disruptive technology is recognized, 
technological sophistication is required to be able to decide how to employ that 
technology effectively.  It would be highly desirable if a much larger percentage (at 
least half) of senior military leaders had advanced technical degrees.  A substantial 
percentage should have more than one advanced degree.  At a minimum every offi-
cer (technical or otherwise) should be required to undergo periodic training on the 
newest technologies and how they might affect the military.  It might even be more 
beneficial than not, if major commands had a staff position equivalent to (and not 
subordinate to) the J2, whose responsibility would be to keep up to date on all rele-
vant technology developments and report them back to the entire staff.  This indi-
vidual should spend as much effort on identifying and evaluating potential disruptive 
technologies, as he spends on trying to evaluate what existing technologies might 
be inserted into existing materiel to alleviate known problems. 
 
 Of course, none of the improvements above will be of much use if the nation 
continues its trend towards technological atrophy, as discussed in the preceding 
section.  If it does we will be unable to recognize potential disruptive technologies 
until they are most disruptive, and we will not be able to respond in any fashion to 








CHAPTER 11.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 In the preceding sections we have identified a number of potential future vulnerabilities 
of United States military forces.  None of these vulnerabilities taken in isolation can provide an 
exploitative competitor the ability to establish an access denial capability.  However, any one of 
a few critical vulnerabilities when combined with a number of the others might provide the basis 
for such an access denial system.  Among these critical vulnerabilities are long-range antiship 
ballistic missiles, massive attacks by antiship cruise missiles, unmanned air superiority aircraft, 
and solid defenses against precision-guided weapons (using GPS or terminal guidance).  When 
combined with lesser vulnerabilities (such as advanced mines or torpedoes or capabilities to at-
tack our satellites, pre-positioned equipment, or strategic sealift or airlift assets), exploitation of 
one or more of the critical vulnerabilities should make it difficult if not impossible for U. S. 
forces to force entry into a denied area.   The majority of the lesser vulnerabilities taken together 
without a critical vulnerability might also allow a competitor to deny us access, although it 
would be more difficult for that competitor to implement such a system.   
 
Note that a competitor’s possession of a strategic nuclear arsenal that cannot be negated 
by a National Missile Defense will not in and of itself create an access denial capability.  It will, 
however, force the United States to treat that competitor with much more respect than it might 
otherwise.  U. S. military options will be severely limited by that eventuality.  We will be con-
tinually faced with determining whether our political/military objectives are worth the possible 
loss of Los Angeles or Chicago or New York City. 
 
Some of these vulnerabilities will become (or already are) reality no matter what actions 
the U. S. pursues.   Others could be easily addressed by changes in policy or by increased will-
ingness to spend more money for defense.  A number will require extensive U. S. research and 
development to prevent their occurrence.  To maintain a position of pre-eminence the U. S. does 
not have to eliminate every one of these potential vulnerabilities.  However, it must address the 
handful of critical ones, and a majority of the less critical ones.  Any vulnerability that is not 
adequately addressed has the potential to create unacceptable casualties when and if hostilities 
finally arise. 
 
 The significance of failing to adequately address these vulnerabilities and of allowing one 
or more competitors to develop viable access denial systems needs to be pointed out.  If our pri-
mary competitors develop access denial systems then U. S. influence in the competitors’ regions 
of the world will diminish to that of a buyer and seller of merchandise.  Economic influence will 
be the only form of influence the U. S. can exert, and this may not be that important in the future 
world economy.  As other nations’ economies grow relative to ours, the U. S. share of the world 
market can only diminish.  If one of the competitors possesses a nuclear arsenal and hegemonic 
desires, we will cease to be the sole superpower in the world.  This will have serious conse-
quences for the U. S. military.  If aircraft carrier battle groups are no longer able to sail anywhere 
in the world and lead the power projection forces, and if amphibious ready groups are no longer 
able to close on enemy territory and land Marines on the beaches, then what uses does our ex-
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pensive Navy have?  The Air Force and the Army have been hinting at this uselessness for sev-
eral years.  If an enemy develops his access denial system, their hints will have serious merit.   
 
Of course, a number of the vulnerabilities will adversely affect the other forces as well.  
The Army is placing a growing emphasis on pre-positioned equipment afloat.  Development of 
highly capable air defenses, unmanned air superiority aircraft, or counter-stealth systems will 
deny the area to our Air Force as well.  The real question is whether the existence of enemy ac-
cess denial capabilities negates the need for any military force that cannot deal with those capa-
bilities.  The answer is obvious.  All aspects of our military must adapt to be able to cope with 
access denial systems or they will no longer be useful.  The people will not tolerate a useless 
military.  Since the total absence of a military is unthinkable for a “have” country, in a world 
filled with armed “have not” countries, the military will either change itself, or the people will 
change it out from under them (and not necessarily for the better).  The military cannot afford to 
let any of the vulnerabilities continue to develop in their current fashion.  The United States can-
not relinquish its current place in world affairs without relinquishing much that we hold near and 
dear. 
 
 It is instructive to examine what vulnerabilities the “red teams” chose to exploit.  Without 
explicitly identifying the nations studied, the list included: 
1) a large nation with a booming industrial economy that will undoubtedly become a peer com-
petitor in the coming century (denoted “peer competitor” and not identical with the hypo-
thetical NPC of the preceding sections),  
2) a second very large nation with a healthy global economy but more concerned with fostering 
internal stability than becoming involved in international problems that do not involve its 
closest neighbors (denoted “hemispheric competitor”), and  
3) a third large nation with clear designs on regional dominance but lacking a healthy economy 
(denoted “regional competitor”).   
Table 11-1 compares the major U. S. vulnerabilities that the teams chose to exploit to establish a 
viable access denial capability.  One team (peer competitor) was originally shown a small subset 
(less than half of the listed vulnerabilities) of this analysis, but none were shown the entire list or 
the DSB analysis.  In general most of the vulnerabilities exploited by the teams were of their own 
devising.  The decision to exploit any vulnerability was entirely each team’s independent choice.  
The fact that a specific vulnerability was not exploited could be due to a team’s failure to iden-
tify the vulnerability, or it could be due to budgetary and/or political concerns. 
 
It appears that the biggest correlation lies in the area of budget.  The larger the military 
budget, the more of our vulnerabilities an adversary is likely to exploit.  It is also interesting that 
some choices appear to be nearly universal. However, some responses occurred for every coun-
try studied.  This indicates that a potential future threat will likely have at least these elements in 
its future force structure.  We will describe only the maritime-relevant responses.  Specifically, 
there was increased emphasis on having a credible diesel submarine force.  The richest adversary 
nations (near peer competitors) developed their own submarines in substantial numbers;  poorer 
adversary nations (regional competitors) purchased relatively modern Soviet or European subma-
rines in modest numbers.  The submarines carried extremely capable, long-range torpedoes, a 
substantial fraction of which had wake-homing seekers.  Each country invested a sizeable (but  
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Table 11-1.  Vulnerabilities exploited by each “Red Team” in the NPS Area Denial Study.  
             Also shown are vulnerabilities identified by the Defense Science Board.  
 
 
      VULNERABILITY EXPLOITED    PC  HC  RC  DSB 
 
Attacks Using WMD 
Attack by Nuclear Missiles (ICBMs)   YES YES ---  YES 
Attack by Other Weapons of Mass Destruction  YES YES ---  YES 
Direct Attacks Against Forces 
Attack by Cruise Missiles    YES YES YES  YES 
Attack by Ballistic Missiles or Superguns  YES YES YES  YES 
Attack by Transatmospheric Aircraft   --- --- ---  --- 
Attack by Naval Mines     YES YES YES  YES 
Attack by Advanced Torpedoes    YES YES YES  YES 
Attack by Advanced Non-nuclear Submarines  YES YES YES  YES 
Attack by Unmanned Air Superiority Vehicles  YES --- ---  --- 
Attack by Infrared Anti-Aircraft Missiles   --- --- ---  --- 
Counters to Offensive Systems 
Reliance on Stealth     YES --- ---  --- 
Jamming of GPS & GPS-Dependent Systems  YES --- YES  --- 
Jamming of Precision-Guided Weapons  --- --- ---  --- 
Attacks on C4I Assets 
Attack by Electromagnetic Weapons   YES --- YES  YES 
Attack by High-Energy Lasers    YES --- ---  --- 
Attack by Information Warfare    YES YES ---  YES 
Attack by Antisatellite Weapons   YES --- ---  YES 
Reliance on Long-Range Airborne Surveillance  --- --- ---  YES 
Susceptibility to Strategic Deception   YES --- ---  YES 
Excessive Intelligence-Response Latency  --- --- ---  --- 
Unconventional Methods of Attack 
Attack by Special Operations Forces   YES --- YES  --- 
Limited Adverse Weather Operation Capability  YES --- ---  --- 
Attack by Nonlethal Weapons    --- --- YES  --- 
Attacks on Logistics Resources 
Limited Strategic Sea/Air Lift Capability   --- --- ---  --- 
Reliance on Limited Overseas Basing   YES YES YES  --- 
Reliance on Pre-Positioned Equipment   --- --- ---  --- 
Reliance on Underway Replenishment   --- --- ---  --- 
Attacks on Societal Vulnerabilities 
Civilian Intolerance of Casualties   YES --- YES  --- 
Restrictive Rules of Engagement   YES --- YES  --- 
Civilian Intolerance of Unnecessary Hardships  --- --- ---  --- 
Need for Coalition Support    YES --- YES  --- 
Unequal Societal Transparency    YES --- ---  --- 
Treaty Limitations     YES --- ---  --- 
Technological Change 
 Technological Surprise     YES YES YES  --- 
 Technological Atrophy     --- --- ---  --- 
 Disruptive Technologies     YES YES ---  --- 
 
PC = Peer Competitor;   HC = Hemispheric Competitor;   RC = Regional Competitor 
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balanced) share of its defense budget in antiship missiles.  Even the poorest country studied 
bought thousands of Exocet or Silkworm missiles and reasonably mobile launching platforms 
without straining its defense budget to the breaking point or ignoring the formation of a well-
rounded military.  The near peer competitor nations purchased (or developed) many tens of thou-
sands of more modern missiles.  The antiship missiles could be launched from at least five dif-
ferent kinds of platforms:  long-range attack aircraft, littoral patrol craft, conventional surface 
combatants (corvette or larger), submarines, and mobile land-based launchers.  Launchers were 
purchased in sufficient quantity to allow multiple massive attacks (1000 missiles per attack in 
flight at one time) to be delivered nearly simultaneously at several different points anywhere in 
the adversary’s region of operations.  Seekers on the missiles included a mix of relatively unso-
phisticated radar seekers (as available today) and very sophisticated advanced radar, imaging in-
frared, and multimode seekers (to be developed in the next 10-15 years).  Each country invested 
heavily in naval mines. These tended to be evenly divided between deep-water CAPTOR-like 
mines, moored mines, shallow-water bottom mines, and surf-zone mines.  Most mines were ex-
pected to possess enough intelligence to permit targeting of specific ship classes, to make sweep-
ing difficult, and to permit mines to be remotely activated and/or deactivated. 
 
 In conclusion we have identified and discussed 36 different areas in which current U. S. 
forces have serious vulnerabilities.  It is expected that there are others that the author has not 
identified.  We have also described an even larger number of responses that potential competitors 
might make to exploit those vulnerabilities.  Much current discussion in the defense community 
centers on the need to develop a focus (a new threat) to guide future defense development.  The 
author suggests that rather than focusing on specific country threats, we should focus on our gen-
eral vulnerabilities and attempt to reduce them.  A list such as that presented here could be used 
to guide future research & development and procurement strategies.   The intelligence commu-
nity might also use it as a checklist to determine if potential adversaries are attempting to cov-
ertly develop an access denial capability.  If the author can identify the vulnerabilities, so can a 
potential adversary.  Any vulnerability the U. S. fails to address is a vulnerability almost certain 
to be exploited by a competitor.  Failure to address our vulnerabilities in a timely fashion will 














APPENDIX A.  WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
 
 
 In strict usage, the term “weapons of mass destruction (WMD)” refers to weapons of 
such destructive capability that a single device can kill or injure hundreds of people.  It was 
originally envisioned to include: 
• Nuclear weapons – explosives based on releasing nuclear energy (through nuclear fis-
sion or fusion) rather than chemical energy.   
• Biological weapons – devices that use dispersed biological materials (infectious mi-
croorganisms or toxins) to kill, injure, sicken, or incapacitate people, plants, or ani-
mals. 
• Chemical weapons – devices that use dispersed toxic chemicals to kill, injure, sicken, 
or incapacitate people. 
• Radiological weapons – devices that use nuclear radiation from dispersed radioactive 
materials to kill, sicken, incapacitate, or otherwise adversely affect people.   
As their potential for mass destruction has been repeatedly demonstrated, massive explosive de-
vices (such as truck bombs) and information weapons (such as computer viruses), have been in-
cluded as categories of WMD by a number of people, including some government agencies.  Al-
though these “newer” weapons clearly have the potential to kill or injure hundreds of people, we 
will opt for the older and more accepted usage here.  In the following pages we will discuss in 





 Nuclear weapons can be divided into two major categories:  fission explosive devices and 
fusion explosive devices [132]-[137].  In fission weapons, energy is produced by nuclear fission 
of a fissile species such as Uranium-235, Plutonium-239, or Uranium-233.  A neutron incident 
on a fissile nucleus causes that nucleus to split (fission) into two smaller nuclei (called fission 
products), releasing roughly 200 MeV of energy and 2 to 3 neutrons per fission.  Complete fis-
sion of one kilogram of Uranium-235 will release roughly 20 kilotons (kT) of fission energy 
yield.  One MeV is equal to 1.6 x 10-13 Joules and one kiloton is equivalent to 4.2 x 1012 Joules.  
In fusion weapons, energy is produced when two light nuclei (typically a deuterium nucleus and 
a tritium nucleus) combine (fuse) into a single heavier nucleus.  In deuterium-tritium fusion, the 
reaction produces a helium nucleus, a neutron, and 17.6 MeV per fusion reaction.  The neutron 
carries off roughly 14 MeV of the total energy released.  Complete fusion of one kilogram of 
deuterium-tritium mix will release roughly 81 kT of fusion energy yield.  
 
 Uranium or plutonium in sufficiently large quantities will sustain a fission chain reaction.  
Each neutron causes fission of a uranium or plutonium nucleus with the consequent production 
of more than one additional neutron. The multiple neutrons from preceding fission reactions will 
in turn produce even more fission reactions producing a still larger number of neutrons, and so 
on.  Some of the neutrons will escape from the mass of fissionable material without producing a 
fission to sustain the reaction.  A fraction of the neutrons will be absorbed without producing fis-
sion.  If too little fissionable material is present, neutrons are lost from the system faster than 
they are produced.  The chain reaction will die out.  However, when slightly more than a “critical 
mass” of material is assembled, the number of extra neutrons produced by fission will exceed the 
total number that escape from the mass or are absorbed without fission, and the reaction will 
continue to occur at ever increasing rates.  Sometimes a shell of material surrounding the fissile 
material is used as a neutron reflector to reduce the rate at which neutrons are lost, reducing the 
amount of fissile material needed to create a critical mass.  The bare (no reflector present) 
spherical critical mass for Uranium-235 is 48 kg.  For Plutonium-239, the bare spherical critical 
mass is 10.5 kg.   
 
The critical mass must be created from subcritical (less than critical) masses of material.  
Transition from extremely subcritical to supercritical (greater than critical) must occur extremely 
quickly (fractions of a microsecond).  A supercritical mass can be assembled in two ways as il-
lustrated in Figure A-1.  In a device using Uranium-235, a solid “cylinder” of mass less than one 
but more than one-half critical mass can be fired from a “gun” into a hollow “cylinder” with 
similar mass.  The aggregate “solid cylinder” of the two assembled masses will be supercritical.  
An alternate geometry is the use of two separated hemispheres (each containing roughly two-
thirds of a critical mass).  When the hemispheres are brought together, the sphere is supercritical.  
Gun assembly was used in the uranium atomic bomb used on Hiroshima.   
 
For technical reasons involving excessive spontaneous fission from Plutonium-240 con-
taminants in the plutonium, gun assembly cannot be used with typical reactor-produced Pluto-
nium-239.  A second assembly technique involves implosion.  Shaped explosive devices create 
an inward-directed spherical shock wave that compresses a hollow spherical shell of Uranium-
235 or Plutonium-239 into a dense solid sphere.  The critical mass for a spherical shell of mate-
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rial is considerably larger than the critical mass for a solid sphere of material.  As the shell col-
lapses it will transition from subcritical to supercritical.  Implosion was used in the plutonium 
atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki. 
 
 






















 Fission weapons can range in yield from less than 1 kT to roughly 100 kT.  There are few 
pure fission weapons.  Many fission weapons have a small amount (a few grams) of deuterium-
tritium gas mix at their core to enhance the fission efficiency.  As the fission weapon begins to 
explode, the D-T mix is compressed and heated to temperatures and pressures at which fusion 
can occur.  As the D-T mix undergoes fusion it emits an intense burst of neutrons that forces the 
fission chain reaction to occur at an even higher rate.  The boosting produces very little fusion 
yield (typically less than 10% of the fission yield), but can double the efficiency at which the fis-
sion reactions occur and the ultimate yield of the weapon.   
 
 Fusion weapons come in two basic forms (Figure A-2).  In the Sakharov “layer 
cake”, several spherical shells of uranium (or other heavy metal) alternate with spherical shells 
of fusion fuel.  The inner most shell is made from uranium-235 or plutonium.  The entire spheri-
cal assembly is surrounded by explosive shaped charges to produce a spherical implosion when 
detonated.  When the device is detonated, the shells collapse heating, compressing, and confining 
the fusion fuel.  When the fissionable core shell collapses to a dense sphere it becomes  
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Figure A-2.  Types of fusion weapons:  a) Sakharov “layer cake” design and 


























supercritical.  The radiation produced by this fission bomb core heats the fusion fuel to ignition.  
The heavy metal layers prevent the hot fuel from expanding before significant fusion occurs.  
The Sakharov design works and can produce weapons with yield of the order of a megaton or 
less.  However, it has proven inferior to the Teller-Ulam design. 
 
 The Teller-Ulam design is capable of scaling to arbitrarily large yields.  It places a fission 
explosive (the primary) and a mass of fusion fuel surrounded by a shell of heavy metal side by 
side inside a larger heavy metal case.  When the fission device goes off, it produces x-rays which 
are contained by the outer shell and absorbed at the surface of the heavy metal shell surrounding 
the fusion fuel.  As the metal surface ablates, it produces a radially outward thrust (as from a 
rocket) that compresses and heats the fusion fuel.  When sufficient compression has been 
achieved the fusion fuel will ignite and produce the fusion yield.   
 
As shown above fusion weapons require a fission device (the primary) to produce the ex-
tremely hot and dense conditions needed for fusion to occur in the fusion fuel (which is con-
tained in a structure referred to as the secondary).  X-rays from the primary heat and compress 
the fusion fuel to high densities and temperatures.  Fusion weapons differ from “boosted” fission 
weapons in the quantity of fusion fuel involved.  Fusion energy output from the secondary will 
typically exceed the fission energy yield of the primary by a factor of ten or more.  The fusion 
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fuel may be deuterium-tritium gas mix or more often it may be lithium deuteride.  The advantage 
of lithium deuteride is that is a solid rather than a gas, so that a large mass can be stored in a 
small volume.  Fission neutrons from the primary can interact with the lithium-6 in lithium deu-
teride to produce tritium that can subsequently fuse with the deuterium in lithium deuteride.  
 
Few fusion secondaries rely entirely on fusion energy for their total yield.  Many devices 
incorporate a blanket of depleted uranium (U-238) wrapped around the fusion core.  High-energy 
neutrons produced in the deuterium-tritium reaction are capable of inducing fission in U-238 re-
leasing considerable additional energy.  Roughly half of the total energy released may come 
from U-238 fission.  Large yield weapons are usually fission-fusion-fission devices.  Fusion 
weapons can range from a few kilotons to many tens of megatons.  However, typical fusion 
weapon yields range from 150 kT to 5 MT.   
 
 Nuclear explosive devices produce three main immediate effects:  neutron and gamma 
radiation, thermal radiation, and blast.  These three effects plus residual radiation from radioac-
tive fallout account for almost all of the energy released.  The partition of explosive yield among 
these effects is described in Table A-1. 
 
 
Table A-1.  Partition of nuclear explosive yield among the primary weapon outputs. 
 
                         Device Type  
 
          Atmospheric          Enhanced     Exoatmospheric 
      Fission          Radiation   Fusion 
Effect    Weapon  Weapon  Weapon  
 
Blast      0.50     0.30     0.20 
 
Thermal IR     0.35     0.20      --- 
Thermal X-Ray     ---      ---     0.70 
 
Initial Gamma    0.03     0.10     0.20 
Initial Neutrons    0.02     0.35     0.02 
 
Residual Radiation    0.10     0.05     0.05 
 
 
“Blast” in the case of the exoatmospheric weapon refers to kinetic energy carried away by fission 
products and gaseous remnants of the weapon structure.  At short range, these particles may 
transfer significant momentum to any object upon which they impinge.  However, there are no 
traditional “pressure” effects as would be associated with a blast wave in the atmosphere. 
 
A nominal 1 kT device exploded at optimum altitude will produce 4-psi blast overpres-
sure at 800 meters, 8-cal/cm2 thermal radiation at 560 meters, and 300 rads, radiation dose at 950 
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meters.  These values are nominal “threshold” values at which structural damage will be signifi-
cant (from overpressure), easily combustible materials will be ignited and exposed skin will be 
burned severely (by thermal radiation), and unshielded individuals will get severe but frequently 
survivable (5-50% will die) radiation sickness (from neutron and gamma radiation).  These 
“threshold” values are the effective radii for producing each distinct type of damage.  For devices 
with yields (W) greater than 1 kiloton, the distances at which the “threshold” overpressure for 
optimum altitude bursts occurs can be shown to scale as  
 
  Rblast(W in kT)  =  R(1 kT) W1/3  =  800 W1/3  in meters. 
 
The distance at which the “threshold” thermal radiation exposure occurs can be shown to scale 
roughly as  
 
 Rthermal(W in kT)  =  R(1 kT) W½  =  560 W1/2  in meters.  
 
The distance at which the “threshold” radiation dose occurs does not have a simple scaling rela-
tion.  However, to a very crude approximation (obtained by graphical curve fitting with no theo-
retical justification) we can use the expression 
 
 Rradiation(W in kT)  =  R(1 kT)+500 log10 W  =  950 + 500 log10 W  in meters. 
 
Thus we would expect a 1 MT bomb to have an effective blast damage radius of 8000 m, an ef-
fective thermal damage radius of 17,400 m, and a radiation injury radius of 2450 m. 
 
The so-called neutron bomb (or enhanced radiation weapon) is a small yield fusion 
weapon that minimizes the amount of fission used and maximizes the amount of neutron radia-
tion allowed to escape from the core.  Less energy is contained in the nuclear fireball, resulting 
in less thermal radiation, less blast, and less gamma radiation output.  The neutron emissions 
cause death or incapacitation of exposed personnel.  Typically exploded at moderate altitudes, 
there is little thermal or blast damage.  Neutron bombs must be low yield devices (of the order of 
1 kT or less).  Because the blast and thermal radii scale much faster with increasing yield than 
the radiation injury radius, at very high yields even a pure fusion weapon would produce signifi-
cantly more blast and thermal damage than radiation injuries.   
 
 Nuclear weapons exploded very near the ground (<2-4 km depending on yield) or at ex-
tremely high altitudes (>30 km) can produce a phenomenon known as electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP) [74], [132].  Consider a nuclear explosion above the atmosphere.  As there is no air to 
heat, the explosion produces little blast.  The absence of the atmosphere means that the x-rays 
produced in the first few microseconds of the explosion are not absorbed in the immediate vicin-
ity of the explosion.  The lack of nearby absorption results in virtually no blast and all of the x-
radiation is free to propagate to long distances.  When the downward directed x-radiation hits the 
top of the atmosphere it is absorbed and produces energetic electrons through Compton scatter-
ing as illustrated in Figure A-3.  Electrons are produced in a layer ranging from approximately 






























is at about 35-40 km altitude.  The high-energy Compton electrons spiral along the Earth’s mag-
netic field lines emitting radiation electromagnetic radiation.  Accelerated charges radiate elec-
tromagnetic radiation and spiral paths must have centripetal acceleration.  The rapid turn-on of 
the radiation coupled with the moderately quick rate of energy decay of the spiraling electrons 
causes the emitted radiation to take the form of a short pulse of broadband electromagnetic radia-
tion with frequencies ranging up to a few hundred MHz.   
 
For explosions above the atmosphere, the electrons will irradiate a portion of the upper 
atmosphere that extends from the point directly below the explosion out to the approximate ra-
dius of the horizon (as viewed from the point of explosion – this radius is often called the tangent 
radius).  For explosions at altitudes greater than 50 km, the radius of the electron deposition re-
gion is roughly given 
 
  R (in km) =  3.581 H1/2 
 
where H is the altitude of the burst in meters.  Thus, for an explosion at 300 km altitude, R = 
1960 km, and the deposition area is large enough to cover almost all the continental United 
States.  Maximum energy deposition occurs directly beneath the blast and falls off to essentially 
zero at the distances beyond the tangent radius R.  The effective radius over which the deposition 
density is comparable to the peak value is roughly half the tangent radius.  The geographic area 
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under the deposition area will receive an electromagnetic pulse with an electric field that can be 
approximated as (times are in seconds) 
 
  E(t)  =  E0 [e-at – e-bt]  =  64.25 [e-30000000 t  -  e-476000000 t]  (in kV/m) 
 
at its peak.  This pulse shape is shown in Figure A-4.  The peak field EMAX = 0.778 E0 = 50.0 
kV/m is essentially independent of the yield of the explosion.  Although there is some structure 
including a null near but not at the point directly beneath the blast, almost all of the area within 
the tangent radius experiences peak field strengths that are at least 0.5 EMAX.   
 
 
























The spectrum of the radiation S(ω) (energy density vs. frequency) is given by the magni-
tude squared of the Fourier transform of the electric field. 
 
  S(ω)  =  |F(ω)|2  =  E02(a-b)2 / (a2 + ω2)(b2 + ω2) 
 
As shown in Figure A-5 the spectrum is essentially flat until a frequency of f = ω/2π = 
30000000/2π = 4.77 MHz is reached at which point the spectrum starts to fall off by 20 dB per 
decade.  This fall off continues until a frequency of 476000000/2π = 75.76 MHz is reached at 
which point the spectrum starts to fall off by 40 dB per decade.  Frequencies above 100 MHz are 
present but have many orders of magnitude less than those below 1 MHz. 
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 For explosions near the ground, most of the x-ray emission goes into heating the fireball 
and producing blast effects.  It is only the initial gamma radiation that is absorbed and produces 
electrons within a radius R0 that is roughly 2 times the value of Rradiation calculated in an earlier 
paragraph.  If the height of the explosion is considerably less than Rradiation then more electrons 
are produced above the burst than are produced below the burst.  The high conductivity of the 
earth negates the effect of any electrons produced by radiation that is absorbed by the ground.  
The asymmetry in the outward directed electron current allows the electron currents to radiate.  
Radiation outside the deposition region has a much longer pulse duration (microseconds) than 
high altitude EMP and has a spectrum that contains frequencies only up to about 1 MHz.  The 
peak field strength is roughly 1 kV/m and falls off with distance as 
 
  E(R) = EMAX R0 /R . 
 
The electromagnetic pulse will propagate out to the horizon (as viewed from the burst).  Nuclear 
explosions at altitudes between roughly 4 km and 30 km will produce electron currents that are 
roughly symmetrical about the burst point.  This symmetry prevents efficient radiation.  The 
peak fields that are generated are less than 100 V/m and fall off with the same distance depend-
ence as low-altitude EMP.  The frequency spectrum is comparable to the low-altitude spectrum. 
Given the small initial fields and the rapid fall off with distance, the EMP from medium-altitude 
bursts will have few effects at any distance.  Both low-altitude and medium-altitude bursts have 
strong radial electric fields within the electron deposition volume.  However, in nuclear explo-
sions with yields larger than a few kilotons, the effects of blast, thermal energy, and nuclear irra-
diation at the short distances involved (less than the deposition radius) usually overwhelm any 





 Biological warfare agents are the substances that are incorporated into biological weap-
ons to give them a WMD function [135], [136], [138]-[142].  Biological warfare agents come in 
two distinct types:  infectious microorganisms and toxins.  Infectious microorganisms are “liv-
ing” entities that can invade a host organism, grow and multiply, and produce a disease.  Toxins 
are “dead” chemicals produced by living organisms that can enter the body of a target and dis-
rupt basic life processes.  A purist is tempted to classify toxins as chemical warfare agents 
(which they truly are) rather than biological warfare agents.  However, both historical and com-
mon usage overwhelmingly favors calling them biological warfare agents. 
 
 The efficacy of a biological agent (or chemical or radiological agent as well) can be char-
acterized by the effect produced, the dose required to produce that effect, the route of exposure 
that produces the required dose, and the persistence of the agent in the environment.  A wide va-
riety of effects can be produced.  Specific effects will be described when specific agents are ad-
dressed.  In general, the effects can be classified as either lethal or incapacitating.  If the agent is 
neither lethal nor incapacitating, then it is of doubtful military utility.   
 
The effective dose can be described in several different ways.  The median lethal dose 
(LD50) is the dose at which 50% of the exposed individuals will die.  Similarly, the median inca-
pacitating dose (ID50) is the dose at which 50% of the exposed individuals will be incapacitated 
at a defined level.  The effective dose for a microorganism is usually described by the number of 
microorganisms required to guarantee establishment of an infection.  Effective doses for toxins 
and chemical agents are strongly dependent on exposure route.  Exposure routes can vary from 
ingestion, inhalation, absorption through the skin, or “injection” into the bloodstream through 
injuries or small cuts in the skin.  For ingested toxic chemicals, the exposure is expressed as the 
number of milligrams of toxic material per kilogram of body weight (i.e., mg/kg).  If expressed 
solely as a number of milligrams, then a body weight of 70 kg is to be assumed.  For an inhaled 
toxic chemical, the dose is usually expressed as a concentration-time product (e.g., mg-min/m3).  
Higher concentrations inhaled for shorter times are assumed to yield the same effect as lower 
concentrations inhaled for longer times.  This assumption is known as reciprocity.  Persons with 
larger body weight tend to inhale more air per unit time, so explicit dependence on body weight 
is unnecessary.  If the agent is in a vapor state and is absorbed through the skin, the effective 
dose is expressed as a concentration-time product.  If the agent is in a liquid state and is applied 
directly to the skin, the effective dose is expressed as a number of milligrams (per kg or per 70-
kg adult).   
 
 Persistence of biological agents can vary from seconds for some microorganisms to many 
years for bacterial spores.  Most microorganisms have a short lifetime in air because they dry out 
and die or are killed by solar ultraviolet radiation.  Many biological weapons are best employed 
at night.  A few species form spores that can stay dormant for many years awaiting reintroduc-
tion into a suitable host.  Gruinard Island was used by the United Kingdom in the 1940’s as a test 
site for anthrax weapons.  Massive quantities of spores remained in the soil until repeated decon-
tamination efforts were finally successful in 1990.  Toxins can blow away, be washed away by 
rain, or they can chemically degrade to “non-toxic” forms by reacting with environmental water 
(hydrolysis).  If the intent is to quickly infect the enemy and later occupy his abandoned posi-
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tions, then non-persistent agents (lifetime in air nominally less than one hour) are ideal.  If the 
intent is to deny an area to use or occupation by the enemy for extended periods of time, then 
persistent agents (lifetime in air nominally greater than one day) are preferred. 
 
Infectious microorganisms of biological warfare interest come from all the major classes 
of microorganism:  bacteria, rickettsia, viruses, fungi, and parasites.  However, to date there has 
been no known weaponization of parasites.  In the remainder of this section we will describe the 
characteristics of the most prominent candidate agents for biological weapons. 
 
Bacteria  –  These agents are one-celled organisms widely distributed throughout nature in the 
soil, air, bodies of living animals and plants, and dead and decaying organic matter.  They re-
quire a suitable environment for growth that can include artificial environments (mixtures of wa-
ter and nutrients called growth media).  They may be spherical, rod shaped, comma-shaped, or 
spiral-shaped.   
 
Anthrax is an acute bacterial infection of the skin, lungs, and the gastrointestinal tract.  It 
is caused by the spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis.  The skin infection is caused by 
direct contact with contaminated animal wool, hides, or tissues and causes the skin to form dry 
scabs over the body.  Untreated cutaneous anthrax has a fatality rate of 5-20%.  Pulmonary an-
thrax results from the inhalation of the bacterial spores and causes fever, shock, and eventually 
death. There is a 90-95% fatality rate after symptoms appear in pulmonary anthrax.  The gastro-
intestinal infection is cause by ingestion of contaminated meat that is not sufficiently cooked.  
This results in bloody stools, shock, and eventually death.  All forms of anthrax are lethal if not 
treated immediately.  The incubation period is usually one to seven days from contact.  Single 
anthrax spores are 2 to 6 µm in size, making most of them respirable (particles are considered 
respirable – capable of being inhaled into the lower portions of the respiratory tract – if they are 
less than 5 µm in size).  The tendency for spores to clump together or bind to dust particles mak-
ing them larger than 5 µm may account for the low incidence of pulmonary anthrax in nature and 
the large effective infectious dose.  The effective infectious dose is 8000 to 50,000 spores in-
haled.  
There are three types of plague (the Black Death of the Middle Ages) caused by the same 
bacterium, Yersinia pestis.  The first is the bubonic plague, which is spread by wild or domestic 
rodents to humans through infected fleas. Typical symptoms include high fever, prostration, and 
shock.  The lymph nodes swell markedly and frequently rupture from accumulated pus.  This is 
extremely painful.  The incubation period is from two to six days.  Treatment with antibiotics is 
highly effective if used in the early states of the disease.  Otherwise the disease is fatal.  The sec-
ond type of plague is the pneumonic plague, which is the airborne form of the Black plague.  It is 
spread from infected individuals by airborne droplets containing plague organisms that gain en-
trance into the respiratory tract of uninfected humans.  Military weapons (of any disease) would 
likely use an aerosol mode of transmission.  It has the same characteristics as pneumonia except 
death usually occurs within hours after the symptoms first appear.  It has an incubation period of 
three to four days.  A third rare form of plague is septicemic plague, in which the bacterium at-
tacks the circulatory system.  This form is almost always fatal.  The aerosol effective infectious 
dose for pneumonic plague is <100 organisms. 
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Tularemia or Rabbit fever is caused by the bacterium Francisella tularensis.  The organ-
ism enters the body through breaks in the skin or from eating improperly cooked contaminated 
meat.  Ticks are the main carriers of this disease and can transmit the bacteria to humans and 
animals by biting the victim.  Military tularemia weapons would rely on inhalation of aerosols 
containing the microorganisms.  The incubation period is one to ten days.  Chills, fever, and 
swelling of the lymph nodes will appear with the nodes frequently breaking open from pus ac-
cumulation.  If not treated in the early stages with streptomycin, tetracycline or chloramphenicol, 
this disease will cause death in approximately 40% of those infected.  The effective infectious 
dose is 10 to 50 organisms.  
Brucellosis is caused by one of several organisms of the Brucella genus:  Brucella abor-
tus, Brucella mellitensis, and Brucella suis.  The organism can enter the body by eating unpas-
teurized foods, inhalation of aerosols, or through skin abrasions.  Symptoms resemble influenza 
with fever, headache, myalgia, arthralgia, back pain, sweating, chills, and generalized weakness.  
The incubation period ranges from 5-60 days (typically 30-60 days).  Fatalities are uncommon.  
The effective infectious dose is 10 to 100 organisms. 
Glanders and Melioidosis are related diseases of animals that are also highly virulent in 
people.  Glanders is caused by the organism Burkholderia mallei;  Melioidosis is caused by the 
organism Burkholderia pseudomallei.  In a biological attack, the Burkholderia organisms would 
most likely be disseminated as an aerosol.  The incubation period ranges from 10-14 days.  The 
diseases may take several forms, but for aerosol inhalation, the likely forms are septicemic and 
pulmonary.  The septicemic form involves fever, sweating, myalgia, chest pain, photophobia, 
lacrimation, diarrhea, and tachycardia.  The pulmonary form involves the same symptoms plus 
the successive development of bronchopneumonia and lobar pneumonia.  If not treated with an-
tibiotics, the diseases are invariably fatal.  The effective infectious dose is assumed to be low (10 
to 100 organisms). 
 
Rickettsiae  –  Rickettsiae are intracellular parasitic microorganisms whose diseases are com-
monly transmitted by the bites of ticks, lice and fleas.  They require living organisms as a suit-
able growth environment.  Rickettsial agents may be spread as contaminated dusts or by release 
of large quantities of the appropriate vector (the insects that naturally spread the disease. 
 
Q fever is an acute fever-producing disease that primarily affects the respiratory system 
and is caused by the rickettsia Coxiella burnetii.  Humans are infected by inhaling dust particles 
contaminated with discharges from infected animals.  Unpasteurized milk is another source of 
infection for humans.  The incubation period is two to three weeks before headaches, weakness, 
severe sweating, coughing, and chest pains appear.  It is an incapacitating disease that can be 
treated with a broad spectrum of antibiotics.  A vaccine is available.  The effective infectious 
dose is 1 to 10 organisms. 
Typhus is caused by the rickettsia Rickettsia prowazekii.  The disease is commonly 
spread by the human body louse.  After an incubation period of 1-2 weeks, symptoms of head-
ache, chills, prostration, fever, and general pains occur.  After about 6 days, macular eruptions on 
the upper trunk and spread to the entire body.  Without treatment, fatalities range from 10% to 
40%.  Except in cold, overcrowded areas, with reduced hygiene, typhus is not expected to pro-




Viruses  –  Viruses are submicroscopic, unable to be seen by light microscopes.  They can pass 
through filter systems that would collect even the smallest bacteria and rickettsiae.  They require 
a living host to survive.  They can be spread as contaminated dusts or aerosols.  A few may be 
spread by release of vectors (typically mosquitoes or biting flies – nature’s method of propagat-
ing the disease).  
 
Smallpox is a disease caused by the Variola virus.  It is transmitted primarily by inhala-
tion and secondarily by contact with the rash and pustules which form as symptoms.   Incubation 
periods average 12 days, but a quarantine of at least 16 days following exposure is suggested.  
Symptoms include general weariness, fevers, vomiting, headache, and backache, followed by a 
rash that develops into lesions, then pustules, and then scabs.  Death occurs in about 30% of in-
fected individuals.  Technically, smallpox has been eliminated from the human population.  
However, samples of the virus still exist in laboratories in both the U.S. and Russia.  Unac-
counted for samples may exist in laboratories elsewhere.  The buried remains of individuals 
killed in earlier epidemics may still contain viable viruses.  Other poxviruses (such as monkey-
pox and camelpox) are very similar to smallpox.  Genetic alteration of these other poxviruses 
may be able to recreate the virus.  In the future, we may be able to fabricate the smallpox virus 
directly from its genetic sequence (which scientists have mapped in detail).  For these reasons, as 
well as the fact that few people still possess any residual immunity from earlier vaccinations, we 
cannot eliminate smallpox from consideration as a biological weapon. Alternatively, monkeypox 
may be a useful biological warfare agent in its own right.  The effective infectious dose in 10 to 
100 viral particles. 
Viral Hemorraghic Fevers or VHFs are a grouping of similar viral fevers.  Some of 
these, the Ebola viruses, are familiar from books and movies.  Others are old favorites, such as 
Yellow fever and Dengue fever.  The effective infectious dose for Yellow Fever is 1 to 10 viral 
particles.  Similar low infectious doses are assumed for other hemorrhagic fevers.  Another one, 
Hantavirus, recently gained notoriety in the Southwest.  VHF’s are fever-producing illnesses 
usually accompanied by massive hemorrhaging.  They are transmitted by contact or inhalation.  
Incubation periods are in the range of days, not hours.  Symptoms include fever, muscular pain, 
headaches, prostration, hemorrhage, vomiting, diarrhea, hypotension, and shock.  They are often 
fatal.  Fatality rates can be as high as 90% given limited medical care; although the rates are usu-
ally lower if patients can be given intensive medical care.  
Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE) is a disease caused by a complex of at least 
eight VEE viruses.  In addition, there are several other equine encephalitis viruses that also affect 
humans.  Any equine encephalitis virus is transmitted to humans by the bites of infected mosqui-
toes.  The incubation period is from one to six days after which headaches, stiffness of the neck 
and spine, reduced sensibility, convulsions, and paralysis accompanied by a high fever appears.  
This disease can manifest itself as an encephalitis or as a generalized infection.  The VEE virus is 
an incapacitating disease in humans.  VEE could be a devastating fatal agent if employed against 
horses.  The effective infectious dose is 10 to 100 viral particles. 
 
There are dozens of other viruses that can cause fatal or debilitating diseases in humans.  
Many of these are transmitted by the bites of arthropods (ticks, fleas, lice, flies, mosquitoes, etc.).  
Any virus could conceivably be used as a biological weapon.  However, the relative scarcity of 
many of these diseases (restricted to occasional outbreaks in remote areas of third world coun-
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tries) and the requirement to use an arthropod vector for transmission (unless complex cell cul-
ture media are available), makes them unlikely candidates for biological weapons.  
 
Fungi  –  The only fungus commonly considered as a candidate pathogen against humans is 
Coccidioides immitis, the cause of Valley Fever in the Southwest United States.  Infection nor-
mally occurs by inhalation of dust contaminated with the fungus.  The incubation period is 1-4 
weeks.  Symptoms include bronchitis, chest pains, fever, chills, and occasionally, death.  
 
A number of fungi are potent anti-plant biological agents.  From a military perspective 
these may be specifically employed to attack food crops (or economically critical plants) on a 
strategic scale.  Among those that have been weaponized in the past include potato late blight, 
southern blight, rice blast, rice brown spot, black stem rust, and wheat covered smut.  There are 
dozens of other candidates. 
 
Toxins  –  Toxins are non-living poisons that are products of animals, plants, fungi, algae, or mi-
crobial cells.  When inhaled, swallowed, or injected toxins will cause severe incapacitating ill-
ness, death, or both.  Some toxins may cause symptoms almost immediately;  others may not 
cause noticeable symptoms for hours or days. 
  
Botulism is the acute, often-fatal intoxication caused by Botulinum toxin, which attacks 
the nervous system.  It is contracted in many ways to include the ingestion of contaminated food 
or water, inhalation of aerosolized toxin, or through injection by contaminated projectiles or 
fragments.  The onset of symptoms occurs at about 12-72 hours, or less if injected into the body, 
and is followed by vomiting, constipation, thirst, general weakness, headaches, dizziness, im-
paired vision and paralysis.  Death can occur within 2-3 days without respiratory support.  Respi-
ratory paralysis is usually the cause of death. With endotracheal intubation and ventilation assis-
tance, the death rate should be reducible to about 5%.  The LD50 for botulinum toxin is 
0.000001-0.00001 mg/kg. 
Staphylococcal enterotoxins are produced by Staphylococcus aureus, and cause infec-
tion through ingestion of improperly handled foodstuffs.  It can also be inhaled, but this would be 
a major indicator of deliberate attack.  For aerosol inhalation, symptoms occur 3-12 hours after 
exposure.  Inhalation symptoms include sudden onset of fever, chills, headache, myalgia, and 
non-productive cough.  Ingestion symptoms also include nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea, in addi-
tion to those above.  Septic shock and death can occur at high exposures.  Symptoms may persist 
for up to 4 weeks.  Ingested staphylococcal enterotoxin is considered as a serious incapacitating 
agent.  The ID50 is approximately 0.00003 mg per person by inhalation.  
Ricin is a water-soluble part of castor beans (Ricinus communis).  The wash from prepar-
ing castor oil contains up to five percent ricin.  As little as a milligram can kill an individual. 
Symptoms occur 18-24 hours after inhalation exposure. Symptoms of topical (skin) exposure or 
implantation of ricin probably occur on this same timeframe.  Small ricin-filled pellets injected 
covertly under the skin have been used as assassination weapons.  Initial inhalation exposure 
symptoms are weakness, fever, cough and pulmonary edema.  These are followed by severe res-
piratory distress and death from hypoxemia, or lack of blood oxygen, in 36-72 hours.  The LD50 
for ricin is 0.001 mg/kg.  Abrin is a toxin extracted from rosary beans (also called precatory peas 
or jequirity beans – Abrus precatorius).  It is very similar to ricin in physical characteristics, 
symptoms, timelines, and toxicity. 
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Saxitoxin is a toxin produced by “red tide” organisms and is responsible for paralytic 
shellfish poisoning.  Many shellfish (such as clams and mussels) ingest the organisms and con-
centrate the toxin in their tissues.  Individuals who eat the contaminated shellfish are sickened 
and often die.  After ingestion exposure, onset of symptoms occurs in 10-60 minutes;  after inha-
lation exposure, onset of symptoms may be seconds to minutes.  Symptoms include progressive 
numbness of lips, tongue, fingertips, extremities and neck, general muscular uncoordination, 
light-headedness, dizziness, weakness, visual disturbances, memory loss, and headache.  
Respiratory distress and flaccid muscular paralysis are the terminal stages and can occur within 
minutes for inhalation or 2-12 hours for ingestion.  The LD50 for ingestion of saxitoxin is 0.26 
mg/kg; for inhalation it is 0.01 mg/kg. 
 
There are many other biological toxins that have potential as biological weapons.  These 
include toxins from cone-shell snails, tetrodotoxin from puffer fish, exotoxins from microorgan-
isms (such as Clostridium perfringens, Shigella dysenteriae, Staphylococcus aureus), and my-





 Chemical warfare agents are toxic chemicals that are incorporated into chemical weapons 
to produce casualties [135]-[137], [143]-[148].  Chemical agents can be lethal or they can be 
merely incapacitating.  Both lethal and incapacitating agents exist that act on many different as-
pects of human physiology.  Some act on the nervous system; some act on the pulmonary sys-
tem; some affect mucous membranes; others inhibit cellular metabolic functions.  Persistence of 
chemical agents can vary from seconds (for gases that are lighter than air) to minutes (for rapidly 
evaporating liquids) to weeks or months (for viscous liquids or powders).  Most chemical agents 
are ultimately degraded to nontoxic species by hydrolysis (interaction with environmental water), 
although this may take days even in liquid water for some agents.  Persistence is strongly af-
fected by temperature, humidity, and wind conditions.  In the follow sections we describe the 
major categories of chemical agents and discuss the most significant specific agents in each cate-
gory. 
 
Nerve Agents  –  Nerve agents are among the most toxic man-made chemicals, hazardous in liq-
uid and vapor states, and capable of causing death within minutes of exposure to a lethal dose.  
Most are odorless, colorless, and tasteless.  Military nerve agents cause the inactivation of the 
enzyme called acetylcholinesterase that prevents muscles from contracting continuously;  the 
muscles then receive a steady stream of “contract” signals causing them to eventually seize up 
and stop functioning.  Death from nerve agents is caused by asphyxiation resulting from paraly-
sis of the respiratory muscles due to muscle fatigue.  
 
The “G” and “V” series nerve agents are second and third generation agents, respectively, 
having been developed in the 30’s (G series) and 50’s (V series).  First generation agents were 
developed (and often used) during World War I.  Both G and V agents are organophosphate 
compounds, similar to commercial insecticides such as parathion and malathion.  Although there 
are 5 standardized G series agents (and there are at least a dozen non-standardized agents) and a 
comparable number of standardized and non-standardized V agents, detailed discussion of only 3 
will suffice to cover all needed points of information.  
 
Sarin, also known as “GB”, acts within seconds of exposure, which may be through skin 
absorption (although this is weaker in sarin than in soman or VX), or more probably through in-
halation.  It is normally a liquid that is relatively nonpersistent, evaporating slightly slower than 
water.  It is more hazardous as a vapor than as a liquid.  Lethal dosages can cause death within 
minutes.  LD50 is nominally 100-500 mg deposited on the skin or 50-100 mg-min/m3 inhalation 
exposure. 
Soman, also known as “GD”, acts within seconds of exposure, which may be through 
skin absorption or through respiration.  It is normally a liquid and is moderately persistent (days).  
It is hazardous as either a vapor or as a liquid.  Lethal dosages can cause death within minutes.  
LD50 is nominally 50-300 mg deposited on the skin or 25-50 mg-min/m3 inhalation exposure.   
VX is much more toxic than the G series agents, acting within seconds of exposure, 
which may be through skin absorption or through respiration. It is normally an oily liquid and is 
highly persistent (up to weeks).  It is equally hazardous as a vapor or a liquid.  Lethal dosages 
can cause death within minutes.  LD50 is nominally 5-15 mg deposited on the skin or 5-15 mg-
min/m3 inhalation exposure.   
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Effects of Vapor or Aerosol Inhalation  
Small inhalation exposure to nerve agents will cause pinpoint pupils (known as myosis), 
runny nose and mild difficulty in breathing.  Large exposure can cause sudden loss of conscious-
ness, convulsions, temporary breathing stoppage, flaccid paralysis, copious secretions (sweat-
ing), and death. 
 
Effects of Liquids on Skin 
Small skin exposure to liquid nerve agents will cause localized sweating, nausea, vomit-
ing, and a feeling of weakness.  Large exposure will cause sudden loss of consciousness, seizure, 
breathing stoppage, copious secretions, flaccid paralysis, and death. 
Binary chemical weapons are weapons in which two “harmless” chemicals are mixed in 
real time after weapons release (as a bomb falls or an artillery shell flies out to its target) to cre-
ate a lethal chemical.  All weaponized binary weapons involve nerve agents.  GB and VX were 
the agents produced by the binary reactions in former U. S. binary weapons.  Because binary 
weapons deliver standard agents, there is little need to discuss them further. 
 
Blood Agents  –  Blood agents, often called “Cyanides”, are so-called first generation agents.  
They are absorbed into the body primarily by breathing, although liquid contact exposure can 
occur.  Blood agents prevent the normal utilization of oxygen by the cells and cause rapid dam-
age to body tissues through lack of oxygen. Death is similar to asphyxiation, but more sudden.  
Specifically, cyanide ions block the cytochrome a step in the respiratory process.  These agents 
are highly volatile and dissipate rapidly in the gaseous state (i.e., they are non-persistent).  All 
soluble cyanide salts (such as sodium cyanide or potassium cyanide) are toxic by both inges-
tion and inhalation.  The lethal dose for sodium cyanide is 100 mg/kg; for potassium cyanide it is 
200 mg/kg. 
 
Hydrogen Cyanide, also known as “AC”, is considered one of the deadliest chemical 
agents.  It acts immediately upon inhalation and manifests itself first in the central nervous sys-
tem.   Normally a vapor, it is nonpersistent, and rapidly disperses because it is lighter than air. 
Lethal dosages cause death in minutes, but less than lethal amounts produce few serious effects. 
Cyanide may possibly have an odor of burnt or bitter almonds.  Unfortunately, about half of the 
population is genetically unable to detect the odor of cyanide.  The LD50 of hydrogen cyanide is 
approximately 1.0 mg/kg.  The LCt50 is 2500-5000 mg-min-m3. 
Cyanogen Chloride, also known as “CK”, is a close relative of Hydrogen Cyanide.  It 
causes intense irritation of eyes, nose and airways and there may be an odor of burnt or bitter al-
monds.  The LCt50 of CK is 11,000 mg-min/m3. 
 
Small exposures are not fatal because cyanides are the least toxic of the “lethal” chemical 
agents and cyanides are rapidly detoxified by the body.  A less than lethal dosage will produce 
few serious effects.  Doses that would be fatal if given in a single amount will not be fatal if di-
vided and spread out over days.  Effects for these smaller dosages include difficulty breathing, 
feelings of anxiety, agitation, vertigo, weakness, nausea, possibly vomiting, and muscular trem-
bling.  Large exposures will manifest themselves within seconds of inhalation of a high concen-
tration of cyanide agent. There is difficulty in breathing, followed within seconds the onset of 
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convulsions.  Respiratory activity ceases within two-three minutes later and cardiac arrest fol-
lows within several minutes, and then death.  Total time is about 6-8 minutes after exposure. 
 
Choking Agents  –  Choking or Pulmonary agents are also first generation agents, hazardous in 
the vapor state, and are only effective when inhaled.  Even in lethal dosages they take hours to 
produce symptoms and death.  Choking agents cause pulmonary edema, wherein the damaged 
tissues produce fluids that flood the lungs and in extreme cases will essentially drown the victim.  
 
Chlorine was the first lethal military gas.  Chlorine exposure causes eye and airway irri-
tation, difficulty in breathing, chest tightness, productive cough, and pulmonary edema.  It has 
the characteristic odor of chlorine (like hypochlorite bleach or a freshly treated swimming pool).  
The median lethal dosage LD50 is 19,000 mg-min/m3 by inhalation exposure. 
Phosgene, also known as “CG”, has essentially the same symptoms as chlorine.  How-
ever, contrary to chlorine, upon cessation of exposure, all symptoms may disappear for a period 
up to 24 hours in length, at the end of which pulmonary edema progresses rapidly often resulting 
in death.  The vapor is four times heavier than air, is initially white in color, but soon turns color-
less, and has the characteristic odor of newly mown hay. The median lethal dosage LD50 is 3200 
mg-min/m3 by inhalation exposure. 
 
Small exposures to chlorine will produce immediate eye and airway irritation.  Small ex-
posures to phosgene will show little or no immediate symptoms.  Again the breakdown of the 
alveoli and capillaries in the lungs caused by choking agents usually takes several hours to begin 
to manifest itself.  Damage from phosgene will take much longer to show itself than damage 
from chlorine.  A productive cough and apparent edema of the lungs will result from sublethal 
exposures.  Large exposures to either chlorine or phosgene shows immediate eye and airway irri-
tation.  The breakdown of the alveoli and capillaries in the lungs begins to occur as quickly as 1 
hour with high concentrations, but usually takes three to four hours to begin to manifest itself.  
During this buildup period, other symptoms from phosgene exposure may disappear; the irritant 
properties of chlorine are so strong that symptoms will not completely disappear.  In either case, 
the fluid buildup is more than the normal drainage capability of the lungs, and they fill up, as in 
pneumonia, and drown the victim.  Death usually occurs within 24 hours. 
 
Vesicants  –  Vesicants or Blister agents were not meant to be fatal; rather they were meant to be 
debilitating and to require extensive supportive care.  Nonetheless, the blister agents proved to be 
twice as toxic as phosgene, and are lethal in liquid and vapor states.  Symptoms may not mani-
fest themselves for many hours, but invisible damage to tissues begins immediately upon contact 
and continues to get worse, the longer contact is maintained.  Once symptoms have begun to 
show, these agents cause redness and large water blisters on exposed skin and irritate the throat 
and lungs, eyes and other mucus membranes.  Their effect on exposed tissues is somewhat simi-
lar to a corrosive chemical such as lye or a strong acid.  Vesicant agents will have either a highly 
irritating geranium odor or smell like onions or garlic, depending on the agent. 
 
Mustard, also known as “HD”, is considered by many to be the ideal chemical agent.  It 
attacks through inhalation and on skin contact, either as a vapor or a liquid.  An oily liquid, it is 
highly persistent. The agent acts quickly upon contact, although its symptoms do not begin to 
appear for several minutes to hours, depending on the concentration and the effected tissue. It is 
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seldom fatal, although pulmonary complications can cause death, if the mustard is inhaled.  The 
median lethal dosage LD50 is nominally 7000 mg deposited on the skin or 1500 mg-min/m3 by 
inhalation exposure.  An eye exposure of only 200 mg-min/m3 will cause long-term incapacita-
tion in 50% of exposed individuals.  
Lewisite, also known as “L”, is quite similar to mustard.  It is an oily liquid and is more 
volatile than mustard.  It causes immediate pain and/or irritation, to the point that the victim will 
seek to remove it.  Lewisite vapors are so irritating that victims will immediately try to leave the 
area.  The median lethal dosage LD50 is nominally 1400 mg deposited on the skin or 1200-1500 
mg-min/m3 by inhalation exposure.  Incapacitation through eye exposure occurs at a median dose 
of 300 mg-min-m3. 
 
Effects of Vapor or Aerosol Inhalation 
Small inhalation exposures to vesicants will produce irritation, burning, and necrosis of 
mucus membranes in the nose, mouth, throat, and airway.  The extent of damage is dependent on 
dosage.  There may be an unproductive cough.  Large exposures will produce irritation, burning, 
and necrosis of mucus membranes in nose, mouth, throat, and airway to include the lungs and 
lower bronchi if the dosage is fatal.  Pulmonary edema is not usually present unless the damage 
is very severe.  The pulmonary edema is usually hemorrhagic in character (rupturing of capillar-
ies rather than simple seepage of blood plasma).  A productive cough may be present.  The cause 
of death is respiratory failure, most commonly resulting from secondary bacterial pneumonia.    
Effects of Liquid or Vapor on Skin 
Small skin exposures to vesicants will produce reddening of the skin (erythema), like 
sunburn, to include stinging pain 2-24 hours after exposure, dependent on state of the agent, hu-
midity, temperature, and skin site exposed.  Thinner, warmer, moister skin sites are more sensi-
tive.  Some blistering, with initially clear fluid may occur, depending on exposure.  Large expo-
sures will produce the same initial effects as small exposures, with larger, more aggressive blis-
ters.  These may also take the form of an area of dead tissue with blisters at the perimeter.  These 
will take longer to heal and are more prone to infection. 
Effects of Liquid or Vapor In/Around Eyes   
The eyes are the organs most sensitive to blister agents and the onset period for effects is 
shorter.  Small eye exposures will produce reddening and irritation of the eye escalating to con-
junctivitis (pink eye), light sensitivity, and pain.  Large exposures will include those symptoms 
mentioned at the small exposure level, with increasing pain and other effects within the eyeball 
itself, leading to serious corneal damage.  The most serious damage results from liquid contami-
nation or from self-contamination (rubbing the eyes).  Additionally, there are systemic effects 
from large exposures to vesicants that can effect the gastrointestinal tract, the skeletal system and 
the central nervous system.  Systemic effects include nausea, vomiting, sluggishness, apathy and 
lethargy.   
 
Incapacitating Agents  –  Incapacitating agents are intended to be non-lethal and to produce no 
long-term casualties.  They are intended to disorient individuals to the point that they cannot per-
form any function requiring intense concentration, rational analysis, or excellent hand-eye coor-
dination.  Incapacitation will last for hours to several days.  Most incapacitating agents investi-
gated to date are psychoactive drugs that induce severe hallucinations.  The most likely agents 
are LSD and the military chemical known as BZ.  These chemicals are typically colorless, odor-
less solids.  They are effective by either ingestion or inhalation.  Absorption through the skin 
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would not be highly effective unless the agents were dissolved in DMSO (dimethyl sulfoxide).  
They could either be introduced into food or drink supplies, or they could be dispensed as ex-
tremely fine microcrystalline “smokes”, such as from a burning munition (smoke grenade).   
 
The symptoms of BZ intoxication (times are time after exposure) include: 
1-4 hours: tachycardia, dizziness, vomiting, blurred vision, confusion, and sedation progress-
ing to stupor; 
4-12 hours: inability to respond to the environment effectively or to move about; 
12-96 hours: increasing activity, random unpredictable behavior with delusions and hallucina-
tion, gradual return to normal 48 to 96 hours after exposure. 
The incapacitating dose of BZ is less than 1 mg per person.  The median lethal dose of BZ is ap-
proximately 200,000 mg-min/m3. 
The symptoms of LSD intoxication include:  early nausea, tachycardia, sweating palms, 
pupillary enlargement, cold extremities, nervousness, trembling or spasms, anxiety, euphoria, 
inability to relax or sleep, heightened awareness, exhilaration, kaleidoscopic imagery, rampant 
emotions, hilarity, and exultation.  Profound terror or ecstasy may occur in some individuals.  
True hallucinations are rare.  The incapacitating dose of LSD is less than 0.05 mg per person.  
The median lethal dose is considerably higher than 5 mg, although some individuals may experi-
ence life-threatening convulsions at doses as low as 2 mg.  
 
Riot Control Agents  –  Riot control agents, also “Irritants” will only be mentioned briefly, be-
cause for the most part the use of these chemical agents will not be debilitating or cause serious 
harm to individuals.  Their potential value is harassment, intimidation, or as a dispersal device or 
cover for other more deadly chemical agents.  These agents are often readily available either 
through commercial or black-market sources.  Typically “tear gas”, either CN or CS, is dis-
persed through some type of burning munition, which presents an incendiary threat as well.  
They produce a temporary discomfort and eye closure through inhalation or absorption of small, 
micropulverized solids.  They are not vapors, nor are they gases.  Oleoresin capsicum, or OC, or 
pepper spray, is the hot pepper irritant, capsaicin, dissolved in a vegetable oil carrier.  It is dis-
persed as a mist or spray.   
 
Riot control agents cause pain, burning, or discomfort on exposed mucous membranes 
and skin, producing tears and irritation of the upper respiratory tract.  The effects occur within 
seconds of exposure and last only minutes once exposure has ceased.  High concentrations can 
cause nausea and vomiting.  Any riot control agent might cause death in very young children, 
individuals with severe pulmonary problems, or in a closed room, as they displace the oxygen 
while being dispersed.  The median incapacitating dosage ID50 is 10-20 mg-min/m3 by inhalation 
exposure for CN and 5-10 mg-min/m3 by inhalation exposure for CS.  The median lethal dosage 
LD50 is 11,000 mg-min/m3 by inhalation exposure for CN and 61,000 mg-min/m3 by inhalation 





Radiological weapons are devices that use nuclear radiation from dispersed radioactive 
materials to kill, sicken, incapacitate, or otherwise adversely affect people [149]-[152].  The nu-
clear radiation can act in two distinctly different ways.  It can irradiate and penetrate the human 
body from a contaminated external environment or the contamination can enter the body allow-
ing the radiation to irradiate organs and tissues from the inside.   
 
There are four common types of nuclear radiation that can be produced by radioactive 
decay.  Gamma rays (γ) are energetic photons or quanta of electromagnetic radiation.  Gamma 
rays can travel hundreds of meters in air and can penetrate significant amounts of protective 
shielding.  Alpha particles (α) are energetic helium nuclei.  Alpha radiation will not propagate 
more than few centimeters in air or more than a small fraction of a millimeter in most materials.  
It cannot penetrate a sheet of paper or the dead outer layer of the skin.  Beta-minus (β-) particles 
are energetic electrons.  Beta-plus (β+) particles are energetic positrons (anti-electrons).  Beta 
radiation will not propagate more than a few meters in air and or more than a few millimeters in 
most materials.  However, as soon as beta-plus radiation is stopped in a material, the positrons 
(antimatter) will annihilate with regular electrons releasing two 0.511 MeV gamma rays per posi-
tron annihilated.  The annihilation radiation is highly penetrating.  Gamma-emitting and posi-
tron-emitting species can be used as external contaminants or as internal contaminants.  Alpha-
emitting and beta-minus-emitting species can only be used as internal contaminants.  Alpha emit-
ters are the most dangerous internal contaminants because alpha particles are capable of causing 
atomic dislocations.  Such dislocations invariably create free radicals or altered chemical species 
that can disable key enzymes or produce toxic products.  Genetic damage or mutations may re-
sult. 
 
Internal contamination can be achieved in three ways.  The radioactive active species can 
be inhaled as a gas or small particle.  Some of the inhaled material will be retained in the lungs, 
where the radiation can act on lung tissue or on the blood cells flowing through the alveoli.  Ra-
dioactive material can enter the body through a wound.  This is a rare form of contamination but 
may be significant on a battlefield.  Finally, the radioactive material can be ingested (swal-
lowed).  Ingestion is not limited to eating or drinking contaminated foods.  Inhaled particles that 
are not respirable can be trapped in the mouth or throat and subsequently be swallowed.  Some of 
the ingested material may be “digested” in the stomach and intestines and absorbed into the 
blood stream.  Some absorbed species are preferentially used by specific organs.  For example, 
most iodine ingested by the body goes to the thyroid gland where it is accumulated and concen-
trated.  These materials may remain in the body for months or years.  Some of the absorbed ma-
terial may be processed by the kidneys and excreted from the body in urine.  Some of the mate-
rial may be rejected by the gastrointestinal system and be excreted by the bowels.  In either of 
these last two cases, the material will remain in the body for one or two days.  Particulate inhala-
tion and ingestion of “accumulated and concentrated” species are the most dangerous modes of 
internal contamination. 
 
External radiation agents are the only serious military threats.  Military personnel have 
protective clothing that, if worn, would prevent ingestion or inhalation of radioactive agents, and 
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would block all alpha radiation and all but the most energetic beta radiation.  Gamma radiation 
will penetrate this protective clothing with little or no attenuation.  If significant gamma doses 
are accumulated, the exposed individuals will develop acute radiation sickness within hours and 
become incapacitated or die.  Internal contaminants are more likely to be used as terrorist or anti-
population weapons.  Most terrorist targets will not have protective equipment (or will not be 
wearing it).  The targets may only receive relatively small exposure rates, so acute radiation 
sickness may not occur, or if it does, it may be survivable.  However, the longer-term threat of 
future cancers and the resulting mental distress is right in line with terrorist intentions. 
 
Effective doses for radiological agents may be expressed in rads (or centigrays; 1 rad = 1 
cGy = 10 µJ/g of absorbed energy per unit of body weight) for external irradiation.  Doses for 
ingested or inhaled radioactive materials are often expressed in grams of material or Becquerels 
(or Curies) of activity (1 Bq  =  1 disintegration per second  =  2.7 x 10-11 Ci).  Any exposure to 
radiation produces a small increase in cancer risk.  Data from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survi-
vors (studied from 1950 to 1990) indicates that external doses from 0.5 to 20 rads can result in 
2.1% excess cancers (cancers over and above those expected in a normal unexposed population).  
Doses from 20 to 50 rads produced 13.2% excess cancers and from 50 to 100 rads produced 
26.3% excess cancers.  The expected cancer rate for unexposed individuals was 8.85%.  Thus the 
50-100 rad dose increased this rate to 11.18 % (= 8.85% times 126.3%), a small but significant 
2.3% additional lifetime cancer rate.  That is, a normal individual has 9% chance of getting can-
cer;  an individual exposed to 50-100 rads has an 11% chance of getting cancer.  The psycho-
logical impact of knowledge of an increased cancer probability is virtually impossible to esti-
mate.  The real impact of a large number of soldiers being subjected to such increased cancer 
rates cannot be ignored.  
 
External radiation doses or whole body internal doses (delivered within a few days or 
less) of less than 70 rads will produce few, if any, acute radiation sickness effects.  Doses be-
tween 70 and 150 rads will produce transient headache and nausea;  death is unlikely.  Doses 
above 150 rads may be fatal and hospitalization will be required in every instance.  The median 
lethal dose is 450 rads.  Fifty percent of those receiving this dose will die within 30 days.  Doses 
above 800 rads are invariably fatal.  Doses between 3000 and 8000 rads will provide complete 
incapacitation within 5 minutes, although partial recovery may occur after 30-45 minutes.  Death 
occurs within 5 days.  Doses above 8000 rads provide complete and permanent incapacitation 
within 5 minutes.  Death occurs within 15 to 48 hours. 
 
The permissible occupational dose rate for gamma radiation is 5 rads/year (0.0025 rad/hr 
for continuous exposure during 40-hour workweeks during a 50-week workyear). 25 rads is per-
missible in a single exposure during an emergency.  Note:  we have used a relative biological 
effectiveness of 1 to convert permissible occupational exposures in rem/year to doses in 
rads/year.  For gamma radiation, 1 rad/year = 1 rem/year.  Any extended exposure to low-level 
radiation that resulted in doses in excess of 5 rads could potentially subject a commanding offi-
cer to a board of inquiry for knowingly risking the health of his/her subordinates.  Accumulation 
of 5 rads total dose is not difficult if contamination is widespread.  For example, occupying a 
bunker for 2 days would produce such a dose if the dose rate were only 0.1 rad/hr.  5 rads could 
be reasonably expected to produce an 0.5% excess cancer rate in the exposed individuals. 
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The activity ζ of a mass of n grams of radioactive material can be calculated from the 
atomic weight A of the isotope and its half-life t1/2 using the relation 
 
 ζ (in Bq)  =  4.174 x 1023 n/A t1/2 . 
 
When exposed to a flux φ (in gamma photons/cm2/sec) of gamma rays of energy E (in eV) the 
dose rate dΦ/dt can be shown to be approximately 
 
dΦ/dt (in rads/sec)  =  1.602 x 10-14 µ E φ 
 
where µ is the mass attenuation coefficient.  Over the range 0.1 MeV to 2 MeV the mass attenua-
tion coefficient for gamma rays in water (a reasonable approximation for the soft tissues of the 
human body) varies up and down between 0.03 and 0.04 cm2/g.  Given the small variation it is a 
reasonable approximation to assume a constant value for soft tissues of µ = 0.035 cm2/g inde-
pendent of gamma energy.  If a quantity of n grams of radioactive material is distributed uni-
formly over a surface area AC (the subscript C stands for contaminated), then the gamma ray flux 
at any point within a few meters of that surface is approximately given by one-half the total ac-
tivity divided by the area: 
 
φ =  0.5 ζ / AC . 
 
The total dose Φ of gamma radiation received in an exposure time T is given by 
 
  Φ  =  3.344 x 109 n µ E T /A t1/2 AC . 
 
For any radioactive species we may define a specific dose rate  
 
dΦ/dt|SP  =  4.2 x 108 E /A t1/2 , 
 
which is the dose rate per unit contamination strength (in rads/hr per kg/m2 of surface contamina-
tion).  If gamma rays are emitted in only a fraction of the decays or if multiple gammas are emit-
ted in each decay, then E must be replaced by the average total gamma energy per decay.  The 
value of dΦSP/dt for Cobalt-60 is approximately 105500 rads/hr per kg/m2.  This is a surprisingly 
small value for a serious contaminant such as Co-60.  It will be difficult to contaminate a very 
large area sufficiently to produce radiation sickness within only a few minutes exposure.  It 
would take 3750 kilograms of Co-60 to contaminate 1 km2 of surface if the goal were to achieve 
the LD50 of 450 rads in a one- hour exposure.  This amount of material could be carried in two 
large aircraft bombs.  On the other hand only 833 grams of Co-60 would be sufficient to con-
taminate 1 km2 to a level producing 0.1 rad/hour dose rate (the dose rate that would exceed per-
missible doses with only a 2-day exposure). 
 
Radiological weapons are seldom viewed as militarily practical.  The widespread avail-
ability of military protective clothing prevents internal contamination.  Although some agents 
might present an external acute radiation sickness problem if the concentrations were extremely 
high and the exposures persisted for hours, it is assumed that military personnel could either de-
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contaminate areas of interest or evacuate the contaminated areas before casualty-producing ex-
posures are received.  However, it should be noted that there are ways to modify standard radio-
logical weapons to make them more effective.  By mixing a strong gamma-emitter with a moder-
ate setting-time adhesive, decontamination could be inhibited.  If such agents were used in areas 
that could not be evacuated or used directly against protected individuals (so that the protective 
clothing became irreversibly contaminated) then militarily effective casualty rates might occur, 
but only with the passage of time.  Of perhaps more military significance is the use of radiologi-
cal weapons in rear areas where protective clothing may not be carried ready at hand or may not 
be available at all.  In this case, internal contamination is likely.  Radiation sickness is not the 
only “militarily effective” effect of nuclear radiation.  Exposures that would produce a measur-
able increase in cancer rates cannot be neglected.  If real cancer rates increased by as little as 1% 
in a sizeable population of soldiers from a democratic country that were knowingly and “unnec-
essarily” exposed to radiation, then the government and the military would be brought severely 
to task.  Radiation levels high enough for 20 rads (the nominal 1% cancer rate increase level) to 
be achieved within a few days exposure would almost certainly require either evacuation or de-
contamination of the site.  A dose rate of less than 0.5 rad/hr would be enough. 
 
Persistence of radiological agents is highly variable.  Radioactive decay will cause all ra-
diological agents to decrease in potency by a factor of two every “half-life” of elapsed time.  
Agents can be dissolved in water and migrate into the subsoil, with upper layers of soil providing 
significant shielding.  They may be washed away as particulates or as solutes.  Such physical re-
moval and/or burying are the only viable mechanisms for decontaminating radiological agents.  
Adhesives can be used to increase persistence of radiological agents in the environment almost to 
the limit imposed by their radioactive decay rates.  The most significant potential radiological 
agents are described below. 
 
Strontium-90 is a serious ingestion hazard and an inhalation hazard.  It poses very little 
external radiation threat.  Strontium is chemically similar to calcium and will preferentially be 
concentrated in bone ends.  Radiation damage to the bone ends and marrow can produce blood 
disorders, immune disorders, and leukemia.  It is a major fission product.  The U. S. studied Sr-
90 as a potential radiological weapon during World War II.  Strontium-90 is produced as a by-
product of fission.  As many as 5.9% of U-235 fissions will ultimately lead to Strontium-90 at-
oms.  Strontium-90 undergoes β- decay to Yttrium-90 with a half-life of 29.1 years.  Yttrium-90 
undergoes β- decay to stable Zirconium-90 with a half-life of 2.67 days.  The Y-90 decays occur 
so quickly after the Sr-90 decay that they are included in the Sr-90 activity.  When any Sr-90 de-
cays, it produces a β- with 0.546 MeV energy and later a Y-90 β- with 2.27 MeV energy.  The 
production and decay data are summarized in the expressions below. 
 
    U-235 (5.9%)   29.1 y   2.67 d   
Fission          Æ          Sr-90          Æ          Y-90          Æ          Zr-90 
   Pu-239 (2.12%)     β-        β- 
 




 Iodine-131 is a critical ingestion and inhalation hazard.  It is also a reasonable choice as 
an external radiation agent.  After ingestion or inhalation, iodine will be biologically concen-
trated in the thyroid gland, an organ that is easily damaged by radiation.  Thyroid damage typi-
cally results in a serious condition known as hypothyroidism, in which insufficient thyroid hor-
mone is produced.  The thyroid damage dose may be estimated from the dose required to treat 
the overactive thyroid diseases, hyperthyroidism and thyrotoxicosis (Graves’ disease).  This 
therapy involves partially damaging the overactive thyroid to bring its hormone outputs back to 
normal levels.  A therapeutic dose delivered to a normal thyroid will reduce thyroid activity to 
abnormally low levels.  The therapeutic dose is 86 µCi/g (of thyroid mass).  Assuming a 20-g 
thyroid mass and a 20% iodine uptake factor, the total required dose is 8600 µCi, which can be 
produced by 70 ng of I-131.  Doses of this magnitude may possibly produce thyroid cancer.  
Larger doses have increased probability of causing cancers.  I-131 is produced in large amounts 
in nuclear fission.  Roughly 2.9 % of fission reactions in uranium produce I-131.  It can also be 
produced by neutron absorption in tellurium metal (followed by beta decays to I-131).  The MOE 
for production from metallic tellurium is 0.00239. 
 
                  25.0 m     8.040 d 
Reactor n   +   Te-130    Æ    Te-131          Æ         I-131          Æ         Xe-131  
        β-            β- 
 
Energies:   β- - 0.247 (1.6%), 0.333 (6.9%), 0.467 (0.5%), 0.606 (90.4%), 0.806 (0.6%) 
      γ  - 0.0816 (5.1%), 0.326 (5.1%), 0.364 (85.3%), 0.637 (6.9%), 0.723 (1.6%) 
 
 
Cesium-137 is a serious ingestion hazard and an inhalation hazard.  It is also useful as an 
external radiation agent.  Cesium can replace potassium in the body (potassium is commonly 
found in intracellular fluids).  Thus, Cs-137 is concentrated inside the cells and is perfectly lo-
cated to cause DNA damage and damage to other intracellular biochemicals.   Cs-137 is also a 
major by-product of nuclear fission.  Over 6% of all fission reactions will ultimately produce a 
Cs-137 atom.  
 
   U-235 (6.23%)  30.17 y 
Fission          Æ         Cs-137          Æ          Ba-137   
    Pu-239 (6.5%)       β- 
 
Energies:   β- - 0.514 (93.5%), 1.176 (6.5%) 
      γ  -  0.662 (93.5%) 
 
 
 Hydrogen-3 or Tritium is a significant ingestion hazard and an inhalation hazard.  It 
poses virtually no external radiation threat..  It is easily produced in large quantities by irradiat-
ing lithium metal in a high-flux nuclear reactor.  Lithium-6 absorbs an incident neutron and fis-
sions into a tritium nucleus and an alpha particle.  This production reaction has a measure of ef-
fectiveness (MOE) of 3.27 atoms per cm3 of target material per neutron per cm2 of thermal neu-
tron flux per second of irradiation time.  The MOE can be determined using the relation: 
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 MOE  =   [(Fractional Natural Abundance of Target Isotope) x  
         (Thermal Neutron Capture Cross Section of Target Isotope) x 
         (Density of Target Material) x 
         (Fractional Weight of Target Element in Target Material) x  
         (Branching Ratio of Absorption Reaction to the Desired Product State) x 
         (Avogadro Number)] / 
       [Atomic Number of Product Isotope] 
 
The total activity (in Becquerels) that is produced when the target material is irradiated in a reac-




 Activity  =  MOE  x  Neutron Flux  x  Target Volume  x  0.693 T / t1/2  if T << t1/2 
     =  MOE  x  Neutron Flux  x  Target Volume     if T >> t1/2 
 
For example, if 103 cm3 of metallic natural lithium is irradiated in a reactor with a thermal neu-
tron flux of 1013 n/cm2/s for a period of roughly 3 hours (104 s) then a total activity of  
 
 3.27 x 1020 Bq (=  8.84 x 109 Curies) 
 
is produced.  If incorporated into “tritiated” water (HTO and T2O), tritium is readily absorbed, 
retained by the body, and distributed uniformly throughout the body.  It is flushed from the body 
through urination and perspiration.  The half-life in the body is about twelve days.  If incorpo-
rated into certain chemicals, such as ethanol, tritium can be made to target certain organs with 
somewhat more specificity than water.  Any tritium that replaces hydrogen in any of the body’s 
biochemicals can be retained for a year or longer, before ultimate elimination. 
 
          < 1s      12.33y 
Reactor n   +  Li-6    Æ    Li-7*          Æ          H-3          Æ          He-3  
         α         β- 
 
Energies:   β- - 0.0186  
 
 Cobalt-60 is an ingestion hazard and an inhalation hazard.  It is an excellent choice as an 
external radiation agent.  It is easily produced in large quantities by irradiating natural cobalt 
metal in a high-flux nuclear reactor.  The MOE for production of Co-60 from metallic cobalt is 
3.36.  Cobalt’s only significant physiological function is as part of vitamin B-12, which the body 
does not manufacture.  Unless the Co-60 was incorporated into vitamin B-12 before dispersal, 
the internal effects of Co-60 exposure will be limited to causing lung cancer or gastrointestinal 
cancers. 
 
              5.271 y 
Reactor n   +  Co-59    Æ    Co-60          Æ          Ni-60  
             β- 
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Energies:   β- - 0.313 (>99%) 
      γ  - 1.173 (>99%), 1.333 (>99%) 
 
 Zirconium-95 is an ingestion hazard and an inhalation hazard.  It is a good choice as an 
external radiation agent.  Zirconium is commonly used a cladding for nuclear reactor fuel rods.  
Thus, Zr-95 is available in large quantities from reprocessing of nuclear fuel rods.  The MOE for 
production of Zr-95 from metallic zirconium is 0.000581.  Iraq attempted to weaponize at least 
one radiological weapon (an airplane bomb) incorporating Zr-95 made from zirconium oxide.  It 
is believed that the zirconium activity in the Iraqi material was significantly augmented by pro-
duction of Hafnium-181 from an impurity in the zirconium oxide.  Zirconium is not concentrated 
in any specific organ in the body.  The effects of ingestion or inhalation will be the production of 
lung or gastrointestinal cancers. 
 
            64.02 d             34.97 d 
Reactor n   +   Zr-94    Æ    Zr-95          Æ         Nb-95          Æ          Mo-95 
  β-        β- 
 
Energies:   β- - 0.160 (100%), 0.365 (49%), 0.397 (49%), 0.886 (2%) 
      γ  - 0.235 (2%), 0.724 (49%), 0.756 (49%), 0.765 (100%) 
 
 
 Hafnium-181 is an ingestion hazard and an inhalation hazard.  It is a good choice as an 
external radiation agent.  Hafnium is a common impurity in zirconium oxide.  The MOE for pro-
duction of Hf-181 from metallic hafnium is 0.22 (much larger than that for Zr-95 so that a 0.1% 
Hf impurity will produce more activity than the zirconium itself).  Hafnium is not concentrated 
in any specific organ in the body.  The effects of ingestion or inhalation will be the production of 
lung or gastrointestinal cancers. 
 
                 42.4 d  
Reactor n   +   Hf-180    Æ    Hf-181         Æ         Ta-181 
            β- 
 
Energies:   β- - 0.408 (93%), 0.404 (7%) 
      γ  - 0.133 (93%), 0.136 (79%), 0.346 (13%), 0.482 (79%), 0.619 (7%) 
 
 
 Iridium-192 is an ingestion hazard and an inhalation hazard.  It is a good choice as an 
external radiation agent.  Iridium has no physiological function in the body.  Internal exposure 
hazards are lung cancer and gastrointestinal cancers.  Ir-192 has two decay modes which must be 
considered.  Ir-192 can be produced by neutron absorption in metallic iridium.  The MOE for 
producing Ir-192 from metallic iridium is a sizable 20.4. 
 
              73.83 d   
Reactor n   +   Ir-191    Æ    Ir-192          Æ         Pt-192   (95.6%)  
    β-   
 
Energies:   β- - 0.253 (4.5%), 0.532 (42%), 0.668 (49%) 
 180
     γ  - 0.136 (0.4%), 0.296 (29.4%), 0.308 (31.0%), 0.316 (85.6%), 0.468 (47.0%), 
    0.589 (3.9%), 0.604 (8.8%), 0.612 (5.6%), 0.885 (0.4%) 
 
 73.8 d 
      Ir-192         Æ         Os-192   (4.4%) 
    EC 
 
Energies:   γ  - 0.201 (0.5%), 0.206 (4.2%), 0.283 (0.2%), 0.375 (0.5%), 0.485 (3.4%),  
           0.489 (0.2%) 
 
 
 Plutonium-238 is not the world’s deadliest material as the popular press would have eve-
ryone believe.  However it is a major inhalation hazard.  The high alpha radiation output almost 
guarantees that inhalation and retention of a few thousand small particles will result in lung can-
cer.  Extrapolating from measurements for Pu-239, it is estimated that the cancer production rate 
is 3600 cancer deaths per milligram inhaled (Pu-239 is 12 deaths per milligram inhaled – see be-
low).[253]  The largest particle of plutonium that can be inhaled is about 3 micrometers in di-
ameter and has a mass of 0.14 ng.  Inhalation of one such particle would result in a 0.05% chance 
of getting cancer.  Pu-238 is only a minor ingestion hazard because plutonium is not readily ab-
sorbed by the gastrointestinal system (only 1 part per 100,000 parts of PuO2 ingested is retained 
by the body).  It is not a significant external radiation hazard.  Pu-238 is commonly used in 
radioisotope thermal generators.  It is produced in large quantities as a by-product of producing 
or using plutonium in nuclear reactors.  There are several formation pathways:  
     
Pu-239  Æ  Pu-238 
    n,2n   
 
           6.75d          2.12d  
U-238  Æ  U-237  Æ  Np-237  Æ  Np-238  Æ  Pu-238 
  n,2n              β-        n capt           β-  
 
         6.75d       2.12d  
U-235  Æ  U-236  Æ  U-237  Æ  Np-237  Æ  Np-238  Æ  Pu-238 
 n capt         n capt          β-     n capt        β-   
 
     15y    16h  163d  
Pu-239  Æ  Pu-240  Æ  Pu-241  Æ  Am-241  Æ  Am-242  Æ  Cm-242  Æ  Pu-238 
 n capt  n capt   β-  n capt  β-  α 
 
 
The first two modes are more probable than the third and fourth modes.  Which mode is domi-
nant depends on whether Pu-239 or U-238 is more abundant in the reactor core.  In a plutonium 
production reactor U-238 is more abundant and the second reaction is the dominant route.  In a 
plutonium power reactor, the first reaction will dominate.   In a highly enriched uranium power 
reactor the third mode may dominate.  Any absorbed plutonium is concentrated in the liver and 
bones.  Liver disease, bone cancer, and leukemia are likely to result from significant ingestion.   
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        87.7 y 
Enriched  Pu-238          Æ          U-234 
         α 
 
Energies:   α - 5.359 (0.11%), 5.454 (28%), 5.498 (72%) 
      γ  - 0.0435 (28.1%), 0.1433 (0.11%) 
 
 
 The behavior of ordinary plutonium (Pu-239) is virtually identical to that of Pu-238.  
However, due to its much longer half-life (24390 years vs. 88 years) and slight lower alpha parti-
cle energy (5.15 MeV vs. 5.48 MeV), Pu-239 is 300 times less effective as a radiological agent 
than Pu-238.  The primary advantage favoring Pu-239 as a radiological agent is that it can be ob-
tained in much larger quantities than Pu-238.  On the other hand, Pu-239 can be used to make a 
nuclear explosive, a much more significant use than incorporation into a radiological weapon. 
 
 
 Uranium-238 or Depleted Uranium is a significant ingestion hazard and a significant 
inhalation hazard.  It is produced in enormous quantities as a waste product during the enrich-
ment of uranium in the isotope U-235.  U-238 does not pose any serious external radiation 
source hazard.  Uranium is readily absorbed by the gastrointestinal system. The absorbed ura-
nium tends to concentrate in the bones & the kidneys.  Bone cancer, renal cancer, leukemia, and 
lymphatic disorders are common long-term by-products of uranium ingestion.  In pregnant 
women ingested uranium can cross the placental barrier and lead to birth defects.  If inhaled ura-
nium is in an insoluble form (such as the oxide), inhaled particles may be retained intact in the 
lung and can result in lung cancer. 
 
   4.47 x 109 y 
Depleted  U-238          Æ          Th-234 
        α 
 
Energies:   α - 4.036 (0.23%), 4.149 (22.4%), 4.196 (77.4%) 




WMD DELIVERY MECHANISMS 
 
 Weapons of mass destruction can, in principle, be delivered by all common forms of 
weapons, even rifle bullets (although poison bullets are forbidden by The Hague Convention of 
1899).  However, some delivery mechanisms are more suited to one form of WMD than to an-
other.  Table A-2 lists all of the major delivery mechanisms for weapons of any kind (other than 
small arms) and comments on the applicability of each mechanism to each kind of WMD.  The 
author has underlined those threats that he believes may make a significant contribution to a na-
val access denial capability. 
 
 The diversity of possible and practical WMD delivery mechanisms is much larger than 
simple bombs or ballistic missiles, as commonly envisioned.  Any obsession on one delivery 
mechanism on the part of our military planners will likely open the door to a creative, asymmet-
ric response on the part of an adversary.  To demonstrate this diversity in way not readily dis-
cernible from Table A-2, we will describe a few representative delivery mechanisms in detail. 
 
There are many forms of “artillery” delivered weapons.  Figure A-6 shows a typical artil-
lery shell capable of delivering chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) agents.  A standard 
metal artillery shell case is filled with the agent in liquid (or powder) form.  A small burster 
charge of explosives is placed at the center of the shell case.  Together with the fuze assembly, 
the shell case and the burster charge serve to hermetically seal the agent into the artillery shell.  
The fuze is optimally altimetric in function and serves to detonate the shell at a height above 
ground that will guarantee optimum dispersion of the agent.  Too high and the agent will not ex-
ist in effective concentrations at the ground.  Too low and the area covered with agent will be 
smaller than desired.  The explosive atomizes the liquid (or powder) agent and creates a wide 
cloud that settles on the positions being attacked.  Timed fuzes or impact fuzes may also be used 
but usually result in less than optimal dispersion.  A CBR mortar shell would look and act very 
similarly to an artillery shell, except that tail fins would be present to stabilize the round in flight.  
The artillery shell shown in Figure A-6 is spin-stabilized in flight, the spin being imparted by the 
rifled barrel of the gun.  CBR artillery shells have been manufactured for almost every size of 
gun from 75 mm up to 240 mm. 
 
 














Table A-2.  Delivery methods of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
              TYPE  OF  WMD 
      DELIVERY METHOD                 NUCLEAR   BIOLOGICAL   CHEMICAL   RADIOLOGICAL 
 
Aerial Bomb - Unitary Warhead   *Yes             Yes            Yes              Yes 
 
Aerial Bomb - Submunitions     No            *Yes            *Yes           Possible  
 
Aerial Bomb - Spray-Type     No            *Yes           *Yes           Possible  
 
Aircraft Spray Tank      No            *Yes            *Yes           Possible  
 
Vehicle Spray Tank      No             Yes             Yes           Possible           
 
Ballistic Missile Warhead     Yes            *Yes           *Yes          *Possible  
(Non-separating Reentry Vehicle) 
 
Ballistic Missile Warhead    *Yes            *Yes        *Possible           Possible 
(Separating Reentry Vehicle) 
 
Artillery Rocket or Cannon Shell    Yes             Yes           *Yes           Possible 
 
Mortar Shell              Unlikely           Yes           *Yes           Possible  
 
Cruise Missile - Unitary Warhead   *Yes           Possible        Possible           Possible        
 
Cruise Missile - Submunitions      No             Yes         Possible           Possible  
 
Anti-Personnel Land Mine            Possible  Yes            Yes           Possible  
 
Demolition/Denial Munition    *Yes          Possible         Possible           Possible        
 
Naval Mine        Yes           **Yes       **Possible           Possible        
 
Torpedo       *Yes          Possible         Possible           Unlikely  
 
Antiaircraft Missile Warhead      Yes          Possible         Unlikely           Unlikely        
 
Transportable Bomb (Clandestine)    *Yes           **Yes           **Yes           Possible  
 
 
* Major Threat             ** Could be significant threat 
Yes – Evidence of weaponization in this form.         No – Not possible or not practical. 
Possible – No evidence of weaponization in this form but physically possible & useful. 
Unlikely – Physically possible;  utility seems too low to warrant weaponization efforts. 
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 An artillery shell designed for dispensing binary chemical agents is shown in Figure A-7.  
It is very similar to a unitary agent artillery shell except that it has two liquid canisters, one for 
each of the binary chemicals.  The two canisters are separated by disks that will rupture under a 
very high acceleration loading.  When the artillery shell is fired, the launch acceleration ruptures 
the disks separating the two chemicals.  The spin of the projectile causes the binary chemicals to 
mix.  The ensuing chemical reaction produces the toxic agent.  After formation of the agent, bi-
nary shells behave exactly like unitary agent shells. 
 
 












Figure A-8 illustrates a typically artillery rocket for disseminating CBR agents.  These 
rockets are typically launched in large numbers from simple tube launchers.  At launch the rocket 
motor ignites and propels the rocket out of the tube.  Upon leaving the tube, fins unfold from the 
body to provide stabilization.  The front half of the rocket is designed very similarly to a CBR 
artillery shell with agent surrounding a burster charge.  After the rocket motor burns out, the pro-
jectile follows a ballistic trajectory.  At the desired altitude (or time after launch or on impact – 
depending on the fuze), the burster charge detonates and disperses the agent.  The U. S. M55 
115mm rocket was a typical example of this type of weapon. 
 
 







Figure A-9 shows a Livens projector and its projectile.  The Livens projector is a kind of 
mortar.  Originally designed to deliver chemical weapons, it can be used to deliver other CBR 
agents.  A large sausage-shaped drum is filled with agent and fitted with an impact fuze and a 
small burster charge.  A large piece of metal “sewer pipe” is fitted with a heavy baseplate and 
buried in the ground, angled at roughly 45 degrees and pointed at the enemy positions.  An elec-
trically-ignited powder charge (propellant) is placed at the bottom of the sewer pipe and a 
wooden pusher block (shaped to fit the bottom of the projectile) is placed on top of the powder 
charge.  The Livens projectile is then lowered onto the pusher block.  Typically dozens of projec-
tors are wired in parallel.  When the powder is ignited, the expanding gases accelerate the pusher 
block down the tube carrying the projectile with it.  The barrage of projectiles can be thrown 
many hundreds of meters towards the enemy.  When each projectile impacts the ground, the 
burster charge spreads the agent for tens of meters around the impact point. 
 
 
























Aircraft-delivered weapons can also take a variety of forms.  Figure A-10 shows an air-
craft bomb capable of explosively disseminating CBR agents.  A cylindrical bomb case is filled 
with liquid or powder agent through a fill port.  A burster charge is inserted into a cavity in the 
bomb case and an aerodynamic nose containing the fuze is added.  A tail fin assembly is added 
opposite the fuze to stabilize the aerodynamics of the weapon.  At a pre-determined altitude (or 
possibly a fixed delay after release), the burster charge is detonated releasing a cloud of agent 
over the target being attacked.  The burst altitude is selected to optimize the dispersion of the 
agent over the target.  
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Explosive bombs produce localized roughly spherical clouds of agent.  Figure A-11 
shows an aircraft bomb that produces a long linear cloud of CBR agent using a spray technique.  
The bomb is little more than a large cylindrical tank for holding the agent, with fins for stabiliza-
tion and a fuze for initiating the spray.  When the fuze decides that the altitude or the time after 
release is correct, explosive cutters (tiny linear shaped charges of explosive) are detonated.  
These cut small holes in front and the back ends of the tank.  Ram air pressure then forces the 
agent out through the holes in the rear.  The agent is atomized by the aerodynamic forces.  A lin-
ear cloud of agent is produced until the tank is exhausted.  Typical line lengths from such a 
“bomb” will be several hundred meters long. 
 
 














An aircraft spray bomb for delivering binary chemical agents is similar but much more 
complicated.  Figure A-12 shows an aircraft bomb for delivering the binary chemical agent VX.  
A ballonet (flexible foil balloon) is surrounded by sulfur and inserted into a thin, scored metal 
cylinder.  This cylinder is inserted into a bomb-shaped tank filled with the binary agent QL.  
When the bomb is released, a gas generator ignites expanding the ballonet.  The expansion of the 
ballonet forces the sulfur to rupture the scored cylinder and be forced into contact with the QL.  
The gas generator also causes the cylinder (which has small paddles attached to its outer surface) 
to spin rapidly.  The spinning paddles stir the sulfur-QL mixture allowing a chemical reaction to 
occur which forms VX.  After sufficient mixing time has occurred, explosive cutters create holes 
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in the front and rear ends of the projectile.  Ram air pressure then causes the VX to spray out of 
the aft holes, creating a long linear cloud of agent. 
 
 
















A fixed aircraft spray tank is an alternative to an expendable spray “bomb” in generating a line 
source of agent.  An aerodynamic tank is filled with agent and mounted to an external stores sta-
tion of the aircraft.  The tank can be pressurized by opening a valve connecting the tank to a ram 
air scoop.  After pressurization, opening a second valve will allow the “fluid” agent to be forced 
through a fine nozzle, which will produce aerosols drops of the desired size.  Closing the valves 
seals the remaining agent in the tank.  An aircraft spray tank is illustrated very generically in 
Figure A-13.  These tanks are similar to those used on crop-dusting aircraft.  They may also be 
mounted on high-speed surface vehicles or boats. 
 
 

















A leaflet bomb (such as the U. S. M16 500-lb leaflet bomb) is illustrated in Figure A-14.  
Originally designed to scatter leaflets over enemy positions as part of psychological warfare 
campaigns, the leaflet bomb can be adapted to disseminate some forms of biological agents.  The 
bomb contains several shelves onto which leaflets can be stacked.  In biological weapon use, the 
contents might be feathers, sawdust, or mouse droppings contaminated with a biological agent 
like anthrax or hantavirus, or they might possibly be chilled, infected insect vectors (such as yel-
low fever-carrying mosquitoes or encephalitis-carrying ticks).  Two releasable half-shells latch 
together at the front of the “bomb”, confine the contents, and provide an aerodynamic shape.  
The bomb is carried on the aircraft like any other bomb of its size.  After release, the fuze, which 
may be altimetric or timed, releases the cover latches.  The covers are torn away from the body 




Figure A-14.  A psychological warfare leaflet bomb that can be adapted 















Mines (land and naval) are also potential mechanisms for delivering CBR agents.  Figure 
A-15 shows a land mine capable of disseminating CBR agents.  A large, usually cylindrical case 
is filled the agent.  A burster charge of explosives is located under the case.  A fuze assembly 
(usually pressure actuated by a footstep, but possibly electrically triggered from a remote site) is 
added to determine when the mine is to detonate.  The whole assembly is either buried with the 
fuze just below the surface or hidden near ground level using camouflage.  When the fuze is trig-
gered, the burster charge explodes, rupturing the case and forcing most of the agent to be pushed 
up and out from the mine.  The agent cloud then settles over a wide area around the location of 
the mine.  Mines of this type could be easily improvised in the field using materials such as gre-
nades, gasoline cans, plastic explosives, and any agent that could be obtained (toxic industrial 






















Figure A-16 shows a hypothetical Naval mine for dispersing CBR agents.  The mine is 
moored close to the bottom of shallow water channels (50 to 200 m depth).  A multiple influence 
fuze detects the presence of specific types of warships.  When the desired ship class is detected, 
the mine capsule is released.  It rises quickly to the surface.  When the capsule breaches the sur-
face, a small powder charge launches a CBR agent-filled projectile a short distance into the air.  
At the height of its travel (50-100 m altitude), the agent-filled projectile explodes, showering the 
passing ship with a large cloud (tens to hundreds of kilograms) of agent.  The attack occurs so 
quickly that the ship will likely be contaminated before the ship can be hermetically sealed and 
collective protection engaged.  The agent will be resistant to decontamination with seawater. 
 
 





















Figure A-17 shows a hypothetical bomblet (submunition) capable of cutting a hole in 
deck panels to inject its CBR agent contents directly into the interior of a vessel.  Such bomblets 
could defeat the collective protection system of a warship.  Such submunitions might be deliv-
ered by cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, or aircraft.  When the bomblet impacts the deck of a 
ship, the annular shaped charge fires, cutting a circular hole through the deck into the compart-
ment below.  A few milliseconds later, the burster (pusher) charge forces the agent through the 
hole and disperses it widely throughout the penetrated compartment. 
 
 
Figure A-17.  A hypothetical submunition for injecting CBR agents into the interior of a vessel 





































PROLIFERATION OF WMD  
 
If only a few (presumably responsible) nations possessed weapons of mass destruction, 
and were willing to abide by treaties already in force, then we would have little to worry about, 
and there would be no need for this appendix.  However, dozens of nations, including more than 
a few irresponsible and even rogue nations, are believed to possess WMD [153].  Table A-3 lists 
the status of WMD proliferation.  Each major class of WMD is listed in a separate column. 
 
There are four categories of “proliferators”.  Known proliferators are those nations for 
which there is incontrovertible proof (including often their own open admission) that they pos-
sess a class of WMD.  Former proliferators include those states who are known to have pos-
sessed a class of WMD (or had a major program to acquire a class of WMD) in the past and who 
claim to have destroyed that WMD and are believed to no longer possess an offensive WMD 
program.  Probable proliferators include those states that are strongly suspected of possessing a 
WMD capability or of actively attempting to acquire such a capability.  It is a virtual certainty 
that one or more of these probable proliferators actually does possess an offensive WMD capa-
bility.  Possible proliferators include those nations that have caused other nations to suspect that 
they are attempting to acquire (or have acquired) a WMD capability.  Often these states openly 
possess a defensive WMD research program that could be a cover for a covert offensive WMD 
program. 
 
 A development of major significance to the United States is the growth of both domestic 
and international terrorism.  In the past terrorist groups were content to blow up buildings or hi-
jack airliners.  However, in the past few years we have seen several terrorist groups acquire 
chemical and biological weapons.  It is likely that more and more terrorist organizations will at-
tempt to acquire one or more types of WMD.  Since many terrorist groups have accepted support 
from and even allied themselves with potential adversary states, the acquisition of WMD by 
these groups is something that must be considered when studying the access denial problem.  
Adversary-sponsored and -directed “terrorist” attacks using WMD against critical infrastructure 
targets could significantly degrade the U. S. ability to respond to an overseas crisis.   
 
The use of a terrorist group as a surrogate WMD strike force may be viewed as a risk re-
duction strategy by an adversary.  If a terrorist group uses WMD against the U. S., then the sup-
plier state has at least one level of insulation against U. S. retaliation.  World opinion will force 
our government to obtain incontrovertible proof that the adversary intentionally supplied the 
WMD to the terrorist group before retaliatory action against another sovereign state would be 
condoned.  This evidence may be difficult if not impossible to obtain.  If it takes too long to ob-
tain and any other significant factors (such as the leader of the adversary state) change in the in-
tervening time we may be effectively stopped from retaliating.  Furthermore, the retaliation will 
probably not be in kind.  If a terrorist group exploded a nuclear device in New York City, the U. 
S. would be unlikely to vaporize the capital city of the presumed guilty supplier state.  More 
likely the U. S. would destroy some military or industrial target at a time and place that mini-
mized civilian casualties.  It is entirely possible that the adversary might view this as an accept-
able trade.  They might even find it advantageous to continue trading a major U. S. city for a ma-
jor military facility until the U. S. responded by upping the retaliatory ante. 
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Table A-3.  Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
 
NUCLEAR          BIOLOGICAL          CHEMICAL            RADIOLOGICAL  
K China   Iraq   India   None 
N France    Russia   Iraq 
O India       Russia 
W Pakistan     U. S. 
N Russia      Yugoslavia 
 U. K. 
 U. S.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
F Argentina (R)  Canada  Canada  U. S. (R) 
O Belarus  France   France   Iraq  
R Brazil (R)  Germany  Germany  Russia (R)?  
M Germany (R)  Japan   Italy 
E Japan (R)  South Africa  Japan 
R Kazakhstan   U. K.   South Africa 
Romania (R)  U. S.    U. K. 
 South Africa 
 Taiwan (R) 
 Ukraine 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
P Iran (R)  China   China   None 
R Iraq (R)  Iran   Egypt 
O Israel      Ethiopia 
B North Korea     Iran 
A       Israel 
B       Libya 
L       Myanmar (Burma) 
E       North Korea 
       Pakistan 
       South Korea 
       Syria 
       Taiwan 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
P Algeria (R)  Algeria (R)  Afghanistan  Yugoslavia 
O Yugoslavia  Bulgaria  Algeria 
S    Cuba   Cuba 
S    Egypt (R)  Indonesia 
I    India (R)  Laos 
B    Israel (R)  Sudan 
L    Libya (R)  Thailand 




(R) denotes a known active research program, but little evidence of weaponization 
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APPENDIX B.  ANALYSIS OF ACTIVE DEFENSE  
 
 
Historically, surface ships have relied on layered active defenses to defend against cruise 
missiles [39].  As illustrated in Figure B-1, the layers of defense involved aircraft, long-range 
missiles, short-range missiles, guns, electronic jammers, and decoys.  The total probability of 
killing an incoming threat is related to the kill probabilities of each layer as shown in the figure. 
For the decades of the 1970’s and 1980’s the major threats to warships was assumed to come 
from cruise missile attacks launched by massed elements of the Soviet Fleet, and/or cruise mis-
sile attacks by division-sized bomber elements of Soviet Naval Aviation.  Any and all engage-
ments involving our Navy would be blue water (open oceans off of the continental shelves) ac-
tions. The maximum credible attack consisted of perhaps 100-200 cruise missiles targeted 
against a carrier battle group.  Carrier-based aviation would engage the surface fleet or bomber 
forces before those forces could launch their missiles.  Shooting the “archer” was preferable to 
shooting down the “arrows”.  Invariably, a sizeable number of “archers” would survive the air 
attack or be able to fire their “arrows” before being shot down.  A few dozen missiles would re-
main for the next layers of defense.  Any remaining available carrier aircraft would attempt to 
shoot down in flight any missiles they could.  Long-range Standard missiles (SM-2) would en-
gage the cruise missiles as soon as the AEGIS system (or its Cooperative Engagement Capability 
upgrade) could detect and track them.  At shorter ranges, Sea Sparrow or Rolling Airframe  
 
 





















Missiles (RAM) would engage those cruise missiles surviving the SM-2 layer.  At minimum 
range, the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) would lay down a barrage of bullets at any 
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target surviving the Sea Sparrow or RAM attacks.  All of the preceding layers would be back-
stopped by SLQ-32 electronic warfare systems, launching a variety of chaff and infrared decoys, 
and possibly employing rf jamming.  Given the Cold War threats, analysis consistently showed 
that only a few, if any, missiles or torpedoes would survive to impact our warships.  However, 
we envision a different threat, one with many more missiles.  In this case, a dramatically differ-
ent conclusion will be reached. 
 
This results because a ship or battle group can carry only a finite number of missile kills 
in its inventory.  A typical battle group in 2020 might consist of an aircraft carrier (CVN), one 
AEGIS cruiser (CG), two AEGIS destroyers (DDG), and three new destroyers (DD-21 class).  
Let us calculate the number of missile kills such a battle group might possess.  The aircraft car-
rier would have an air wing of 60-80 aircraft.  Of these aircraft no more than 36 would typically 
be assigned to combat air patrol (CAP) missions.  Of course, not all of these aircraft would be 
flightworthy at the same time.  Perhaps 10% would be “down” for maintenance.  Although only 
a fraction of the flightworthy aircraft will be airborne unless at least a half-hour of early warning 
is given, for the purposes of this analysis we will assume all flightworthy CAP aircraft have been 
sortied.  We further assume that each of the roughly 32 carrier aircraft available for CAP might 
be able to intercept 4 missiles in a massive raid.  Four intercepts per aircraft is not the maximum 
possible.  However, air-to-air loadout is likely to be 6 to 8 AMRAAM missiles depending on 
whether the interceptor is an F-18 or a Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).  It is unlikely that every missile 
will achieve a kill.  It is also unlikely that an interceptor aircraft will be able to find, chase down, 
track, and attack more than four or five small, high-speed missiles in the 4-6 minutes that it takes 
the incoming missiles to close from a nominal 300-km aircraft patrol outer envelope to within 
SM-2 missile range.  Once SM-2 missiles can be brought to bear on the threats, the interceptors 
must break off the fight or risk being inadvertently shot down by our own missiles.  All factors 
considered, 4 intercepts per aircraft is optimistic.  Thus, CAP may account for as many as 128 
missile kills. 
  
Among the surface combatants, there may be as many as {0 (CVN) + 128 (CG) + 96 
(DDG) + 96 (DDG) + 128 (DD) + 128 (DD) + 128 DD)} = 704 VLS cells [59].  Two-thirds of 
the AEGIS ship cells may contain Standard Missile SM-2 (214 total) and 1/8 of the DD-21 cells 
may contain four-packs of Sea Sparrow missiles (192 total) for air defense.  This is not an unrea-
sonable loadout given that the AEGIS ships are primarily air dominance ships and the DD-21’s 
are primarily land attack ships.  Many of the total VLS cells must be devoted to Tomahawk (land 
attack) and antisubmarine warfare missions.  If any of the ships has an exoatmospheric ballistic 
missile defense mission, then even fewer VLS cells will be available to carry SM-2s or Sea Spar-
rows.  In addition to all of the missiles, the battle group may have (4 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2) = 
16 CIWS Gatling guns, each good for roughly 4 kills each under ideal conditions.  A CIWS car-
ries roughly 1500 rounds of ammunition good for approx. 30 seconds of firing at the nominal 
3000 round per minute rate.  The maximum range of the CIWS rounds is about 6000 m with a 
quoted effective of about 1500 m.  Continuous firing at an incoming subsonic missile over the 
range from 2500 m to 500 m (approx. 6.7 seconds) will almost certainly (but not always) result 
in a kill.  Continued firing at targets closer than 500 m will increase the hit probability, but the 
probably of receiving serious damage from missile debris rises rapidly as the destruction range 
decreases below 500 m.  In any event CIWS is capable of only four complete 6.7 second bursts 
before requiring rearming.  Any engagement for shorter times will have an increased probability 
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of miss.  Thus, assigning 4 kills per CIWS is optimistic.  The electronic warfare systems will 
contain a mix of some systems with passive detection, active jamming, and chaff/flare dispensers 
and some systems without active jamming capability.  Systems with jamming will be somewhat 
more effective against rf-guided missile than systems employing only chaff.  Both will have the 
same limited effectiveness against ir-guided missiles.  All things considered, the EW systems 
may be expected to negate roughly half of those missiles that are not destroyed by the hard-kill 
defenses.   
 
Assume that the antimissile missiles are 95% reliable and effective (historically very 
good performance – many missiles do not perform this well) and that only one missile is 
launched at each threat.  Also assume that the aircraft and CIWS systems are 100% effective at 
achieving their stated number of kills.  Then the battle group is capable of killing at most 128 + 
{0.95 x (214 + 192)} + 64 = 578 hard kills with soft kills on half of the remaining threat.  The 
NPS Red Team results suggested that 1000 missiles per attack (2-3% of a near peer competitor’s 
inventory and 10-20% of a regional competitor’s inventory) was not an unreasonably large ex-
penditure for attacking (and almost certainly destroying) a battle group.  In this instance, assum-
ing that only 80% of the launched threats functioned properly, then 111 missiles would survive 
to hit the 7 ships of the battle group (16 hits per ship).  If each CIWS were replaced by an 11-
missile Sea-RAM launcher (providing roughly 103 additional hard kills per battle group), then 
60 missiles would survive to hit the 7 ships (giving 8-9 hits per ship).    
 
In practice, several factors would make the actual numbers of hits per ship even larger.  
Temporal saturation of the defenses due to finite defensive engagement rates will permit some 
cruise missiles to close to zero range without ever being attacked.  A traditional shoot-shoot-
look-shoot firing doctrine, selected to optimize the number of kills in an engagement rate-limited 
system, causes two missiles to be fired at each missile threat to increase the kill probability.  This 
will deplete the missile magazines twice as quickly.  This will also make temporal saturation of 
the defense easier to achieve.  Despite wishes and best intentions, some cruise missiles will es-
cape being killed by the missiles fired at them.  Additional missiles must be fired at those threats 
that were missed by the first shots, further depleting the magazines.  If the incoming raid con-
tains a very large number of missiles, it will be difficult to allocate a single shooter against each 
missile.  To the extent that command and control discipline breaks down and two or more differ-
ent ships fire on exactly the same missile threat, then missiles will be wasted and magazine de-
pletion will occur even faster.  As an additional complication, the attacking missiles will not be 
uniformly distributed against the targets.  It is quite likely that the majority of the attacking mis-
siles will concentrate on the largest targets (the carrier and the AEGIS cruiser).  Even though this 
may not increase the total number of leakers, it means that if there are a total of 111 leakers, then 
the larger ships might take 30, 40, or even more hits apiece rather than only 16. 
 
For these and other reasons a single massive strike is probably not the best enemy strat-
egy.  A smaller but still massive first strike (of say 500 missiles) would be followed by damage 
assessment and a subsequent smaller second strike to finish off survivors would permit the ad-
versary to conserve more of his resources.  Variations with several sequential strikes might per-
mit as few as 500 missiles to completely destroy a battle group.  It should be noted that complete 
destruction means just that.  Given our ships’ current questionable ability to take even a single 
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hit and then continue fighting, it is likely that raids even smaller than 500 missiles would elimi-
nate a battle group as an effective force. 
 
Doubling the size of the defensive suite might effectively counter a 1000-missile raid but 
would also add enormously to the cost.  Payload costs would roughly double and each ship 
would have to get substantially larger to handle the increased number of missile launch cells.  
More launch cells are necessary because removal of the land attack, ballistic missile defense, and 
antisubmarine missiles currently assumed to be loaded in the remaining VLS cells to make room 
for additional air defense missiles, will prevent the battle group from performing its primary mis-
sions.  Total battle group cost would likely increase by 30-50%.  Of course, even this doubled 
defense could be defeated by 1500-missile attacks. It will cost the adversary far less to buy more 
missiles and launchers/launch platforms than it will cost us to put more defensive weaponry on 
each of our ships.  Buying twice the number of combatants is of course totally out of the question 
from a cost perspective.  Even if the Navy was able to mount a task force with all 12 of its carrier 
battle groups, a 12,000 missile attack is not beyond the capability of a peer competitor and might 
deplete less than a third of that competitor’s anticipated missile inventory.  The fleet-wide inte-
gration of the Cooperative Engagement Capability [40] will allow optimum use of the available 
weaponry, but will not affect the outcome – all the defensive weapons are used up before the in-
coming raid can be depleted of missiles. 
 
The trade between offensive weapon costs and defensive weapon costs gets even worse 
in the littorals.  If the Navy is close enough to bombard targets on shore, weapons on shore are 
close enough to bombard the Navy.  In addition to cruise missiles, land-based artillery [43]-[45] 
(possibly with imaging seekers on maneuverable projectiles), aircraft (including civilian aircraft 
with improvised armaments, armed drones, and kamikazes – manned by martyrs or remotely-
piloted), and small anti-armor weapons fired from “non-combatant” vessels such as small fishing 
boats, must be considered.     
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APPENDIX C.  MISSILE NOMENCLATURE 
 
 
Missiles come in many varieties and can be sorted into many different categories.  One 
categorization is based on the locations of the launch platform and the target.  For example, an 
air-to-air missile (AAM) is air-launched at an airborne target.  Other categories include:  surface-
to-air missiles (SAM), surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), and air-to-surface missiles (ASM – 
although this abbreviation usually stands for anti-ship missile) or air-to-ground missiles (AGM).  
Another categorization is guided versus unguided.  Unguided “missiles” are usually referred to 
simply as rockets.  Rockets follow a simple trajectory governed at first by the propulsion charac-
teristics, and later follow a ballistic trajectory after the rocket motor burns out.  Most military 
missiles are guided.  One major classification of guided missiles is based on guidance type.   
 
Inertially-guided missiles measure the linear and angular accelerations to which the mis-
sile is subjected.  Position is determined by double integration of the linear accelerations (as 
measured in inertial coordinates).  An autopilot commands the missile to fly a preset course with 
respect to inertial coordinates.  This course may be as simple as a straight line determined by the 
initial axis of the missile (some very short-range anti-armor weapons employ this trajectory).  It 
may also be a more complicated course that ends up at motor burnout with the missile at a spe-
cific point in space, traveling with a specific velocity (remember that velocity is a vector quan-
tity; speed is a scalar).  When subsequently acted on by gravity and other environmental forces, 
the missile will follow a ballistic trajectory that impacts near the intended target.   
 
Inertial guidance is a form of “navigational” guidance, or guidance by knowing where the 
missile and the target are in space.  Two other forms of navigational guidance are commonly 
employed.  If the missile possesses a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, then it can de-
termine exactly where it is in earth-centered coordinates.  The missile is given a set of coordi-
nates where the target is located and the autopilot flies a course that ultimately brings the missile 
GPS location into coincidence with the target GPS location.  If the missile possesses an altime-
ter, it may be possible to utilize terrain contour matching (TERCOM) guidance.  The missile car-
ries a number of small topographic “maps” in its computer memory.  While in a segment of level 
flight near a planned checkpoint, the missile measures the altitude profile of the ground beneath 
it.  This terrain height profile is correlated against one of the stored topographic maps to deter-
mine which segment of the map matches the observation.  Once a match has been determined, 
the missile knows its location and its direction of motion.  It is then a simple command to give it 
a new heading to take it to the next checkpoint.  
 
Command-guided missiles require a fire control sensor that tracks both the target and 
missile, a computer that calculates missile course adjustments necessary for intercept, and a 
communication link to communicate those course adjustments to the missile.  The fire control 
sensor may be a radar or an electro-optical sensor.  Some newer variants of command-guided 
missiles place an imaging sensor on the missile with a two-way communication link.  The opera-
tor detects the target via the sensor image and gives up-down/left-right commands to the missile 
to keep the target in the center of the sensor image.   
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Homing missiles have seekers that detect the position of the target with respect to the di-
rection of missile motion and compute guidance commands that permit the missile to ultimately 
impact the target.  Homing seekers may be active (radiating energy from the seeker and detecting 
energy backscattered from the target), semi-active (detecting energy backscattered from the tar-
get produced by illumination from a separate radiating aperture – often back at the launcher), and 
passive (detecting energy emitted by the target).  Active seekers usually employ small radars for 
radiation and detection).  Semi-active seekers may operate at microwave frequencies or laser fre-
quencies.  The latter are called laser-guided missiles.  Passive seekers may detect microwave 
emissions or infrared emissions.  Missiles employing the former are called anti-radiation homing 
missiles;  the latter are called infrared-guided missiles.  
  
Three classification schemes involve the propulsion mechanism.  If both the fuel and the 
oxidizer (a fuel combines chemically with an oxidizer in a process called combustion) are carried 
on board the missile, the missile uses rocket propulsion.  If the missile carries only fuel and 
draws in external air as the oxidizer, the missile uses air-breathing (or jet) propulsion.  A missile 
that has a single motor (or cluster of motors that burn simultaneously) it is said to be a single-
stage missile.  If the missile has two or more motors that burn one after the other and each earlier 
motor is discarded as soon as it burns out it is said to be a multi-stage missile.  A stage whose 
function is to produce rapid acceleration of the missile is called a booster.  A stage whose func-
tion is to barely overcome the velocity-reducing effects of atmospheric drag and gravity is called 
a sustainer.  Boost-sustain is a common two-stage missile configuration.  The booster motor ac-
celerates the missile from zero to maximum speed; the sustainer motor keeps the missile flying 
near its maximum speed.  Many anti-aircraft missiles use a boost-sustain configuration.  Missiles 
that use only (one or more) booster rocket stages are commonly called ballistic missiles.  Mis-
siles that use a sustainer stage for all but the initial portion of the flight and are capable of flying 
relatively long distances are called cruise missiles.  Many cruise missiles use air-breathing pro-
pulsion in the sustainer motor. 
 
Cruise missiles can be further classified by the trajectories they fly and the targets they 
are capable of striking.  Cruise missiles that fly at low altitudes over water (a few meters to less 
than or equal to 30 meters) are called sea-skimming missiles.  Some missiles fly at high altitudes 
(drag and aerodynamic heating are reduced at high altitudes) and dive at steep angles (approach-
ing 45°) towards the target after target detection.  These are often referred to as “high divers”.  
Some missiles fly at low altitudes until they come within an estimated short distance of the target 
location, at which time they “pop up” to a modest altitude, search and detect the target, and then 
either dive at the target or return to “sea skimming” altitude until impact.  Cruise missiles with 
the ability to independently find a moving target are used as “anti-ship” cruise missiles.  Anti-
ship cruise missiles invariably have active or passive seekers.  Cruise missiles that can accurately 
guide to a known point in inertial space are used as “land attack” cruise missiles.  Most land at-
tack cruise missiles use navigation guidance (inertial, GPS, or TERCOM) guidance.  
  
There is no standard terminology for describing ballistic missiles with different maxi-
mum ranges.  The terminology used by the author is given below.  For comparison the author has 
listed the terminology used in the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty [154] and the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty [21]. 
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       Author          Range       INF Treaty      ABM Treaty 
           Short-range       < 500 km             ---              ---   
           Medium-range    500 – 1000 km Shorter-range             --- 
           Intermediate-range  1000 – 3500 km Intermediate-range            --- 
           Long-range   3500 – 5500 km Intermediate-range “No tests against” 
           Intercontinental     > 5500 km             ---  “No tests against” 
 
“No tests against” means that missiles of these ranges may not be used as targets for testing any 
missile defense system except the one treaty-authorized “ABM system”.  Note that the author’s 
usage encompasses all of the different breakpoints used by the two treaties.  The National Air 
Intelligence Center [155] uses similar labels but a different set of breakpoints:  
 
 NAIC           Range 
Short-range       < 1000 km 
Medium-range  1000 – 3000 km 
Intermediate-range  3000 – 5500 km 
Intercontinental      > 5500 km  
 
The NAIC breakpoints are not consistent with the treaty language.  The Center for Defence and 
International Security Studies in the United Kingdom promulgates the following classification 
scheme.[258] 
 
  CDISS           Range 
 Battlefield Short Range      < 150 km 
 Short Range     150 – 800 km 
 Medium Range   800 – 2400 km 
 Intermediate Range  2400 – 5500 km 
 Intercontinental Range     > 5500 km 
 
The former Soviet and now Russian military uses a different nomenclature scheme for their mis-
siles.[259] 
 
  Russian         Range 
 Tactical        < 50 km 
 Operational-Tactical    50 – 300 km 
 Operational    300 – 500 km 
 Operational-Strategic  500 – 1000 km 
 Strategic      > 1000 km 
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APPENDIX D.  BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
 
 
 There are a variety of conceptual systems for defense against ballistic missiles.  The sys-
tems may be ground-based, airborne, or space-based.  The kill mechanism may involve directed 
energy (destruction by high-energy lasers) or kinetic energy (destruction through direct high-
speed impact of a “kill vehicle” with the missile).  Kinetic energy kill is possible at high relative 
velocities.  Assuming the incoming target to be much, much more massive than the kill vehicle, 
we may assume that the center of mass of the combined target interceptor system is roughly co-
incident with the target center of mass.  Since incoming missiles typically have masses of several 
thousand kilograms and kill vehicles typically have masses of the order of 50 kg or less, the cen-
ter of mass approximation above will cause very small errors in any calculation.  If m is the mass 
of the kill vehicle and V is the relative velocity between the target and the kill vehicle, then the 
kinetic energy E potentially released in the impact is roughly 
 
   E  = 0.5 m V2. 
 
Let us assume an incoming target velocity of 2000 m/s, an outgoing kill vehicle velocity of 2000 
m/s (yielding a relative velocity of 4000 m/s), and a kill vehicle mass of 50 kg, then for a direct 
hit, the kinetic energy released is 4 x 108 Joules.  In an impact, the kinetic energy will be trans-
formed into heat energy.  By way of comparison, explosion of 1 kg of TNT releases 4.2 x 106 
Joules, mostly as heat energy.  Thus our hypothetical kinetic energy intercept releases as much 
energy as 100 kg of TNT, more than enough to completely destroy both target and kill vehicle. 
 
Intercept (or destruction) can occur within the atmosphere (endoatmospheric – altitudes 
nominally less than 100 km) or above the atmosphere (exoatmospheric – altitudes nominally 
greater than 100 km).  It may occur during any of the phases of missile flight, as illustrated in 
Figure D-1.  Boost phase intercepts occur while the ballistic missile’s rocket motors are still fir-
ing.  Post-boost phase intercepts occur while a post-boost vehicle (PBV), if any, separates from 
the missile body and dispenses one or more reentry vehicles (RV) and/or penetration aids (pe-
naids or decoys).  PBVs are usually associated with Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry 
Vehicles (MIRVed) ballistic missiles.  Mid-course intercepts occur after the post-boost phase (if 
any) and before terminal phase.  Terminal phase intercepts occur as the RV (in some cases the 
entire missile) begins to reenter the atmosphere.  Defense systems may provide defense of an ex-
tended region (area defense) or they may provide defense of a very limited area centered on the 
defense system (point defense).  Area defense systems may provide only rear area defense (the 
defense system is positioned between the ballistic missile launch site & the defended area) or 
general area defense (the defended area includes the defense system position).  General area de-
fense systems are capable of point defense;  rear area defense systems are not. 
 
Figure D-1 specifically illustrates the trajectory of a 2000 km range missile.  The ranges 
of potential intercepts for a nominal 500 km range interceptor (or directed energy weapon for 
boost phase intercepts) at several ground positions along the missile trajectory are illustrated by 
the shaded triangular regions.  The reader should note that an interceptor fast enough to intercept 
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another missile at 500 km range is a very large missile in its own right (much larger than tradi-
tion long-range air defense missiles).   
 
 Complete ballistic missile defense systems have a number of components.  For every 
kind of system there must be a warning element that detects the launch of a missile or the mid-
course flight of a reentry vehicle and cues the defense system.  There must also be a tracking sys-
tem that reacquires the incoming target and determines where and when to point a directed en-
ergy weapon or fire an interceptor missile.  Additional components of a directed energy weapon 
system are described in Appendix I.  For the remainder of the present appendix we will consider 
only kinetic energy weapon systems.  Kinetic energy weapon systems further require a launcher 
and an interceptor.  The interceptor typically consists of one or more booster stages and a kill 
vehicle.  The kill vehicle contains a homing seeker (typically active radar or passive infrared) 
and a guidance & control system consisting of attitude control motors and divert thrust motors.  
The divert system produces thrust directed through the kill vehicle center of mass.  Thus it pro-
duces pure lateral motions that can be used to steer the kill vehicle into the path of the incoming 
target.  The kill vehicle may also have a “kick motor” oriented back along the direction of mo-
tion to provide additional acceleration and velocity at intercept.  The higher the relative velocity, 
the higher the kinetic energy released at impact. 
 
 For purposes of this paper it is useful to “quantify” some of the characteristics of kinetic 
energy defense systems.  Rear area defense against intermediate-range ballistic missiles is 
somewhat easier than point defense.  In rear area defense, intercepts are made while the missile 
passes overhead the shooter.  “Overhead” is used loosely.  In general, the interceptor travels 
more vertical distance than horizontal ground track distance.  Detection occurs along a line of 
sight that makes a significant angle to the interceptor trajectory.  In point defense, the geometry 
is more or less nose-on.  Detection occurs along the same line of sight as the interceptor trajec-
tory.  For an intercept at a given high altitude, the average target velocity will be essentially the 
same for both area defense and point defense intercepts.  If we assume the same interceptor ve-
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locity in both cases, then the angle, A, between the interceptor velocity vector and the target ve-
locity vector is A(pd) ≈ 180° for point defense, but A(ad) << 180° for area defense.  Then from 
the law of cosines  
 
(a2 = b2 + c2 – 2bc cosA)  
 
where a, b, and c are the sides of the triangle, and A is the angle opposite side a, it is obvious that 
a (the minimum detection range) is substantially larger for point defense than for area defense, 
when b is associated with the distance the target moves before intercept and c is associated with 
the distance the interceptor flies out before intercept.   
 
If intercepts are allowed within the atmosphere, then the target leg of the triangle be-
comes very small, and the difference in detection range can become negligible.  Point defense 
and area defense become roughly equally difficult.  Unfortunately, at velocities exceeding 2 km/s 
within the atmosphere, it is exceedingly difficult to use a high-resolution imaging seeker, be-
cause the aerodynamic heating of the window material (and the air in front of the window) will 
produce noise that would obscure the target.  To guarantee an intercept against a “maneuvering” 
target, the interceptor velocity must be comparable to the target velocity.  Thus, endoatmospheric 
intercepts are difficult against targets with velocities in excess of 2 km/s (or ranges in excess of 
400 km – see below).  Exoatmospheric point defense is further complicated by differences in ra-
dar cross section of the target.  The cross section of a cone (typical reentry vehicle shape) or 
cone-cylinder (typical missile shape) is at a minimum when viewed nose-on (see Appendix E).  
The cross section increases rapidly until the viewing angle is perpendicular to the side of the 
cone (i.e., “broadside” to the cone).  For cones, the cross section then falls off again with increas-
ing viewing angle;  for cone-cylinders, the cross section continues to increase until the viewing 
angle reaches 90° (broadside to the cylinder).  Thus, in point defense, not only is the range 
longer, but the radar cross section is smaller, making detection and tracking much more difficult 
than in area defense. 
 
 If some cueing sensor other than the shooter’s radar can provide the accurate track data 
needed to launch the interceptor much earlier in time (than required for a minimum range inter-
cept), then the missile defense system can readily provide both point defense and wide area de-
fense capabilities.  Such a cueing sensor might be surface-based (e.g., an AEGIS ship in another 
battle group closer to the launch point), although more likely it would be airborne or space-
based.  For example, it is virtually certain that the sensors onboard the Air Force’s Airborne La-
ser could detect and track some targets at ranges well in excess of those at which the laser was 
capable of engaging those targets.  If available, any accurate track data could be provided to the 
shooter over the Cooperative Engagement Capability. 
  
 The maximum range, R, versus total velocity, v, for a ballistic missile is given approxi-
mately by the relation 
 
R ≅ v2/g,  
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where g is the acceleration of gravity.  In arriving at this simple relation (based on a simple para-
bolic trajectory) we have ignored the finite time extent of the boost phase, the curvature of the 
earth, air resistance, and the rotation of the earth.  The primary conclusion from this equation – 
longer-range missiles must have higher velocities – is true even if we had considered the factors 
we ignored.  The velocity of a 1000 km range missile is 41% higher than the velocity of a 500 
km range missile.  The peak altitude, h, of a maximum range missile is approximately  
 
h ≅ v2/4g ≅ R/4.   
 
The length of time that the missile is within the atmosphere (below 70-90 km altitude) will de-
crease approximately inversely as the velocity increases. The time of flight from launch to im-
pact, T, is approximately  
 
T ≅ (v√2)/g.   
 
Thus, a 1000 km range missile will have a velocity of 3.2 km/s, reach an altitude of 250 km, and 
have a flight time of 450 s.  A 4000 km range missile will have a velocity of about 6 km/s, reach 
an altitude of 1000 km, and have a flight time of 900 s.  Note that the approximate relations 
given above will overestimate the velocity required for an ICBM (R ≥ 15,000 km) by roughly a 





APPENDIX E.  RADAR PERFORMANCE ESTIMATION 
 
 
 Radars work by transmitting microwave electromagnetic radiation from an antenna to-
wards a target [156]-[157].  The target in turn scatters some of the incident radiation back to-
wards the radar.  The radar then collects this radiation with an antenna and mixes it with radia-
tion from a local oscillator in its receiver.  The signal coming out of the receiver is finally ana-
lyzed to determine the presence of a target, the range or velocity of a target, or some other target 
attributes.  A generic block diagram of a microwave radar is shown in Figure E-1.  This diagram 
shows the arrangement and interconnections of the critical components.  It should be noted that 
alternative technologies may be employed for almost every element.  For example, a parabolic 
dish antenna is illustrated, but this may be replaced by a phased array antenna.  A klystron ampli-
fier may be used in place of a traveling wave tube amplifier.  Several stages of mixing may be 
employed rather than the single stage shown.  The display may be replaced by an automatic 
tracker or the input to a missile autopilot.  Coaxial cables may replace waveguides and micro-
wave striplines may replace coaxial cables.  And so on. 
 
  




 The performance of a noise-limited radar is given by the classical radar equation.  This 
expression relates the carrier (average signal level)-to-noise ration CNR of the radar to radar pa-
rameters (such as power, aperture size, frequency, bandwidth), target parameters (cross section), 
and propagation parameters (atmospheric losses).  Figure E-2 shows a simple graphical deriva-
tion of the radar equation.  The process used in the derivation is an example of radiometric 
analysis.   
 
 





In slightly modified form (the average power divided by the pulse repetition frequency replaces 
the peak power divided by the bandwidth and the antenna area is replaced by the appropriate ex-
pression involving the antenna diameter), the radar equation becomes 
 
  CNR = PAV π D4 σ e-2αR / 64 k T PRF F λ2 R4 
 
where the parameters are defined in Table E-1 below along with numerical values characteristic 
of three different radar applications. 
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Table E-1.  Parameters of microwave radars used in three generic applications. 
 
 
          BMD MISSILE        AD/CMD 
  PARAMETER    RADAR SEEKER  RADAR  
 
 CNR = Carrier-to-Noise Ratio   14 dB  23 dB  33 dB 
  (Required to give desired 
   detection performance)   
 PD = Detection Probability   0.9   0.9  0.99 
 PF = False Alarm Probability   10-8  10-8  10-8  
 PAV = Average Transmitter Power  10,000 W 10 W  1000 W 
 D = Aperture Diameter   16 m  20 cm  4 m 
 σ = Target Cross Section   0.01 m2  10,000 m2 0.02 m2 
 Cross Section Statistics   Swerling 0 Swerling 2 Swerling 2 
 α = Atmospheric Attenuation   0  0  0  
  (Often neglected)   
 T = Electronics Temperature   300 K  300 K  300 K 
 PRF = Pulse Repetition Frequency  150 Hz  5 kHz  1 kHz 
 F = Amplifier Noise Factor    10  10  10 
  (Typically 3 to 10)   
 λ = Radar Wavelength   5 cm   2 cm  6 cm 
 f  = Radar Frequency    6 GHz  15 GHz 5 GHz 
 R = Radar Range    950 km 26 km  30 km 
 
 
 There are other parameters of interest in determining radar performance.  The Round-
Trip Time Delay of the transmitted waveform is 
 
  tR  =  2 R / c . 
 
The Ambiguous Range (the maximum target range at which close-in small targets can be differ-
entiated in range from large distant targets – caused by transmitting the next radar pulse before 
the first pulse’s target reflection from a distant target can return to the radar) is given by 
 
  RAMB  =  c / 2 PRF 
 
where PRF is the pulse repetition frequency.  The Doppler shift of a received waveform can be 
determined from the relation 
 
  ∆f  =  (2 V/c)  =  2 V/λ 
 
where V is the relative radial velocity (line-of-sight closure velocity).  The 3-dB beamwidth of 
the transmitted beam is roughly 
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  θB  =  1.045 λ/D 
 
while the angular resolution of the radar is approximately 
 
  ∆θ  =  0.88 λ/D. 
 
The range resolution of the radar may be determined from 
 
  ∆R  =  cτ/2  =  cB/2 
 
where τ is the radar pulsewidth and B is the bandwidth of the radar waveform.  The choice of 
resolution expression is governed by whether the radar transmits simple pulses or more complex 
waveforms.  Velocity resolution of the radar may be estimated from the relation 
 
  ∆V  = λ/2τ  =  λB/2 
 
Again the choice of expression depends on the radar waveform.  In the radar range equation, 
peak power PPK or pulse energy EP may be substituted for the average power by using the 
equivalence relations 
 
  PAV /PRF  =  PPK /B  =  τ PPK   =  EP . 
 
The alternative forms of the radar range equation may be easier to use for some calculations.  
 
 As mentioned in the first paragraph of this appendix, conventional parabolic antennas are 
often replaced by phased array antennas.  The fundamental principle of phased array antennas is 
shown in Figure E-3.  Consider a regular array of emitters.  If there is a regular variation of phase 
from element to element, then the radiation emitted from each element will be perfectly in phase 
with the radiation emitted from each other element in one direction only (angle θ).  This is the 
direction of radiation emission of the phased array.  If the regular variation of phase is altered  
 
 
Figure E-3.  Alignment of emitted wavefronts in a phased array antenna. 
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slightly, then the direction of emission will also vary.  The regular phase relationship can be de-
termined from Figure E-4.  For emitters with spacing l and radiation of wavelength λ, the phase 
of the nth element relative to the zeroth element, φn, at emission angle θ can be shown by geome-
try to be 
 
 φn = n2π X/λ = n2π (l/λ) sinθ 
 
By applying the phase φn to emitter element n, the antenna radiation will be emitted in direction   
θ.  This one dimensional result is easily extended to two-dimensional arrays (replace θ by an or-
thogonal angle β and φn by a phase variation χm in the second array dimension).   
 
 
Figure E-4.  Geometry of phase variation. 
 
 The detection probability, false alarm probability, and carrier-to-noise ratio (CNR where 
CNR = [Mean Received Signal]/[Mean Receiver Noise]) are interrelated by receiver operating 
characteristics.  The receiver operating characteristics depend on the noise in the receiver, the 
statistics of fluctuations in the radar cross section, and the statistics of fluctuations in the effec-
tive extinction of the propagation medium.  Figure E-5 shows the receiver operating characteris-
tic of a conventional microwave radar for a non-fluctuating target.  Figure E-6 shows the receiver 
operating characteristic of a conventional microwave radar for a target exhibiting Rayleigh cross 
section statistics.  Such statistics result when the target can be modeled as the sum of many 
small, randomly phased scattering centers (Model 2 developed by Swerling).  This is often used 
as a worst case cross section assumption.  It is also encountered as a good approximation to the 
true cross section statistics in a number of examples.  The CNR values shown in the table above 
were derived from these receiver operating characteristics. 
 
 Calculation of radar cross sections of real objects is complicated.  However, simple geo-
metric shapes can be analyzed explicitly.  For example, the radar cross section of a smooth me-
tallic sphere of radius a and reflectivity ρ is given by 
 



















































For a cylinder of radius a and length L viewed at angle θ with respect to the cylinder broadside 
the cross section is 
 
σcylinder  =  4aλ ρ  cosθ  sin2(kL sinθ) / 2π  sin2θ 
 
where λ is the radar wavelength and k = 2π/λ.  For a cone of height H and cone half-angle θ0 
viewed nose-on the cross section is 
 
σcone  =  (λ2 ρ  tan4θ0) / 16π . 
 
When viewed at angle θ with respect to the nose the cross section is approximately 
 
σcone  =  2H tanθ0 λ ρ  cos(θ0-θ)  sin2(kH secθ0  tan(θ0-θ)) / 2π  sin2(θ0-θ). 
 
The broadside cross section is orders of magnitude larger (roughly 64π2H6/λ3a3 larger) than the 
nose-on cross section.  For a trihedral (or corner reflector or retroreflector – the bane of stealth 
design) with physical aperture A and viewed at angle θ with respect to the normal to the aperture, 
the cross section is given by 
 
σtrihedral  =  (4πA2 ρ  cos2θ) / λ2 . 
  
Consider the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) radar example listed in the table.  The ra-
dar cross section is representative of the cross section of a complete missile.  The cross section of 
a separated reentry vehicle is expected to be much smaller (refer to the cross section expressions 
above).  Note: cross sections of specific real missiles and reentry vehicles may differ by more 
than an order of magnitude larger or smaller than the representative values used here.  However, 
since radar range scales as σ1/4, an order of magnitude error in cross section yields only a factor 
of 1.78 error in range.  This “BMD” radar will detect and track a ballistic missile at roughly 
1000-km range.  One face of this radar (4 are required for 360-degree coverage) has a power-
aperture product of 1,770,000 W-m2.  One face is ABM treaty compliant.  An aggregate of four 
faces might possibly be considered to be a single radar under the treaty.  If it were, its power-
aperture product would exceed treaty limits.  Any attempt to push the detection range beyond 
1000 km or to detect smaller cross section targets would likely cause even a single face to exceed 
the treaty limit. 
 
 Now let us consider the radar seeker example.  These parameters are consistent with the 
active radar seeker of an anti-ship missile.  Against a typical ship-sized target and given an un-
cluttered environment, this seeker will detect the ship at approx. 26 km (roughly equal to the ra-
dar horizon).  There are several clutter and propagation effects present in the antiship missile 
problem that do not impact the BMD problem analyzed earlier.  These include wave clutter, re-
fractive ducting, and multipath.   
 




  σclutter  =  R  ∆θ  ∆R σ0  
 
where ∆θ is the angular resolution of the radar, ∆R is the range resolution of the radar, and σ0 is 
the mean backscatter coefficient of the sea (or terrain).  σ0 is a function of radar frequency, ob-
servation angle (grazing angle), radar polarization, and sea state (or type and roughness of ter-
rain).  For Sea State 4 (the median encountered sea state in open oceans) and a radar frequency 
of 10 – 15 GHz the backscatter coefficient is roughly –29 dBsm/m2 at 10° grazing angle and 
roughly –48 dBsm/m2 at 0.1° grazing angle.  At the maximum range of our hypothetical seeker 
and assuming a range resolution of 50 m and an angular resolution of 0.088 radians, we obtain a 
sea clutter cross section of only 1.8 m2 at a typical sea-skimming angle of 0.1°.  We also obtain a 
value of only 144 m2 at an angle of 10° that corresponds to a typically pop-up-and-search-for-
targets mode.   Since ship cross sections are typically 10,000-m2 or even larger, sea clutter is not 
a serious problem. 
 
 Multipath interference can occur when the target and the ground (sea surface) are closer 
together than the angular resolution of the radar.  Here it is possible for the radar radiation to take 
several different paths between the radar and the target and back.  Some of the radiation may 
make an intermediate bounce off the ground before or after (or both) reflecting from the target.  
The signals from each of these paths will be temporally coherent but will have different phase 
shifts, resulting in interference between the signals.  The instantaneous received power will fluc-
tuate as the range or heights of the radar and target vary.  For the simplest case (target, radar, and 
one reflecting surface), the power fluctuates as 
 
  P/P0  ∝  16 sin4(k HT HR / R) 
 
where P0 is the power that would be received on the direct path alone, k = 2π/λ, HT is the height 
of the target above the surface, and HR is the height of the radar above the surface.  This function 
goes to zero whenever 
 
  m  =  2 HT HR / λ R 
 
is an integer.  As the range drops from infinity to zero, m will acquire integer values many times.  
When this occurs, detection of the target will be very difficult.  In practice, for an antiship mis-
sile seeker, this is not really a problem.  This “good luck” happens because a ship is a large target 
with radar scattering centers at a wide variety of heights.  It is almost impossible that every scat-
tering center could be in a multipath “null” at the same time.  The numerous random interfer-
ences from multiple paths and multiple scattering centers contribute to the Swerling 2 (a model 
that assumes the target is composed of many small randomly phased scatterers) statistics as-
sumed for the ship cross section. 
 
 Ducting occurs because there are irregularities in the strong gradients in water vapor den-
sity, temperature, and pressure in the atmosphere above the surface.  These three factors influ-
ence the refractive index of the atmosphere at radar frequencies.  In an ideal atmosphere, the re-
fractive index decreases smoothly with altitude.  However, when conditions are right, there may 
be a maximum of refractive index that occurs at an elevated height (typically a few meters to 
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hundreds of meters).  This is commonplace above water.  Radiation emitted in the duct will tend 
to bend back towards this refractive index maximum.  If the duct is strong enough and big 
enough, the radiation can oscillate back and forth many times about the index maximum.  The 
duct effectively forms a waveguide.  Radiation emitted outside the duct will tend to be bent in a 
fashion that moves it away from the index maximum at the fastest possible rate without oscilla-
tion.  The implications on detection of low altitude targets by surface-based radars should be ob-
vious.  If both the radar and the target are in a duct, detection range may be vastly increased.  If 
one is outside the duct and the other is inside the duct, then detection ranges will be drastically 
reduced because the radiation is directed away from the radar and/or the target.  If the ducting 
structure can be determined ahead of time, there are computer codes that can indicate whether a 
specific cruise missile scenario will lead to increased or reduced detection range.  For the missile 
seeker, regardless of whether the seeker is inside a duct or not, there will be parts of the target at 
heights that are inside the duct and parts of the target that are either above or below the duct.  
Ducting might help the detection performance of a missile seeker, but it will seldom hurt its de-
tection performance.  The same thing cannot be said about an air defense radar looking for low 
altitude cruise missiles.   
 
 Consider the third example in the table.  Theoretically, the air defense/cruise missile de-
fense (AD/CMD) radar is capable of detecting a cruise missile at the considerable range of 30 
km.  However, sea clutter, multipath, and ducting will seriously limit this performance.  Consider 
first sea clutter.  For Sea State 4, a grazing angle of 0.1°, and a frequency of 5 GHz, the backscat-
ter coefficient is approximately –60 dBsm/m2.  Assuming a range resolution of 50 m and an an-
gular resolution of 0.0132 radians, we calculate a sea clutter cross section of 0.02 m2 at 30 km.  
This is equal to the 0.02 m2 cross section of our assumed cruise missile (which was estimated 
based on a 20-inch diameter sphere with 10% reflectivity – a simplified model of the nose-on 
cross section of a Tomahawk).  The radar will be as likely to detect a wave as it will a cruise 
missile.  In fact because sea clutter will be present at all directions and in many range bins, 
waves will be detected far more often than the missile.  As the missile gets closer, the sea clutter 
cross section will get smaller, and missile detection will become more probable.   
 
Waves propagate at speeds of the order of ten m/s, while missiles move at hundreds of 
m/s.  If the radar can measure target Doppler, then it is easy to eliminate sea clutter when search-
ing for missiles.  Unfortunately, many search radars do not have Doppler discrimination.  The 
Doppler shift for a 100 m/s velocity at a frequency of 6 GHz is 4000 Hz.  If the radar PRF is only 
1000 Hz and it uses a complex quasi-cw waveform (such as FMCW or pulse Doppler) then it is 
theoretically capable of resolving a 25 m/s velocity.  This would easily permit elimination of sea 
clutter.  If, however, the pulsewidth or waveform duration is less than 80 µs, then the velocity 
resolution exceeds 300 m/s and Doppler discrimination is impossible. 
 
 Consider next the effects of multipath and ducting.  Contrary to the missile vs. ship ex-
ample, the ship vs. missile example has all of the missile scatterers located at what is effectively 
a single height.  There is no averaging of multipath fades.  As the missile closes on the ship, its 
signal strength will grow and fade with regularity, and the missile will appear and disappear from 
the radarscope.  Assume the height of the radar is 30 meters and the altitude of the missile is 10 
meters.  The first multipath null occurs at 10-km range, the second at 5 km, the third at 3.33 km, 
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etc.  Since 10 km is roughly the range at which the target cross section appears to become domi-
nant over sea clutter, the presence of multipath may significantly delay the detection.  Ducting is 
also likely to occur.  Because the missile and radar are at different altitudes, there is a possibility 
that the missile is in a duct while the radar is not, or vice versa.  If this occurs, it can delay detec-
tion until extremely short ranges.  The combination of adverse effects makes the problem of de-
tecting and tracking cruise missiles at long ranges difficult.  Unfortunately, if the missile cannot 
be detected at long ranges, it cannot be attacked at long ranges, negating much of the benefits of 
a layered defense. 
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APPENDIX F.  THE 3X ACCELERATION HEURISTIC 
 
 
 In air defense missile design, a commonly-used heuristic or “rule or thumb” can be stated 
as “In order for an interceptor missile to reliably ‘hit’ a maneuvering target, the interceptor must 
be able to sustain turns with three times the acceleration that the target can sustain”.  Like any 
heuristic, this rule is only approximate, and is violated in a number of situations.  However, the 
fact that a heuristic of this sort should exist can be determined in a straightforward manner.  Con-
sider two platforms moving directly towards each other and let one platform (the target) initiate a 
constant, maximum acceleration turn.  The radius of that turn will be given by  
 
rT = vT2/aT,  
 
where vT is the target velocity and aT is the centripetal acceleration of the turn.  Assume that the 
separation of the target and the second platform (the interceptor) is comparable to or less than the 
radius of the target turn, and that the interceptor begins its turn immediately after the target be-
gins to turn.  Then, for the interceptor to hit the target its turn radius must equal the target’s turn 
radius.  Any target that can outturn an interceptor can theoretically avoid being hit.  Thus, using 
the equation above we must have the ratio of the centripetal accelerations equal to the inverse 
square of the ratio of velocities, that is,  
 
vI2/vT2 = aI/aT.   
 
Since interceptor velocities are usually higher (typically 1.5x to 3x) than target velocities (you 
want to be able to hit the target even if it is running away from you), the ratio of accelerations is 
invariably larger than one.  If the interceptor is twice as fast as the target, its acceleration capabil-
ity should be four times that of the target.   
  
In real life, we must complicate the problem.  First, if the target begins to turn too far 
away from the interceptor, then it turns out that the interceptor needs to pull only a mild turn to 
correct its trajectory.  This is true, because at sufficiently long range, the angle subtended by the 
target’s turning circle can be arbitrarily small.  It is unlikely that a piloted aircraft will initiate its 
turn at the perfect separation to require the interceptor to pull the maximum acceleration.  Sec-
ond, the engagement geometry is seldom head-on.  In a complex geometry, there is a turn direc-
tion that maximizes required interceptor acceleration.  All other directions require less than 
maximum acceleration.  A piloted aircraft may choose a less than optimal turn direction (regard-
less of pilot skill, although training will reduce avoidable errors).  There are unavoidable errors, 
as it is possible that the optimum turn direction would cause the target to experience even greater 
hazards, such as flying into the ground.  Third, most missiles have proximity fuzes.  They only 
need to get close to the target not hit it.  This leads some ballistic missile defense “wags” to 
comment that that is why missiles are called “miss”iles not “hit”tiles (BMD kill vehicles are oc-
casionally referred to as hittiles).  Fourth, the interceptor cannot detect the turn immediately; it 
must wait until the actual target motion deviates significantly from its predicted motion.  This 
time delay to initiation requires larger accelerations to match the target’s turn.  The first three 
complications reduce the required interceptor acceleration; the fourth increases it.  Taking all 
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factors together, and considering an average over all combinations of interceptors, targets, and 
geometries, the missile industry has arrived at its 3-to-1 acceleration heuristic.  Obviously, the 
heuristic will break down if there is a very large velocity differential between target and intercep-









Missiles may be guided to their targets by many different approaches.  Many of these ap-
proaches are listed in Table G-1, although the list is far from complete.  In the following we will 
describe these guidance techniques in more detail.  However, regardless of the technique used, 
certain principles apply to all guidance problems.  Although the term missile will be used 
throughout, it should be noted that the navigation and guidance techniques described here can 
apply to any platform, whether manned, remotely controlled, or autonomous, and whether un-
derwater, surface-bound, airborne, or exoatmospheric.  Indeed, some of the guidance approaches 
find limited applications in missiles, and far more application in other platforms. 
 
Figure G-1 describes in some detail a generic guidance and control model.  Whether the 
missile is guided by an active seeker, a semi-active seeker, a passive seeker, command guidance, 
or beamrider, or whether the guidance employs radio frequency or infrared radiation, the guid-
ance problem can be described at the top level by this model.  Although we will emphasize the 
guidance subsystem of this model, the characteristics of the complete feedback loop are suffi-
ciently important to warrant special mention. 
 
 
Figure G-1.  A generic guidance and control model.  
 
 
 The guidance subsystem contains the sensor (seeker), inertial reference, and processor 
necessary to compare actual missile motion to the desired missile motion and derive guidance 
errors. The autopilot (or pilot in a manned system) converts guidance errors into commands suit-
able for actuating the motion control system.  Frequently, complex transformations and nonlinear 
gains must be applied to the guidance errors in order to accomplish this.  In a manned system the 
pilot may fulfill both the guidance and autopilot functions without augmentation from other 
hardware.  The motion controls act upon receipt of control commands to apply forces to the mis-
sile in order to alter its motion.  The applied forces may be aerodynamic/hydrodynamic (pro-
duced by canards, fins, ailerons, elevators, rudders, or the body of the missile), frictional (pro-
duced by wheels, tracks, or runners), or propulsive (produced by tilting rocket nozzles, exhaust 
vanes, divert motors, etc.).  In addition to control forces, the missile is subject to external forces, 
such as gravity, buoyancy, winds, ocean currents, blast forces, and turbulence, as well as drag 
and thrust (propulsion).  The forces applied to the missile will elicit changes in center of gravity 
motion and orientation.  In addition, static and dynamic structural deformations will occur. These  
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Table G-1.  Types of missile guidance. 
 
 
NAVIGATION     * CELESTIAL   - STAR TRACKERS 
 
      * INERTIAL   - STRAPDOWN INERTIAL MEASUREMENT UNIT 
- STABLE TABLE INERTIAL PLATFORM 
 
   * DOPPLER 
 
      * CORRELATION  - TERRAIN CONTOUR MATCHING (TERCOM) 
      (”MAP” READING)  - SCENE MATCHING 
 
   * RADIONAVIGATION - HYPERBOLIC (e.g., LORAN) 
- RANGE-BASED (e.g., GPS) 
       - DIFFERENTIAL (e.g., DIFFERENTIAL GPS) 
 
 
RADIO-FREQUENCY   * ACTIVE RADAR  - CON-SCAN RADAR 
      - MONOPULSE RADAR 
- TRACK-WHILE-SCAN RADAR 
 
   * SEMI-ACTIVE RF    
 
   * COMMAND  
 
   * ANTI-RADIATION HOMING 
 




INFRARED     * PASSIVE NON-IMAGING - RETICLE -- SPIN-SCAN vs CON-SCAN 
 -- AM vs FM 
-- ONE-COLOR vs TWO-COLOR 
- CON-SCAN CROSS DETECTOR ARRAY 
 
   * PASSIVE QUASI-IMAGING - ROSETTE SCAN 
    - SPINNING LINEAR ARRAY 
 
   * PASSIVE IMAGING - SCANNED LINEAR ARRAY  
             - MULTI-COLOR SCANNED LINEAR ARRAY 
- STARING FOCAL PLANE ARRAY 
- MULTI-COLOR STARING FOCAL PLANE ARRAY 
 
   * SEMI-ACTIVE LASER - QUAD-CELL LASER SPOT TRACKER 
     (DESIGNATOR) - IMAGING LASER SPOT TRACKER 
 
   * BEAMRIDER - TEMPORALLY-ENCODED LASER BEAM 
- SPATIALLY-ENCODED LASER BEAM 
 
      * COMMAND   - RF COMMUNICATION LINK 
- WIRE COMMUNICATION LINK 
- LASER COMMUNICATION LINK 
- FIBER-OPTIC COMMUNICATION LINK 
 
   * ACTIVE - SCANNING LASER TRACKER 
- IMAGING LADAR 
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deformations interact with the motional changes.  Consequently, the motional changes do not 
occur instantly, nor are they exactly the desired changes. 
 
The guidance subsystem employs a model for the desired motion in order to determine 
the error signal to be generated for any given seeker measurement.  These models are commonly 
called guidance laws.  The simplest law is straight-line guidance.  Any measurement that differs 
from that which would be generated if the missile moved in a straight line, produces an error sig-
nal proportional to that difference.  This type of guidance law is employed in very short range 
missiles (e.g., a light antitank weapon) targeted against slowly moving or stationary targets.  
Line of sight guidance is another common guidance law.  The missile is assumed to be follow-
ing a straight line along the line of sight from a sensor.  Any deviations detected from this pre-
dicted motion will produce an error signal.  Note that this law differs from straight-line guidance 
in that the straight line used to define proper motion can vary in time.  The line of sight does not 
need to be stationary.  Line of sight guidance is commonly used in command-guided or beam-
rider-guided missiles.  Offset line of sight guidance is the same as line of sight guidance except 
that the expected line of missile motion is offset from the true line of sight by a constant angle.  
It is used when it is desired that the missile should miss the target by a short distance.  One ap-
plication is in top-attack anti-tank weapons.  The missile is aimed to pass just above the turret of 
a tank.  As it passes the fuze fires a side-directed shaped charge down onto the turret.  This is 
offset line of sight guidance because the gunner tracks the tank not the empty space above the 
tank.  A fourth guidance law is pursuit.  The expected motion is assumed to follow a straight 
line from the seeker to the detected target.  It is called pursuit guidance because the missile 
chases the apparent target position and in many cases will wind up attacking the target from the 
rear quarter.  It is seldom used.  A more commonly used law is proportional guidance or 
proportional navigation.  The missile is assumed to follow a path that is a straight line between 
the seeker position and the predicted position of the target at the predicted time of impact.  In 
practice, this path is the path that provides zero line of sight rate of the target in the seeker field 
of view.  If the target has a line of sight motion relative to the seeker, an error signal is generate.  
This guidance law is used by almost every homing seeker. 
 
Missile guidance and control loops can be characterized by a missile time constant.  This 
is the time required for an error to be translated into control commands, the commands to be ap-
plied to the controls, and the resulting airframe responses to interact with each other and stabi-
lize.  A valuable heuristic in aircraft interceptor missiles is that the time constant is usually in the 
range 0.1-0.2 seconds.  This range of time constants is consistent with being able to follow the 
maneuvers of a nominal target capable of performing 10g maneuvers, without overdesigning the 
agility of the missile.  After a target maneuver occurs, it takes time for the missile to make a 
compensating maneuver and to stabilize its flight on the new trajectory.  Typically, the time re-
quired for this to occur is 10-20 missile time constants (1-4 seconds for an interceptor missile).  
Each measurement of guidance error (difference between the measured target position and the 
estimated position which the missile has been using to determine control commands) will itself 
be somewhat in error due to sensor noise, random motional disturbances, etc.  Rather than have 
the missile respond to this noise, the guidance error measurements are filtered (e.g., with a Kal-




These fundamental design concerns lead to several obvious consequences.  First, guid-
ance measurement intervals in interceptor missiles are typically between 0.01 and 0.04 seconds 
(corresponding to 25-100Hz rates).  Secondly, terminal phase guidance must begin at least 1 to 4 
seconds before predicted impact, or the missile will be unable to make any desired trajectory cor-
rections and stabilize its flight path.  The exact values required depend on the missile time con-
stant and the integration time of the guidance filter.  The most important consequence is that 
once the missile designer has selected a guidance technique, many of the parameters he might 
wish to vary are fixed within narrow limits by the fundamental requirements imposed by the 





Navigational guidance attempts to move the missile (or any other guided platform) from 
one position in space (presumably known with accuracy) to another position in space (also pre-
sumably known with accuracy).  There are at least five classes of navigational guidance: celes-
tial, inertial, Doppler, correlation, and radionavigation.  They are commonly employed when 
transit times and/or distances are long.  
 
Celestial navigation uses star trackers to search at least three selected star fields, analyze 
the patterns, identify pre-cataloged reference stars, and determine (from the stellar lines of sight) 
the orientation of the missile relative to the “fixed stars”.  Coupling this information with the di-
rection of the center of the earth (usually determined from the direction of the gravitational force, 
although it could be determined by other means) confines the missile location to lie on a specific 
half-line that extends outward from the earth’s center.  Knowledge of the precise time (from a 
stable clock) permits the rotation of the earth to be taken into account and allows the intersection 
of the half-line with the earth’s surface to be uniquely determined.  Altitude above the surface of 
the earth, if it is required, must be determined by other means.  These might include radar, de-
termination of the magnitude of the earth’s gravitational attraction (the force falls off as 1/r2 
where r is the missile distance from the earth’s center), or angular extent of the earth’s disk. 
 
Inertial navigation uses an inertial measurement unit (IMU) consisting of three acceler-
ometers oriented along orthogonal axes and three gyroscopes whose “input” axes coincides with 
the axes of the accelerometers.  Each accelerometer measures the component of missile linear 
acceleration lying along its measurement axis and each gyro measures the component of missile 
rotation rate along its input axis.  Use of this information depends on how the IMU is oriented 
with respect to the missile.  In a stable table inertial platform, the IMU uses its gyroscopic char-
acteristics to maintain a constant precise alignment to a fixed external coordinate system called 
the inertial reference frame. No matter how the missile moves, the stable table always remains 
aligned to the inertial frame. Continuous acceleration measurements along each axis can be dou-
bly integrated with respect to time to yield the change in position along that axis.   
 
    t      t           
  ri(t)  =  ∫ dt  ∫ dt ai(t)     where I  =  x, y, or z 
             0     0   
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At any point in time, simple measurement of the orientation of the stable table with respect to the 
missile yields the orientation of the missile with respect to the inertial reference frame.  In a 
strapdown inertial system, the axes of the IMU are permanently aligned to the missile.  Continu-
ous rate measurements from each gyro may be singly integrated over time to give the angular 
position of the missile about each axis relative to the initial angular position.  The angular data is 
used to transform the instantaneous accelerometer data (measured in missile coordinates) into 
accelerations measured with respect to the inertial frame. Doubly integrating the continuously 
transformed accelerations over time gives the actual position of the missile in inertial coordinates 
relative to its initial position. 
 
Doppler navigation systems use radars transmitting in three non-collinear directions.  
The Doppler shift of the radar return along each direction is measured, corrected for missile rota-
tion rate (which will induce additional, but predictable, Doppler shifts) using gyroscope data, and 
used to determine the vector direction and magnitude of the missile velocity.  Singly integrating 
the velocity over time gives the missile position relative to its initial position. 
 
Correlation navigation involves using sensors to measure some characteristic of the ex-
ternal environment at a preselected waypoint and correlating the measured characteristic against 
reference characteristics previously measured and stored as a function of spatial position.  This is 
the electronic equivalent of a traveler reading street signs and using the observed street names to 
find his location on a map.  One implementation of correlation guidance is terrain contour match-
ing (TERCOM).  A radar altimeter measures the altitude of the missile over an extended path. 
Assuming the missile moved in a straight line, the collected altitude measurements can be readily 
converted to a terrain elevation profile.  If the motion is not straight line, then an IMU can pro-
vide needed corrections.  The terrain profile is correlated both in angle and position against a 
stored terrain map.  The highest correlation will be obtained when the measured profile precisely 
overlays a stored map profile.  The position and orientation (direction of motion) can be deter-
mined directly.  Scene matching uses an imaging sensor to acquire an image of a portion of the 
outside scene.  After appropriate image processing, the acquired scene can be correlated against 
stored reference scenes.  The location associated with the stored scene that gives the best correla-
tion against the measured scene gives the missile position.  With a few dozen (or less) waypoints 
and given moderate accuracy inertial guidance in between, a missile can be navigated with frac-
tional kilometer accuracy over many thousands of miles. 
 
Radionavigation systems employ radio frequency emissions from multiple transmitters. 
Based on the signals detected by a receiver, the position can be calculated.  One class of ra-
dionavigation systems is hyperbolic in nature.  The transmitted signals are used to detect the dif-
ference between the distance between the receiver and one transmitter and the distance between 
the receiver and a second transmitter.  The curve of possible positions for a specific measured 
distance difference is a hyperbola.  If the distance difference between the receiver, one of the 
first two transmitters, and a third transmitter is also measured, a second hyperbolic solution is 
generated.  The intersection of the two hyperbolas establishes the receiver position.  LORAN is a 
common example of a hyperbolic system. LORAN chains consists of a master station and sev-
eral slave stations located roughly 1000 miles apart.  All stations transmit pulsed signals at a car-
rier frequency of 100 kHz.  The master station transmits its signal first, and as soon as each slave 
station receives this signal, it transmits its own signal.  The process is repeated roughly every 0.8 
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to 1.0 seconds.  The repetition interval is unique and is used to identify the specific chain being 
detected.  The time difference between reception of the master signal and a slave signal is the 
distance difference divided by the speed of light (minus a small known correction for retransmis-
sion delay in the slave stations).  Reception of the master and two slave signals permit identifica-
tion of receiver position (with the possibility of the mirror image uncertainty).  Reception of the 
master and three slave signals permits unique identification of the receiver position. 
 
Range-based radionavigation systems invariably involve satellite transmitters and use a 
large constellation of satellites.  The constellation is designed to place at least 4 satellites above 
the horizon at any selected time and at any geographic position.  The satellites transmit timing 
signals.  From these signals, the line of sight distance to each satellite can be calculated.  Knowl-
edge of one distance limits position to lie on a sphere.  Addition of a second distance permits iso-
lation to a circle (the intersection of two spheres is a circle).  Addition of the third distance per-
mits isolation to one of two points (the intersection of a sphere with a circle is two points).  Addi-
tion of a fourth distance permits selection of the proper point.  However, one of the two points 
usually lies at an unreasonable position or is moving at an unrealistic velocity.  For example, in 
GPS one point usually lies within the sphere of satellite orbits, while the other lies outside.  Usu-
ally, it is easy to tell whether you are near the surface of the earth or in deep space.  Thus, only 
three distance measurements would seemingly suffice.  Usually, however, there are other reasons 
to require four measurements.   
 
In the Global Positioning System (GPS) the satellite constellation involves at least 24 
satellites placed in six orbital planes – spaced 60° apart, inclined at an angle of 55° with respect 
to the equator, and containing four satellites apiece (roughly illustrated in Figure G-2).  Each sat-
ellite orbits at a distance of roughly 20,200 km with a period slightly less than 24 hours.  In real-
ity there are usually more than 24 satellites as replacements are launched in advance for those 
satellites nearing the end of their operational lifetimes.  This constellation guarantees that five to 
eight satellites are above the horizon at any time and at any point on the surface of the earth.  
Each satellite carries an atomic clock to provide for the transmission of its coded signals in per-
fect synchronization with every other satellite. 
 
The satellite signals are basically pseudo-random noise (PRN) binary codes.  The dis-
tance from a satellite is determined by correlating the code received from the satellite against the 
code generated by the receiver.  The time displacement of the peak of the correlation function is 
the time required for the signal to propagate from the satellite to the receiver.  By multiplying by 
the speed of light the distance to the satellite can be calculated.  The position of the satellite is 
encoded into the satellite’s message.  The receiver can decode this message, and use the orbital 
parameters (ephemeris data) transmitted to calculate the satellite’s position at any point in time.  
When coupled with the calculated distance this permits the calculation of the position sphere for 
that measurement. Three such measurements theoretically permit determination of position.   
 
However, there is a problem.  The satellites carry expensive atomic clocks to permit syn-
































clocks means that the time used by the receiver to generate the start of its code sequence will dif-
fer by a small amount from time used by the satellites to generate the start of their code se-
quences.  This time error translates directly into position errors.  For example, a tiny error of only 
1 microsecond translates into an unacceptable 300-m distance error.  This problem is why four 
satellite measurements are required.  The time error is the same for the signal from every satellite 
(the receiver’s clock is the one with the error).  If four measurements are compared using this 
same error, then at most three of the distances can be made to intersect at a point.  The fourth 
will not match. However, if a constant error is subtracted from each distance, the intersection 
characteristics will change.  When the true constant error is subtracted from each distance, all 
four measurements will intersect at a single point.  By trying a number of possible constant er-
rors until a four-measurement intersection, the timing error can be effectively eliminated and an 
accurate position determination can be achieved. 
 
There are a number of other factors that influence accuracy.  One of these is the refractive 
index of the ionosphere, which changes as a function of time.  The refractive index reduces the 
speed of light.  If the actual speed of light (due to the ionosphere) is less than the value assumed 
in the calculation, then the distance estimated from the time delay will be larger than the actual 
value.  GPS actually transmits two coded signals at carrier frequencies L1 (1575.42 MHz) and 
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L2 (1227.60 MHz).  The ionosphere delays each one differently.  By measuring the difference in 
delays, the ionospheric delay can be eliminated.   
 
The L1 carrier phase is modulated by a PRN code called the clear/acquisition (C/A) code. 
This code has a bit time of roughly 1 µs and repeats every 1023 bits (one millisecond).  This 
code spreads the spectrum of the L1 carrier over a 1.023 MHz bandwidth.  Each satellite has a 
different C/A code.  The C/A code is the basis of the Standard Positioning Service (SPS) which 
is available to all users, civilian or military.  Civilian receivers only need to receive the L1 carrier 
and are provided with the PRN codes of every satellite).  The SPS guarantees accuracy (two 
standard deviations) of at least 100 meters horizontal accuracy, 156 meters elevation accuracy, 
and 340 nanoseconds time accuracy, under standard conditions.  Under a program of selective 
availability (SA), the Department of Defense intentionally degrades the accuracy of the C/A code 
by using a time-varying bias (the actual time of transmission is dithered around the atomic clock-
specified time of transmission by a small amount that varies over hours-long time scales.  Each 
satellite has a different random bias applied.  The errors induced by the biases preclude any 
measurement using the C/A code from having a guaranteed accuracy better than the SPS stan-
dard. 
 
The carrier phases of both L1 and L2 are modulated by a second PRN code called the 
precise (P) code.  This code is modulated at 10.23 MHz rate and has a repeat length of a week.  
The P code is further encrypted into the Y code.  The complex code followed by encryption 
makes spoofing (generation of false P coded signals) almost impossible.  Authorized (military) 
users can obtain receivers that contain decryption electronics permitting the P code to be used for 
timing.  Timing derived by correlation of the P codes is the basis for the Precise Positioning Ser-
vice (PPS).   The PPS guarantees accuracy (two standard deviations) of at least 22 meters hori-
zontal accuracy, 27.7 meters vertical accuracy, and 100 nanoseconds time accuracy, under stan-
dard conditions.  The generation of the L1 and L2 signals from the individual data streams is 
summarized in Figure G-3. 
 
 

















 The use of PRN codes in GPS serves several purposes.  First, it permits the extraction of 
the timing information.  Second, the spread spectrum nature of the code adds an inherent jam re-
sistance. Noise introduced by jamming at a single frequency is effectively reduced by the ratio of 
the jammer bandwidth to the spread spectrum bandwidth.  However, the anti-jamming margin 
provided by spread spectrum techniques does not preclude jamming.  Spread spectrum only 
makes jamming more difficult.  PRN codes also permit “processing gain” to be achieved through 
integration over extended periods of time.  This gain is essentially the spread spectrum band-
width over the integration time. The high processor gains permit very small receiver antennas to 
collect enough signal intensity to produce an acceptable signal-to-noise ratio after the antenna 
gain is included.   
 
 For some applications even the accuracy available from PPS is inadequate.  Differential 
measurements can frequently overcome those limitations.  Consider placing a receiver at a posi-
tion whose position is accurately known from traditional surveying methods.  The position 
measured by the GPS system can be compared to the known position and the “correction” can be 
transmitted to other receivers in the area.  The correction is due entirely to errors caused by the 
nature of the GPS system.  However, any receiver located within a limited distance of the “refer-
ence” receiver will have almost exactly the same GPS-produced errors at the same time as the 
reference receiver. Therefore the correction derived from the reference receiver can be applied to 
the measured value from the second receiver.  The corrected value will now have accuracy com-
parable to the residual errors (due to the initial surveying) of the reference location.   
 
If a reference location is unavailable, a different differential approach might still be valu-
able. For example, two receivers at unsurveyed locations can make GPS measurements and 
compare them. Since each receiver will have roughly the same GPS-produced error, the differ-
ence between the two measurements will be an accurate measurement of the relative distance 
between the two receivers. Coupled with accurate angle measurements from passive targeting 





Radio-frequency guidance employs sensor systems operating in the radio frequency or 
microwave regions of the electromagnetic spectrum to determine the information needed for 
guidance.  There are five major classes of radio-frequency guidance: active radar, semi-active 




Active radar guidance employs seekers containing microwave radar sensors.  Refer to 
Appendix E for a technical discussion of radar.  Figure G-4 illustrates active radar guidance.  Af-
ter initial flyout in the direction of the target (most likely using inertial guidance and initial target 
positions derived from a search radar), the seeker radar transmits electromagnetic radiation in the 
general direction of the target.  The target reflects a small fraction of the radiation that is subse-
quently detected by the seeker radar.  The angle of arrival of the radar return relative to the mis-
sile axes is used to derive a guidance error signal.   
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Radar seekers are likely to employ one of three tracking modes:  track-while-scan, coni-
cal scan (con-scan), or monopulse.  Track while scan systems sweep out a large field of view 
with a relatively narrow beam.  Every threshold crossing in the received signal is recorded on a 
scan cycle. These are correlated against threshold crossings on subsequent scans.  Likely targets 
are assigned to track files, data from each file being processed by a track filter.  One target is 
designated by the system or the operator (based on any of a number of criteria).  The location of 
the designated target relative to the nominal center of the field of view is used to determine the 
guidance error.   
 
Conical scan systems use a moderate width radar beam that is circularly swept about a 
fixed direction, as shown in Figure G-5.  This results in the beam sweeping out a conical region 
of space.  If a target is located at the center of the circle defining the conical scan (the + in the 
figure), then the edge of the beam continually illuminates the target and the radar return will be 
constant (except for cross section fluctuations).  If the beam is not at the center of the conical 
scan (e.g., at the x in the figure) then part of the time the target will be near the center of the ra-
dar beam and part of the time the target will be distant from the center of the radar beam.  The 
intensity of the radar return will be amplitude modulated at the scan frequency.  The magnitude 
of the amplitude modulation is linearly proportional to the radial distance of the target from the 
center of the conical scan. 
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Monopulse radar systems transmit broad radar beams and have four closely spaced re-
ceivers (see Figure G-6).  If a target is located exactly at the center of the radar beam, then each 
receiver will see a return of exactly the same amplitude and phase.  If the target is located an an-
gular distance away from the center of the beam, then amplitudes on some of the receivers will 
be larger than the amplitudes on other receivers.  The phases of the signal will also differ from 
receiver to receiver.  In a monopulse system, the phases (or amplitudes) of the four receiver out-
puts are summed and differenced in such a way that horizontal and vertical error signals are pro-
duced (as shown in the Figure).  These signals are linearly proportional to the target’s angular 
distance away from the beam center. 
 
 
Figure G-6.  Error signal generation in a quadrant detector (or a monopulse radar). 
A, B, C, D in the equations represents the signal strength being generated 
by detector quadrant A, B, C, D, respectively. 
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 Active radar seekers are susceptible to the same kinds of countermeasures as are all ra-
dars of comparable design.  For example, con-scan seekers with doppler discrimination are sus-
ceptible to inverse gain jamming or velocity gate walk-off just like their equivalent surface-based 





Semi-active radar guidance employs seekers containing microwave receivers, as illus-
trated in Figure G-7.  An external sensor such a radar is used to detect and track the target.  This 
tracking information is used to point a microwave illuminator beam at the target.  The target re-
flects some of this radiation, which is subsequently detected by the receiver in the seeker.  The 
angle of arrival of the reflected signal relative to the missile axes is used to derive a guidance er-
ror signal.  Conical scan and “monopulse” receivers are two techniques commonly employed to 
obtain the angular information about the target position relative to the missile location. 
 
 Semi-active guidance implements a form of bistatic radar.  Bistatic radars have transmit-
ters and receivers located at different locations.  The detection performance of a bistatic radar is 
given by a “radar equation” in which 
 
  CNR = PAV π DT2 DR2 σ exp[-α(RR + RT) / 64 k T PRF F λ2 RR2 RT2  
 
This is the same as the radar equation derived in Appendix E, except that the fourth power of the 
radar transmit/receive aperture is replaced by the product of the squares of the transmit (illumina-
tor) aperture and the receive (seeker) aperture, and the range has been replaced where appropri-
ate by the range between the illuminator and the target RT and the range between the target and 
the seeker RR.  The bistatic radar cross section may differ from the cross section for a traditional 
radar.  For conventional targets, the average difference in cross section will be small;  for stealth 
targets, it is possible that the bistatic cross section is much larger than the traditional radar cross 
section.  The anticipated receiver operating characteristics should be essentially the same. 
 
 Semi-active radar missiles are not immune to countermeasures.  Chaff may provide a  
strong decoy reflection that will seduce the missile seeker away from the target reflection.  The 
geometry provides for main lobe coupling of self-defense jammer radiation into the seeker.  
Noise jamming may be effective against all kinds of semi-active seeker.  A strong sinusoidal AM 
at frequencies near the scan frequency of a conical-scan seeker may also prove effective.  How-
ever, the nominal 1/RR2 dependence of the semi-active seeker performance tends to make it less 








































In a command guidance system, a fire control radar (occasionally an electro-optical sen-
sor such as a television may augment the radar) detects and tracks the target and also tracks the 
missile. A processor in the fire control system computes the guidance errors and transmits spe-
cific guidance commands (up/down, left/right, and how much of either) to the missile.  The mis-
sile receives these commands and adjusts its control surfaces accordingly.  The commands from 
the fire control system are commonly transmitted to the missile via a radio frequency communi-
cation link.  
 
 Command guidance of missiles can be countermeasured in two distinctly different ways.  
In the first technique the guidance link between the fire control and the missile may be jammed.  
Unfortunately, the range of communication frequency options (HF to millimeter-wave) may ex-
ceed the spectrum coverage of the jammers.  The second alternative is to jam the tracking radar 
of the fire control system.  If electro-optical adjuncts to tracking are available, then fire control 










Anti-radiation homing guidance (shown in Figure G-9) employs a seeker containing di-
rectional microwave receivers.  If the target emits microwave radiation, the receiver in the seeker 
will detect it and determine its angle of arrival. This is subsequently used to derive a guidance 
error signal.  Common receivers used for anti-radiation homing are “monopulse” and conical 
scan.  Anti-radiation missile homing is seldom used against aircraft.  Its more common applica-
tion is to attack and destroy enemy air defense radars on the ground.  The Suppression of Enemy 
Air Defenses (SEAD) mission relies heavily on anti-radiation homing missiles.  However, anti-
radiation homing missiles may find a significant application in attacking high-value airborne ra-
dar assets such as AWACS or J-STARS. 
 
Anti-radiation homing guidance is difficult to jam or decoy.  The most common tactic is 
to turn the radar off and on intermittently, thus denying continuous signals to the seeker.  This 
may be done independently or in concert with other nearby radars.  A second radar may come 
on-line to take over the job of the first radar which is shutting down.  Blinking between radars 
may confuse some anti-radiation homing missiles.  It may attempt to acquire each new target as 
it becomes strongest and will ultimately impact somewhere in between the blinking radars.  
However, once a more modern anti-radiation homing missile has acquired a lock on an emitter, it 
may be difficult for that emitter to avoid destruction.  It is possible for the missile to inertial 
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guide itself in the direction of the last good radar emission.  Although accuracy will not be as 
high as if the radar had been kept on, anti-radiation missiles usually have warheads with large 
kill radii (100 meters) against soft targets such as radar vans and antennas.  If the radar waits too 
long before turning off, the inertial follow-up accuracy will likely be high enough to produce a 
kill.  The seeker may have an infrared imaging adjunct that acquires a separate track on the sus-
pected emitter.  The infrared image will not disappear if the rf emissions disappear.  The infrared 
guidance accuracy may even exceed the anti-radiation homing guidance accuracy.  Lastly, if a 
cruise missile is equipped with an anti-radiation homing seeker, the missile may be able to loiter 
over a suspected radar site until the radar turns on again.  Each time the radar blinks on, the loi-
tering missile refines its estimate of the target location, until the missile is certain enough of the 
location to attack and destroy it.  Thus, shutting down the radar will not prevent its destruction.  
Even if the radar can survive by shutting down, any radar that is not radiating is a radar that is 





In a beamrider a beam of microwave radiation is projected along the path that the missile 
should follow.  Refer to Figure G-10.  The pointing information is typically generated by a sepa-
rate tracking radar used for fire control.  The beamrider beam has spatial characteristics that are 
detected by receivers on the aft end of the missile.  These characteristics are used by the missile 
to determine where it is located with respect to the center of the beam.   Corrections to the mis-
sile motion are used to bring it to the center of the beam and keep it there.  The missile will then 
ride the beam until it intercepts the target (assuming of course that the beam intercepts the tar-
get).   
 
There are a variety of concepts for using a beamrider to give spatial information to the 
missile.  In some beamrider systems a simple conical-scanned beam is employed.  If the missile 
is not at the center of the conical scan, the aft receivers will detect an amplitude-modulated sig-
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nal at the scan frequency.  Once the missile is centered on the scan, the amplitude modulation 
will disappear.  The magnitude of this modulation is linearly related to the angular displacement 
from the center of the conical scan.  In another beamrider implementation, four beams are trans-
mitted along directions separated by a beam width.  Each beam carries a different modulation.  
The aft receivers on the missile detect the modulations. The relative amplitude of each signal is 
used to determine the direction and distance of the missile from the center of the multiple beams.  
When the signal strengths of all four beams are equal, the missile is at the center.  One version of 
this has the “up” beam transmit a series of long pulses with short spaces between pulses.  The 
“down” version transmits short pulses where the spaces occur in the “down” beam.  If the missile 
veers too far in the “up” direction, it detects the series of long pulses;  if it veers too far in the 
“down” direction, it detects the series of short pulses;  if it is exactly on the midline between the 
two beams, it detects a steady tone.  Left-right position can be conveyed in exactly the same 
fashion using a different rf carrier frequency or a different pulse repetition frequency.  The two 
schemes described above are not the only possible means of implementing  beamrider guidance. 
 
 Beamrider guidance is difficult to jam or deceive using self-protection jammers.  The 
rear-facing geometry makes coupling of jamming radiation into the missile guidance an ineffi-
cient proposition.  The prospects for jamming improve as the missile approaches the target (and 
the jammer), but the potential miss distance produced by effective jamming decreases as the ap-
proach distance decreases.  It is often more effective to try to jam the tracking radar that points 
the beamrider.  However, the possibility of electro-optical tracking as an adjunct to the radar may 
negate the effectiveness of this approach.   
 
 























INFRARED GUIDANCE     
 
 
Passive Non-Imaging Seekers 
 
Reticle seekers are among the earliest proposed infrared guidance techniques and among 
the most widely utilized.  A reticle is a thin optical element coated with a pattern of transmitting 
regions and non-transmitting regions (the latter may be reflecting or absorbing).  Radiation from 
a target is imaged through the reticle onto a detector.  Motion of the reticle pattern relative to the 
target radiation results in modulation of the transmitted radiation intensity with consequent pro-
duction of a time-varying photocurrent from the detector.  The modulations in the photocurrent 
carry the guidance error information.  The relative motion of the radiation and the reticle pattern 
is commonly achieved in one of two ways.  First, the reticle may be rotated about its center;  the 
radiation pattern and the detector remain stationary.  In such a "spin-scan" reticle system, the mo-
tion of the reticle transmission pattern through the radiation modulates that radiation.  Second, 
the radiation pattern may be moved over the reticle pattern in a circular fashion by using coni-
cal-scanning optics (a rotating tilted mirror or rotating wedge).  In such a "con-scan" reticle sys-
tem, the motion of the radiation pattern over the reticle transmission pattern produces the modu-
lation in the transmitted radiation.  Reticles can also be used to produce amplitude-modulated 
signals or frequency-modulated signals.  There are advantages and disadvantages to every com-
bination of scan and modulation formats. 
 
 Figure G-11 describes the functioning of a typical spin-scan reticle seeker employing 
amplitude modulation.  In this example, the "rising sun" transmission pattern produces an ampli-
tude-modulated output in which the magnitude of the amplitude is proportional to the distance 
from the center of the reticle.  The neutral (50% transmission) region allows the phase of any 
amplitude modulation to be determined.  When the output from the detector is properly analyzed, 
the magnitude of the amplitude modulation gives the radial component of target alignment error; 
the phase of the modulation gives the azimuthal component of the target alignment error.  By 
making appropriate control corrections the amplitude modulation can be driven to zero and the 
missile is guiding straight at the target. 
 
The rising sun pattern of Figure G-11 was the reticle pattern used in the original Side-
winder missile (AIM-9B) seekers.  The seeker locks onto the brightest infrared object in its field 
of view and tracks it.  This worked well when tracking hot exhaust pipes of jet aircraft but ulti-
mately proved susceptible to a variety of countermeasures.  The simplest is a small hot flare.  If 
the infrared radiant emission of the flare exceeds the infrared radiant emission of the target 
(which is generally larger but cooler than the flare), then the seeker will follow the ejected flare.  
The trend of modern aircraft to have reduced infrared emissions makes this type of seeker even 
more susceptible to flares.   
 
It is also possible to countermeasure this seeker with modulated infrared sources.  Con-
sider a blackbody source large enough and hot enough to have an infrared radiant emission that 
exceeds that of the target.  If a shroud with appropriately spaced transparent slots is placed 
around this source and rotated at the proper frequency, the emission in any direction will look 
much like the pattern observed by the seeker at position 1 in Figure G-11.  If the seeker looks at 
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such a modulated source, some of the modulated signal will pass through the reticle and be de-
tected at the seeker output.  If this modulated source signal is stronger than the normal signal 
produced by the target, then the seeker will lock onto the modulated source.  Since the modulated 
source acts like a target at the edge of the field of view of the missile, the missile will pull a hard 
turn in that direction until the target exits the seeker field of view and guidance is lost. 
 
 
Figure G-11.  A typical spin-scan amplitude-modulated reticle seeker and the associated  



























Figure G-12 describes the operation of a con-scan reticle seeker.  If the target is located at 
the center of the field of view, the conical-scanning will move its radiation pattern in a circle 
about the center of the reticle pattern.  The detector photocurrent will have an amplitude modula-
tion at a well-defined carrier frequency.  If, however, the target is offset slightly from the center 
of the field of view, the conical-scanning process moves the radiation in a circle that is offset 
from the center of the reticle pattern.  At some points in the circular scan the radiation pattern 
takes a long time to traverse a single spoke of the reticle pattern;  at other points the traverse time 
is very short.  In this instance, the detector photocurrent experiences a frequency modulation (at 
times higher than the carrier frequency and at other times lower than the carrier frequency).  If 
the frequency modulation is demodulated by the seeker, the magnitude of the frequency excur-
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sion gives the radial component of the guidance error, while the phase of the frequency modula-
tion gives the azimuthal component of the guidance error. 
 
 Con-scan FM reticles are somewhat more robust than spin-scan AM reticles in their per-
formance.  Some of this derives from conical-scan, the remainder derives from the use of fre-
quency modulation rather than amplitude modulation.  Nevertheless, con-scan reticle seekers can 




Figure G-12.  A typical con-scan frequency-modulated reticle and the associated  


























Spin-scan reticles can also be designed to give frequency modulations as a function of 
guidance error.  Such reticles may be designed from rings of spoke patterns; each successive 
outward ring having more spokes than the interior rings.  As the radial guidance error increases, 
the amplitude modulation increases from zero to some amplitude at frequency f1.  As the error 
increases further, the amplitude at f1 begins to decrease with a simultaneous increase at fre-
quency f2, and so on. Several spoke sectors may be made neutral to give a time reference, allow-
ing the azimuthal guidance error component may be extracted as a phase angle.  Another imple-
mentation of a spin-scan frequency modulated reticle is shown in Figure G-13. 
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Figure G-13.  A typical spin-scan frequency-modulated reticle and the associated 
























 Spin-scan FM reticle seekers are arguably no better and possibly less robust than con-
scan FM reticle seekers.  They can also be decoyed by flares and deceived by modulated infrared 
sources.  However, they do add another dimension to the countermeasure designer’s problem.  
The very possibility of their use must be considered in deception jammer design.  
 
Spectral information is of great use in assisting an infrared seeker to discriminate be-
tween the target and countermeasure decoys or thermal clutter.  As shown in Figure G-14, targets 
with skin temperatures around ambient temperature (300 K) have an infrared emission spectrum 
which is very small at wavelengths below 3 µm and increases rapidly towards a peak near 10 
µm.  Very hot objects, such as the sun (roughly 5900 K) or a magnesium flare (roughly 2000 K) 
have their peak intensity below 2 µm and emit very little spectral energy beyond 5 µm.  If we 
measure the intensity in two wavebands (one between 3 µm and 4 µm – such as BAND 1 in the 
figure – and a second between 4 µm and 5 µm – such as BAND 3 in the figure) then targets will 
have a ratio of intensity in the two bands 
 
BAND 1/BAND 3  <  1.0 
 
while flares, fires, and solar glints (strongly reflected sunlight) will have a ratio 
 
BAND 1/BAND 3  >  1.0 . 
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The narrow band around 4.3 µm is special.  This is the emission line of hot CO2.  Jet engines and 
the exhaust stacks of large diesel or turbine engines emit plumes containing large amounts of hot 
CO2.  Addition of a third band (between roughly 4.0 µm and 4.5 µm – BAND 2 in the figure) 
permits detection of the anomalously large emission from hot CO2.  This provides additional 
evidence that the object being detected is a target (that often has an exhaust plume as opposed to 
a decoy or a natural object that does not).  
 
 
Figure G-14.  The principle rationale for multicolor seekers.  Hot targets such as the sun  
have spectral intensities that different dramatically from cool targets.  Objects  

























By making several reticle patterns out of bandpass filter multilayer coatings, two or more 
reticle patterns each sensitive to a different waveband may be deposited one on top of the other.  
A detector looking through such a multi-color reticle will detect two (or more) modulation pat-
terns in the transmitted radiation.  The relative amplitude of these modulation patterns provides 
information on the spectral distribution of radiation coming from the target.  Such multi-color 
reticles are commonly employed as counter-countermeasures against flares.  Reticle systems 
usually are limited to only two wavebands.  However, imaging seekers (to be discussed below) 
may have three or more wavebands, possibly including the CO2 emission band.  With laser-based 
deception jammers it is conceptually possible although difficult to overcome the counter-
countermeasure capabilities of multi-color non-imaging seekers. 
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A guidance mechanism related to reticle seekers is the con-scan cross detector array, as 
illustrated in Figure G-15.  Four long, narrow detectors are arranged in a symmetric cross pat-
tern.  Radiation from the scene is conically scanned around the center of symmetry.  As radiation 
from a target scans across each detector, that detector will emit a pulse of photocurrent.  If the 
target is centered in the field of view, each pulse will be equally spaced from its neighbors.  If 
the target is displaced from the center of the field of view, the pulse spacings will be unequal.  
Appropriate mathematically analysis of the pulse timing (outlined at the bottom of Figure G-15) 
provides both the horizontal and vertical displacements from the center of the field of view. 
 
 





 Con-scan crossed array detectors are also susceptible to being decoyed by flares and to 
being deceived by modulated IR sources.  However, like spin-scan FM reticles, their very exis-







Passive Quasi-Imaging Seekers 
 
By combining a linear sinusoidal scan with a continuous rotation, a rosette scan pattern 
may be generated (see Figure G-16).  The rosette patterns are usually chosen to be closed form 
figures that provide moderately uniform coverage of a circular field of view.  Because the cover-
age is dense enough to produce a coarse image of the field of view, if the data were properly 
scan-converted, rosette scan seekers are often referred to as pseudo-imaging seekers.  As the ro-
sette scan optics move the target radiation across the detector, a brief pulse of photocurrent will 
be generated.  The timing of this output pulse relative to some reference provides both the azi-
muthal (azimuthal variation is a linear function of the pulse time relative to the reference) and the 
radial (radial variation is a sinusoidal function of the relative timing) guidance errors. 
 
 




























At the edges of the field of view only a single leaf of the rosette will pass over the target 
image (see Figure G-17).  Here a regular train of pulses will be generated with the pulse period 
being the rosette pattern repeat time.  As the target moves closer to the center, two consecutive 
leaves of the rosette will pass over the target image.  The resulting pulse train now exhibits two 
closely spaced pulses, repeating at the rosette period. At the very center of the field of view, 
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every leaf of the rosette passes over the target image and a regular pulse train of pulses separated 
by the leaf period is produced.  The transition from double pulses to continuous pulses occurs in 
integer increments as the target gets nearer the center of the field of view.  This fact must be con-
sidered in the design of a rosette scan countermeasures system. 
 
Spinning linear array seekers use a linear detector array that is rapidly rotated either 
about one end or about the center.  In this fashion a circular field of view defined by the array 
length may be completely covered at the rotation rate (or twice that rate if rotated about the cen-
ter of the array). Radial guidance error is readily obtained from the detector that detects the target 
radiation. Azimuthal guidance error is determined by the time of target detection relative to a 
nominal rotation reference time.  In one variant of this kind of seeker, the detector array is ro-
tated behind stationary optics.  In a second variant, the detector array is stationary, and the image 
scene is rotated by a prism or mirror assembly (such as a K-mirror).  In a third variant, the detec-
tor array is stationary, and the image scene is conically scanned about it. 
 
 

























 All of the non-imaging infrared seeker techniques described above are susceptible to in-
frared countermeasures.  A variety of techniques can give them some degree of resistance to 
countermeasures, but ultimately the countermeasure designer has won.  For this reason, most fu-
ture infrared seeker designs will use imaging techniques.  These are described in the next section. 
Passive Imaging Seekers 
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 The remarkable performance of infrared imaging systems in target detection and weapons 
delivery has almost assured that the next generation of infrared seekers will use infrared imaging.  
Figure G-18 depicts the five general types of infrared imaging systems.  All five types have been 
used in on or another thermal imager in the past two decades.  The simplest is the one-detector 
raster-scanned system.  The output of the detector is raw video that can be processed or output to 
a display.  One-detector systems generally suffer from poor sensitivity, as the ratio of detector 
angular size to field of view size is generally very small. 
 
Serial scan systems improve sensitivity by utilizing a number of detector elements to 
view the same scene point one after another.  With an appropriate delay between each of the sig-
nals, the sum of all the detector outputs at any point in time represents the sum of all signals de-
tected from a single point in the scene.  Time-delay-&-integration (TDI) as this approach is 
called improves signal to noise ratio by the square root of the number of detectors in the array.  
Typically, TDI results in this degree of improvement for detector array sizes between 4 and 16.  
Larger arrays seldom exhibit this degree of improvement due to problems in assuring that the 
scan process (including any missile or target motion effects) brings the signal across each detec-
tor in turn with the proper time delays. 
 
 






Figure G-19 shows the geometry of a TDI array.  Physically and mathematically the out-
put current from a TDI array is given by 
 
i(t)  =  iN[t; xN(t)]  +   iN-1[t-T; xN-1(t-T)]  +  ...  +   i1[t-(N-1)T; x1(t-(N-1)T)] , 
 
where in is the contribution to the total current from detector n.  For a linear scan, the spatial po-
sition viewed by detector n is 
 
xn(t)  =  Vt  +  (N-n)L  if  XN(0)  =  0, 
 
where L is the distance between detector elements and V is the velocity at which the image is 
scanned across the detectors.  If V = L/T, i.e., the scan velocity is matched to the delay and the 
detector spacing, then 
 
xn(t)  =  V[t+(N-n)T]  =  xN(t+(N-n)T) or xn(t-(N-n)T)  =  xN(t) 
For this matched scan the total output current is given by 
 
i(t)  =  iN[t; xN(t)]  +  iN-1[t-T; xN(t)]  +  ...  +  i1[t-(N-1)T; xN(t)] . 
 
The output signal is thus seen to be the sum of N components originating from a single point.  
However, the noise from each detector is uncorrelated with the noises from the other detectors.  
As a consequence, 
 
 SIGNAL  % N  NOISE  % (N)1/2  SNR = SIGNAL/NOISE  % (N)1/2 . 
 
TDI results in a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) that improves as the square root of the number of 
detectors being integrated together.   
 
 












Parallel scan imagers use a long, linear array of detectors to cover one dimension of the 
field of view (or a small-integer submultiple of that field of view) instantaneously.  The array is 
scanned back-and-forth in the other dimension to generate the image.  The output of each detec-
tor forms one line of the image.  It is not uncommon to butt two or more arrays with different 
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wavelength response side by side at the focal plane.  In this fashion multi-color images can be 
easily obtained. 
 
The fourth type of imager combines the SNR improvement available from TDI with the 
short frame times available from parallel scan systems by using a specially designed two-dimen-
sional detector array. 
 
Staring focal plane array imagers provide a separate detector element for each picture 
element (pixel) in the image.  These systems provide significant advantages over any of the other 
4 types by having the highest sensitivity (radiation may be integrated for the complete time to 
generate a single frame of image data) and the lack of moving parts (scanners) with their notori-
ously poor reliability impacts.  On the other hand, it is difficult to obtain focal plane arrays of 
very large numbers of detectors in some wavelength regions.  If arrays are available, they may be 
prohibitively expensive for one-shot applications such as missile seekers. 
 
Multi-color staring focal plane array seekers may be implemented in two fashions.  The 
simplest is to split the signal into its spectral components using dichroic beamsplitters and place 
a separate focal plane array at the focus of each waveband.  Such systems may have cooling 
problems, alignment problems, or large size problems in seeker applications.  The second ap-
proach is to fabricate one detector array on top of another detector array.  Often a material is 
transparent at the wavelengths to which it is not sensitive.  Such stacked arrays have been dem-
onstrated in the mid- infrared using GaAs quantum well detectors with very promising results.  
The second approach eliminates the problems of the first, but is still in the early stages of devel-
opment.   
 
 Imaging infrared seekers possess enormous countermeasure resistance.  The high resolu-
tion possible with infrared imagers means that targets have significant spatial extent.  Aircraft 
look like aircraft, tanks look like tanks, and ships look like ships.  Small hot decoys like flares 
look like small hot decoys.  Deception jammers look like blinking “black boxes”.  But even 
when decoys or deception jammers are present, targets look like targets.  Virtually all currently 
deployed countermeasures will be ineffective against advanced infrared imaging seekers.  Infra-
red countermeasures to imaging seekers must either be based on precision replicas (decoys that 
have the same size, shape, and appearance as real targets) or on blinding countermeasures 
(blooming or saturating the detector outputs or even damaging the individual detector elements).  
Precision replicas are only practical for ground vehicular targets.  Blinding countermeasures re-




Semi-active Laser Seekers 
 
Semi-active laser guidance is completely analogous to semi-active radar guidance.  The 
primary difference is that laser radiation replaces microwave radiation.  In semi-active laser 
guidance, a modulated laser beam is directed onto the target by a separate fire control system.  
This fire control system may be a soldier pointing a laser designator by hand, or it may be a so-
phisticated electro-optical fire control system employing a thermal imager or television for target 
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tracking.  Some of the laser radiation reflects off the target and can be detected by a quadrant de-
tector array, placed at the focal plane of a lens system that converts angular position information 
into spatial displacement information.  By taking appropriate sums and difference of the signals 
from the four elements of the quadrant detector array (see Figure G-6 – a quadrant detector is 
essentially the same as a monopulse receiver), the horizontal and vertical angular position errors 
of the target may be detected.  Signal-to-noise ratio in semi-active laser seekers is enhanced by 
placing a narrowband optical filter at the laser wavelength in front of the detector array (to elimi-
nate background optical radiation) and by synchronously detecting the signal at the modulation 
frequency. 
 
 Countermeasures exist to laser semi-active guided missiles, as they do to most guidance 
systems.  High-intensity laser beams can blind the missile seeker.  A laser repeater jammer can 
produce multiple copies of the laser spot at different locations on the ground (this only works for 
targets that are essentially on the ground).  Expendables can be designed to emit laser radiation 
that looks like the spot on which the seeker is designed to home. 
 
 
Laser Beamrider Guidance 
 
Laser beamrider guidance is the laser radiation analog of microwave beamrider guidance. 
In laser beamrider systems, a laser beam is pointed in the direction the missile is to fly.  A sensor 
(or sensors) on the missile interprets the radiation received from the laser beam to determine the 
missile's distance from the center of the beam.  This interpretation can be accomplished in many 
different ways.  If the laser beam is conically scanned about the desired flight direction, the de-
tector on the missile will see an amplitude modulation that increases in strength as the missile 
moves away from the centerline.  On the desired flight path the amplitude modulation is zero.  
The missile may fly a slightly wobbling path along the laser beam and its sensor can detect the 
normal off-axis decrease in beam intensity as an amplitude modulation.  A hill-climbing servo 
loop will keep the wobble at a minimum and centered about the beam.  The laser beam may be 
spatially encoded.  That is, the transverse beam pattern is divided into small elements, and each 
element is modulated differently in time.  The missile detects the modulation pattern and then 
knows in which beam element it is located, and can correct its flight accordingly.  The laser 
beam may be raster-scanned over some small solid angle.  A clock on the missile is synchronized 
with this raster pattern.  When the laser beam scans over the rear of the missile, the detector will 
sense a pulse.  The time at which this pulse occurs tells the missile where it is in the raster pat-
tern and the missile can then correct its motion.  Many other information encoding techniques 
can be and are used by various laser beamrider systems.  A laser beamrider system needs a sen-
sor at the laser platform that tracks the target and points the laser beam at that target.  This sensor 
is usually a moderate to high resolution imaging sensor such as a thermal imager, a television 
sensor, or possibly a human eye.  This fire control sensor does not need to track the missile;  the 
missile is responsible for keeping itself centered in the guidance beam. 
 
The rearward looking receivers on laser beamrider systems are almost impossible to jam.  
The best countermeasure techniques for countering laser beamrider missiles are to blind the fire 
control system that points the guidance beam.  This will require medium- to high-power lasers 
(almost certainly at multiple wavelengths as most fire control systems employ several different 
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electro-optical sensors), a high quality target acquisition system (to locate the fire control plat-
form), and precision pointing and tracking (to place the blinding laser beams on the appropriate 
apertures).  Because the fire control sensors do not close with the target (as missile seekers do), 






Infrared (or electro-optical) command guidance is completely analogous to rf command 
guidance.  In any command guidance system, a fire control sensor (or sensors) detects and tracks 
the target and also tracks the missile.  A processor in the fire control system computes the guid-
ance errors and transmits specific guidance commands (up/down, left/right, how much) to the 
missile.  The missile receives these commands and adjusts its control surfaces accordingly. 
 
 In infrared command guided systems, the fire control sensors are typically electro-optical 
or infrared sensors.  Television cameras, thermal imagers, or direct view optics (magnified hu-
man vision) are the typically systems used to generate the data for missile and target tracking.  
The processing necessary to generate guidance error signals may be done by computer, or may 
be done by a human operator. 
 
The commands from the fire control system may be communicated to the missile in sev-
eral ways.  A radio frequency communication link may be employed, as may a laser communica-
tion link.  Some missiles dispense a wire as they fly and use this wire to carry guidance com-
mands.  A more recent variant of wire guidance is fiber optic guidance.  In this case, the missile 
dispenses a fiber optic cable as it flies.  The fiber optic cable carries guidance commands to the 
missile.  In some variants of this class of missiles, the fiber-optic cable may also carry informa-
tion from a sensor on the missile back to the fire control system, effectively eliminating the need 
for a sensor at the fire control system.  This last type of guidance is more properly an imaging 
seeker with part of the autopilot displaced from the missile to the launcher. 
 
Countermeasures to many electro-optical command guided missiles will be similar to 
those required to counter laser beamrider missiles.  The exception to this observation is the fiber-
optic guided missiles with imaging sensors on the missiles.  The countermeasures to these sys-
tems will of necessity look like countermeasures to infrared imaging seekers. 
 
 
Active Infrared Seekers 
 
Active infrared seekers replace the passive sensors on the missile with active sensors, or 
laser radars.  The seeker emits a laser beam that illuminates the target.  The back-reflected laser 
radiation is detected by a sensor and used to determine target position relative to the center of the 
seeker field of view.  Active infrared seekers are perfectly analogous to active radar seekers, ex-
cept that the infrared “radars” employ much higher frequency radiation. 
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The laser radar can take several different forms.  It may consist of a con-scanned or ro-
sette-scanned laser beam and a simple direct detection receiver that detects the modulations in 
the back-reflected signal.  The seeker converts the modulations to position information in a man-
ner analogous to the corresponding passive seekers.  The seeker may or may not extract target 
range information from the returns.  The active seeker may utilize a high-PRF laser and a raster 
scan mechanism to form an image, with guidance information being extracted from the image 
contents. The receiver for such an imager may use direct detection or it may utilize heterodyne 
detection. Coherent reception laser radars such as this last one can produce three-dimensional 
target images and measure the closing velocity.  This gives them the potential for automatic tar-
get identification and countermeasures resistance superior to both passive infrared seekers and 
active microwave seekers.  Such seekers have been demonstrated for high value missiles such as 
cruise missiles and strategic interceptors, and may find application in tactical situations in the 
near future. 
 
 Active infrared seekers will have countermeasure resistance characteristics very similar 
to passive infrared imaging seekers.  Laser based countermeasures that aim to blind the receiver 
in the seeker will be required. 
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APPENDIX H.  STEALTH 
 
 
 Stealth is the process of reducing all significant observables (emitted or reflected radia-
tion or other signatures that can be detected by an appropriate sensor) of a platform to levels that 
make it difficult to attack that platform.  Critical observables usually include:  radar cross section 
(RCS), infrared emission, rf emissions, visual contrast, acoustic emissions, and magnetic field 
anomalies.  The first five are most important for aircraft; the last two are most important for 
submarines; and all are important for surface warships.  In the following paragraphs we will de-
scribe the essential characteristics of stealth at the simplest and totally unclassified level. 
 
Because radars are among the most ubiquitous long-range sensing systems in the atmos-
phere, most work on stealth involves reducing the radar cross sections of ships and aircraft [64]-
[66], [158].  Radar cross section (σ) is the effective size of a target as viewed by a radar.  It is a 
function of three components:  physical size (A - affecting how much of the radar beam the target 
intercepts), reflectance (ρ - affecting how much of the intercepted radiation gets re-radiated), and 
retrodirectivity (ψ - affecting how much of the re-radiated radiation is directed back at the radar 
and not elsewhere).  That is, 
 
σ  =  A ρ ψ. 
 
The physical size of a platform is usually determined by payload, range, and speed requirements, 
so little can usually be done with this factor.  The reflectance is a function of the surface materi-
als of the target.  Bare metals and many painted metals have reflectances near unity.  Some mate-
rials will absorb incident electromagnetic radiation (they appear “black” at the appropriate fre-
quencies).  By analogy with visible reflectances – most surfaces that appear black actually reflect 
1% - 10% of the incident light – we expect that simple absorbing coatings and applique materials 
(radar absorbing materials) can reduce the reflectance to between 0.01 and 0.1.  More compli-
cated composite structures (radar absorbing structures) can achieve lower reflectances but have 
so much physical depth that they must be designed into the target from the beginning.  Retrodi-
rectivity is the degree to which the target reflects radar energy back at the radar rather than scat-
tering it isotropically.  Certain geometric shapes preferentially reflect energy back at the radar.  
For example, a corner reflector (three reflecting planes each at right angles to the other two – a 
trihedral) will reflect any ray that strikes it back along the exact direction of incidence.  This ret-
roreflective character is illustrated in Figure H-1 for two kinds of sources.  Other shapes can 
preferentially reflect energy away from the radar (as shown in Figure H-2).  Design for radar 
stealth is therefore an activity that tries to incorporate good geometric shapes into the design 
while eliminating all bad geometric shapes, and makes appropriate use of reflectance reducing 
coatings and structures. 
 
The primary effect of radar cross section reduction is a reduction in detection range.  As 
discussed in Appendix E, the radar CNR will scale proportional to cross section and inversely 
proportional to the fourth power of range.  For a constant CNR, detection range will be reduced 
by the fourth root of the cross section reduction (i.e., 4 orders of magnitude reduction in RCS 
will produce a 1 order of magnitude reduction in detection range).   This is illustrated in Figure 
H-3.  Reduced detection range means that adversary forces have much less time to react to a low  
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RCS target.  The reduction in available reaction time may make it impossible to intercept the low 
RCS platform.  Reduced RCS has two other effects.  If the platform carries a jammer, then at 
some range, a radar attempting to detect the platform in the presence of the jammer, will finally 
be able to do so.  The radar signal grows faster than the jammer signal.  The point at which the 
jammer becomes ineffective is the burnthrough range.  Reduced RCS reduces the burnthrough 
range as the square root of the RCS reduction for a constant power jammer.  If at a fixed range, 
the jammer is required to produce a given jamming-to-signal ratio, then the jammer power re-
quired is reduced by the same amount as the RCS is reduced.  Although a modest amount of ra-
dar stealth may have a small reduction on detection range, it can permit greatly reduced jammer 
powers to be effective.  This has a significant cost, weight, volume, and power benefit to the re-
duced RCS platform. 
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The infrared signature of a target is the contrast of the target’s thermal emissions (plus 
any reflected infrared) against the thermal emissions (plus reflected radiation) of the background, 
i.e.,  
 
          Contrast  =  ((TGT radiation – BKG radiation)/(TGT radiation + BKG radiation))   
 
The thermal emission (or spectral radiant exitance) of any surface is given by the Planck 
distribution: 
 Mλ (in W/m2-µm)  =  3.74 x 108 ελ / λ5 [e14388/λT – 1]     
 
where λ is the infrared wavelength, ελ is the spectral emissivity of the target, and T is the tem-
perature.  Figure H-4 illustrates the wavelength and temperature behavior of the Planck distribu-
tion.  The emissivity of a surface is one minus any transmittance or reflectance.  A perfectly ab-
sorbing surface has an emissivity of one.  If the intensity of target radiation exactly matches the 
intensity of the background radiation, then the target will have no contrast against that back-
ground and the target will effectively disappear.  Infrared stealth attempts to make the target 
temperature and spectral emissivity match those of the background.  Since many targets can be 
considerably hotter than the background, most efforts go into reducing the temperature of the 
viewable target surface.  Masking hot surfaces by placing colder surfaces into the line of sight to 
a presumed infrared sensor or seeker, is a commonly employed practice.  The introduction of 
multicolor or even hyperspectral infrared imaging systems has complicated the problem of infra-
red stealth.  At its ultimate, infrared stealth must address matching the infrared brightness, infra-
red color (spectral variations), and infrared texture of target and background, just as described in 
the next paragraph on visual stealth. 
 
 





















The visual signature of a target is the contrast of target reflected light against background 
reflected light for each resolvable element (pixel) of the image.  Most targets do not emit visible 
radiation of their own (except possibly at night).  The reflected light at any wavelength is usually 
a simple product of the illumination intensity and the reflectivity of the surface.  Because of the 
higher resolution of visual sensors, visual signature must consider not only overall brightness, 
hue (color), and saturation (degree of white admixed into the hue) of the reflection but also the 
texture.  Texture is a correlated spatial variation in intensity or color across a target or back-
ground, i.e., uniform vs. striped vs. mottled vs. checkered vs. spotted, etc.  Visual stealth (also 
called camouflage) attempts to make the target surface match the color, brightness, saturation, 
and texture of the background.  It also requires control of any visible emissions (lights). 
 
The acoustic signature is the sound emissions produced by vibrations of the target or the 
medium in which the target moves.  These emissions contain broadband noise components as 
well as variable tones (single frequencies) and harmonics.  Aerodynamic (hydrodynamic) flow, 
rotating or reciprocating machinery, and people are common sources of acoustic signature.  
Acoustic stealth attempts to reduce the emissions by reducing the amplitude of vibrations at their 
source (by balancing rotating equipment, for example) and damping out, absorbing, or canceling 
the remaining vibrations before they reach the exterior of the target and propagate into the sur-
rounding atmospheric or oceanic medium.   
 
The rf signature is the radio frequency (and microwave) equivalent of the acoustic signa-
ture.  rf emission stealth is attempted by EMCON (emission control – turning off rf emitters that 
are not essential), good electromagnetic interference practices (elimination of electromagnetic 
noise), and use of low probability of intercept transmitters (wide-bandwidth spread spectrum 
signals, controlled directional transmission with narrow beamwidth and low sidelobes, and 
minimum output power). 
 
The magnetic signature is the difference between the magnetic field surrounding a target 
and the Earth’s magnetic field (in the absence of the target).  It consists of an eddy current con-
tribution, a permanent magnetization, and a dipole magnetic anomaly.  The eddy current mag-
netization is produced when any conducting object moves through the Earth’s magnetic field.  
Any ferromagnetic object may gradually acquire a permanent magnetization simply by remain-
ing stationary in the earth’s magnetic field – thermal excitation gradually causes some of the fer-
romagnetic domains to align with the field (a condition of lower energy).  The magnetic anomaly 
is a distortion in the Earth’s magnetic field produced instantaneously by any ferromagnetic shell 
(such as a ship’s hull), because magnetic field lines tend to concentrate in the shell rather than in 
the surrounding non-ferromagnetic space.  Magnetic stealth involves designing systems without 
ferromagnetic components (e.g., all titanium, aluminum, or plastics) and degaussing the object 
using multiple orthogonal current-carrying coils that produce fields exactly opposite and cancel-





APPENDIX I.  DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS 
 
 
 Directed energy weapons (DEW) [81] include high-energy lasers [80], high-power mi-
crowaves [76], and electromagnetic radiation countermeasures [159].  Work performed in the 
1970’s and 1980’s studied the potential utility of x-ray lasers (pumped by nuclear explosives) 
[160] and high-power electron beams, proton beams, positive-charged and negative-charged ion 
beams, and neutral particle (atomic) beams [80], [81].  None of these particle beam systems 
could be made to propagate interesting distances (kilometers) through the atmosphere and only 
x-ray lasers and neutral particle beams could be used in space.  Interest in these technologies for 
weapon applications has diminished significantly.  They will not be discussed further.  Only de-
vices emitting electromagnetic radiation in the optical (visible and infrared) or microwave por-
tions of the electromagnetic spectrum appear to be of practical use as directed energy weapons.   
 
Almost all practical, directed energy devices have the same basic architecture, as shown 
in Figure I-1, although specific systems may delete one or more of the following major compo-
nents.  A power supply generates, stores, and/or conditions energy (usually electrical) for use in 
the weapon.  A pulse-forming network shapes the energy release into a pulse of proper amplitude 
and time duration.  A radiation generator (a laser or a microwave tube) converts the incident en-
ergy into electromagnetic radiation.  A beam director system (usually a steerable antenna for mi-
crowave systems or a pointable telescope optical system for laser systems) transmits the radia-
tion in the direction of the target.  A beam handling system transports the radiation from the gen-
erator to the beam director and conditions the beam for proper propagation.  Finally, a tracking 
system is needed that tracks the target and controls the aimpoint of the beam director. 
 
 




 In general we may classify practical DEW into two categories: optical and microwave.  
Optical DEW invariably uses lasers as radiation sources.  With the exception of free-electron la-
sers, all laser systems involve pumping electrical, optical, or chemical energy into an ionic, 
atomic or molecular medium [161].  The pump energy kicks the ionic, atomic, or molecular spe-
cies into an excited energy state.  If the proper species has been chosen and the pump energy is 
large enough, then more of the species will be in an excited state than in some lower-lying en-
ergy state.  This is the process of population inversion.  When an inversion exists, the normal 
process of absorption is reversed.  If radiation (having a frequency matched to the energy differ-
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ence between the excited and lower-lying states) is incident on a normal population (more spe-
cies in the lower-lying level), then more radiation will be absorbed (forcing the species from the 
lower state to the upper state) than is emitted (allowing the species to drop from the upper state 
to the lower state).  If the radiation is incident on an inverted population, then more emission oc-
curs than absorption.  The inverted population produces optical gain.  Optical radiation passing 
through the medium will be amplified.  It is well known from electronics that any amplifier can 
be converted into an oscillator if it is placed into a feedback circuit in which the amplifier gain 
exceeds the circuit losses.  By placing the inverted population between two mirrors, optical feed-
back can be established, and an oscillator (called a laser – light amplification by stimulated emis-
sion of radiation) is created. 
  
 For use in a directed energy weapon, a laser must be capable of emitting large powers or 
pulse energies while sustaining reasonable efficiencies in consumption of pump energy.  Several 
species have proven of interest.  Carbon dioxide (CO2) lasers emit at many wavelengths between 
9 and 11 µm although its strongest emission is at 10.59 µm.  They can be pumped by electric 
discharges or by gasdynamic processes (expanding and cooling hot carbon dioxide from a 
“rocket engine” through a supersonic nozzle will produce an intense inversion) [162].  A gasdy-
namic carbon dioxide laser was used in the Air Force’s Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL) which 
demonstrated an ability to shoot down a guided missile in flight from an airborne platform [79].  
Although carbon dioxide lasers cannot produce the highest power levels needed for ballistic mis-
sile defense, lower power systems can be used to countermeasure infrared seekers.  Hydrogen 
fluoride and deuterium fluoride lasers produce inversions from the chemical energy released 
when fluorine gas reacts with hydrogen (deuterium) [163].  Hydrogen fluoride (HF) lasers emit 
at many wavelengths between 2.6 µm and 3.0 µm.  Although these wavelengths are strongly ab-
sorbed by the atmosphere, HF lasers are serious candidates for space-based defense systems.  
Deuterium fluoride (DF) lasers emit at many wavelengths between 3.6 µm and 4.0 µm.  DF laser 
wavelengths propagate well through the atmosphere.  The MIRACL laser at the High Energy 
Laser System Test Facility (HELSTF) at White Sands is a DF laser.  The primary drawbacks to 
DF lasers are the high cost of the deuterium fuel and the difficulty in environmentally safe dis-
posal of the toxic byproduct (i.e., DF itself).  The Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL) uses a 
chemical reaction to produce excited oxygen molecules which subsequently react with iodine 
molecules to produce excited iodine atoms (the lasing species).  The COIL laser emits at a wave-
length of 1.315 µm.  This wavelength propagates well through the atmosphere at high altitudes, 
but has enough absorption (due to water vapor) at low altitudes to make its utility questionable at 
sea level.  The Air Force is using a COIL device in their new airborne laser (ABL) ballistic mis-
sile defense system [85].  The ABL flies at high altitudes and shoots at missiles as they leave the 
atmosphere, so the water vapor absorption is not a problem. 
 
 Free electron lasers operate on an entirely different principle [87].  Relativistic electrons 
are passed through a region of spatially alternating magnetic field polarity (N up, N down, N up, 
N down, etc.) produced by a large number of strong magnets with alternating orientation.  This 
device (called a wiggler) causes the electrons to alternately be bent one direction and then the 
other in a periodic fashion.  The accelerations produced by this periodic wiggling cause the elec-
trons to emit electromagnetic radiation (accelerated charges radiate!).  Because the wiggling is 
periodic with a fixed frequency, the emitted radiation will have that same frequency.  By placing 
mirrors for feedback on opposite ends of the wiggler, laser oscillation can be made to occur.  
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Free electron lasers have the potential to efficiently produce very high-power coherent radiation 
that can be tuned to any desired wavelength.  At the present time, output powers useful for mis-
sile defense have not yet been demonstrated and free electron lasers are too large for military ap-
plications.  However, it is reasonable to expect that these limitations will be overcome in the next 
twenty years and free electron laser-based weapons will be available. 
 
 Microwave radiation sources are invariably electron tubes that operate somewhat simi-
larly to free electron lasers.  In almost any microwave tube, high voltage electrons emitted from 
an electron gun interact with the tube structure, with external electric and magnetic fields, and 
with self-induced fields in a fashion that results in current oscillations at microwave frequencies.  
The oscillating currents emit microwave radiation.  There are many different kinds of tubes using 
different structures and field configurations that are capable of producing intense microwave 
outputs.  The reader is referred to the text by Benford and Swegle [76] for details of tube design 
and the physics of tube operation.  Currently, tubes can be obtained at any frequency between 
500 MHz and 50 GHz with peak powers as high as 1 to 10 GW.  At the present time practical 
HPM weapons capable of destroying shielded electronics can be built that work over relatively 
short ranges (hundreds of meters).  Long-range systems (tens to hundreds of kilometers range) 
await major improvements in tubes and power supplies.  Tube technology has long been capable 
of supporting jamming systems at microwave frequencies, as the output power requirements for 
jamming sources are in the kilowatts to megawatts as opposed to gigawatts to terawatts. 
 
All directed energy weapons function by directing electromagnetic radiation onto a target 
at sufficient power density for a sufficient period of time to create a desired effect.  The maxi-
mum power density that any directed energy weapon can produce at a target is given by 
 
 I  ≅  4 P D2 e-αR / π λ2 R2 
 
where P is the transmitted power, D is the diameter of the transmitting aperture, α is the atmos-
pheric attenuation (often negligible), λ is the wavelength of the radiation, and R is the range from 
the transmitter to the target.  The power density from real systems can actually be up to 30% lar-
ger or smaller than that predicted by this expression, depending on the exact shape of the aper-
ture illumination function.  Uniform illumination will produce roughly 30% less power density.  
Gaussian illumination will produce roughly 30% higher power density.   
 
If λ/D is much less than 1 mrad, then aimpoint jitter due to platform vibrations may sig-
nificantly move the beam around its long-term average centroid on millisecond time scales and 
smear out the energy deposition.  Inertial stabilization of the beam can reduce jitter effects to ac-
ceptably small levels. Inertial stabilization involves measuring the angular motion of the plat-
form using gyroscopes followed by compensating reverse angular motion of the beam pointing 
system.  Stabilization to residual motions as small as tens of microradians is commonplace.  Sta-
bilization to sub-microradian residual motions is challenging but demonstrable. 
 
At visible and infrared wavelengths, atmospheric turbulence can have a similar smearing 
effect.  Turbulence smearing has two major components:  beam wander (which occurs on frac-
tions of a second time scales) and beam spread (an instantaneous distortion of the beam that 
changes randomly on millisecond time scales).  The majority of this smearing is due to phase 
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aberrations imparted to the beam due to the fluctuating atmospheric refractive index produced by 
randomly moving “blobs” of air (officially called turbules) of random sizes located between the 
laser and the target.  Turbulence smearing can be reduced to insignificant levels if not completely 
eliminated by using adaptive optics.  If the adaptive optics imposes the phase conjugate of the 
turbulence aberration on the beam, then when the phase conjugate beam propagates to the target, 
the turbulence adds the normal phase aberration to the conjugate phase, resulting in nearly com-
plete cancellation.  The result is a smooth beam with maximum power density.  An adaptive op-
tical system is composed of a wavefront phase sensor (that measures the spatial distribution of 
the phase aberration imposed on a signal reflected from the target) [164] and a deformable mirror 
(that warps its surface in response to two-dimensional electrical inputs to impose the conjugate 
phase profile on the transmitted laser beam) [83].  Due to growing use by the astronomical com-
munity, adaptive optics has become a relatively mature technology and will be a part of almost 
any system employing laser transmission through the atmosphere.  
 
Thermal blooming is caused by absorption of a small portion of the laser radiation by the 
air itself.  This absorption heats the air and causes it to undergo thermal expansion.  The resulting 
density reduction is greatest near the center of the beam.  Since refractive index is a linear func-
tion of density, the expansion forms a negative (diverging) lens.  The negative lens of the heated 
atmosphere causes the beam to expand rapidly.  The expansion of the beam significantly reduces 
the power density at the target.  Adaptive optics can partially (but not completely) compensate 
for thermal blooming by imposing an additional focus to the initial radiation.  However, the re-
sidual beam divergence from compensated thermal blooming may often be too large for weapons 
applications.  Choosing a wavelength with minimum absorption and resulting minimal thermal 
blooming is much more beneficial. 
  
Directed energy weapons can produce a variety of effects.  In order of increasing required 
power density these can include: 
• noise injection into a receiver 
• overload of receiver amplifier circuits 
• electrical burnout of receiver components  
• direct thermal damage of primary receiver elements  
• damage to optical components 
• melting and structural failure of domes or bodies.   
The desired effect occurs when the incident radiation exceeds the threshold for that effect.  Most 
thresholds are power density dependent (i.e., the threshold is measured in W/cm2). 
 
 The noise equivalent power density (power density that produces a signal equal to the 
average noise) in a microwave receiver can be estimated from 
 
  NEPD  =  4 k T B F L / π D2 
 
where T is the electronics temperature, B is the electronics bandwidth, F is the amplifier noise 
figure, L is the total internal transmission line loss, and D is the diameter of the receiver antenna.  
Typical values of NEPD range from 10-10 to 10-16 W/cm2.  A jamming signal I that is 103 to 104 
times NEPD will almost always overwhelm desired signals in a receiver.  Thus power densities 
of 10-6 to 10-12 W/cm2 can cause interference with device function.  This interference will disap-
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pear as soon as the jamming signal is removed.  Jamming signals 104 to 108 times NEPD may 
cause saturation in the amplifier circuits.  Recovery from saturation takes microseconds to milli-
seconds after the jamming signal is removed.   
 
Electronic component damage due to breakdown will almost certainly occur when volt-
ages of the order of ten times the rated voltage are applied to them.  In modern systems the rated 
voltages range from 3 to 15 volts.  Many straight-line wire lengths between components will be 
between 1 mm to 1 cm in length.  An imposed electric field of the order of 3000 to 150,000 V/m 
will therefore be required to produce the 30 to 150 V needed to cause breakdown.  The rms elec-
tric field (in V/m) of an electromagnetic wave is related to the power density (in W/cm2) by the 
relation 
 
Erms  =  1942 (PD)1/2. 
 
Thus, damaging field strengths can be produced by power densities greater than a threshold that 
lies somewhere between 2.4 W/cm2 and 6000 W/cm2.  The wide range accommodates almost all 
single-lead, single-component situations.  In even the simplest military electronics system, there 
will be hundreds of leads and components of varying lengths, sensitivities, and operating volt-
ages, but only one needs to burn out for the hardware to fail.  Thus, we may expect that a value 
in the range of 2.4 to 60 W/cm2 would be sufficient to cause burnout in almost any system (with 
higher voltage systems being at the upper end of the range and lower voltage systems at the 
lower end).  This is valid for unshielded components.  In well-shielded systems, external field 
strengths will of necessity be much higher, perhaps as large as 1000 to 10,000 W/cm2 or even 
larger. 
 
Much lower voltages induced on component leads can produce digital device upset.  This 
occurs when “0” levels are mistakenly read as “1” levels and vice versa.  This will occur almost 
every time if the induced lead voltages are comparable to the operating voltages.  In a 5 V inte-
grated circuit, the “1” level might be specified as 3-6 V input to a device and the “0” level as 0-2 
V input.  If the electromagnetic field-induced voltages exceed 3 V, then if it opposes a normal 5 
V signal, a “1” can be lowered to a “0”.  If the induced voltage adds to a 0 V signal, then a “0” 
can be converted to a “1”.  In practice because of the electrical noise that is always present in any 
electronic system and because many independent logic circuits are present in any practical de-
vice, induced voltages of the order of 10% of the operating voltage have a high probability of 
producing an upset.  Using the same values as the preceding paragraph, we estimate that logic 
elements can be upset by power density between 240 µW/cm2 and 0.6 W/cm2.  A nominal 
threshold for device upset can be assumed to be in the range of 0.24 to 6 mW/cm2 for unshielded 
systems and 0.1 to 1 W/cm2 for shielded systems. 
 
Jamming of the human visual system can be accomplished by a non-injurious phenome-
non known as veiling glare.  Veiling glare is caused by scattering from the optical components of 
the imaging system – in this case the lens and vitreous humor.  A detailed description of veiling 
glare can be found in the book by Sliney and Wolbarsht [165].  The power density needed to 
produce veiling glare is a function of ambient light level and wavelength.  In bright sunlight, 
power densities in the range of 0.1 to 10 mW/cm2 are needed.  At night, power densities as low 
as 0.1 to 10 nW/cm2 will suffice.  By analogy, we might argue that a television-based imaging 
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system would be no more difficult to jam with veiling glare than the eye.  In fact, because TV 
systems typically have many more optical elements than the eye, veiling glare is often even eas-
ier to produce in TV systems than in the eye.  If we take into account that TV imagers have large 
telescopes for image formation (and can therefore collect more jamming light), we can estimate 
that the power density required for producing veiling glare in a TV imager is related to the power 
density for producing veiling glare in the eye by the relation 
 
  PDTV  =  η (d/D)2 PDEYE 
 
where η is an optical quality factor of the TV optics relative to the eye (lacking specific data we 
will assume this to have a value of 1), D is the diameter of the telescope, and d is the diameter of 
the pupil.  For daylight imaging, d = 3 mm, D = 10 cm, and PDEYE  = 1 mW/cm2 yields PDTV  ≅  
10-6 W/cm2, a very modest and easily achieved value.  Note: a pocket laser pointer can produce 
veiling glare at hundreds of meters if pointed at someone’s eyes (but don’t try this at home with-
out professional supervision). 
 
  Physical damage to a structural material requires the deposition of enough electromag-
netic energy to heat the material to melting (or at a minimum until it softens enough to fail under 
applied stresses.  An estimate of the energy density required to raise a material to its melting 
temperature can be obtained from 
 
  ED  =  {Cp (TMELT – TAMBIENT) + ∆HFUSION} ρ h 
 
where Cp is the specific heat of the material, ∆HFUSION is the heat of fusion of the material, ρ is 
the material density, and h is the material thickness.  This estimate ignores the temperature de-
pendence of heat capacity (which usually increases slowly with increasing temperature) and 
thermal conduction away from the heated region.  For a 1-mm thick sheet of aluminum, ρ = 2.7 
g/cm3, TMELT = 932 K, Cp = 0.9 J/g-K, and ∆HFUSION  = 387 J/g.  Thus if the ambient temperature 
is 300 K, ED = 258 J/cm2.  If we assume that the energy is deposited in one second (the maxi-
mum amount of time a practical, high rate of fire weapon could spend on each target) and that 
the metallic surface reflects 99% of the energy, then the damage criterion becomes an incident 
power density of roughly 26 kW/cm2.  The value of 99% chosen for reflectance is that of a pol-
ished metal surface at room temperature.  Any significant surface roughness, oxide layer forma-
tion, or coating would likely reduce this number.  At higher temperatures, oxidation is almost 
certain to occur reducing the reflectance.  In addition, many materials soften (lose their strength) 
at temperatures well below the melting temperature.  If the material is subjected to any aerody-
namic or structural loads, it will fail before melting.  Thus, our calculated value is almost cer-
tainly an overestimate of the power density needed to destroy a target with a 1-mm aluminum 
skin.  If we perform the same estimate for a 1-mm titanium sheet (ρ = 4.5 g/cm3, TMELT = 1660 
K, Cp = 0.528 J/g-K, and ∆HFUSION  = 435 J/g) we find a requirement for ED = 520 J/cm2, or as-
suming 99% reflectance, a damage threshold of 52 kW/cm2.  This probably represents the top 
end of the range of power densities required for structural failure.  Taking all of our assumptions 
into account, power levels of 10 kW/cm2 sustained for 1 second will almost certainly suffice for 








 Information warfare is any form of warfare that directly involves the generation, process-
ing, or transmission of information.  As shown in Table J-1, there are perhaps six major elements 
of information warfare:  command & control warfare, intelligence warfare, electronic warfare, 
psychological operations, information economic warfare, and cyberwarfare.  The characteriza-




Table J-1.   Scope of information warfare. 
 
 
        INFORMATION             INFORMATION 
    WARFARE ELEMENTS     WARFARE OPERATIONS 
 
COMMAND & CONTROL  ANTI-HEAD (Attacks on communications centers) 
WARFARE    ANTI-NECK (Attacks on communications links) 
     C2 ELECTRONIC ATTACK 
     C2 ELECTRONIC PROTECTION 
      
INTELLIGENCE (or   OFFENSIVE (Sensor use to determine threat character) 
KNOWLEDGE) WARFARE  DEFENSIVE (Counter-intelligence and Deception) 
     SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 
     CRYPTOGRAPHY 
      
ELECTRONIC WARFARE  ELECTRONIC ATTACK 
(ANTI-SENSOR)   ELECTRONIC PROTECTION 
     ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES 
      
PSYCHOLOGICAL   OPERATIONS AGAINST NATIONAL WILL 
OPERATIONS    OPERATIONS AGAINST COMMANDERS 
     OPERATIONS AGAINST TROOPS 
     CULTURAL CONFLICT 
      
INFORMATION   INFORMATION BLOCKADE  
ECONOMIC WARFARE  INFORMATION IMPERIALISM  
      
CYBERWARFARE   COMPUTER DISEASES 
HACKER WARFARE 
     INFORMATION TERRORISM 
     SEMANTIC ATTACK 
     SIMULA WARFARE 




 Command & control warfare (C2W) is warfare that addresses the physical ability of 
commanders to receive direction from higher command, make decisions, communicate those de-
cisions to subordinates, and receive situation reports from subordinates.  C2W can involve physi-
cal attack or electronic attack.  Physical attack can involve bombs or missiles with deep penetrat-
ing warheads or submunition (bomblet) payloads or attack by ground forces.  Anti-head C2 at-
tacks are designed to destroy enemy command & control centers.  Anti-neck C2 attacks are de-
signed to destroy enemy communication links or communications nodes.  Obviously, physical 
attacks require friendly force access to enemy communications nodes or command centers.  In an 
environment in which the enemy possesses an access denial capability, physical attacks as an 
information warfare strategy become problematic.   
 
C2 electronic attack involves the use of communications jammers to degrade or deny the 
ability to use his electronic communication links to exercise command & control.  Electronic at-
tack is a relatively short-range capability.  Depending on the system being jammed, the jammer 
may be as distant as a few hundred kilometers, but more often the jammers must be within a few 
tens of kilometers.  Thus, electronic attack is also problematic in an access denial scenario.  C2 
electronic protection involves techniques designed to preserve and protect friendly communica-
tion links against enemy electronic attack.  Both C2 electronic attack and protection used to be 
considered part of the field of electronic warfare.   
 
 Intelligence warfare (or knowledge warfare – KW) involves actions designed to deter-
mine the composition, disposition, and intent of the threat.  Offensive KW operations involve 
the employment of sensors to characterize the threat.  These sensors may be on satellites, un-
manned vehicles (air, ground, or submarine), or manned platforms (aircraft, submarines, surface 
ships, or ground vehicles), or deployed from such platforms.  Specific operations involve de-
ployment of the sensors, acquisition of intelligence data, transmission of intelligence data, and 
possibly recovery of the sensors.  Forces in the field might be involved in launching, flying, and 
recovering unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) carrying radar, passive microwave, infrared, or televi-
sion reconnaissance sensors.  They might carry high-resolution night vision sensors to the front 
lines to spy out enemy positions.  They might use patrol boats to deploy small acoustic detector 
networks in littoral waters to track diesel submarines.  As with a number of other forms of in-
formation warfare, if an adversary possesses an access denial capability, offensive knowledge 
warfare operations may be difficult or impossible to perform. 
 
Defensive KW operations involve the denial of these sensor-based intelligence capabili-
ties to the enemy.  These may involve anti-sensor operations (electronic warfare or physical at-
tack), denial of access to critical areas to enemy sensor platforms, and strategic deception (pres-
entation of misleading information to the enemy’s sensors).  Development of weapons to specifi-
cally target and destroy UAVs would facilitate an important class of defensive knowledge war-
fare applications.  Antisatellite operations also fit under the umbrella of defensive KW.   
 
Intelligence warfare also includes signals intelligence and its relative cryptography.  
Signals intelligence involves the collection of radar, radio, and other electronic transmissions 
made by the enemy and their processing, understanding, and exploitation.  In many instances the 
signals will be encrypted, in which case, cryptography, the art of decrypting encrypted signals, 
plays a significant role. 
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 Electronic warfare has a somewhat reduced status in the new hierarchy of electronic 
threats and capabilities.  Today it is almost exclusively aimed at sensor (e.g., radar) performance.  
Nevertheless, it is still a complex subject, as illustrated by Figure J-1.  Radars and radar-guided 
missiles are located everywhere.  Jammers abound on platforms of all kind.  Both sides may em-
ploy dedicated standoff jammers (usually denial jammers as described below).  Air strikes may 
be accompanied by escort aircraft carrying a variety of denial and deception jammers.  Aircraft 
will be provided with self-protection jammers (usually deception type) and decoys.  Flights of 
aircraft may use their self-protection jammers in cooperative fashion to enhance their effective-
ness.  Radars and jammers may be targeted by anti-radiation missiles.  Lastly, directed energy 
weapons and nuclear EMP will add the potential for catastrophic destruction of both inade-
quately-designed radars and jammers. 
 
 
Figure J-1.  The electronic warfare environment. 
 
 
Electronic attack involves those operations designed to degrade or deny the enemy the 
use of the electromagnetic (and/or acoustic) spectrum.  There are acoustic analogs (useful against 
sonar systems) to almost every electromagnetic electronic attack technique (useful against radar 
systems).  Denial jamming seeks to introduce sufficient noise into a sensor system such that de-
sired signals cannot be reliably detected or analyzed.  Key denial jamming techniques include 
barrage noise (broadband noise radiated throughout a specific waveband), spot noise (narrow-
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band noise radiated at a single frequency), rail jamming (transmission of very short pulse trains 
at very high pulse repetition frequencies), and bright light sources (for jamming optical and in-
frared sensors).   
 
Deception jamming seeks to introduce signals into a sensor system that the sensor sys-
tem will mistake for the desired signals and initiate incorrect actions.  Significant deception 
jamming techniques include the following.  Inverse gain is a technique used against conical scan 
radars in which the received signal is retransmitted with a gain that is inversely proportional to 
the received signal strength.  Range gate walkoff is used against range-gated radar trackers and 
involves retransmitting the amplified received signal with successively longer (or shorter) delays.  
The strong signal captures the radar and walks the system off the true target range by the chang-
ing delays, until the true range is outside the radar’s range gate.  When the jammer is turned off, 
the radar can no longer detect the true target return.  Velocity gate walkoff and automatic gain 
control capture (AGC) work in roughly similar fashion.  In velocity gate walkoff the frequency 
of the retransmitted signal is gradually shifted until the target’s Doppler shift is outside the 
velocity gate of the radar.  In AGC capture, the amplitude of the retransmitted signal is gradually 
increased causing the radar AGC to gradually turn the gain to minimum.  When the jammers are 
turned off, the true target signals are no longer detectable.  Delta jamming transmits strong sig-
nals at two frequencies.  In the radar receiver the signals essentially act as local oscillators for 
each other.  The frequency difference of the two transmissions is varied in a fashion to produce 
whatever frequency waveform the radar is expecting but bears no relation to the signal the target 
return would have produced.  Cross-eye jamming involves transmitting the same signal from two 
separated antennas with a half-wave phase shift between them.  In a monopulse receiver, the two 
signals will produce an output that appears to come from a slightly different angular position 
from the real target position.  Crosspole jamming involves transmitting the same signal from two 
separated antennas with different polarizations.  This too tends to cause monopulse receivers to 
have angular errors.  In addition to those mentioned above, there are hundreds of specific denial 
and deception jamming techniques, a few of which that can be made to work against almost any 
kind of sensor system.  They exploit almost every conceivable weakness in sensors’ signal recep-
tion and processing systems.   
 
Decoys are physical deception devices that attempt to mimic the target characteristics that 
an enemy system is attempting to exploit.  The aim is to get the enemy system to accept the de-
coy as the real target and subsequently ignore the real target.  Chaff is a cloud of thin metal strips 
or fine metal wires that when dispersed in the atmosphere will produce a large radar cross section 
(RCS).  The chaff radar cross section must be significantly larger than the target radar cross sec-
tion for chaff to be effective.  Each piece of chaff produces a specific average cross section.  
Thus larger RCS targets require more chaff to act as effective decoys.  Retroreflectors (corner 
reflectors) are also used as radar decoys.  In addition to having a large RCS, active expendables 
emit radio frequency radiation that matches the target emission to fool electronic support meas-
ures systems.  Flares are used as decoys against infrared sensors.  To be effective the flare must 
emit more infrared radiation in the sensor waveband than the target emits.  The total emission is 
proportional to the area of the emitter and the Planck spectrum (see Appendix H).  Since flares 
are much smaller than the target they must be much hotter to allow the Planck function to out-
weigh the smaller area.  Flares can be made with shrouds to alter the color characteristics of the 
emissions.  They can be fitted with aerodynamic bodies to better simulate the motional character-
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istic of an aircraft target.  Flares and chaff can be combined using pyrophoric metals to yield “hot 
chaff”.  Decoys for ground systems can involve balloons with the shape and color of desired tar-
gets (and possibly augmented to have desirable RCS and infrared emission as well as shape and 
color).  Silhouettes are easy to make and surprisingly effective.  Shells which replicate the shape 
of vehicles can be fitted to automobiles or jeeps to simulate much larger and more important ar-
mored vehicles.  Even shadows on the ground can be simulated to hint at the existence of targets 
that don’t exist in reality.  The science of electronic warfare is quite advanced and exceedingly 
creative. Many other decoy variations exist beyond those mentioned here. 
 
Electronic protection involves those actions taken to protect friendly use of the electro-
magnetic (and/or acoustic) spectrum.  Sensors can be hardened against overload from intense 
electromagnetic signals.  Electronic counter-countermeasures are techniques designed to compli-
cate radar waveforms and processing to levels that are difficult for deception jammers to dupli-
cate.  The use of spread spectrum waveforms is one of these techniques.  Jamming at a single 
frequency will have its effectiveness reduced by the ratio of the jammer bandwidth to the spread 
spectrum bandwidth.  Rapid frequency jumping is another electronic protection technique.  In 
general, electronic protection measures are implemented to overcome whatever specific elec-
tronic attack techniques are brought to bear against it. 
 
Electronic support measures includes action taken to exploit the enemy’s use of the 
electromagnetic (and/or acoustic) spectrum.  It includes interception of enemy sensor emissions, 
identification of the source(s) of those emissions, and the location or localization of the source(s) 
of those emission.  Modern interferometer arrays can localize emitter direction to less than a ra-
dar beamwidth.  They can detect virtually all amplitude and frequency modulations characteristic 
of a given emitter, thus permitting the emitter identification.  This permits consideration of at-
tacks (possibly using anti-radiation missiles) against those emitters. 
 
 Psychological operations are those operations aimed at affecting the enemy’s mental 
toughness, his desire to continue to fight, and his mental ability to fight effectively.  Operations 
against the enemy’s national will are designed to instill questions in the minds of the enemy’s 
people and civilian leadership.  Such questions include: 
 Can we win the current (or impending) conflict? 
 What do we have to sacrifice in order to win? 
 How will I (or my family) personally fare if we continue to fight and lose? 
 What happens to our way of life if we continue to fight and lose? 
 Is the expected sacrifice worth the potential payoff if we win? 
 Can I trust my government and its leaders to do the right thing for the country? 
 Are we fighting for an acceptable reason? 
One type of national will operation conducted in advance of open conflict uses a technique that 
can be described as the velvet glove (“Accept us as friendly”) covering the iron fist (“or else”).  
That is, if the adversary goes along with the desired policies, then benefits will flow.  If it op-
poses those policies, then retribution will follow.  Propaganda in the media (foreign and domes-
tic), leaflets, and radio and television broadcasts, as well as government to government commu-
nications are among the physical tools employed.   
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Operations against the enemy’s commanders are designed to confuse or disorient the 
operational commanders.  Such operations may suggest that their subordinates are disloyal, or 
that their superiors are planning to betray or sacrifice them.  They may play on perceived predis-
position of a commander.  For example, the Allies in WW II perceived that the German forces, 
and especially Adolf Hitler, were convinced the invasion would occur at the Pas de Calais.  De-
ception plans successfully exploited this perceived predisposition by reinforcing it.  Some opera-
tions might aim to enrage an unstable commander.  If he can be made sufficiently angry he will 
lose his objectivity and change his operational mode from proactive to reactive.  For example, 
“accidental” capture of a home video showing an adversary unit performing a skit in which the 
unstable commander is portrayed as a laughingstock or as an incorrigible pervert is likely to un-
hinge that commander when he views it.  This is even truer if he knows his subordinates have 
had the opportunity to make copies of the video. 
 
Operations against troops are designed to disaffect the direct fighting forces.  They may 
attempt to instill fear of death or injury.  They may be designed to instill fear for the safety of 
family or friends.  They may attempt to build on the natural resentment between those serving in 
the trenches and those staying on the “home front”.  Messages, pamphlets, magazines, or movies 
showing images of  “4-F” types seducing the wives and girlfriends of soldiers doing the fighting 
exacerbates the effects of the real “Dear John” letters that will be received by any sizable collec-
tion of people undergoing enforced separation.  Having a “daisy cutter” bomb or a B-52 raid 
strike the regiment next to yours, followed immediately by being bombed by leaflets explaining 
that your regiment’s turn will come tomorrow at 0900 is guaranteed to instill fear in any soldier 
and make him consider going over to the other side.  News broadcasts showing natural disasters 
and mass murders back home will cause soldiers to be concerned for their families, especially if 
mail call or telephone access has not been forthcoming. 
 
Cultural conflict involves the perceived disruption or corruption of fundamental beliefs 
and values.  It is a common source of conflict and internal unrest.  Western European culture is 
often in conflict with Middle Eastern and Asian cultures.  In countries whose governments have 
made attempts at “westernization”, the oldest generation begrudges the changes they are forced 
to make and mourns the loss of the old ways.  The youngest generation (finding something lack-
ing in their lives) demands the return of the abandoned traditions that they identify as the reason 
for their feelings of loss.  The two generations often unite against the middle generations (who 
often wield the economic and political power) to demand reversal of the changes.  Sometimes 
this can become open revolt.  At other times the unrest is directed at the most visible representa-
tives of the West.  Once a multicultural conflict has been engaged, the cultural differences facili-
tate the demonization of the enemy, making it easier on the conscience to kill them.  
 
As an offensive tool, cultural conflict might be exploited in operations designed to con-
vince one opponent that its current allies are attempting to corrupt its way of life.  This is a fre-
quent claim by Iran made in an attempt to weaken the alliance of other Persian Gulf states with 
the United States.  When backed up by believable evidence, the technique can be effective.  In 
1857, British troops in India (regular and native) used the Minie cartridge.  This greased paper 
cartridge had to be bitten before loading.  Disaffected native troops spread the word throughout 
the ranks that the cartridges were greased with fat from pigs (unclean to Moslems) and cows (sa-
cred to Hindus).  When 85 sepoys were punished for refusing to use the cartridges, the general 
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unrest turned into the Great Mutiny of 1857-1858.  Later investigation showed that some of the 
cartridges were indeed greased with pig or cow fat. [166]  Regardless of the truth of the “rumor”, 
this is an excellent example of an information operation involving cultural conflict. 
 
 Information economic warfare is economic warfare that takes advantage of the distinct 
economic value of information or access to information.  For example, access to the Internet is a 
sign of a modern organization or individual.  Yet Internet access is not a right;  it must be negoti-
ated with the operators.  Access can be denied and it can be revoked after it has been granted.  
Information blockade is the interdiction of existing vital information flows to an adversary until 
desired concessions have been obtained.  Access to the Internet might be physically interdicted.  
The use of electronic international banking or securities exchange can be severed.  Access to sat-
ellite imagery used in natural resource management can be denied (as access to SPOT imagery 
was withheld from Iraq during the Gulf War.  These actions can cripple an economy or permit a 
poor economy from having any of the benefits of the world economy and its growth.   
 
Information imperialism involves preferential offering of access to valuable or desir-
able information in exchange for support or concessions.  Imagery from intelligence satellites is 
a highly desirable commodity.  Any selective sharing of such data is sure to warrant a steep price 
from the receiver.  Even earth resources satellite images can be worth a fortune to a country 
looking to develop and exploit its mineral wealth.  Information can also include the data needed 
to exploit new technologies.  A computer code that can integrate national weather measurements 
and generate accurate forecasts has significant value.  Computer-aided design and computer-
aided manufacturing software is data with major economic value.  Seismic sounding data might 
show structures with a high probability of containing oil, gas, or pure water.  Only a few coun-
tries around the world can generate the data described above.  Those countries control the access 
to that data for both economic and political reasons. 
 
 Cyberwarfare is the branch of information warfare that actually involves computer op-
erations.  Computer diseases include computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and other nasties.  
They are typically attached to software that is exchanged between computers.  Once the software 
is received by a computer, the disease activates itself, makes replicas of itself and attaches them 
to other software that is destined to be transmitted to yet other computers.  The disease may or 
may not affect the host machine in a malicious way.  It may simply display a message on a moni-
tor.  It might command the host computer to erase certain files.  It might command the host com-
puter to format its disk drives, causing total data loss.  The disease may contain an operational 
trigger (activate when program XYZ is run) or a time-based trigger (activate on a certain date) 
for these actions.  Sometimes the diseases have little direct effect on the computer but have a se-
rious cumulative effect.  For example, a disease may create ten (or some other number of) copies 
with random names every time it is triggered.  Over time, more and more copies accumulate in 
memory until the memory is entirely consumed.  The Internet Worm made and transmitted ex-
ponentially more copies of itself as time progressed until the transmission medium became satu-
rated and real messages could no longer be transmitted.  The net was forced to shut down.  Oth-
erwise, it was designed to be totally benign.  Diseases can be transmitted in executable files, in 
electronic mail attachments, in macros appended to word processing files, and in many other 
ways.  Many people think of computer viruses first when they think of cyberwarfare. 
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Hacker warfare is another form of information warfare that many people commonly en-
vision.  Hackers (perhaps better called cyberwarriors when professionals are involved) gain ac-
cess to individual computer systems and modify the host software in such a fashion to: 
 * Deny one or more functions of the computer system to the user. 
 * Destroy stored data. 
 * Alter stored data in a covert fashion . 
 * Acquire and transfer stored data in a covert fashion (computer espionage). 
The tools hackers use to gain access are freely shared on the web and computer bulletin boards.  
A single hacker can cause major damage to a number of computer systems.  If that damage were 
multiplied by tens of thousands if a full corps of cyberwarriors were established by an adversary, 
the results might be beyond comprehension. 
   
Information terrorism is related to hacker warfare (it must either use hackers or insider 
help) but involves the disruption of civilian and/or military affairs through an attack or possibly 
multiple attacks on critical computer-controlled systems.  The aim is not the denial of the com-
puter function, but denial of the function of the system controlled by the computer.  Shutting 
down the air traffic control system in a region, with the subsequent probability of airliner crashes 
and the certain slowdown in air travel is a prime example.  Attacks may be preemptive or unan-
nounced.  They may be announced in advance (essentially holding the system as hostage).  In-
cluded among the kinds of things of which information terrorism is capable are: 
* Disrupting electrical power service to large regions of the country,  
* Invalidating the transactions of the major stock exchanges,  
* Performing major untraceable transfers of funds between all of the accounts of a  
   number of major banks,  
* Shutting down the control signal and switching system of the national railroads,  
* Trapping trains in the middle of subway or undersea tunnels, and 
* Creating massive traffic jams by shutting down the computers that control traffic lights  
   in a major city. 
 
Semantic attack involves the alteration of host computer programs in such a subtle way 
that erroneous output is generated even though the system is perceived to be functioning nor-
mally and the erroneous output is accepted as error-free.  Obviously a hacker or insider help is 
needed to perpetrate a semantic attack.  A semantic attack on a national air defense system might 
convince an adversary that it was under attack.  The reaction to this conviction in the form of an 
“unprovoked attack” on friendly assets could cost the adversary the benefit of world opinion and 
justify a massive (and pre-planned) retaliation by friendly forces.  Semantic attack might cause 
the insertion of false targets or forces into the situational awareness picture of a commander.  In 
an air defense weapon’s computer system it might cause subtle guidance errors in command-
guided missile systems causing them to miss their targets.  In a logistics computer system it 
might cause less materiel than requested to be shipped to the proper destination or it might cause 
all of a critical component to be shipped to a single site with no use for the part.  The effects of 
semantic attack can be devastating to a military force (or for that matter, a commercial or gov-
ernmental entity).  Obviously semantic attack requires detailed knowledge of the system being 
attacked and its associated software. 
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Simula-warfare is warfare waged by mutually simulated battles rather than through real 
battles.  This is the computer equivalent of battle between heroes (such as David vs. Goliath).  
The watch phrase is “my computer simulated force is better than your computer simulated 
force”.  Simula-warfare is possible today.  On the one hand, it is unlikely that hostile parties 
would abide by the results.  On the other hand, the outcome of a truly realistic simulation might 
convince one party that it is likely to lose a real confrontation and therefore be more amenable to 
negotiation of a settlement.  It might also convince the other party that it would easily win the 
real confrontation and make the conflict inevitable.  One-sided simulations are routinely used by 
the major powers to plan and evaluate their forces.  
 
Gibson warfare is a potential form of future conflict in which virtual creations wage real 
war in cyberspace with real consequences.  This is currently only science fiction.  However, in 
the reasonably near future we may have near global, wireless access to the Internet.  Direct neu-
ral connection between humans and computers is also soon to be developed.  When everyone’s 
brain is directly connected twenty-four hours a day to a global Internet, the conditions for Gibson 





APPENDIX K.  NONLETHAL WEAPONS 
 
 
 Nonlethal weapons (NLW) are devices or chemical agents whose primary purpose is 
other than inflicting lethal injury on an adversary.  They may be intended to disable or incapaci-
tate personnel, they may be intended to disable or incapacitate equipment or vehicles, or they 
may be intended to destroy equipment or vehicles that do not have human occupants or opera-
tors.  Many NLW do possess the potential for lethal effects against humans.  Because of this, 
NLW are sometimes called less-than-lethal weapons.   
 
Non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, high-power microwave (HPM) 
weapons used against electronic systems, and information weapons (computer viruses or other 
pathogenic software such as Trojan Horses, worms, or logic bombs) are often classified as NLW.  
Nuclear EMP is discussed in Appendix A.  Non-nuclear EMP and HPM weapons are discussed 
in Appendix I.  They will not be discussed further.  Information warfare and information weap-
ons are discussed separately Appendix J. 
 
Good NLW have several requirements that they should meet.  They should contribute to 
the accomplishment of a task or tasks that may be assigned to military or law enforcement 
forces.  They should be consistent with established policies including laws, treaties, arms control 
agreements, or other legal obligations the government is committed to observe.  They should be 
technologically and operationally feasible.  They should have an acceptably low probability of 
being fatal or inflicting permanent disablement on personnel, and causing undesired damage to 
property and the environment.  They should not be capable of being easily defeated by enemy 
countermeasures once their operational principles are known;  or if they could, the benefits of a 
single opportunity to use them in a given context should be so great as to outweigh that 
disadvantage.  In the paragraphs below we describe a number of different candidate classes of 
NLW.  
 Non-penetrating projectiles include bullets, pellets, or ring airfoils that will not pene-
trate the skin but will deliver significant kinetic energy and momentum to the target.  The projec-
tiles will produce significant pain similar to a punch with a fist or a knuckle.  The intent is to 
produce a noticeable and highly unpleasant, yet minimally damaging impact.  Larger projectiles 
may be used to knock an individual off balance.  Projectiles may be made of rubber, wet 
sponges, beanbags, or compressed powder (like chalk).  They may be fired from rifles, shotguns, 
or grenades.  Obviously, the projectiles can cause serious injuries if they strike the eyes or go-
nads.  Individuals reacting to the impacts may subject themselves to indirect injuries from falls. 
 
 Flash-bang devices are pyrotechnic devices (usually grenades) that produce intense 
sound (200 dB at 1 meter distance), high pressure waves, and blindingly intense light.  The com-
bined sound, pressure, and light saturate the human sensory system.  Any individual within a few 
meters of a flash-bang explosion is stunned (unable to process any sensory input or command 
motor responses) for periods up to six to eight seconds.  The device is designed not to produce 
any fragments or ballistic motion.  There is some possibility of hearing and/or vision damage if 
the device explodes too close to an individual’s head. 
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 Lacrimators are chemical agents that irritate the mucous membranes and produce in-
tense tear production, eye pain and throat congestion.  They are commonly called tear gases, 
even though they are seldom dispersed as gases.  Common examples are the chemical agents CN 
(Mace), CR, CS, and OC (Pepper Oil).  Sternutators are chemical agents that irritate the respira-
tory passages.  They produce violent sneezing, ultimately inducing severe nausea and vomiting.   
As a result they are commonly called vomiting or nausea agents.  Common examples are the 
chemical warfare agents DA, DC, and DM (Adamsite).  Lacrimators and sternutators have been 
commonly used in riot control.  They are commonly dispensed from pyrotechnic grenades, al-
though they can be dispensed on large scales from aerial spray tanks.  They are very effective at 
incapacitating unprotected individuals.  Complete recovery occurs within a few minutes to an 
hour, once exposure to the agent is terminated.  The high toxicity of the sternutators has caused 
them to be removed from service by most countries.  For the same reason CN is now seldom 
used in the United States.  Deaths have occurred from the use of any of these chemicals, even 
OC, although they are rare with CS and OC. 
 
 Electric stunners produce high voltage shocks in the targeted individuals.  The shock is 
sufficient in amperage to cause muscular inhibition, but not ventricular fibrillation or death.  
Stunners include tasers (guns which shoot twin barb-ended wires connected to a capacitive pulse 
forming system), cattle prods (batons with two closely spaced electrodes at one end connected to 
a pulse forming system), electrically charged fences (these can be designed to be lethal, stunning, 
or merely “shocking”), and electrically charged objects (commonly door handles). 
 
 Water cannons use high-pressure water streams to knock targeted individuals off their 
feet.  The simplest implementation is fire hoses, although specialized pump and nozzle systems 
(such as those found on fireboats or some fire engines) can be used with greater accuracy at 
longer distances.  Obviously if the water cannon can knock someone off their feet, the resulting 
fall may be capable of producing injuries. 
 
 Vortex ring projectors are devices that create and direct vortex rings against distant de-
sired targets.  Vortex rings are donut-shaped volumes of air that rotate about the azimuthal axis 
of the donut.  The azimuthal axis is oriented perpendicular to the ring’s direction of motion.  
Molecules of air are trapped within the vortex and will propagate with it.  Vortex rings can main-
tain their shape and character for many seconds to minutes after formation and can propagate 
distances of hundreds of meters.  The primary function of a vortex projector is to deliver a pulse 
of energy and momentum to the target.   A vortex ring can knock an individual off his feet.  It 
can hypothetically knock an aircraft out of the air.  Note that wake vortices from large jetliners 
have been known to cause small aircraft to crash.  Vortex rings can also be used to carry chemi-
cals or small particles with them.  Thus a vortex ring projector might be used to deliver a puff of 
tear gas, calmative agent, or malodorant (see below) to a specific target from long distance.  It 
might also be used to deliver lethal chemical or biological agents to specific targets. 
 
Tranquilizer dart guns are commonly used by zoologists and animal control personnel 
to sedate dangerous wild animals so that they can be safely transported.  There is nothing physi-
cal to prevent their use on humans.  There is always danger of adverse reactions and damage in-
duced by having the hypodermic dart strike bone a bone or the eye.  It is possible that future im-
provements might eliminate the hypodermic dart, replacing it with small, highly soluble projec-
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tiles (needles) that would penetrate the skin, rapidly dissolve (or melt), and thereby release the 
tranquilizing agent. 
 
 Infrasound projectors are devices that create sound with frequencies below the range of 
human hearing (nominally <20 Hz) and direct it against desired targets.  Infrasound resonates 
with the internal organs of the body to produce rapid discomfort, nausea, and loss of bowel and 
bladder control.  Complete recovery takes many seconds to minutes.  At high enough levels, it 
may resonate with other material structures, causing them to undergo amplified vibration fol-
lowed by possible structural failure.  A large infrasound projector could induce the equivalent of 
an earthquake in a structure causing walls to fail and the building to collapse.  Modern infra-
sound generators consist of small open-ended combustion chambers that are alternately filled 
with fuel-air mix and ignited at rates of a few Hz.  Tubes or parabolic reflectors can serve to di-
rect and concentrate the radiation at an intended target. 
 
 Sensor aperture coatings are opaque adhesive materials applied to the external apertures 
(windows or domes) of sensors.  The materials coat the apertures and block signals entering or 
leaving the apertures.  A multitude of materials could be employed.  A thin layer of mud on the 
window of an electro-optical sensor will destroy its performance.  Unfortunately, many sensor 
systems have window washers to counter this occurrence.  Paint is a better choice.  It can be de-
livered in spray form and has adhesive properties that make it difficult to remove.  Heavy oils 
and petrolatum can also be used.  Metallic paints (powdered metals in adhesives or heavy oils) 
can be used to coat radomes negating the performance of the radars that those radomes are sup-
posed to protect.  
 
 Obscurants and smokes degrade the ability of many sensor systems to provide visual 
information about targets and their movements.  Smoke may be used to hide actions that might 
appear provocative to assembled crowds or adversaries.  Smoke may be used to protect troop 
movements and delay directed fire until separation decreases to hand-to-hand combat ranges.  
Although not exactly weapons, the cost-effective protective action of smokes and obscurants, 
with almost no collateral or long-lasting effects, warrants their inclusion. 
 
 Laser dazzling weapons are intended to temporarily blind humans and electro-optical 
sensor systems.  Temporary blinding of humans can be accomplished by flashblinding or veiling 
glare.  Flashbinding is an effect in which the visual receptors are saturated.  An afterimage re-
sults whose intensity decays slowly with time.  As long as the afterimage brightness exceeds am-
bient light levels, the exposed individual cannot distinguish objects in his environment (he sees 
the afterimage, not the real image).  Flashblindness can last from second to many minutes, de-
pending on ambient light levels.  Veiling glare is produced by scattering in the eye.  The scat-
tered laser light produces a strong illumination over much of the retina.  When this scattered il-
lumination exceed ambient illumination levels, the real images are veiled by the scattered light.  
The effects of veiling glare disappear as soon as the laser beam illumination is removed.  Both 
flashblindness and veiling glare can be produced by laser intensities below those levels at which 
eye damage can occur.  Nevertheless, a device that can flashblind an individual at 100 meters 
may be capable of permanently blinding an individual at 10 meters.  There is an attempt to pro-
duce an international accord that bans laser-blinding weapons.  The U. S. is not a signatory to 
this accord.  Laser dazzling weapons would technically be allowable under the proposed accord, 
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although any use at ranges where blinding was known to result would be illegal.  The potential 
confusion and inadvertant violations that might result has resulted in U. S. policy that we will not 
develop or deploy such devices. 
 
 Isotropic radiators are pyrotechnic light sources.  Explosive shock waves propagating 
through inert gases produce blackbody temperatures at the shock fronts of tens of thousands of 
degrees Kelvin.  Blackbody radiation from these shockwave light sources is much brighter than 
the sun.  A single artillery-delivered isotropic radiator could be used to flashblind all unprotected 
individuals within hundreds of meters of the explosion.  With one side wearing protective eye-
wear, use of isotropic radiators at the outset of a direct assault could temporarily blind everyone 
on the opposing side at the critical moments when they need their vision the most. 
 
 Bucha strobes are colored lights (typically red or blue) that flash at frequencies near the 
frequency of brain waves.  Their effect is to alter brain function similar to that in petit mal epi-
leptic seizures.  Within seconds, affected individuals would rapidly become disoriented and 
probably nauseous.  There is concern that a fraction of the population may not be affected by 
such strobes.   
 
 Microwave projectors can be used as anti-personnel weapons as well as anti-materiel 
weapons.  Appendix I discusses the use of high-power microwaves (HPM) against electronic 
systems.  The potential for anti-personnel applications warrants discussion in this appendix as 
well.  Depending on the frequency, intensity, duration, and waveform projected, microwaves can 
cause a variety of effects in humans and animals.  They can cause either readily noticeable or 
very subtle overheating and fevers.  They can induce memory impairment.   They can cause 
complete temporary neural overload (stunning), pseudo-epileptic seizures, and even cardiac ar-
rest.  Radar transmitters have also been known to produce detectable sounds in the human ear.  It 
is theoretically possible that a properly modulated microwave projector could create intelligible 
speech in an irradiated target’s ears.  The possibilities of this in psychological warfare might 
prove most interesting. 
 
 Conductive strand chaff consists of long strands of carbon fiber or long thin metal strips 
or long metal wires.  When dispersed over an area, the chaff will drift into power lines or trans-
formers shorting them out and producing power outages.  It is often impossible to restore power 
until all of the chaff has been cleaned away from the power equipment and the nearby areas 
(wind can blow any uncleared chaff back into the equipment at later times). 
 
 Metal embrittlement agents are chemicals that when applied to metals will alter the mo-
lecular structure of the metal in such a fashion as to cause it to become brittle.  The embrittled 
metals will later fail under operating stresses.  For example, a metal embrittlement agent applied 
to supports of a bridge could cause it to collapse when a convoy of vehicles or a railroad train 
passed over it.  Hydrogen is a common embrittlement agent.  However, it is difficult to employ 
in tactical situations.  The liquid metals, mercury and gallium, are also known to be embrittle-
ment agents to certain structural alloys. 
 
 Supercaustics and superacids are bases stronger than sodium hydroxide or acids 
stronger than concentrated sulfuric acid.  Cesium hydroxide is an example of a supercaustic.  It 
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readily dissolves glass.  Methylsodium is another supercaustic.  One class of super acids is based 
on mixtures of metal fluorides and hydrofluoric acid (for example, an equal mixture of antimony 
pentafluoride and hydrofluoric acid).  The metal fluoride forms a complex that binds fluoride 
ions much more strongly than hydrofluoric acid binds fluoride ions.  The result is an activation 
of hydrofluoric acid to an acidity orders of magnitude stronger than normal.  Superacids can dis-
solve almost all metals and glasses.  Only a few plastics such as Teflon are unaffected.  Rela-
tively small amounts sprayed on vehicles or equipment could render them unusable by etching 
windows and optical components or by weakening metal structures or destroying critical metal 
parts such as wiring.     
 
 Calmative agents are pharmaceutical chemicals that have a sedative or hypnotic effect 
on exposed individuals.  If a riotous crowd were sprayed with such agents, their levels of emo-
tion and motivation could be reduced to the point that they would no longer be capable of acts of 
violence or unrest.  Such agents are likely to be considered as incapacitating chemical agents and 
would be banned by the intent of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  The powerful narcotic 
fentanyl and its chemical relatives comprise one potential class of calmative agents. 
 
 Traction modification agents are chemicals or mixtures that either reduce traction by 
lubrication or to increase traction by adhesion.  Super-lubricants can be sprayed on roads, ramps, 
staircases, ladders, etc., to make them impassable.  Anyone attempting to use them will not be 
able to gain sufficient traction to exert any lateral force.  Adhesives can be placed on the same 
surfaces to slow down and eventually immobilize moving objects (personnel or vehicles).  A 
classic example is the tar pit (such as at the La Brea tar pits).  Any animal contacting the sun-
warmed tar will get stuck (permanently in the case of the tar pits).  
 
 Tire deflation devices are designed to deflate the tires of moving vehicles causing them 
to slow down or possibly lose control.  Tire deflation devices include caltrops (small objects that 
look like a child’s “jacks” with sharp ends) that can be scattered across a road or alleyway and 
erectable spike strips that can be laid completely across a road or a lane of a highway.  Spikes 
may be hollow to permit deflation over extended time frames to minimize the potential for loss 
of vehicle control. 
 
 Polymer modification agents are chemicals designed to alter the physical properties of 
common polymers.  Hypothetical examples of polymer modification agents include the follow-
ing.  One agent might be used to dissolve rubber in tires to disable vehicles or in gaskets to vio-
late the hermetic integrity of a compartment.  Another agent might be used to make lexan wind-
screens so brittle that they would shatter under mild aerodynamic stresses.  Yet another agent 
might turn a polymer lubricant (such as Teflon) into an adhesive. 
 
 Foams are low-density materials filled with long-lasting bubbles.  Sticky foam is made 
from resins that have strong adhesive properties and take long times to set.  Once stuck to an ob-
ject (such as a running adversary), it will not easily come off and one piece of foam tends to stick 
to another piece of foam.  Spraying such foam on an adversary will quickly immobilize him.  
Special solvents are required to remove the foam and restore mobility.  In large quantities, sticky 
foams can prove lethal.  If a target falls and thoroughly covers his breathing passages, he will 
eventually suffocate.  Hard foams are similar to sticky foams except that they set more quickly 
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(seconds to minutes).  This kind of foam can be used to create barriers to personnel and vehicle 
mobility.  It can also be used to immobilize dusts or liquids (such as NBC agents) and can be 
used to absorb significant amounts of explosive energy.  Aqueous foams are foams based on wa-
ter and can be easily produced in large quantities.  Unless the foam is directly inhaled or ingested 
in large quantities, the foam is breathable.  Aqueous foam can be used to carry irritants, malo-
dorants, or calmative agents.  It can also be used to limit mobility either directly (speed through a 
foam is much less than without the foam) or by using it to conceal devices such as entanglement 
nets.  
 
 Combustion alteration agents are chemicals that change the combustion properties of 
fuels, making them burn more or less efficiently.  The chemicals may be added to fuel supplies 
via sabotage or ingested along with air for combustion.  An efficiency-enhancing additive, such 
as acetylene in air, could make an engine run considerably faster or hotter, or subject it to uncon-
trollable detonation (knock) that would rapidly lead to wear and engine damage.  An efficiency-
reducing additive would result in less energy and power per unit fuel consumption.  Vehicles 
with such additives could not carry their intended loads or travel at maximum speeds.  The ulti-
mate in efficiency-reducing additives would halt combustion entirely, making the fuel unusable.  
Other efficiency-reducing additives might produce by-products that are detrimental to engine life 
and performance.  Sugar added to gasoline will produce rapid carbon deposition that will eventu-
ally prevent proper ignition.  Yet another class of additives changes the viscosity of fuels so that 
they are improperly fed into the combustion chambers.  Wax added to gasoline, causing carbure-
tors to clog up, is an example of such a viscosity-changing additive. 
 
Filter-clogging agents are chemicals that can polymerize or otherwise adhere when they 
come in contact with the fine mesh structures of air (or possibly water) filters.  Sprayed as an 
aerosol around a vehicle with a running engine, the ingested agent would soon completely clog 
the air filter causing the engine to stop.  Special solvents would be required to clean the filters 
once clogged.  There is some concern that such agents might have serious health effects if ab-
sorbed into the lungs of nearby individuals.  It is conceivable the agents might act to block the 
smallest respiratory passages, just as they block the filter passages.  Proper chemical design 
should be able to eliminate this possibility. 
 
Entanglement devices are basically nets.  The nets may be projected by special guns, 
called netcasters or netthrowers.  They may be erected across roads to act as barriers.  They may 
be dropped from elevated platforms.  They may be towed by small boats or submersibles.  Gun 
projected nets will entangle and trip up running adversaries.  Barriers nets can slow down and 
stop moving vehicles.  Similar nets are used on aircraft carriers to land aircraft that have 
dysfunctional arresting hooks.  Marine nets can be used to foul propellers of large boats.  Such 
nets may be made with very strong multi-strand steel cable to prevent them from breaking under 
the stresses produced by the ship’s propulsion system. 
 
 Biological fuel-eaters are microorganisms genetically engineering to metabolize hydro-
carbon fuels.  It is conceptually possible to create an organism that requires only hydrocarbons 
and oxygen to live.  Waste products would likely render the fuel unusable.  Such an organism 
could be introduced into adversary fuel supplies to destroy them.  If not detected early enough 
such contamination could spread to virtually every vehicle drawing from the infected supplies 
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and possibly beyond, rendering every vehicle inoperative.  Disinfection would be a tremendously 
costly and time-consuming process.  Analogous organisms could be engineered to eat other criti-
cal materials such as plastics, rubber, plant fibers, etc.  Microbial weapons of this type will al-
most certainly be considered to violate the Biological Weapons Convention, although they are 
not explicitly addressed by it.  
 
 Malodorants are chemical with extremely strong and usually offensive odors.  For ex-
ample, butyl mercaptan has the characteristic odor of skunk, skatole has the odor of fecal matter, 
cadaverine has the odor of rotten meat, and n-butyric acid has the odor of vomit.  Sprayed onto 
individuals, a malodorant can instantly convert them into social outcasts.  Others will leave their 
presence to avoid the smell.  Malodorant attacks on leaders can disrupt the command and control 
of all but highly disciplined organizations.  Most individuals whose bodies or clothing are partly 
covered with malodorants will attempt to leave the area and clean themselves up.  Malodorants 
cannot form an impenetrable barrier, but they can discourage all but determined attempts to cross 
a contaminated zone.  Sprayed over a large area, a malodorant will prevent casual lingering in or 
even transit of that area.   
 
 The list presented above is as complete as the author can make it at this time.  However, 
it obviously cannot be all-inclusive.  There are undoubtedly many other materials and devices 
(some of which may not yet have been invented) that have weapons applications without neces-
sarily having lethal consequences.  It should be noted that some of the classes of nonlethal weap-
ons described above have not been reduced to practice.  They remain areas of basic research.  
Others have been used for years as riot control measures. 
 
 Figure K-1 reprises the above list of possible nonlethal weapons.  The figure also lists 
those characteristics that might limit the utility of each class of weapon.   For example, some 
NLWs may violate treaties or current policies.  Other NLWs may have a substantial probability 
of causing fatalities or long-lasting injuries.  Still other NLWs may cause environmental damage 
or have persistent effects that are difficult to remediate.  Still other NLWs have effects that can-
not be limited to the intended targets, and therefore have the potential to produce collateral dam-
age to either personnel or to equipment.  For each class of NLW and utility-limiting characteris-
tic Figure K-1 gives an estimate of the likelihood of the characteristic actually limiting the utility. 
 
 Figure K-2 lists ten common functions that have been identified for nonlethal weapons to 
perform: 
• Incapacitate or subdue single persons 
• Incapacitate or subdue large groups 
• Disperse or disrupt crowds 
• Assist forced entry into structures 
• Disrupt personnel mobility (restrict free movement or access) 
• Stop moving vehicles (fleeing suspects, vehicular assault, roadblock runners, etc.) 
• Negate sensor functions  
• Damage critical electronic systems (especially weapons-related or C2-related) 
• Damage critical mechanical structures (vehicles, bunkers, bridges, towers, etc.) 
• Negate the electrical power system (locally or regionally) 
Each of the classes of NLW has been evaluated for its utility in performing these functions. 
 276
Figure K-1.  Utility-Limiting Characteristics of Nonlethal Weapons. 
           
UTILITY-LIMITING CHARACTER Æ       VIOLATES      MAY             MAY CAUSE          MAY CAUSE       EFFECTS PERSIST; COLLATERAL COLLATERAL 
       TREATIES    CAUSE              CHRONIC       ENVIRONMENTAL   REMEDIATION DAMAGE TO DAMAGE TO 
NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGY   OR POLICY FATALITIES           INJURIES  DAMAGE            DIFFICULT     EQUIPMENT PERSONNEL 
Non-Penetrating Projectiles         NO      YES      YES      NO      NO    UNLIKELY   UNLIKELY 
Flash-Bang Devices          NO  POSSIBLE          YES         NO      NO    UNLIKELY   POSSIBLE 
Lacrimators & Sternutators       CWC?     YES      YES  POSSIBLE      NO        NO    POSSIBLE 
Electric Stunners           NO  POSSIBLE  POSSIBLE      NO      NO        NO         NO 
Water Cannons           NO  POSSIBLE      YES      NO      NO    POSSIBLE   UNLIKELY 
Vortex Ring Projectors      POSSIBLE INDIRECT INDIRECT     NO      NO    POSSIBLE   POSSIBLE        
Tranquilizer Dart Guns        CWC?   RARELY      YES      NO      NO        NO    UNLIKELY 
Infrasound Projectors          NO  INDIRECT             UNKNOWN     NO      NO        YES        YES 
Sensor Aperture Coatings          NO  INDIRECT INDIRECT POSSIBLE      YES    UNLIKELY   UNLIKELY 
Obscurants and Smokes          NO    RARELY    RARELY  POSSIBLE      NO    UNLIKELY   UNLIKELY 
Laser Dazzling Weapons    U.S. POLICY INDIRECT     YES      NO      NO    POSSIBLE   POSSIBLE 
Isotropic Radiators          NO  INDIRECT POSSIBLE      NO      NO    POSSIBLE       YES 
Bucha Strobes           NO      NO   RARELY      NO      NO        NO    UNLIKELY 
Microwave Projectors          NO      YES              UNKNOWN     NO      NO    UNLIKELY   POSSIBLE    
Conductive Strand Chaff          NO  INDIRECT INDIRECT     YES      YES        YES    INDIRECT 
Metal Embrittlement Agents       CWC? INDIRECT INDIRECT     YES      YES    POSSIBLE   INDIRECT 
Supercaustics & Superacids       CWC?     YES      YES      YES      YES    POSSIBLE   INDIRECT 
Calmative Agents         CWC? UNLIKELY      NO      NO      NO        NO        YES 
Traction Modification Agents                   NO  POSSIBLE  POSSIBLE      YES  POSSIBLE    POSSIBLE   POSSIBLE 
Tire Deflation Devices          NO  INDIRECT INDIRECT     NO      NO    POSSIBLE           UNLIKELY 
Polymer Modification Agents                   NO  POSSIBLE  POSSIBLE      YES      YES    POSSIBLE   INDIRECT 
Foams            NO  UNLIKELY UNLIKELY     YES      YES    UNLIKELY   UNLIKELY 
Combustion Alteration Agents                 NO  POSSIBLE  POSSIBLE      YES      YES    POSSIBLE   INDIRECT 
Filter-clogging Agents          NO  POSSIBLE  POSSIBLE      YES      YES    POSSIBLE   POSSIBLE  
Entanglement Devices          NO  POSSIBLE  POSSIBLE      NO  POSSIBLE    POSSIBLE   UNLIKELY 
Biological Fuel-Eaters        BWC? INDIRECT INDIRECT     YES      YES        YES         NO 
Malodorants         CWC? UNLIKELY UNLIKELY POSSIBLE     YES         NO         YES 
 
BWC – Biological Weapons Convention   CWC – Chemical Weapons Convention 
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Figure K-2.  Applications of Nonlethal Weapons. 
 
               POTENTIAL APPLICATION 
                                         SUBDUE       SUBDUE      DISPERSE/      ASSIST        DISRUPT           STOP           DAMAGE        DAMAGE       NEGATE      NEGATE 
               SINGLE           LARGE         DISRUPT       FORCED    PERSONNEL     MOVING       CRITICAL        CRITICAL        SENSOR       POWER 
NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGY          PERSONS        GROUPS       CROWDS        ENTRY        MOBILITY      VEHICLES    ELECTRONICS  STRUCTURES  FUNCTION    SYSTEM 
Non-Penetrating Projectiles  YES          YES                 YES               NO           POSSIBLE        UNLIKELY        UNLIKELY        NO            UNLIKELY          NO 
Flash-Bang Devices   YES      POSSIBLE       POSSIBLE           YES               NO                 NO               NO        NO               NO                NO 
Lacrimators & Sternutators  YES          YES                 YES               YES           INDIRECT       NO               NO        NO                NO               NO 
Electric Stunners    YES          NO            UNLIKELY           NO           UNLIKELY            NO               NO        NO                NO               NO 
Water Cannons    YES          YES                 YES                NO              YES              POSSIBLE        POSSIBLE        NO            POSSIBLE     UNLIKELY 
Vortex Ring Projectors   YES          NO            UNLIKELY       POSSIBLE          YES                  NO           POSSIBLE        NO                NO               NO       
Tranquilizer Dart Guns   YES          NO                 NO           POSSIBLE           NO                 NO               NO        NO                NO               NO 
Infrasound Projectors   YES          YES                 YES           POSSIBLE      INDIRECT             NO           POSSIBLE    POSSIBLE           NO          UNLIKELY 
Sensor Aperture Coatings   NO          NO                 NO           POSSIBLE           NO             POSSIBLE            NO        NO                YES               NO 
Obscurants and Smokes   NO          NO             POSSIBLE      POSSIBLE       LIMITED          UNLIKELY            NO        NO                YES               NO 
Laser Dazzling Weapons   YES      POSSIBLE       POSSIBLE       POSSIBLE           NO             POSSIBLE            NO        NO                YES               NO 
Isotropic Radiators             POSSIBLE          YES             POSSIBLE           NO               NO                 NO               NO        NO                YES               NO 
Bucha Strobes    YES      POSSIBLE        POSSIBLE           NO               NO                 NO               NO        NO                NO               NO 
Microwave Projectors             POSSIBLE      POSSIBLE        POSSIBLE      POSSIBLE      INDIRECT             YES               YES                 NO            POSSIBLE     POSSIBLE    
Conductive Strand Chaff   NO          NO                 NO                NO               NO                 NO           POSSIBLE        NO                NO               YES 
Metal Embrittlement Agents  NO          NO                 NO           POSSIBLE      INDIRECT         POSSIBLE        POSSIBLE        YES            POSSIBLE     POSSIBLE 
Supercaustics & Superacids  NO          NO                 NO           POSSIBLE           NO             POSSIBLE            YES        YES            POSSIBLE     POSSIBLE 
Calmative Agents    YES          YES             POSSIBLE           YES               NO                 NO               NO        NO                NO               NO 
Traction Modification Agents             NO          NO             POSSIBLE           NO               YES                 YES               NO        NO                NO               NO 
Tire Deflation Devices   NO          NO                 NO                NO            LIMITED             YES               NO        NO                NO               NO 
Polymer Modification Agents             NO          NO                 NO                NO               NO                 YES               YES    POSSIBLE           NO          POSSIBLE 
Foams     YES     UNLIKELY            YES                NO               YES             POSSIBLE        UNLIKELY    POSSIBLE           NO               NO 
Combustion Alteration Agents           NO          NO                 NO                NO               NO                 YES               NO        NO                NO          INDIRECT 
Filter-clogging Agents   NO          NO                 NO                NO          INDIRECT             YES           INDIRECT    INDIRECT           NO               NO  
Entanglement Devices   YES     POSSIBLE        UNLIKELY           NO               YES             POSSIBLE            NO    POSSIBLE           NO               NO 
Biological Fuel-Eaters   NO          NO                 NO                NO               NO                 YES               NO        NO                NO          INDIRECT 
Malodorants    YES          YES                 YES            POSSIBLE       LIMITED             NO               NO        NO                NO               NO 
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APPENDIX L.  RELEVANT ARMS CONTROL TREATIES 
 
 
Treaties, Conventions, Protocols, and Agreements 
 
 Affairs between nations that require mutual understanding and acceptance of specific 
rules or modes of action are traditionally governed by negotiated and signed formal documents.  
These documents are generally referred to as “treaties”, although in the legalistic language of 
diplomacy they may be given other specific titles as appropriate to the nature of the document.  It 
is not possible to truly understand the technological possibilities available to some states but not 
to others without learning about the various “arms control” and “non-proliferation” agreements 
that define “legal” vs. “illegal” behavior on the international scene.  It is not possible to review 
every agreement relating to the laws and conduct of war.  The author has attempted to discuss 
those that impact on one or more of the vulnerabilities identified in the body of this work.  The 
relevant agreements may be treaties with full national and international ramifications or they 
may be less-binding documents that merely express the desires of two or more nations (or possi-
bly only the desires of their negotiators).  The language is important.  For this reason the author 
has presented definitions for a number of diplomatic terms that the reader is likely to encounter 
in the course of his review of arms control negotiations [167]. 
 
 
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENT DEFINITIONS 
 
Treaty   A contract in writing between two or more political authorities, formally 
signed by duly authorized representatives and usually ratified by the law-
making authority of each state. 
 
Protocol  1.  A preliminary memorandum often formulated and signed by diplomatic 
negotiators as a basis for a final convention or treaty. 
   2.  An annex to a treaty giving supplemental data relating to it. 
 
Convention  An agreement between states for the regulation of matters affecting all of 
them.  Conventions are typically both signed and ratified. 
 
Agreement  An arrangement as to a course of action. 
 
Accord  A formal reaching of agreement. 
 
Regime  A mode of rule or government.  In practice, an agreed upon way of con-
ducting governmental affairs between nations that is not prescribed by 
treaty nor ratified by the respective legislative bodies. 
 





Agreed   A formal declaration of accord on one or more specific points.  These are 
Statement  issued at the conclusion of a round of negotiation to affirm those points on 
which agreement has been reached even though complete agreement on 
all issues has not. 
 
Memorandum  An informal diplomatic communication. 
 
Accession  The act by which one nation becomes party to an agreement already in 
force between other states. 
 
Ratify   To approve and sanction formally.  Usually this requires legislative ac-
tion. 
 
Sanction  1.  v.t. To give effective or authoritative approval or consent to. 
        n.  Explicit or official approval, permission, or ratification. 
   2.  n. An economic or military coercive measure adopted usually by sev-
eral nations in concert for forcing a nation violating international 
law to desist or yield to adjudication. 
 
Succession  The process whereby a new state that has gained its independence from a 
parent state, or a new government that has taken power from a former 
government, becomes bound by any or all prior treaties or agreements 
made by the former state or government.  Succession is seldom automatic 
although it is often assumed.  It is best accomplished with a formal, signed 
document.  Without a formal declaration of succession, an unprincipled 
state could disregard any prior treaty whenever it pleased.  It could claim 
that those prior agreements were made by a government which did not le-
gitimately represent the people of the new state. 
 
Reservation  An expressed exception or qualification to part of a formal document.  A 
state may generally agree with a treaty or other document and sign and/or 
ratify that document, but disagree with one or points of that document.  
When a state makes a reservation when it signs a document, all points of 
that document become binding on the state, except the point or point ex-
plicitly described in the reservation.  For example, a state may make a 
reservation about the absolute non-use of chemical weapons in war, by re-
serving the right to use chemical weapons in defense if an attacking state 
has used chemical weapons first. 
 
Declaration  A formal statement made by one or more states that amplifies or clarifies 
one or more points of a formal document.  The declaration is attached to a 
formal document at the time the declaring state signs the document.  The 
declaration is not binding on any other state.  A declaration define exactly 
what the declaring state assumes or means by specific terminology that is 
used in the document.  For example, a state may declare that the term 
“chemical warfare agents” does not include “riot control chemicals”. 
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 In the following sections we will discuss many of the international agreements that di-
rectly affect the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  A more or less comprehensive list 
of such agreements is given in Table L-1.  The major agreements will be discussed in some de-
tail.  For each of this agreements we will describe the following items:  dates on which the 
United States signed and ratified the treaty, other important signatories, the date the treaty en-
tered into force, and a brief discussion of each of the important provisions and implications of 
the agreement.   Minor agreements will be discussed in enough detail that the reader will know 
the subject content and relevance of each agreement. 
 
 For none of the agreements will point-by-point or paragraph-by-paragraph analyses be 
presented.  Complete texts and in-depth analyses of most of the “treaties” described in subse-
quent sections of this chapter can be found at the World Wide Web (Internet) site of the State 




Specific URL references will be given for each “treaty” when it is discussed.  An alternate 
source of the complete texts is the book Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements published 
for the ACDA by the Government Printing Office [168] 
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Table L-1.  International agreements affecting proliferation of WMD.  The agreements  




Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisoning or Other Gases, and 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare   (The Geneva Protocol) 
U.S. signed 17 Jun 1925;    U.S. ratified 22 Jan 1975;    Entry into force 8 Feb 1928 
 
The Antarctic Treaty 
U.S. signed 1 Dec 1959;    U.S. ratified 18 Aug 1960;    Entry into force 23 Jun 1961 
 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water   (Lim-
ited Test Ban Treaty) 
U.S. signed 5 Aug 1963;    U.S. ratified 7 Oct 1963;    Entry into force 10 Oct 1963 
 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, In-
cluding the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies   (Outer Space Treaty) 
U.S. signed 27 Jan 1967;    U.S. ratified 24 May 1967;    Entry into force 10 Oct 1967  
 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America   (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
Signed 14 Feb 1967;     U.S. signed both protocols; Entry into force 22 Apr 1968 
     
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons   (Non-Proliferation Treaty) 
U.S. signed 1 Jul 1968;    U.S. ratified 24 Nov 1969;    Entry into force 5 Mar 1970 
 
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass De-
struction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof    (Seabed Treaty) 
U.S. signed 11 Feb 1971;    U.S. ratified 26 Apr 1972;    Entry into force 18 May 1972 
 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio-
logical) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction   (Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention) 
U.S. signed 10 Apr 1972;    U.S. ratified 22 Jan 1975;    Entry into force 26 Mar 1975 
 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limita-
tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems   (ABM Treaty) 
U.S. signed 26 May 1972;    U.S. ratified 30 Sep 1972;    Entry into force 3 Oct 1972 
 
Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms   (SALT I) 
U.S. signed 26 May 1972;    U.S. ratified 30 Sep 1972;    Entry into force 3 Oct 1972 
SALT I expired in October 1977. 
 
Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (and Protocols Thereto) (Conven-
tion on Conventional Weapons) 










Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limita-
tion of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (and Protocol Thereto)   (Threshold Test Ban Treaty)       
U.S. signed 3 Jul 1974;    U.S. ratified 8 Dec 1990;    Entry into force 11 Dec 1990 
 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Under-
ground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes   (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty) 
U.S. signed 3 Jul 1974;    U.S. ratified 8 Dec 1990;    Entry into force 11 Dec 1990 
 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques   (Environmental Modification Convention) 
U.S. signed 18 May 1977;    U.S. ratified 13 Dec 1979;    Entry into force 17 Jan 1980 
 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limita-
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms, Together with Agreed Statements and Common Understandings Re-
garding the Treaty   (SALT II) 
U.S. signed 18 Jun 1979;    U.S. did not ratify, but did not reject;   Observance required. 
 
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
U.S. signed 3 Mar 1980;    U.S. ratified 4 Sep 1981;    Entry into force 8 Feb 1987 
 
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty   (Treaty of Rarotonga) 
Signed 6 Aug 1985;     Entry into force 11 Dec 1986; 
 
Missile Technology Control Regime   (MTCR) 
Established 16 Apr 1987;    Not a formal treaty. 
 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimi-
nation of their Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles    (INF Treaty) 
U.S. signed 8 Dec 1987;    U.S. ratified 1 Jun 1988;    Entry into force 1 Jun 1988 
 
Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate 
the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons 
U.S. signed 1 Jun 1990;    Ratification not required;    Entry into force 1 Jun 1990 
 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe   (CFE Treaty) 
U.S. signed 19 Nov 1990;    U.S. ratified 30 Oct 1992;    Entry into force 9 Nov 1992 
 
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms   (START I) 
U.S. signed 31 Jul 1991;    U.S. ratified 1 Oct 1992;    Entry into force 5 Dec 1994 
 
Treaty on Open Skies 
U.S. signed 24 Mar 1992;    U.S. ratified 3 Dec 1993;    Entry into force awaiting ratification by  











The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction 
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms   (START II) 
U.S. signed 3 Jan 1993;    U.S. ratified 26 Jan 1996;    Russian Duma ratified 14 April 2000. 
Entry into force should occur shortly if it has not already occurred.   
 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction   (Chemical Weapons Convention) 
U.S. signed 13 Jan 1993;    U.S. ratified 25 Apr 1997;    Entry into force 29 Apr 1997 
 
South East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty   (Treaty of Bangkok) 
Signed 15 Dec 1995;  U. S. not ratified Protocol; Entry into force 27 Mar 1997 
 
The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty   (Treaty of Pelindaba) 
Signed 11 Apr 1996;     Entry into force awaits sufficient ratifications. 
 
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty   (CTBT) 
U.S. signed 24 Sep 1996;    U.S. ratification currently under Congressional review. 
 
Fissile Material Production Cut-off Treaty 
Currently under negotiation. 
 
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks III   (START III)  
Negotiations should begin after START II enters into force. 
 
Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 









The Hague Conventions and the Geneva Protocol 
 
 On 29 November 1868 an International Military Commission assembled in St. Peters-
burg, Russia to determine if it was practical to ban certain kinds of weapons to “alleviate as 
much as possible the calamities of war”.  The “Declaration of St. Petersburg” [237] provided 
that States’ Parties would not employ arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled 
men, or render their death inevitable.  The declaration specifically renounced the employment of 
any projectile of a weight less than 400 grams, which is either explosive or charged with fulmi-
nating or inflammable substances.  Although of limited significance, the St. Petersburg Declara-
tion set the tone for later arms control agreements. 
 
 At the invitation of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, and hosted by Queen Wilhelmina of the 
Netherlands, The First International Peace Conference convened in The Hague on 18 May 
1899.[169]  This meeting was unique in that for the first time nations gathered together not to 
settle an ongoing war but to try to build a lasting peace.  After ten weeks of negotiations between 
25 attending nations, on 29 July 1899 the conference adopted a number of agreements including: 
 * “Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes” 
 * “Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land” 
 * Several other Declarations. 
The second of these conventions is of significance to proliferation.  The Second Hague Conven-
tion (1899), formally called the “Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land”, was [170]: 
* Signed on 29 July 1899 by Germany, United States, Russia (tsarist), France, Italy, 
   United Kingdom, Austria, Hungary, and many other states. 
 * The Convention entered into force on 4 September 1900. 
 
 The Second Hague Convention of 1899 contained a large number of provisions.  Among 
these were provisions relating to: 
 * Qualifications of belligerents subject to the Laws of War,  
 * Humane treatment of prisoners of war,  
* Care of the sick and wounded, 
 * Conduct of hostilities,  
 * Spies, 
 * Flags of Truce, 
 * Surrender, 
 * Armistices, 
 * Military authority over hostile territory, 
 * Internment of belligerents in neutral countries. 
The provision relating to the conduct of hostilities prohibits (among other things): 
 * Employment of poison or poisoned arms, 
 * Employment of arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury. 
One separate “Declaration on the Use of Bullets Which Expand or Flatten Easily in the Hu-
man Body” was signed on 29 July 1899.[238]  This declaration explicitly prohibited the recently 
developed “dum-dum” bullets designed to cause excessive damage to internal organs and tissues.  
A second “Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of As-
phyxiating or Deleterious Gases”, also passed on 29 July 1899 [239], was the first serious at-
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tempt at banning chemical weapons, even though these weapons had not yet been used in war-
fare. 
 
 A Second International Peace Conference was held at The Hague in 1907.  Even more 
nations participated in this second conference than participated in the first.  On 18 October 1907, 
the conference adopted eleven different conventions.  Among these was a revision of the Second 
Hague Convention.  The Hague Convention IV of 1907, i.e., the  “Convention Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land” was [171]: 
* Signed on 18 October 1907 by Germany, United States, Russia (tsarist), France, Italy, 
   United Kingdom, Austria, Hungary, and many other states. 
 * The Convention entered into force on 16 January 1910. 
 
 The provisions of the revised Second Hague Convention of 1907 were essentially the 
same as those of the 1899 version.  Language was altered to clarify meanings.  The provision 
relating to the conduct of hostilities prohibits: 
 * Employment of poison or poisoned arms, 
 * Employment of arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary  
    suffering. 
 * The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are  
    undefended [and not being used for military purposes]. 
In sieges and bombardments steps must be taken to spare buildings dedicated to religion, art, sci-
ence, charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places for the collection of sick and 
wounded, provided they are not being used for military purposes. 
 
 Neither version of the Second Hague Convention contained any enforcement or verifica-
tion provisions.  Essentially, the convention represents a statement of good intent.  However, any 
country that decided to violate any provision could do so with impunity.  They might earn the 
condemnation of other countries, but that would be the only significant penalty.  To say that the 
convention did no real good is unfair.  There is evidence that Britain delayed developing and us-
ing chemical weapons in World War I until after the Germans used them at Ypres, because in the 
words of Winston Churchill, “we were confined to a limited sphere of International Law till 
Germany forced us to take reprisals in the matter of poisonous gas” [172].  That is, they did not 
want to be the first to violate the Hague Convention.  Nevertheless, once the Germans used poi-
son gas, everyone used poison gas; and the poison gas provisions of the Hague Convention 
ceased to have any meaning or value. 
 
 Several other conventions adopted at the second Hague peace conference limit military 
technology options in warfare.  The Hague Convention III of 1907 or “The Convention Rela-
tive to the Opening of Hostilities” was signed on 18 October 1907.[240]  This convention re-
quires that hostilities “must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form 
either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with condition declaration of war.  The 
fact that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor preceded by 35 minutes the delivery of such an ul-
timatum to the U. S. government (due to delays in the Japanese Embassy) was a major factor is 
stirring America to war against the Japanese.  It also was a factor in U. S. insistence on uncondi-
tional surrender (that ultimately led the U. S. use of atomic weapons).  
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 The Hague Convention XI of 1907 or “The Convention Relative to Certain Restric-
tions With Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War” was signed on 18 Oc-
tober 1907. [241] Among other things this convention exempted “vessels used exclusively 
for fishing along the coast or small boats employed in local trade” from captures as long as those 
vessels take no part in any hostilities.  The Contracting Powers also agreed not to take advantage 
of the harmless character of such vessels in order to use them for military purposes while pre-
serving their peaceful appearance.  Vessels charged with religious, scientific, or philanthropic 
missions are likewise exempt from capture.  The Hague Convention XI of 1907 effectively pro-
hibits the use of the civilian fishing fleet and/or coastal commerce fleets from acting as armed 
auxiliaries to the military.  However, since these vessels do have the right to carry certain kinds 
of weapons for defense against piracy and since virtually every vessel has long-range radios, 
GPS, and navigational radars, it is probably impossible to enforce this convention.  However, in 
the absence of proven hostile intent, States must recognize these vessels as non-hostile and avoid 
attacking or capturing them. 
 
 The Hague Convention VIII of 1907 or “The Convention Relative to the Laying of 
Automatic Submarine Contact Mines” was also signed on 18 October 1907. [242]  The primary 
provisions of this convention forbid: 
 * Laying unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so constructed as to 
    become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them ceases to control 
    them.  
 * Laying anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as  
    they have broken loose from their moorings.   
 * Using torpedoes that do not become harmless when they have missed their mark.  
 * Laying automatic contact mines of the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole  
    object of intercepting commercial shipping.    
Provisions also require: 
 * Rendering harmless deployed mines within a limited time. 
 * Notifying all governments and ship owners of the danger zones as soon as those areas 
    cease to be under surveillance. 
 * At the end of hostilities, removing all mines that each power has laid off its own shores  
     notifying the other belligerents of the locations of all mines laid off the others’ shores 
     so that the other belligerents may safely remove them. 
The Hague Convention VIII of 1907 and the Seabed Treaty (discussed later) are the only two 
significant treaties which address the deployment of unattended weapons (such as mines) at sea. 
 
 The Geneva Protocol was the first major international agreement attempting to ban new 
forms of technological warfare.  Note: the Geneva Protocol is to be distinguished from the Ge-
neva Conventions of 1949 that addressed treatment of prisoners of war.  Formally titled the 
“Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisoning, or Other Gases, 
and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare”, the Geneva Protocol was [173]: 
* Signed on 17 June 1925 by the United States, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, 
   Japan, and many other states. 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 22 January 1975 
 * Protocol entered into force on 8 February 1928. 
Countries of special note that have ratified or acceded to the Geneva Protocol include: 
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 Argentina   Belarus   Brazil    
Bulgaria (ab)   Burma (ab)   Cambodia 
Canada (ab)   China (ab)   Cuba     
Czechoslovakia (b)  Egypt    France (ab)  
Germany   India (ab)   Indonesia   
 Iran    Iraq (ab)   Israel (ab) 
 Japan    North Korea   Republic of Korea (ab) 
 Libya (bd)   Malaysia   Mexico   
 Pakistan   Philippines   Romania (ab)   
Russian Federation (ab)? South Africa (ab)  Sudan    
Syria (d)   Taiwan   United Kingdom (ab)  
United States (c)  Vietnam   Yugoslavia 
Countries of special note which have not signed or acceded to the Geneva Protocol include: 
- El Salvador has signed but not ratified the Protocol 
 - The Russian Federation has not formally acknowledged its succession to this  
               agreement. 
   Only Belarus of the former USSR has declared succession to this agreement 
- The successor states to the former socialist republic of Yugoslavia have not declared 
              succession to this agreement. 
 
 The entire Geneva Protocol is less than a page in length.  It contains three principle pro-
visions.  Each state ratifying or acceding to the Protocol shall: 
* Accept the prohibition on the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and  
   of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices. 
 * Accept the prohibition on the use in war of bacteriological methods of warfare. 
 * Exert every effort to induce other states to accede to the present Protocol. 
  
 Many ratifiers expressed one or more reservations to the protocol.  The letters in paren-
theses following a country’s name identify the specific reservations made.  The reservations are: 
 a - binding only as regards to relations with other parties. 
b - to cease to be binding in regard to any enemy States whose armed forces or allies do 
not observe provisions. 
c - to cease to be binding as regards use of chemical agents with respect to any enemy 
State whose armed forces or allies do not observe provisions. 
 d - does not constitute recognition of or involve treaty relations with Israel. 
 As an arms control agreement, the Geneva Protocol has been both a success and a failure.  
Its success lies in the fact that even during the largest and bloodiest war in human history there 
were few if any incidents of chemical weapons use (and most of those were by a non-ratifier of 
the Protocol).  Many government and military leaders believed that the Protocol outlawed the use 
of chemical weapons.  No one (including Hitler, it seems) was willing to become the first “out-
law”.  The incidents of use other than during World War II have also been few in number.  An-
other measure of success was that it paved the way for both the Biological & Toxin Weapons 
Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention in the last part of this century. 
 
 The Geneva Protocol’s failure lies in that it did little to stop the proliferation of chemical 
weapons.  It addressed only the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.  The Protocol says 
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nothing about not acquiring, not improving, not manufacturing, not selling, nor destroying exist-
ing chemical weapons.  Many countries openly reserved the right to retaliate with chemical 
weapons if they were attacked by other countries using chemical weapons.   
 
 The protocol has two other main flaws.  First, it lacks a verification provision.  There is 
no stated legal right for one state to investigate on the accused’s sovereign territory any allega-
tions of the use of chemical weapons by the accused against another state.  Second, it lacks any 
punitive provision.  Even if it is proved that State A (a ratifier of the Protocol) used chemical 
weapons in war against State B, there is no penalty prescribed.  In principle, State A cannot be 
seriously investigated for potential violations of the Protocol, and even if it admits violations, it 
cannot be punished for those violations.  In short, the Geneva Protocol is a statement of good in-
tent, but not seriously binding or limiting on the behavior between states.  
 
 It should be noted that the United States pushed for the adoption of the Geneva Protocol, 
signed it, and then failed to ratify it for 50 years.  The details are not entirely clear.  It appears 
that there was extensive lobbying against the Protocol when it first came to the Senate for ratifi-
cation.  The arguments used are not available to the author.  When it failed on the first try, ratify-
ing the Protocol was placed on the back burner, as business more pressing needed doing.  Later, 
the Protocol was seen to have no obvious effect on disarmament and the United States military 
had turned to view chemical weapons as another element of its arsenal of deterrence.  It lan-
guished until the 1970's when new arms control incentives required that the issue of non-
ratification be put to rest permanently.  
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Chemical Weapons Convention 
 
 The Chemical Weapons Convention (or CWC) is the primary international agreement 
for limiting the use of chemical weapons.  Formally titled the “Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruc-
tion” , the CWC was [174]: 
* Signed on 13 January 1993 by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and 
   many other states 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 25 April 1997 
 * Treaty entered into force on 29 April 1997 
Countries of note that have signed & ratified or acceded to the CWC include: 
 Algeria    Argentina    Australia   
 Belarus    Bosnia & Herzegovina Brazil     
 Bulgaria   Canada   China  
 Croatia   Cuba     Czech Republic 
 Fed. Rep. Yugoslavia  France    Germany   
 India     Indonesia    Iran   
 Japan    Kazakhstan   Laos     
 Malaysia    Mexico   Pakistan    
 Republic of Korea  Romania   Russian Federation  
 Slovak Republic  Slovenia   South Africa   
 Sudan    Ukraine    United Kingdom  
 United States   Vietnam   
Countries that have signed but not ratified the CWC include: 
 Afghanistan    Bahamas   Bhutan   
Cambodia   Cape Verde   Chad  
 Comoros   Congo    Dem. Rep of the Congo 
Djibouti   Dominica   Dominican Republic 
 Gabon    Grenada   Guatemala   
 Guinea-Bissau   Haiti    Honduras 
 Israel    Jamaica   Kyrgyzstan 
Liberia    Madagascar   Marshall Islands 
 Myanmar (Burma)  Nauru    Rwanda 
St. Kitts & Nevis  Samoa    Sierra Leone  
 Thailand   Uganda   United Arab Emirates  
Yemen    Zambia 
Countries of special note that have not signed or acceded to the CWC include: 
 Angola   Egypt     Iraq     
 Lebanon   Libya    Mozambique   
 North Korea   Somalia   Syria   
 Taiwan (not permitted to sign due to PRC) 
     
 In the CWC, the following definitions are used.   
“Chemical weapons” means together or separately, (a) toxic chemicals and their precursors, ex-
cept where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and 
quantities are consistent with such purposes, (b) munitions and devices, specifically designed to 
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cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in (a), 
which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices, and (c) 
any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of 
munitions and devices specified in (b).   
“Toxic chemicals” means any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can 
cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or animals.  This includes 
all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or their method of production, and regardless of 
whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.   
“Precursor” means any chemical reactant that takes part at any stage in the production by what-
ever method of a toxic chemical.  This includes any key component of a binary or multicompo-
nent chemical system.   
“Key component of binary or multicomponent chemical systems” means the precursor that 
plays the most important role in determining the toxic properties of the final product and reacts 
rapidly with other chemicals in the binary or multicomponent system.   
“Old chemical weapons” means chemical weapons produced before 1925, or produced in the 
period 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such extent that they can no longer be used as 
chemical weapons.   
“Abandoned chemical weapons” means chemical weapons, including old chemical weapons, 
abandoned by a State after 1 January 1925 on the territory of another State without the consent of 
the latter.   
“Riot control agent” means any chemical not listed in one of the Schedules of the Annex on 
Chemicals (see below), which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling ef-
fects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.   
“Chemical weapons production facility” means any equipment, as well as any building hous-
ing such equipment, that was designed, constructed, or used at any time since 1 January 1946 (i) 
as part of the stage in the production of chemicals where material flows would contain, when the 
equipment is in operation, any chemical listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals or any 
other chemical that has no use above 1 tonne per year for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention, but can be used for chemical weapons purposes, or (ii) for filling chemical weapons.  
“Purposes not prohibited under this convention” include industrial, agricultural, research, 
medical, pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes; protective purposes related to protection 
against toxic chemicals or chemical weapons; military purposes not connected with the use of 
chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method 
of warfare; and law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.   
“Production capacity” means the annual quantitative potential for manufacturing a specific 
chemical based on the technological process used. 
 
 The primary provisions of the CWC include: 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstance: 
* To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or  
   transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone. 
 * To use chemical weapons. 
 * To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons.  
Each State Party undertakes: 
* To destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place  
   under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. 
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   NOTE:  in the following, “possess” shall mean “owns or possesses, or that are located  
   any place under its jurisdiction or control”. 
* To destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party. 
* To destroy any chemical weapon production facilities it possesses. 
 * Not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.     
 
 The Convention contains provision for a number of declarations to be made.  Thus, each 
State Party shall submit to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the fol-
lowing declarations in which it shall: 
* Declare whether it possesses any chemical weapons. 
* Specify the location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of chemical weapons it  
     possesses. 
* Report any chemical weapons on its territory that are possessed by another State. 
 * Provide its general plan for the destruction of chemical weapons it possesses. 
* Declare whether there are abandoned chemical weapons on its territory and provide all 
    available information. 
* Declare whether it has abandoned chemical weapons on the territory of other States and 
    provide all available information. 
* Specify any chemical weapons production facility that it possesses or has had under its 
     possession at any time since 1 January 1946. 
* Provide its general plan for destruction of any chemical weapon production facility it 
    possesses. 
* Specify the precise location, nature and general scope of activities of any facility or 
    establishment under its possession that has been designed, constructed, or used since 1 
    January 1946 primarily for development of chemical weapons.  Such declaration shall 
     include laboratories and test and evaluation sites. 
The declaration provisions shall not apply to any chemical weapons buried on its territory before 
1 January1977 and which remain buried, or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 
1985. 
 
 The destruction of chemical weapons must be carried out in a safe and environmentally 
friendly manner.  Open pit burning, land burial, or dumping in any body of water are specifically 
prohibited.  Any chemical weapons previously buried on its own territory (before 1 January 
1977) or dumped at sea (before 1 January 1985) may remain untouched.  If a State elects to re-
cover such weapons they must be declared and destroyed like all other chemical weapons.   
 
 States Parties to this convention are required to destroy all chemical weapons within 10 
years.  The rate of destruction shall be according to the schedule: 
 * Begin destruction of Schedule 2 and 3 chemical weapons within 1 year 
 * Test the first Schedule 1 destruction facility within 2 years 
 * Destroy 1% of Schedule 1 chemical weapons within 3 years 
 * Destroy 20% of Schedule 1 and 100% of Schedule 2 and 3 chemical weapons within  
    5 years 
 * Destroy 45% of Schedule 1 chemical weapons within 7 years 
 * Destroy 100% of Schedule 1 chemical weapons within 10 years. 
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It remains to be seen whether either the United States or the Russian Federation will be able to 
complete destruction of their massive chemical arsenals according to this timetable. 
 
 After completion of destruction, the chemical industries of the States Parties will be sub-
ject to production limitation on certain chemicals. For Schedule 1 chemicals: 
The national aggregate of all Schedule 1 chemicals may not exceed 1 tonne at any given 
time.  Production data must be declared for all facilities producing any quantity of these 
chemicals.  A single small-scale production facility with a maximum annual production 
of up to 1 tonne per year is permitted.  All other facilities are limited to less than 10 kg 
per year production rate.  Schedule 1 chemicals can only be transferred from one State 
Party to another State Party.  An advance notification to the OPCW is required. 
For Schedule 2 chemicals: 
Production, processing, consumption, import, and export data must be declared for all 
plant sites producing, processing, or consuming in excess of 1 kg per year for those 
chemicals in  Schedule 2A marked with an asterisk, 100 kg per year for all other chemi-
cals in Schedule 2A, or 1 tonne per year for all chemicals in Schedule 2B.  The sites of all 
such plants must also be declared.  The State Party will report national aggregate amounts 
of each Schedule 2 chemical produced, processed, consumed, imported, or exported.  Im-
port and Export quantities must be specified for each country involved.  A State Party can 
only transfer Schedule 2 chemicals to another State Party. 
For Schedule 3 chemicals: 
Production, import, and export data must be declared for plant sites producing Schedule 3 
chemicals in excess of 30 tonnes per year.  The sites of all such plants must also be de-
clared.  The State Party must report national aggregate amounts of each Schedule 3 
chemical produced, imported, and exported, as well as quantitative data on the imports 
and exports for each country involved.  Beginning in May 2002, the OPCW will consider 
restrictions on the transfer of Schedule 3 chemicals to States not party to the Convention. 
For all other organic chemical sites: 
A State Party will have to declare all plant sites that produce aggregate quantities of dis-
crete organic chemicals in excess of 200 tonnes per year.  It must also declare the sites of 
plants producing more than 30 tonnes per year of any discrete organic chemical contain-
ing the elements phosphorus, fluorine, or sulfur. 
 
 Verification of compliance with this treaty will be performed by the Technical Secretariat 
of an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).  The OPCW will be 
headquartered in The Hague.  It will be governed by a Conference of the States Parties which 
will meet on an annual basis.  An Executive Council consisting of 41 representatives elected for 
2-year terms among the Member States, has the day-to-day responsibility for supervising the ac-
tivities of the OPCW. 
 
 The destruction of chemical weapons and the production of organic chemicals are subject 
to inspections to verify compliance with the Convention.  Routine on-site inspection and possibly 
continuous monitoring shall be used to verify the compliance of the destruction of all chemical 
weapons and chemical weapon production facilities.  Details of the inspection and monitoring 
are to be negotiated between the OPCW and each State.  Routine on-site inspections will also be 
made of each industrial facility that produces, processes, consumes, imports, or export any of the 
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Scheduled chemicals that was declared to the OPCW by virtue of the quantities of chemical in-
volved (as described above).   
 
 Any Member State has the right to request a challenge inspection.  The purpose of a chal-
lenge inspection is to clarify and resolve any question in relation to a possible non-compliance 
with any of the provisions of the Convention.  Any facility at any location in the territory or any 
other place under the jurisdiction or control of any other State Party.  The Executive Council 
may abort any challenge inspection if by 3/4 majority decision it decides the request is abusive, 
frivolous, on non-consonant with the Convention.  The Executive Council may sanction any 
State that it deems to be abusing the challenge inspection process.  At least 12 hour advance 
warning must be given for challenge inspection.  The inspected party is under the obligation to 
make all reasonable efforts to demonstrate compliance.  However, it may invoke access delays 
and managed access to protect sensitive installations and confidential information unrelated to 
the Convention.  The inspectors are obligated to use “only those methods necessary to provide 
sufficient relevant facts to clarify the concern of possible non-compliance”.  They are bound by a 
strict confidentiality policy not to acquire, record, or disclose any information not relevant to the 
concern that prompted the inspection.    
 
 A final right under the Convention is the right to assistance if chemical weapons are used 
against any State Party.  That assistance may consist of detection equipment, protection equip-
ment, decontamination equipment, medical antidotes and treatments, and advice on protective 
measures.  The assistance shall be provided by other Member States according to their capabili-
ties. 
 
 Compliance with the Convention can be mandated in two ways.  If a non-compliance is 
proven, then the Conference of the States Parties may suspend the rights of the non-compliant 
State under the Convention.  Basically, this means that transfers of Scheduled chemicals to any 
other State would be prohibited (a potentially serious impact on the chemical industry of the of-
fending State).  Particularly serious non-compliance can be referred to the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly and the United Nations Security Council for potential action on a broader scale.  
The United Nations could impose penalties ranging from police action to widespread economic 
sanctions and embargo. 
 
 The chemical which are explicitly controlled under the CWC are defined in the Annex on 
Chemicals.  The Annex has three schedules.  Schedule 1 chemicals are highly lethal chemicals 
and their precursors.  These chemicals include nerve agents of the tabun, sarin, and VX families, 
vesicants including mustards and lewisites, and two toxins (ricin and saxitoxin).  These chemi-
cals have almost no non-military applications.  Schedule 2 chemicals are less lethal chemical 
warfare agents and precursors to Schedule 1 and 2 chemical warfare agents.  These chemicals 
have some but limited use in industry.  Schedule 3 chemicals include several World War I 
chemical warfare agents and a wide variety of precursors to more lethal chemical warfare agents.  
Schedule 3 chemicals invariably have considerable industrial applications, that make their total 
banning unacceptable.  Details of all three Schedules are included in Table L-2 below. 
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Table L-2.  Chemicals controlled under the Chemical Weapons Convention:  Schedule 1.[174] 
 
SCHEDULE 1 - Major chemical warfare agents or their key final-stage precursors with little 
or no commercial use.  All stocks except 1000 kg stored at one facility per country must be 
destroyed.  This facility is subject to inspection. 
 
 
A. TOXIC CHEMICALS:  
 
* O-R1-R2-phosphonofluoridate   R1 # C10 including cycloalkyl  
 R2 = methyl, ethyl, n-propyl, isopropyl 
 EXAMPLE:    Sarin or GB O-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate 
         Soman or GD O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate 
* O-R1-N,N-di(R2)-phosphoramidocyanate  R1 # C10 including cycloalkyl  
 R2 = methyl, ethyl, n-propyl, isopropyl 
 EXAMPLE:    Tabun or GA O-Ethyl-N,N-dimethyl phosphoramidocyanidate 
* O-R1-S-[2-N,N-di(R2)amino)ethyl]-R3-phosphonothiolate and alkylated or protonated salts 
  R1 # C10 including cycloalkyl   R2 = methyl, ethyl, n-propyl, isopropyl 
 EXAMPLE:    VX O-Ethyl-S-[2-N,N-(diisopropylamino)ethyl]methylphosphonothiolate 
SULFUR  * H Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide 
MUSTARDS * Q 1,2-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)ethane 
  * T Bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether 
  *  Bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane 
  * 1,3-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane 
  * 1,4-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane 
  * 1,5-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane 
  * 2-chloroethylchloromethylsulfide 
  * Bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether 
LEWISITES * L-1 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine 
  * L-2 Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine 
  * L-3 Tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine 
NITROGEN * HN1 Bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine 
MUSTARDS * HN2 Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine 







* R1-Phosphonyldifluoride    R1 = methyl, ethyl, n-propyl, isopropyl 
 EXAMPLE: DF  Methylphosphonic difluoride 
* O-R1-O-[2-(N,N-di(R2)amino)ethyl]-R3-phosphonites and alkylated or protonated salts  
  R1 # C10 including cycloalkyl   R2, R3 = methyl, ethyl, n-propyl, isopropyl 
 EXAMPLE: QL O-[2-(N,N-Diisopropylamino)ethyl]-O-ethyl methylphosphonite 
* Chlorosarin  O-Isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate 












SCHEDULE 2 - Toxic chemicals with high potential for use as chemical warfare agents (or 
their key final-stage precursors) or key early-stage precursors to Schedule 1 chemicals with 
low to moderate commercial use.  All quantities in excess of 100 kg (toxics) and 1000 kg 
(precursors) must be reported.  Facilities are subject to inspection. 
 
A. TOXIC CHEMICALS: 
 
* Amiton O,O’-Diethyl-S-[2-N,N-(diethylamino)ethyl]phosphorothiolate 
* PFIB  1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-1-propene 





* Chemicals (except those in Schedule 1) containing a phosphorus atom bonded to a single methyl,         
ethyl, or propyl group but to no other carbons 
EXEMPTED: Fonofo  O-Ethyl-S-Phenyl-Ethylphosphonothiolothionate 
* N,N-Di(R1)phosphoramidic dihalide   R1 = methyl, ethyl, n-propyl, isopropyl 
* O,O’-Di(R1)-N,N-di(R2)phosphoramidate  R1, R2 = methyl, ethyl, n-propyl, isopropyl 
* Arsenic trichloride 
* Benzilic acid  2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid 
* Quinuclidine-3-ol 
* N,N-Di(R1)aminoethyl-2-chloride and protonated salts 
  R1 = methyl, ethyl, n-propyl, isopropyl 
* N,N-Di(R1)aminoethan-2-ol and protonated salts 
  R1 = methyl, ethyl, n-propyl, isopropyl 
* N,N-Di(R1)aminoethane-2-thiol and protonated salts 
  R1 = methyl, ethyl, n-propyl, isopropyl 
 EXEMPTED: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol and protonated salts 
   N,N-Diethylaminoethanol and protonated salts 
* Thiodiglycol  Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulfide 








SCHEDULE 3 - Toxic chemicals considered obsolete as chemical warfare agents or early 
stage precursors to any scheduled chemical with high commercial use.  Facilities producing 
30,000 kg/yr of any scheduled chemical must be declared.  Facilities producing more than 
200,000 kg/yr are subject to inspection. 
 
A. TOXIC CHEMICALS: 
 
* Phosgene (or Carbonyl dichloride) 
* Cyanogen chloride 
* Hydrogen Cyanide 





* Phosphoryl chloride      
* Phosphorus trichloride     
* Phosphorus pentachloride     
* Thionyl chloride 
* Sulfur Monochloride  
* Sulfur Dichloride 
* Trimethyl phosphite      
* Triethyl phosphite      
* DMHP or Dimethyl hydrogen phosphite   





Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention 
 
 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (or BTWC) is the primary interna-
tional agreement for limiting the use of biological weapons.  Formally titled the “Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biologi-
cal) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction”, the BTWC was [175]: 
* Signed on 10 April 1972 by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and 
   many other states 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 22 January 1975 
 * Treaty entered into force on 26 March 1975 
Countries of special note that have ratified or acceded to the BTWC include: 
 Argentina   Belarus   Bosnia & Herzegovina 
 Brazil    Bulgaria   Cambodia   
 China    Croatia   Cuba    
 Czech Republic  France    Germany 
 Hungary   India    Indonesia   
 Iran     Iraq    Japan    
 Republic of Korea  Laos     Libya 
 Malaysia   Mexico   Mongolia 
 North Korea   Pakistan   Romania 
 Russian Federation  Slovakia   Slovenia   
 South Africa   Taiwan   Ukraine 
 United Kingdom  United States   Vietnam   
 Yugoslavia   
Countries of special note that have signed but not ratified the BTWC include: 
 Burundi   Central African Republic Cote d’Ivoire 
 Egypt     Gabon    Guyana 
 Haiti    Liberia    Madagascar 
 Malawi   Mali    Morocco  
 Myanmar (Burma)  Nepal    Somalia 
 Syria    Tanzania   United Arab Emirates  
Countries of special note which have not signed or acceded to the BTWC include: 
 Algeria    Israel    Kazakhstan 
 Lithuania   Moldova   Taiwan (not permitted) 
 
 The principal provisions of the BTWC include: 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes: 
 * Never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or  
    retain: 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method  
of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylac-
tic, protective, or other peaceful purposes; 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or tox-
ins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
 * To destroy, or divert to peaceful purposes, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and 
    means of delivery which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. 
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* Not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to 
    assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States, or international organizations to 
   manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or 
   means of delivery. 
 * In accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit 
    and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the 
    agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery, within the territory of such 
    State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. 
 
 In fulfillment of the provision requiring measures to prohibit the development, etc. of 
agents, toxins, etc., the United States passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996.[176]  Pursuant to this act the Centers for Disease Control established a list of biological 
agents and toxins requiring special controls on their use and distribution for any purposes (peace-
ful or otherwise).[177]  This list is reproduced in Table L-3.  Facilities using these agents must 
keep records of their consumption and disposal.  Any transmission of these agents can only occur 
between facilities authorized by the Centers for Disease Control and records of transmission 
must be kept. 
 
 In the international arena, the primary shortcomings of the BTWC are the lack of effec-
tive verification protocols and the lack of provision for enforcement (sanctions for violation).  
Possible improvements to the Convention are discussed in Reference 178. 
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Table L-3.  Agents controlled under U.S. laws. [176,177] 
 
VIRUSES 
       C Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus 
       C Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus 
       C Ebola viruses 
       C Equine Morbillivirus 
       C Lassa fever virus 
       C Marburg virus 
       C Rift Valley fever virus 
       C South American hemorrhagic fever viruses (Junin, Machupo, Sabia, Flexal, Guanarito) 
       C Tick-borne encephalitis complex viruses 
       C Variola major virus (Smallpox virus) 
       C Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus 
       C Yellow fever virus 
       C EXEMPTIONS: Vaccine strains of viral agents 
BACTERIA 
       C Bacillus anthracis 
       C Brucella abortus, B. melitensis, B. suis 
       C Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei 
       C Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) pseudomallei 
       C Clostridium botulinum 
       C Francisella tularensis 
       C Yersinia pestis 
       C EXEMPTIONS: Vaccine strains 
RICKETTSIAE 
       C Coxiella burnetii 
       C Rickettsia prowazekii 
       C Rickettsia rickettsii 
FUNGI 
       C Coccidioides immitis 
TOXINS 
       C Abrin 
       C Aflatoxins 
       C Botulinum toxins 
       C Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin 
       C Conotoxins 
       C Diacetoxyscirpenol 
       C Ricin 
       C Saxitoxin 
       C Shigatoxin 
       C Staphylococcal enterotoxins 
       C Tetrodotoxin 
       C T-2 toxin 
       C EXEMPTIONS: - Toxins for medical use 
    - Toxins inactivated for use as vaccines 
RECOMBINANT ORGANISMS/MOLECULES 
       C Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements from organisms above, shown to 
encode for a factor associated with a disease 
       C Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences 




Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA Safeguards 
 
 The Non-Proliferation Treaty (or NPT) is the primary international agreement for limit-
ing the spread of nuclear weapons.  Formally titled the “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons”, the NPT was [179]: 
* Signed on 1 July 1968 by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and many 
               other states 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 24 November 1969 
 * Treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970  
Countries of special note that have ratified or acceded to the NPT include: 
 France      China 
 South Africa     North Korea 
 Algeria     Iran 
 Iraq      Argentina 
 Japan      Taiwan 
 Republic of Korea    Libya 
Countries of special note that have not signed or acceded to the NPT include: 
 India      Pakistan 
 Israel      Syria 
The nuclear-weapons holding states of the former Soviet Union are a special case.  The Russian 
Federation has formally declared that it will uphold all rights and responsibilities of the Soviet 
Union with respect to this treaty (as a nuclear weapons-possessing state).  Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine have all filed letters of accession to the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states and 
have transferred all of their nuclear weapons to the control of the Russian Federation.  The Lis-
bon Protocol [180] to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) formally documented the 
succession of these four states to the responsibilities of the former Soviet Union, not only with 
respect to START, but also explicitly with respect to the NPT. 
 
 Under the NPT, signatory states are divided into nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-
weapon states with different responsibilities:  nuclear-weapon states (possessing nuclear weap-
ons and/or the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons) and non-nuclear-weapon states 
(lacking nuclear weapons and the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons).  The capability to 
manufacture nuclear weapons means possession of weapons-grade fissionable materials or facili-
ties capable of producing highly-enriched uranium or of separating plutonium from irradiated 
nuclear fuel, possession of nuclear weapons designs, and control of facilities for translating those 
designs into hardware.  A country which has built all of the parts, but not yet assembled them 
into a nuclear explosive device, is assumed to possess nuclear weapons.  In the provisions listed 
below, “source material” is uranium or thorium metal, or their ores.  “Special fissionable ma-
terial” is Uranium-233, Plutonium (all isotopes), and enriched Uranium-235. 
 
 The principal provisions of the NPT include: 
Nuclear-weapon states will not: 
 * transfer nuclear weapons to any other state. 
 * give control of nuclear weapons to any other state. 
* assist, encourage, or induce non-nuclear-weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons or 
               control over nuclear weapons. 
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Non-nuclear-weapon states will not: 
 * receive nuclear weapons from any state. 
 * accept control over nuclear weapons from any state. 
 * attempt to acquire nuclear weapons or control over nuclear weapons. 
Non-nuclear-weapon states will: 
* accept safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to  
   nuclear weapons. 
* conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
   in accordance with the IAEA safeguards program. 
All states will not: 
* provide source or special fissionable material to any party unless that material is subject 
   to an IAEA safeguards program. 
* provide equipment or material designed for processing, use, or production of special 
               fissionable material unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to an 
               IAEA safeguards program. 
The treaty shall not affect the inalienable right of all states to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear en-
ergy. 
 
 The NPT has been reasonably effective in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons.  
The primary reason for this is the ability to apply sanctions to non-complying states.  The weak-
ness is that all of these sanctions apply to the IAEA Safeguard requirement (see the section of 
this chapter that deals with IAEA Safeguards).  States that violate the NPT are prevented from 
legally acquiring fissionable materials.  If the violator has a nuclear power program, sanctions on 
obtaining nuclear fuel could be catastrophic.  The weakness is that a violator might possess suffi-
cient indigenous uranium ore and an enrichment capability that would negate any need to obtain 
fuel from outside sources.  Alternatively, the violator might possess some item of commerce suf-
ficiently attractive to tempt an non-NPT state with uranium enrichment capability to sell to the 
violator or to tempt an NPT state to violate the agreement.  Uranium has always been available if 
the price is high enough.  Sanctions that affected other areas of a proliferator’s economy might 
have more effect. 
 
 The NPT called for a conference of the States Parties after 25 years to determine if the 
Treaty warranted cancellation, extension for an additional fixed period, or extension for an in-
definite period.  This conference was held in 1995 and the participants voted to extend the NPT 
indefinitely. [181]  
 
 The signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty have chosen to control the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons by the applications of “safeguards” on production of, access to, and transfer of 
fissionable material.  The safeguards are such that the reasonable development of peaceful appli-
cations of nuclear energy is not unnecessarily hindered.  The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) is the organization that has been selected to supervise and implement the safe-
guards process. The Non-Proliferation Treaty specifies that the mechanism for control of prolif-
eration will be Safeguards agreements negotiated between the individual states and the IAEA.  
 
 Safeguards agreements are described in “The Structure and Content of Agreements Be-
tween the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
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of Nuclear Weapons”, IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) (June 1972).[182]   
The Safeguards Agreement between the United States and the IAEA may be found in Reference 
[183].  A Safeguards Agreement consists of two parts. 
 
 Part I of the Safeguards Agreement should (among other things): 
 * Contain an undertaking by the State to accept safeguards on all source or fissionable 
   material in all peaceful nuclear activities under its control for the purpose of verifying 
   that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. 
 * Provide for the IAEA’s right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied on 
    all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities under the 
     State’s control. 
 * Provide that the IAEA and the State shall cooperate to facilitate the implementation of 
    the safeguards. 
 * Provide that safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed to: 
- avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the State in the     
field of peaceful nuclear activities 
  - avoid undue interference in the State’s peaceful nuclear activities 
- be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and 
safe conduct of nuclear activities 
 * Provide that the IAEA shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial 
    secrets. 
 * Provide that in implementing safeguards the IAEA shall take full account of  
    technological developments in the fields of safeguards and shall ensure optimum cost- 
     effectiveness.  Cost-effectiveness shall include concentrating the verification  
    procedures on those stages of the nuclear fuel cycle involving nuclear material from 
    which nuclear weapons could be readily made. 
 * Provide that the State shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and  
    control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards. 
 * Provide that the IAEA shall be given information concerning nuclear material subject 
    to safeguards and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material. 
 * Provide that the State shall ensure that IAEA inspectors can effectively discharge their 
    functions. 
* If the State is a Nuclear Weapons State, provide that materials and facilities used in  
   nuclear weapons activities shall not be subject to safeguards until such time as that 
   material or facilities are converted to peaceful applications. 
 
 Part II of the Safeguards Agreement should specify the procedures to be applied for the 
implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.  Specifically, the Agreement should: 
 * Provide that the objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of  
    significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the  
    manufacture of nuclear weapons and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early 
    detection. 
 * Provide for the use of material accountancy as a safeguards measure of fundamental 
    importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. 
 * Provide that the technical conclusion of the Agency’s verification activities shall be a 
    statement, in respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material un- 
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   accounted for over a specific period, giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated. 
 * Provide that the IAEA shall make full use of the State’s system of accounting for and 
    control of all nuclear material. 
 * Provide that the accounting system shall be based on material balance areas. 
 * Provide that safeguards begin when any nuclear material is imported, exported, or  
    converted to a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic  
    enrichment. 
 * Provide that design information of nuclear facilities be provided to the IAEA by the 
    State. 
 * Provide that records are kept in respect of each material balance area as part of a  
    national system of accounting for nuclear material. 
 * Provide that the State shall provide reports to the IAEA describing the inventory of  
    nuclear material and changes in that inventory. 
 * Provide that the IAEA shall have the right to make inspections to verify the information 
    in any reports or documents submitted by the State. 
 * Provide that any potential transfers of nuclear material between States shall be  
    described in advance to the IAEA.  
 
 The Safeguards System is described in “The Agency’s Safeguards System” IAEA In-
formation Circular INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 (16 September 1968).[184]  Safeguards will only be im-
plemented if there exists a Safeguards Agreement negotiated between the State and the IAEA.  
Nuclear material shall be subject to IAEA Safeguards if: 
 * The material was submitted to safeguards under a Safeguards Agreement. 
* The material was produced, processed, or used in a principal nuclear facility subject to 
   a Safeguards Agreement. 
 * The material was produced in or by the use of material subject to a Safeguards  
    Agreement. 
Principal nuclear facilities include reactors, plants for processing nuclear materials irradiated in 
a reactor, plants for separating the isotopes of nuclear materials, or plants for processing or fabri-
cating nuclear materials.   
 
 Small amounts of nuclear material may be exempted from safeguards upon request.  The 
exempted material may not exceed: 
 * 1 kilogram in total of special fissionable material, consisting of one or more of: 
  - plutonium 
  - uranium with enrichment of 20% or higher, determined by the material weight 
     times the enrichment 
  - uranium with enrichment less than 20% but greater than natural uranium,  
    determined by the material weight times five times the square of its enrichment.   
* 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment 
   greater than 0.5%. 
 * 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with enrichment of 0.5% or less. 
 * 20 metric tons of thorium. 
Produced or used nuclear material shall be exempted if it is: 
 * plutonium produced in the fuel of a reactor whose production rate is less than  
   100 g(Pu)/yr. 
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 * produced in a reactor with maximum calculated continuous power less than 3 thermal 
   megawatts.  Integrated thermal power of exempted reactors may not exceed 6 thermal 
    megawatts. 
 
 The following procedures shall be followed in implementing the Safeguards System.  The 
Agency shall review the design of principal nuclear facilities to determine that a facility will 
permit the effective application of safeguards.  The review shall occur as early as possible using 
information supplied by the State. 
 
 The State shall arrange for the keeping of records with respect to principal nuclear facili-
ties and with respect to all safeguarded nuclear material outside such facilities.  The records shall 
consist of accounting records of all safeguarded nuclear material and operating records for prin-
cipal nuclear facilities.  Records shall be kept for at least two years. 
 
 The State shall submit to the IAEA reports with respect to the production, processing, 
and use of safeguarded nuclear material in or outside principal nuclear facilities.  Timing and 
number of such reports will be negotiated.  Reports need only include such information as is 
relevant to the purpose of safeguards.  Routine reports include accounting reports and operating 
reports.  Routine reports should show the receipt, transfer out, inventory, and use of all safe-
guarded nuclear material.  In principle, these reports would account for all nuclear material com-
ing into, residing in, and going out of a facility (or a material balance area).  Net input minus net 
output would be expected to equal material remaining in the area plus “losses”.  Losses might 
include airborne dust or machining wastes, chemically altered material deposited as corrosion in 
piping, leakage from storage tanks, material lost due to radioactive decay or fission (in reactors), 
material that is unrecoverable from processing solvents, and material consumed in testing and 
quality control.  Every attempt is made to calculate such losses, but accuracy is difficult.  In prac-
tice, in a plant with a large throughput, it may not be possible to balance the accounts to an accu-
racy any better than 250 kg of nuclear material.[185]  Unfortunately, this is enough to make at 
least twenty-five ten nuclear weapons.  Operating reports should show the use made of each 
principal nuclear facility since the last report and the planned program of future use until the next 
report.  The State shall submit special reports to the IAEA if any unusual incident occurs involv-
ing actual or potential loss or destruction of, or damage to any safeguarded nuclear material or 
principal nuclear facility; or if there is good reason to believe that safeguarded nuclear material is 
lost or unaccounted for in quantities that exceed the normal operating and handling losses that 
have been accepted by the IAEA as characteristic of the facility.  If the IAEA requests it, the 
State shall submit amplifications or clarifications of any report.  Reports for nuclear reactors 
shall be provided at least twice a year, but in no case more than 12 per year. 
 
 The IAEA may inspect safeguarded nuclear materials and principal nuclear facili-
ties.  The purpose of safeguards shall be to verify compliance with Safeguards Agreements.  The 
number, duration, and intensity of such inspections shall be kept to the minimum consistent with 
the effective implementation of safeguards.  Inspectors shall neither operate any facility them-
selves nor direct the staff to carry out any particular operation.  Routine inspections may include: 
 * Audit of records and reports 
 * Verification of the amount of safeguarded material by physical inspection,  
    measurement, and sampling 
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 * Examination of principal nuclear facilities, including a check of their measuring  
    instruments and operating characteristics 
 * Checking the operations carried out at principal nuclear facilities and at research and 
    development facilities containing safeguarded nuclear material. 
The IAEA may carry out special inspections if any circumstance indicates that such inspection is 
desirable.  The IAEA may also inspect any substantial amount of nuclear material that is to be 
transferred outside the jurisdiction of a State.  Reactors are subject to one inspection per year for 
every 5 kg of nuclear material that they have in inventory, have as annual throughput, or have a 
maximum annual potential production.  If any of these exceeds 60 kg per year, then the IAEA 
shall have continuous access to the facility.  Inspections of other facilities will be subject to the 
same inspection rate limitation. 
 
 Storage facilities for nuclear material shall have their designs reviewed by the IAEA.  
The method and procedure for sealing the facility shall be mutually agreed upon by the State and 
the IAEA.  Accounting reports for material in sealed storage shall be submitted twice per year.  
One routine inspection of sealed material may be conducted annually.  Removal of material from 
sealed storage requires advance notification of the IAEA. 
 
 Since the latter years of the 20th Century, the IAEA has been attempting to strengthen the 
Safeguards process by including more of the nuclear fuel cycle in the records and reporting proc-
ess. The IAEA formulated the “Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards” INFCIRC/540 
(Corrected) (September 1997) [186] and requested that all States with existing Safeguards 
agreements also sign the Protocol (or a negotiated version thereof).  As of early 2000, roughly 50 
signatory States had also signed the Protocol, including the United States. 
 
 The principal provisions of the Protocol include that the State Party shall provide infor-
mation on and access to specific activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle.  Specific information 
shall include: 
* A general description of and information specifying the location of nuclear fuel cycle-  
   related research and development activities not involving nuclear materials. 
 * Information identified by the IAEA on the basis of expected gains in effectiveness on 
    operational facilities and at locations outside facilities where nuclear material is  
   customarily used.  
 * A general description of each building on each site, including its use and its contents. 
 * A description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in any of the  
   activities specified in Annex I. 
 * Information specifying the location, operational status and the estimated annual  
   production capacity of all uranium mines, uranium concentration plants, and thorium 
   concentration plants. 
 * Information regarding source material which has not reached the composition and  
   purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched. 
 * Information regarding the quantities, uses, and locations of nuclear material exempted 
   from safeguards. 
 * Information regarding the location or further processing of intermediate or high-level 
   waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium, or uranium-233 on which  
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   safeguards have been terminated. 
 * Information regarding the export and/or import of equipment or non-nuclear material 
    specified in Annex II. 
Access shall also be provided to any materials, facilities, or sites identified in any of the above, 
for purposes of verifying that nuclear material is not being diverted or that preparations are not 
being made for the future diversion of nuclear materials. 
 
 The following activities are listed in Annex I and whose details must be reported in ac-
cordance with Article 2.a.(iv) of the Protocol. 
 * The manufacture of centrifuge rotor tubes or the assembly of gas centrifuges. 
 * The manufacture of diffusion barriers. 
 * The manufacture or assembly of laser-based [isotope separation] systems. 
 * The manufacture or assembly of electromagnetic isotope separators. 
* The manufacture or assembly of columns or extraction equipment [for isotopically 
     enriching, separating, or purifying nuclear materials] 
 * The manufacture of aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes. 
 * The manufacture or assembly of uranium plasma generation systems. 
 * The manufacture of zirconium tubes. 
 * The manufacture or upgrading of heavy water or deuterium. 
 * The manufacture of nuclear grade graphite. 
 * The manufacture of flasks [for the transportation and/or storage] of irradiated fuel. 
 * The manufacture of reactor control rods. 
 * The manufacture of criticality safe tanks and vessels. 
 * The manufacture of irradiated fuel element chopping machines. 
 * The construction of hot cells. 
 
 The following equipment and non-nuclear material is listed in Annex II and whose export 
or import must be reported in accordance with Article 2.a.(ix) of the Protocol. 
1.   Reactors and equipment therefor 
 1.1    Complete nuclear reactors 
 1.2    Reactor pressure vessels 
 1.3    Reactor fuel charging and discharging machines 
 1.4    Reactor control rods 
 1.5    Reactor pressure tubes 
 1.6    Zirconium tubes 
 1.7    Primary coolant pumps 
2.   Non-nuclear materials for reactors 
 2.1   Deuterium and heavy water 
 2.2   Nuclear grade graphite 
3.   Plants for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements, and equipment especially designed or 
      prepared therefor 
 3.1   Irradiated fuel element chopping machines 
 3.2   Dissolvers 
 3.3   Solvent extractors and solvent extraction equipment 
 3.4   Chemical holding or storage vessels 
 3.5   Plutonium nitrate to oxide conversion system 
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 3.6   Plutonium oxide to metal production system 
4.   Plants for fabrication of fuel elements 
5.   Plants for separation of isotopes or uranium and equipment, other than analytical instruments, 
      especially designed or prepared therefor 
 5.1   Gas centrifuges and assemblies and components especially designed or prepared for 
        use in gas centrifuges 
 5.2   Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for 
        gas centrifuge enrichment plants 
 5.3   Especially designed or prepared assemblies and components for use in gaseous  
        diffusion equipment 
 5.4   Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for 
        use in gaseous diffusion enrichment 
 5.5   Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in 
         aerodynamic enrichment plants 
 5.6   Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in 
        chemical exchange or ion exchange enrichment plants 
 5.7   Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in  
        laser-based enrichment plants 
5.8   Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in 
        plasma separation enrichment plants 
5.9   Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in 
         electromagnetic enrichment plants 
6   Plants for the production of heavy water, deuterium and deuterium compounds and equipment 
     especially designed or prepared therefor 
 6.1   Water-hydrogen sulfide exchange towers 
 6.2   Blowers and compressors 
 6.3   Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers 
 6.4   Tower internals and stage pumps 
 6.5   Ammonia crackers 
 6.6   Infrared absorption analyzers 
 6.7   Catalytic burners 
7   Plants for the conversion or uranium and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor 
7.1   Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of uranium ore  
        concentrates  to UO3 
 7.2   Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO3 to UF6 
 7.3   Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO3 to UO2 
 7.4   Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO2 to UF4 
 7.5   Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF4 to UF6  
 7.6   Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF4 to U metal 
 7.7   Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF6 to UO2  
 7.8   Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF6 to UF4  
 
 The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities 
of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and 
deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.  The Safeguards System was de-
signed to deter the continuing diversion of small amounts of material by the State or by individu-
als or groups associated with the nuclear industry.  Inadequate attention is paid to the prevention 
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of theft or related diversion of larger amounts of materials.  Seals are the only form of physical 
security even mentioned in the description of the Safeguards System.  Containment (physical 
barriers to material movement) and surveillance (e.g., cameras with recorders and recorders at-
tached to measurement devices) are acknowledged as complementary measures to material ac-
counting in the Safeguards Agreement document but not in the Safeguards description.  It is a 
certainty that some degree of containment and surveillance is applied to all principal nuclear fa-
cilities.  Nevertheless, a risk that material may be discovered to be missing after passage of a few 
days, weeks, or months is no deterrence to a criminal group or organization.  It is only a deter-
rence to the State Government or individuals desiring continued association with the nuclear in-
dustry.  The risk of theft is particularly strong when material is shipped between states. 
 
 To address this deficiency a convention was negotiated between the signatories to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty to provide for the physical protection of nuclear material at all times 
whether in transit, use or storage.  Formally titled the “Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material”, the Nuclear Material Convention was: [187] 
 * Signed on 3 March 1980 by the United States and several other countries 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 4 September 1981 
 * Convention entered into force on 8 February 1987 
 
 The principle provisions of the Nuclear Materials Convention include: 
Each State Party shall: 
 * Take appropriate steps within the framework of its national law and consistent with 
    international law to ensure that during international transport, nuclear material within 
    its territory or on board a ship or aircraft under its jurisdiction is protected at the levels  
    described in Annex I.  
 * Not export (or import) or authorize the export (or import) of nuclear material unless it 
    has received assurances that the material will be protected under international transport 
    at the levels in Annex I. 
 * Not allow the transit of its territory by land or internal waterways or through its airports 
    or seaports of nuclear material between States that are not party to this convention  
    unless the State has received assurance that this material will be protected during  
    international transport at the levels described in Annex I. 
 * In the case of theft, robbery, or any other unlawful taking of nuclear material or  
    credible threat thereof, in accordance with their national law, provide cooperation and 
    assistance to the maximum extent feasible in the recovery and protection of such  
    material to any State that so requests. 
 * Enact legislation that makes any of the following a punishable offense under its  
    national law: 
  - unauthorized receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal, or dispersal 
    of nuclear material, and which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury 
    to any person or substantial damage to property. 
  - theft or robbery of nuclear material 
  - embezzlement or fraudulent obtaining of nuclear material 
  - an act constituting a demand for nuclear material by threat or use of force or by 
    any other means of intimidation 
  - a threat to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or 
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    substantial property damage 
  - a threat to commit theft or robbery of nuclear material in order to compel any 
    person, organization, or State to do or to refrain from doing any act. 
  - any attempt to commit any of the above acts. 
 * Make the offenses described above punishable by appropriate penalties which take into 
    account their grave nature. 
 
 In the context of this Convention, nuclear material means: plutonium (except material in 
which the concentration of the isotope Pu-238 exceeds 80%), uranium-233, uranium enriched in 
the isotopes U-233 or U-235 or both, natural uranium in any form other than ore or ore-residue, 
or any material containing one or more of the foregoing materials.  This Convention shall apply 
to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international transport, as well to nuclear 
material used for peaceful purposes while in domestic use, storage, and transport. 
 
 Annex II categorizes nuclear materials for the purposes of the level of protection needed.  
Category I materials include: 
 * 2 kg or greater of plutonium 
 * 5 kg or greater of U-235 enriched to 20% or higher 
 * 2 kg or greater of U-233 
Category II materials include: 
 * 500 to 2000 g of plutonium 
 * 1 to 5 kg of U-235 enriched to 20% or higher 
 * 10 kg or greater of U-235 enriched to levels between 10% and 20% 
 * 500 to 2000 g of U-233 
* Depleted or natural uranium, thorium or low enriched fuel, plutonium, U-233, or U-235 
   if previously irradiated in a nuclear reactor and currently possessing a radiation level 
    exceeding 100 rads/hr at one meter unshielded. 
Category III materials include: 
 * 15 to 500 g of plutonium 
 * 15 to 1000 g of U-235 enriched to 20% or higher 
 * 1 to 10 kg of U-235 enriched to levels between 10% and 20% 
 * 10 kg or greater of U-235 enriched above natural levels but less than 10% 
 * 15 to 1000 g of U-233. 
Quantities below Category III levels and natural uranium should be protected in accordance with 
prudent management practices. 
 
 Annex I provides for the following degrees of protection: 
Storage Category III Storage within an area to which access is controlled. 
  Category II Storage within an area under constant surveillance by guards or 
electronic devices, surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited 
number of entry points under appropriate control. 
  Category I Storage within an area as defined for Category II, to which in addi-
tion, access is restricted to persons whose trustworthiness has been 
determined and which is under surveillance by guards who are in 
close communication with appropriate response forces.  Specific 
measures should have as their object, the detection and prevention 
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of any assault, unauthorized access or unauthorized removal of ma-
terial. 
Transport Category III Transportation shall take place under special precautions including 
  Category II prior arrangements among sender, receiver, and carrier, and prior 
agreement between persons subject to the jurisdiction and regula-
tion of exporting and importing States, specifying time, place, and 
procedures for transferring transport responsibility. 
  Category I Transportation shall take place under special precautions above, 
and in addition, under constant surveillance by escorts and under 
conditions which assure close communication with appropriate re-
sponse forces. 
Transport of natural uranium other than ore in quantities exceeding 500 kg shall include advance 
notification of shipment specifying mode of transport, expected time of arrival, and confirmation 
of receipt of shipment. 
 
 Taken together, Safeguards and the Nuclear Material Convention provide reasonable pro-
tection for nuclear materials.  However, we have seen that the undetected diversion of small but 
substantial amounts may be possible in some nuclear facilities.  A State has other options for 
clandestine acquisition of nuclear materials that can bypass the Safeguards System.  These are 
discussed in detail in Reference [188].  Although they are not perfect, no state that has accepted 
Safeguards controls has developed nuclear weapons while the Safeguards were in force. 
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Nuclear Test Ban Treaties 
 
 A series of treaties has been negotiated governing the conduct of nuclear weapons tests.  
In sequence, these prohibited first atmospheric tests, outer space test, and underwater tests; then 
any test exceeding 150 kT in yield; and finally any and all nuclear explosions.  The first of these 
treaties was the Limited Test Ban Treaty. 
 
 Limited Test Ban Treaty – Formally titled the “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests 
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water”, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) 
was  [189]: 
* Signed on 5 August 1963 by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and 
               many other states 
 * Ratification was advised by the U. S. Senate on 24 September 1963 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 10 October 1963 
 * Ratification document was deposited on 10 October 1963 
 * Treaty entered into force on 10 October 1963 
Countries of special note which have ratified or acceded to the LTBT include: 
 Argentina   Australia   Belarus  
 Brazil     Canada   Egypt    
 Germany   India    Indonesia   
 Iran    Iraq    Israel   
 Japan    Republic of Korea  Libya  
 Mexico    Pakistan   Russian Federation(USSR) 
 South Africa   Syria    Taiwan    
 Ukraine   United Kingdom  United States  
Countries which have signed but not ratified the LTBT include: 
 Algeria   Burkina Faso   Burundi 
 Cameroon   Ethiopia   Haiti 
 Mali    Paraguay   Portugal 
 Somalia     
Countries of special note which have neither signed nor acceded to the LTBT include: 
 China    Cuba    France    
North Korea   Vietnam      
 
 The principal provisions of the LTBT include: 
Parties to this treaty undertake to: 
* Prohibit, prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other 
               nuclear explosion, at any place under their jurisdiction or control: 
  - in the atmosphere 
  - in outer space 
  - under water, including territorial waters or high seas 
- in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be  
   present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or  
   control such explosion is conducted 
* Refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of 
   any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in any of the  
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   environments above or which would have the effect described above. 
 
 Threshold Test Ban Treaty – Formally titled the “Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear 
Weapon Tests”, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was [190]: 
 * Signed on 3 July 1974 by the United States and the Soviet Union 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 8 December 1990 
 * Treaty entered into force on 11 December 1990 
 
 The principal provisions of the TTBT include: 
Parties to this treaty undertake to prohibit, prevent, and not to carry out any underground nuclear 
weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. 
 
    Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty – Formally titled the “Treaty Between the United 
States of America and the Union of Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions 
for Peaceful Purposes”, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty was [191]: 
 * Signed on 28 May 1976 by the United States and the Soviet Union 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 8 December 1990 
 * Treaty entered into force on 11 December 1990 
   
 The principal provisions of the PNE treaty include: 
Parties to this treaty undertake to prohibit, prevent, and not to carry out: 
* Any individual nuclear explosion (including those for peaceful purposes) having a yield 
               exceeding 150 kT 
* Any group explosion (including those for peaceful purposes) having an aggregate yield 
   exceeding 150 kT unless each individual explosion can be identified and the aggregate 
             yield is less than 1500 kT. 
 
 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – Formally titled “The Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty”, the CTBT was [24]: 
* Signed on 24 September 1996 by the United States, Russian Federation, France, United 
    Kingdom, China, Israel, and many other states  
* Ratification was is awaiting the advice and consent of the U. S. Senate (ratification is in 
    doubt until such time as the stability and reliability of the stockpile of existing weapons 
    can be adequately assured without occasional full-scale testing) 
 * Treaty has not entered into force pending many outstanding ratifications (countries 
    whose names appear in bold type in the list of signatories must ratify the treaty before it 
    can enter into force) 
Countries of note that have signed and ratified the CTBT include: 
 Australia   Argentina   Austria 
 Bangladesh   Belgium   Brazil    
 Bulgaria   Canada   Colombia   
Egypt    Finland   France  
Germany   Hungary   Italy    
Japan    Mexico   Netherlands   
 Norway   Peru    Poland   
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Republic of Korea  Romania   Russian Federation 
Slovakia   South Africa   Spain    
Sweden   Switzerland   Turkey   
Ukraine   United Kingdom    
Countries that have signed but not yet ratified the CTBT include: 
 Algeria    Belarus    Chile    
 China    Indonesia   Iran     
 Israel     Kazakhstan   United States   
 Vietnam  
Countries of special note that have not signed the CTBT include: 
 India     Iraq    Libya  
 North Korea    Pakistan    Syria    
Taiwan (not allowed to sign due to PRC) 
 
 The principal provisions of the CTBT include: 
Each state party undertakes:  
 * not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and 
     to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or 
    control.   
* to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of 
              any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. 
The parties will establish the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Organization to ensure the im-














Nuclear-Free Zones and Other Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreements 
 
 Several geographically related groups of nations have undertaken to ban nuclear weapons 
not only from their individual countries but from an entire geographical region.  They established 
several “nuclear free zones” within which nuclear weapons are absolutely prohibited.  Note that 
such treaties cannot have jurisdiction over ships navigating in international waters.  The treaties 
creating these zones are described below. 
 
 Treaty of Tlatelolco – Formally titled the “Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America”, the Treaty of Tlatelolco was [192]: 
 * Signed 14 Feb 1967    
 * Treaty entered into force 22 Apr 1968 
Virtually all countries in Latin and South America have signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlate-
lolco except:   
 Argentina     Belize    
 Dominica     St. Lucia    
The following countries have signed and ratified Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco: 
 France      Netherlands 
 United Kingdom    United States 
The following nuclear weapons states have signed and ratified Protocol II to the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco: 
 China      France 
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  United Kingdom 
 United States 
 
 The principal provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco include: 
The contracting parties undertake to: 
 * Use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are  
    under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories; 
    (a) the testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means whatsoever 
         of any nuclear weapons, by the parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf 
         of anyone else or in any other way; and 
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    (b) the receipt, storage, installation, deployment, and any form of possession of any  
         nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the parties themselves, by anyone on their 
         behalf or in any other way. 
 * Refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any 
    way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession, or control of 
    any nuclear weapon. 
Protocol I calls on nations outside the Treaty zone to apply the denuclearization provisions of the 
Treaty to the territories in the zone for which they are de jure or de facto responsible.  Protocol II 
calls on nuclear weapons states to respect the denuclearized status of the zone, not to contribute 
to acts involving violation of obligations of the parties to the Treaty, and not to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties.  The treaty does not prohibit the use of 
peaceful nuclear explosives provided that those explosives cannot be used for any military pur-
pose.  In practice it is almost impossible to guarantee that a nuclear explosive is incapable of 
military utility. 
 The United States is responsible for Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the naval base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba under Protocol I of the treaty.  The United States has agreed to abide by 
Protocol I to the treaty.  This means that we may not store, manufacture any part of, test, or use 
nuclear weapons in these territories. 
 
 Treaty of Rarotonga – Formally titled the “South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty”, 
the Treaty of Rarotonga was [193]: 
 * Signed 6 Aug 1985    
 * Treaty entered into force 11 Dec 1986 
The following countries have signed and ratified the Treaty of Rarotonga: 
 Australia     Cook Islands 
 Fiji      Kiribati 
 Nauru      New Zealand 
 Niue      Papua New Guinea 
 Solomon Islands    Tonga 
 Tuvalu      Vanuatu 
 Western Samoa  
 
 The principal provisions of the Treaty of Rarotonga include: 
Each party undertakes: 
 * Not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear 
   explosive device by any means anywhere inside or outside the South Pacific Nuclear 
   Free Zone. 
 * Not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear 
    explosive device. 
 * Not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material  
    especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special  
    fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any state unless subject to IAEA  
    safeguards. 
 * To support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system 
    based on the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system. 
 * To prevent the stationing of any nuclear explosive device in its territory. 
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 * To prevent in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device. 
 * Not to dump radioactive wastes or other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the 
    South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. 
 * To prevent the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone in 
    its territorial sea.  
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone is defined by the area bounded by a line defined by precise 
geographic locations specified in the treaty (and essentially encompassing all of the Territories of 
the signatories, most of the South Pacific Ocean, and many non-signatory entities such as New 
Caledonia, French Polynesia, American Samoa, and numerous other small islands controlled by 
the United States, United Kingdom, or France). 
 
 The Treaty permits each party to exercise its sovereign rights and to remain free to decide 
for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of 
its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archi-
pelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane 
passage, or transit passage of straits. 
 
 Treaty of Pelindaba – Formally titled “The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 
Treaty”, the Treaty of Pelindaba was [194]: 
 * Signed 11 Apr 1996    
 * The treaty’s entry into force awaits sufficient ratifications. 
Countries which have signed and ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba include (as of 19 Nov. 1998): 
 Algeria   Burkina Faso   Gambia 
 Mauritania   Mauritius   South Africa 
 Tanzania   Zimbabwe 
Countries which have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty include: 
 Angola   Benin    Botswana 
 Burundi   Cameroon   Cape Verde 
 Central African Republic Chad    Comoros 
 Congo    Cote d’Ivoire   Dem. Rep. of Congo 
 Djibouti   Egypt    Eritrea 
 Ethiopia   Gabon    Ghana 
 Guinea    Guinea-Bissau   Kenya 
 Lesotho   Liberia    Libya 
 Malawi   Mali    Morocco 
 Mozambique   Namibia   Niger 
 Nigeria   Rwanda   Sao Tome & Principe 
 Senegal   Seychelles   Sierra Leone 
 Sudan    Swaziland   Togo 
 Tunisia   Uganda   Zambia 
The following countries have not signed the Treaty: 
 Equatorial Guinea  Madagascar   Somalia 
The following countries have signed (* denotes ratified as well) Protocol I to the Treaty: 
 *China    *France   Russian Federation 
 United Kingdom  United States of America 
The following countries have signed (* denotes ratified as well) Protocol II to the Treaty: 
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 *China    *France   Russian Federation 
 United Kingdom  United States of America 
France has signed and ratified Protocol III.  Spain has neither signed nor ratified Protocol III. 
 
 The principle provisions of the treaty include: 
Each party undertakes: 
 * Not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire,  
    possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere. 
 * To prohibit, in its territory, the stationing of any nuclear explosive device. 
 * Not to test any nuclear explosive device. 
 * To prohibit in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device. 
 * To declare any capability for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. 
 * To dismantle and destroy any nuclear explosive device that it has manufactured prior to 
     the coming into force of this treaty. 
 * To destroy facilities for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, or where  
    possible, to convert them to peaceful uses. 
 * To permit the IAEA to verify the processes of dismantling and destruction of the  
    nuclear explosive devices, as well as the destruction or conversion of the facilities for 
    their production. 
 * Not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping of radioactive wastes and 
    other radioactive matter anywhere within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone 
 * To conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA for the purpose of 
    verifying compliance. 
 * To maintain the highest standards of security and effective physical protection of  
    nuclear materials, facilities, and equipment to prevent theft or unauthorized use and 
    handling.  To that end each party undertakes to apply measures of physical protection 
    equivalent to those provided for in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear 
    Material. 
  
 Protocol I requires the nuclear weapons States not to use or threaten to use a nuclear ex-
plosive device against any Party to the Treaty or any territory within the African nuclear-
weapon-free zone for which a Party to Protocol III has international responsibility.  Protocol II 
requires the nuclear weapons States not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere in the Af-
rican nuclear-weapon-free zone.  Protocol III requires States with international responsibility for 
territories within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone (but not in the zone themselves) to re-
spect all provisions of the Treaty insofar as those territories are concerned. 
 
 The Treaty permits each party to exercise its sovereign rights and to remain free to decide 
for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of 
its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archi-
pelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane 
passage, or transit passage of straits. 
 
The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free zone includes the entire continent of mainland Africa, and 
the following islands: 
 Agalega Island   Bassas da India 
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 Canary Islands   Cape Verde 
 Cardagos Carajos Shoals  Chagos Archipelago - Diego Garcia 
 Comoros    Europa 
 Juan de Nova    Madagascar 
 Mauritius    Mayotte 
 Prince Edward & Marion Islands Principe 
 Reunion    Rodrigues Island 
 Sao Tome    Seychelles 
 Tromelin Island 
 
 Treaty of Bangkok – formally titled the “Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear 
Weapon-Free Zone” the Treaty of Bangkok was [195]: 
 * Signed 15 December 1995.  
 * Treaty entered into force 27 March 1997 
The following countries have signed and ratified the Treaty of Bangkok: 
 Brunei      Cambodia 
 Indonesia     Laos 
 Malaysia     Myanmar (Burma) 
 Philippines     Singapore 
 Thailand     Vietnam 
None of the Nuclear Weapons States have yet ratified the Protocol to the Treaty. 
 
 The principal provisions of the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free 
Zone include: 
Each State Party undertakes not to: 
* Develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear 
    weapons anywhere inside or outside the Zone 
 * Station or transport nuclear weapons by any means 
 * Test or use nuclear weapons 
 * Allow in its territory any other State to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, 
    possess or have control over nuclear weapons 
 * Allow in its territory any other State to station, test, or use nuclear weapons 
 * Dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere anywhere within the Zone any 
    radioactive material or wastes, or allow any other State to do so. 
* Dispose radioactive material or wastes on land in the territory of or under the  
   jurisdiction of other States 
 * Provide source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially  
    designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable  
    material to any State except under IAEA safeguards. 
Each State Party undertakes to: 
 * Use exclusively for peaceful purposes nuclear material and facilities that are within its 
     territory and areas under its jurisdiction and control 
 * Support the continued effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA 
     Safeguards system.  
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 The Protocol to the Treaty requires Nuclear Weapon States to undertake not to use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the treaty and not to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons anywhere within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. 
 
 The Treaty permits each party to exercise its sovereign rights and to remain free to decide 
for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of 
its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archi-
pelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane 
passage, or transit passage of straits.  Nothing in the Treaty shall prejudice the right of the States 
Parties to use nuclear energy. 
 
 The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone consists of the area comprising the terri-
tories of all States in Southeast Asia, namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, and their respective conti-
nental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones. 
 In the “Almaty Declaration” of 28 February 1997, the leaders of five states in Central 
Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) expressed their joint 
support for the formation of a nuclear weapon-free zone.[196]  A treaty creating such a zone 
would be virtually identical to those creating the other four nuclear weapon-free zones.  To date, 
a “Treaty on the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone” has not gone beyond initial draft 
stage. 
 
 Given the existence of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Treaty of 
Bangkok, and the Antarctic Treaty, plus the probable entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba, 
almost all of the lands of the Southern Hemisphere are members of one nuclear weapon-free 
zone or another.  Because of this there has been some talk of making the entire Southern Hemi-
sphere into a single nuclear weapon-free zone.[196] 
 
 A number of other agreements have been signed which limit where and how nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction may be used.  These additional agreements in-
clude the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Seabed Treaty, and the several Nuclear-
Free Zone treaties.  In this section we will take an abbreviated look at each of these treaties. 
 
 Antarctic Treaty – Formally titled the “The Antarctic Treaty”, was [197]: 
* Signed on 1 December 1959 by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and         
many other states 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 18 August 1960 
 * Treaty entered into force on 23 June 1961 
Countries of special note that have ratified or acceded to the Antarctic Treaty include: 
 Argentina   Australia   Austria 
 Belarus*   Belgium   Brazil  
 Bulgaria   Chile    China 
 Cuba    Czechoslovakia  Denmark  
 Ecuador   Finland   France    
 Germany   Greece    Hungary   
 India    Italy    Japan  
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 Kazakhstan*   Republic of Korea  North Korea   
Netherlands   New Zealand   Norway   
Papua New Guinea  Peru    Poland    
Romania   Russian Federation*  South Africa   
Spain    Sweden   Ukraine*   
 United Kingdom  United States   * As USSR successor state 
All countries with research stations and/or claims to territorial sovereignty have ratified the 
treaty.  Countries of special note which have not signed or acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in-
clude: 
 Algeria   Egypt    Iran    
 Iraq    Pakistan   Sudan  
Syria    Taiwan 
 
 The principal provisions of the Antarctic Treaty include: 
 * Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only.  Establishment of military bases  
    and fortifications, carrying out of military maneuvers, and testing of any kind of  
    weapons is prohibited. 
* Military personnel or equipment may be used for scientific research or other peaceful 
    purposes. 
 * Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste  
    material shall be prohibited. 
 * All areas of Antarctica including all stations, installations, and equipment within these 
    areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or  
    personnel in Antarctica shall be open to inspection at all times. 
This treaty does not affect any claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.  No new claims 
shall be made while this treaty is in force. 
 
 Outer Space Treaty – Formally titled the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activi-
ties of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies”, the Outer Space Treaty was  [51]: 
 * Signed on 5 August 1963 by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and  
    many other states 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 10 October 1963 
 * Treaty entered into force on 10 October 1963 
Countries of special note that have ratified or acceded to the Outer Space Treaty include: 
 Argentina   Australia   Belarus   
 Brazil    Canada   Chile    
 China    Egypt    France    
 Germany   India    Iraq    
 Israel    Italy    Japan    
Republic of Korea  Libya    Norway    
Pakistan   Russian Federation  Singapore  
 South Africa    Spain    Sweden   
 Taiwan   Ukraine   United Kingdom  
 United States    
The list of ratifiers includes most but not all countries developing a space launch capability. 
 322
Countries of special note which have not ratified or acceded to the Outer Space Treaty include: 
 Algeria   Guyana   Indonesia 
 Iran    Kazakhstan   Malaysia 
 North Korea   Sudan    Zaire   
 
 The principal provisions of the Outer Space Treaty include: 
 * Exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies shall  
    be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. 
 * Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies shall be free for exploration 
    and use by all states without discrimination. 
 * Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies is not subject to national 
   appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other 
    means. 
 * Parties will not place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or 
    other weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station 
    such weapons in outer space in any other manner. 
 * The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all parties exclusively for peaceful 
    purposes.  Establishment of military bases, installations, and fortifications, the testing 
    of any type of weapons, and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall 
    be forbidden. 
 * Parties shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind and render them all possible  
    assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of  
    another, and provide for their prompt return to the state of registry of their spacecraft. 
 * Astronauts of one state shall render all possible assistance to astronauts of other states 
    in carrying on activities in outer space. 
 * Non-governmental entities carrying out activities in space must be regulated by their 
    responsible states.  International organizations must be responsible for their activities as 
    are all parties participating in such organizations. 
 * Parties who launch objects into space retain ownership of those objects under all  
    conditions. 
 * Parties who launch objects into space are responsible for any damages caused to others 
    by such objects. 
 * All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial 
    bodies shall be open to representative of other states on a basis of reciprocity.   
    Representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of visits. 
  
 Seabed Treaty – Formally titled the “Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of 
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean 
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof”, the Seabed Treaty was  [198]: 
* Signed on 11 February 1971 by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and 
               many other states 
 * Ratification was advised by the U. S. Senate on 15 February 1972 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 26 April 1972 
 * Ratification document was deposited on 18 May 1972 
 * Treaty entered into force on 18 May 1972 
Countries of special note that have ratified or acceded to the Seabed Treaty include: 
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 Algeria   Australia   Belarus  
Brazil    Canada   China   
Cuba    Germany   India 
 Iran    Iraq    Japan    
 Republic of Korea  Russian Federation  South Africa 
 Taiwan   Turkey    Ukraine   
United Kingdom  United States       
Countries of special note that have not signed or acceded to the Seabed Treaty include: 
 Argentina    Chile    Egypt  
 France    Libya    North Korea 
 Pakistan   Sudan    Syria 
       
 The principal provisions of the Seabed Treaty include: 
Parties to this treaty shall: 
* Not implant or emplace on the seabed or ocean floor or the subsoil thereof beyond the 
   12-mile limit, any weapon of mass destruction, or structures, launching installations, or 
    others facilities designed for storing, testing, or using WMD. 
* Not assist, encourage, or induce another state to implant or emplace weapons of mass 
               destruction or associated structures on the seabed, ocean floor, or subsoil thereof. 
* Have the right to verify through observations the activities of other states on the seabed 
               or ocean floor provided such observation does not interfere with those activities. 




Missile Technology Control Regime 
 
 The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987 by the 
United States and the other members of the G-7 economic group (United States, Canada, Ger-
many, France, Italy, Japan, and United Kingdom).[199]  The MTCR is not a treaty nor an inter-
national agreement.  Rather it is a set of guidelines, mutually established and voluntarily fol-
lowed by “member countries” for the restriction of proliferation (by controlling exports to prolif-
erating countries) of missile technology capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.  Cur-
rently the following 29 countries are “members” of the MTCR: 
 Argentina   Australia   Austria 
 Belgium   Brazil    Canada 
 Denmark   Finland   France 
 Germany   Greece    Hungary 
 Iceland   Ireland    Italy 
 Japan    Luxembourg   Netherlands 
 New Zealand   Norway   Portugal 
 Russian Federation  South Africa   Spain  
 Sweden   Switzerland   Turkey 
 United Kingdom  United States 
Notably absent from this list are Belarus, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, 
Pakistan, South Korea, and the Ukraine, all of which have significant missile programs and many 
of whom are known for their tendencies to proliferation.  One unstated purpose of MTCR is to 
keep critical missile technology away from these countries. 
 
 The MTCR is implemented through its Guidelines.[200]  The Guidelines define the pur-
pose of the MTCR and provide identification of critical technology items and rules to guide 
member countries in making export decisions.  “The purpose of the Guidelines is to limit the 
risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons), by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than 
manned aircraft) for such weapons.”  It is intended that all transfers of identified technology be 
treated on a case-by-case basis with due restraint and consideration of the likelihood that trans-
ferred technology would be put to use in peaceful versus WMD applications.  The Regime is not 
intended to stifle or impede national space programs to the extent that those programs make no 
contributions to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.  Since a satellite launch vehi-
cle could be adapted for use as a WMD delivery system, it is clear that sound judgement must be 
exercised in the decision whether to permit a transfer.  For example, a country with no history of 
WMD activity, no significant military weapons industry, and a substantial investment in satellite 
systems and space launch might be given favorable treatment with respect to a proposed transfer 
of missile technology; whereas a country with suspected clandestine WMD programs, no space 
launch industry, and a history of selling arms to other countries would not receive favorable 
treatment with respect to the same proposed transfer.  
 
 The Equipment and Technology Annex to the Guidelines identifies twenty items of tech-
nology critical to missile and unmanned air vehicle systems.  These items are divided into two 
categories.  Category I items are complete missile or air vehicle systems or complete major sub-
systems that could be immediately incorporated into potential delivery systems for WMD.  It is 
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expected that most proposals for transfer of Category I items would be denied.  Category II items 
are generally critical components required for complete delivery systems.  There is more poten-
tial for peaceful use of these components and more likelihood of approval for their transfer.  A 
rough description of the items contained in each Category is provided below.  The Annex should 
be consulted for more detail. 
  
     Category I 
 
1.  Complete rocket systems and unmanned air vehicle systems capable of delivering a 500 
kg payload to a range of at least 300 km as well as specially designed production facilities for 
these. 
 
2.  Complete subsystems usable in Item 1 as well as specially designed production facilities for 
these, to include: 
 individual rocket stages 
 reentry vehicles and component specially designed for reentry vehicles 
 rocket engines having total impulse greater than 1.1 MN-s 
 guidance sets capable of CEP < 3.33 % of range 
 thrust vector control subsystems 
 safing, arming, fuzing, and firing mechanisms 
 
     Category II 
 
3.  Propulsion components or specially designed production facilities. 
 
4.  Propellants and constituents.  
 
5.  Production technology or production equipment for production, handling, processing, 
or acceptance testing of liquid propellants or solid propellants. 
 
6.  Equipment, technical data, and procedures for the production of structural composites 
usable in missile systems. 
 
7.  Pyrolytic deposition and densification equipment. 
 
8.  Structural materials usable in missile systems. 
 
9.  Instrumentation, navigation, and direction finding equipment. 
 
10.  Flight control systems. 
 
11.  Avionics equipment, technology, and components. 
 
12.  Launch support equipment. 
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13.  Analog or digital computer systems which are either rated for use at temperatures > -
45 C and < +55 C or are designed to be radiation hardened. 
 
14.  Analog-to-digital converters with >= 8 bit resolution which are either MILSPEC or ra-
diation hardened or rated for operation at temperatures from -45 to +55 C. 
 
15.  Test facilities. 
 
16.  Specially designed software/computers for modeling, simulation, or design integration 
of missile systems. 
 
17.  Materials for reducing observables such as radar reflectivity, ultraviolet/infrared sig-
natures, and acoustic signatures. 
 
18.  Devices for protecting missile systems against nuclear effects. 
 
19.  Complete rocket or unmanned air vehicle systems not covered in Item 1 and capable of 
a maximum range > 300 km. 
 
20.  Complete subsystems usable in Item 19 but not in systems in Item 1. 




 The ABM Treaty limited a potential arms race over the development and deployment of 
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems whose purpose was to destroy enemy ICBMs and/or reentry 
vehicles.  Formally titled the “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems”, the ABM Trea-
ty was [21]: 
* Signed on 26 May 1972 by the United States and the Soviet Union 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 30 September 1972 
 * Treaty entered into force on 3 October 1972 
NOTE ADDED PRIOR TO PRINTING:  As of December 2001, the Bush administration in-
formed the Russian government that the U. S. was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.  However, 
the U. S. Congress has indicated that it will consider the matter and may pass legislation that 
restores the treaty obligations. 
   
 The principle provisions of the ABM Treaty include: 
Each party undertakes not to: 
 * Deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country nor provide a base for 
   such a defense, not deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as 
    provided for in this treaty. 
 * Develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, 
    space-based, or mobile land-based. 
 * Deploy ballistic missile early warning radars except along the periphery of its national 
    territory and oriented outward. 
 * Develop, test, or deploy launchers with multiple launch or rapid reload. 
 * Give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM components, capabilities to counter 
    strategic ballistic missiles in flight. 
Each party is permitted: 
 * One ABM system deployment area with 150 km radius centered on the national  
    capital and having no more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptors at the 
    launch sites, and ABM radars within no more than 6 3 km diameter circular complexes. 
 * One ABM system deployment area with 150 km radius and having no more than 100 
    ABM silo launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles at the launch sites, two large 
    phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to ABM radars operational or under 
    construction on the date of signature of this treaty, and 18 ABM radars having a  
    potential less than the smaller of the two large ABM radars. 
 * Up to 15 launchers at ABM test ranges. 
 
 The “Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements Regard-
ing the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems” was signed by both parties on 26 May 
1972.[201]  The primary technical result of this document is that both parties agreed not to de-
ploy phased array radars with mean emitted power times antenna area that exceeds 3 million 
watt-square meters unless those radars are used exclusively to track objects in deep space or as 
part of national technical means of verification.  This is equivalent to a radar with an 10 m by 10 
m antenna emitting an average power of 30 kW.  This is large but not excessively so. 
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 The “Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems” was:[202] 
 * Signed on 3 July 1974 by the United States and the Soviet Union. 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 19 March 1976. 
 * Protocol entered into force on 24 May 1976. 
 
 The principle provision of this protocol was to limit each party to one of the two ABM 
deployment areas permitted in the original treaty.  The U.S.S.R. selected Moscow as its deploy-
ment site and the U.S. selected Grand Forks, ND (near to bases containing a number of ICBM 
missile launching silos). 
 
 The “Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Treaty Between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Systems of May 26, 1972” was released on 26 September 1997.[203]  By this memoran-
dum the United States, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation agreed to be-
come parties to the ABM Treaty.  The Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START)entered into force on 5 December 1994.  It identified Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and the Russian Federation as successor states to the former Soviet Union, and bound them to 
comply with START and with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  The Lisbon Protocol has 
been used as justification for extending all agreements between the U. S. and U.S.S.R. to include 
the new states as successor states. 
 
 The “Standing Consultative Commission Second Agreed Statement Relating to the 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972” was released on 26 Septem-
ber 1997.[204]  The parties agreed: 
 * During tests of higher-velocity (VINT > 3 km/s) theater missile defense (TMD) systems: 
  - the velocity of the target missiles will not exceed 5.0 km/s 
  - the range of the target missiles will not exceed 3500 km. 
  * Not to develop, test, or deploy space-based theater missile defense interceptor missiles  
     or space-based theater missile defense based on “other physical principles” (such as 
     lasers). 
The implication of the Second Agreed Statement is that if a theater missile defense system has an 
inherent ABM capability (either by accident or design), then that capability can never be tested 
against an ICBM.  Lack of successful ICBM testing would sustain doubts as to the true capabil-
ity and probably prevent deployment of the system in an ABM role. 
 
 The ABM treaty is reviewed regularly.  As a result of these reviews there are many other 
memoranda, agreed statements, unilateral statements, etc. that bear on the law.  Those which ad-
dress true proliferation issues have been discussed above.  The others may be found on the Inter-
net at the Worldwide Web site for the treaty.[21] 
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Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) and Reduction Treaties (START) 
 
 The nuclear-related treaties and conventions described in the earlier sections of this chap-
ter have almost exclusively dealt with the reduction or prevention of the spread of nuclear weap-
ons to countries, regions, or applications where they were not already entrenched.  In the 1970's, 
1980's, and 1990's the United States and the Soviet Union conducted a number of bilateral nego-
tiations aimed at limiting the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers.  The arms limita-
tion and reduction treaties discussed in this section placed limits on already proliferated strategic 
nuclear forces and ultimately forced significant reductions in quantities of deployed and stock-
piled nuclear weapons. 
 
 The first of these negotiations was the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).[205] 
Considerable progress was achieved, but many stumbling blocks remained.  The primary outputs 
of the first SALT negotiations were the ABM treaty, the interim “SALT I” Treaty, and agree-
ment to continue with further SALT negotiations.  Formally titled the “Interim Agreement Be-
tween the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain 
Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms”, the SALT I Treaty 
was:[206]  
 * Signed on 26 May 1972 by the United States and the Soviet Union 
 * Approved by the U. S. President on 30 September 1972 
 * Agreement entered into force on 3 October 1972. 
 
 The principle provisions of the SALT I Treaty included: 
 * Neither side will begin construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers 
 * Neither side will convert light ICBM launchers into heavy ICBM launchers 
 * The U. S. is limited to a total of 1054 land-based ICBMs 
 * The U. S. S. R. is limited to a total of 1618 land-based ICBMs 
 * The U. S. may deploy no more than 710 SLBM launchers on 44 submarines 
 * The U. S. S. R. may deploy no more than 950 SLBM launchers on 62 submarines 
No limitations on mobile ICBMs were established. 
 
 The second set of SALT talks led to an agreement to limit nuclear forces to levels even 
lower than the SALT I levels and to agreement to enter into nuclear arms reduction negotiations.  
Formally titled the “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms”, the SALT II Treaty 
was:[207]  
 * Signed on 18 June 1979 by the United States and the Soviet Union 
 * Treaty was never ratified. 
 
 The principle provisions of the SALT II Treaty included: 
 * An aggregate limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBM  
   launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and long-range (>600 km range)  
   air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs)) of 2250 for each side. 
 * An aggregate limit of 1320 launchers with MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy  
   bombers with long-range cruise missiles for each side 
 * An aggregate limit of 1200 launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs for  
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   each side 
 * An aggregate limit of 820 launchers of MIRVed ICBMs for each side 
 * No construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers 
 * No heavy mobile ICBM launchers, no heavy SLBM launchers, and no heavy ASBM 
    launchers 
 * No flight-testing or deployment of new types of ICBM, with the exception of one new 
    type of light ICBM for each side 
 * No increasing the number of warheads on existing ICBMs, a limit of 10 warheads on  
    the new ICBM permitted each Party, a limit of 14 warheads on SLBMs, and 10  
    warheads on ASBMs 
 * An average limit of 28 cruise missiles per bomber with no more than 20 cruise missiles  
    on each existing bomber 
 * Limitations on the launch weight and throw weight of ballistic missiles 
 * A ban on the Soviet SS-16 ICBM 
 * A ban on rapid reload ICBM launch systems 
  
 Shortly after the SALT II Treaty was sent to the U. S. Senate for ratification, the Presi-
dent requested that ratification be delayed due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  Subsequent 
findings that the Soviet Union had not lived up to its commitment to abide by the treaty provi-
sions, precluding ratification.  However, the U. S. agreed to continue to abide by the SALT II 
limits unless Soviet violations of the Treaty provisions were deemed to warrant their abandon-
ment. 
 
 After many years of continued negotiations, now called the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks (START), an agreement was reached which promised actual reductions in strategic nu-
clear weapons, not just limits. This followed the successful total elimination of intermediate 
range nuclear weapons, as discussed below.  Formally titled the “Treaty Between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limita-
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms”, the START Treaty was:[208]  
 * Signed on 31 July 1991 by the United States and the Soviet Union 
* Lisbon Protocol signed on 23 May 1992 by United States and the successor states to the 
   Soviet Union  
 * Treaty entered into force on 5 December 1994. 
 
 The principal provisions of the START Treaty include: 
Each Party: 
 * Shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, 
    heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments so 
     that the aggregate numbers do not exceed: 
- 1600, for deployed ICBMs and associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and 
                associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, including 154 for heavy 
     ICBMs and their associated launchers. 
  - 6000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and  
    deployed heavy bombers, including: 
   — 4900 for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs 
   — 1100 for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers 
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   — 1540 for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs. 
 * Shall limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs to 
    be less than 3600 metric tons. 
 * Shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers to no 
    more than 250; within this limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs for rail-mobile 
    launchers shall not exceed 125. 
 * Shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs to no  
    more than 110; within this limit the number of non-deployed rail-mobile launchers of 
    ICBMs shall not exceed 18. 
 * Shall limit the number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges to no more than 25. 
 * Shall limit the number of test launchers to no more than 25 fixed launchers and 20  
    mobile launchers. 
 * Shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers at training sites to no more  
    than 40; training launchers must contain only training models of missiles. 
 * Shall limit the number of silo training launchers and mobile training launchers to no  
    more than 60; training launchers must contain only training models of missiles. 
* Shall limit the number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments and  
   training heavy bombers to no more than 75. 
 
 Each Party undertakes not to: 
 * Produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy ICBMs of a new type. 
 * Produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs 
 * Produce, test, or deploy mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs 
 * Produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more than 10 reentry vehicles. 
 * Flight-test from space launch facilities ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with reentry  
    vehicles. 
 * Produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload of launchers. 
 * Produce, test, or deploy air-to-surface ballistic missiles. 
 * Produce, test, or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with two or more warheads. 
 * Flight test with nuclear armaments any aircraft that is not an airplane that has a range of 
    8000 km or more. 
 * Have underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines. 
 
 For purposes of counting towards the maximum aggregate limits: 
 * Each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit. 
 * Each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit. 
 * Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit. 
 * Each deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain one deployed ICBM. 
 * Each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be considered to contain one deployed SLBM. 
 * Ballistic missiles separated from their launchers shall be considered to be contained in 
    those launchers. 
 * The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of each existing type shall be  
    the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. 
 * The number of warheads attributed to a new ICBM or SLBM shall be the maximum 
    number of reentry vehicles with which that missile has been flight tested. 
 * Each reentry vehicle is considered to be one warhead. 
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 * Each U. S. heavy bomber equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs up to a total of  
    150 shall be attributed to have 10 warheads. 
 * Each U. S. heavy bomber equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 
    shall be attributed to have a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range  
    nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped.  
 * Each Russian heavy bomber equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs up to a total of 
   180 shall be attributed to have 8 warheads. 
 * Each Russian heavy bomber equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of  
    180 shall be attributed to have a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range 
    nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. 
  * Each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear 
    ALCMs shall be attributed with one warhead. 
 
 The START Treaty also places severe restrictions on the basing of mobile ICBMs.  To 
facilitate treaty verification, flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs shall not deny access to telemetry 
by any means, including encryption, jamming, narrow directional beaming, or encapsulation of 
telemetric data in ejectable capsules or reentry vehicles.  There are a number of provisions re-
quiring advance notification of changes in deployment or tests.  Additional provisions give each 
Party the right to conduct a number of on-site inspections of missiles, launchers, warheads, test 
facilities, and disposal facilities.  
 
 The “Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items 
Subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” [209] spells out ex-
plicit mechanisms for accomplishing the reduction of offensive arms. 
  
 Warheads shall be removed from ICBMs before destruction.  The following may be re-
moved before destruction: 
 * electronic and electromechanical devices of the guidance and control system. 
 * propellant from the stages. 
 * auxiliary pyrotechnic devices. 
 * penetration aids. 
 * propulsion units from the warhead dispensing mechanism. 
If solid fuel has not been removed from stages, the stages shall be destroyed by explosive demo-
lition or burning.  Rocket motor nozzles and cases and interstage skirts shall be crushed, flat-
tened, cut into two pieces of roughly equal size, or destroyed by explosion.  The warhead dis-
pensing mechanism shall be crushed, flattened, cut into pieces of two roughly equal sizes, or de-
stroyed by explosion.  Launch canisters shall be crushed, flattened, cut into multiple pieces, or 
destroyed by explosion. 
 
 Silo launchers shall be destroyed by removing, dismantling, or destroying the silo door 
and destroying the silo headworks.  The headworks may be destroyed by excavation to a depth of 
at least 8 meters or by explosion to a depth of at least 6 meters.  The silo may be filled to the 
level of the bottom of the excavation or explosion crater. 
 
 Road-mobile launchers shall be destroyed by: 
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 * Removing the erector-launcher mechanism and leveling supports from the launcher  
    chassis 
 * The framework of the erector-launcher on which the ICBM is mounted shall be cut at 
     locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size. 
 * Launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be 
               removed. 
 * The mountings of the erector-launcher and of the launcher leveling supports shall be cut 
    off the launcher chassis and each such mounting shall be cut at a location that is not an 
    assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size. 
 * A portion of the self-propelled chassis at least 0.78 meters in length shall be cut off aft  
    of the rear axle, and that portion shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal 
    size. 
Rail-mobile launchers shall be destroyed by: 
 * Removing the erector-launcher mechanism from the railcar 
 * The framework of the erector-launcher on which the ICBM is mounted shall be cut at 
     locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size. 
 * Launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be 
     removed. 
 * The railcar shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of 
     approximately equal size. 
 
 SLBM launchers shall be eliminated by removing the missile section from the submarine 
or by following these steps: 
 * The missile launch tubes, and all elements of their reinforcement, including hull liners 
    and segments of circular structural members between the launch tubes, as well as the 
    entire portion of the pressure hull, the entire portion of the outer hull, and the entire 
    portion of the superstructure through which all the missile launch tubes pass and that 
    contain all the missile launch tube penetrations shall be removed from the submarine.  
 * Missile launch tubes that have been removed shall be cut into pieces of approximately 
    equal size.  
Upon completion of these steps, the submarine may be used for other purposes after: 
 * Installing a section without SLBM missile launch tubes and penetrations for them, and 
    without SLBM missile launch-tube reinforcements. 
 * Replacing the entire portion of the pressure hull, the entire portion of the outer hull, and 
    the entire portion of the superstructure that were removed with portions without SLBM 
    missile launch tubes and penetrations for them, and without SLBM missile launch-tube 
    reinforcements. 
Such submarines shall differ from ballistic missile submarines on the basis of external differ-
ences observable by national technical means. 
 
 The elimination of heavy bombers shall be accomplished in the following manner: 
 * The tail section with tail surfaces shall be severed from the fuselage at a location  
    obviously not an assembly joint. 
 * The wings shall be separated from the fuselage at any location by any method. 
 * The remainder of the fuselage shall be severed into two pieces within the area of  
    attachment of the wings to the fuselage at a location obviously not an assembly joint. 
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 Formally titled the “Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms”, the Lisbon Protocol was:[180]  
* Signed on 23 May 1992 by the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation,  
and the Ukraine     
The protocol held that the successor states to the former Soviet Union would abide by all provi-
sions of the recently signed treaties, specifically the START Treaty and the Nuclear Proliferation 
Treaty.  The Lisbon Protocol has been tacitly assumed to bind the successor states to all Treaties 
concluded with the former Soviet Union.  This assumption does not have any legal standing, but 
does have considerable political significance.  Violations of any Soviet Union treaty by any of 
the successor states would bring serious repercussions to that state from the world community. 
 
 Formally titled the “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms”, 
the START II Treaty was:[210]  
 * Signed on 3 January 1993 by the United States and the Soviet Union 
 * Ratification advised by the U. S. Senate on 26 January 1996  
 * Treaty entered into force on ? (Ratified by the Russian Duma on 14 April 2000) 
 
 The principal provisions of the START II Treaty include: 
Each Party: 
 * Shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, 
    heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so 
    that aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed: 
  - 3500 total strategic warheads. 
  - 1750 warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs. 
- 0 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one  
  warhead is attributed (i.e., no MIRVed ICBMs). 
  - 0 warheads attributed to heavy ICBMs.   
 * Shall eliminate all of its heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters.  SS-18s must be 
    eliminated. 
* Subject to aggregate limits, may convert MIRVed ICBMs (except heavy ICBMs) to 
    single warhead ICBMs.  For example, Minuteman III and SS-19 missiles may be  
    converted. 
 * Subject to downloading limits, may load MIRVed SLBMs with fewer warheads each 
    to satisfy total limits.  Basically, Trident and SS-N-18 missiles may be redeployed with 
    fewer warheads. 
 * Not to produce, acquire, flight-test (except for flight tests from space launch facilities 
    for the purpose of lifting items into space), or deploy ICBMs to which more than one  
    warhead is attributed.  Under this provision, Peacekeeper and SS-24 ICBMs must be  
   destroyed or used only as space launch vehicles. 
Except for the items listed above, the provisions of the START Treaty remain basically un-
changed by START II. 
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 Upon the entry into force of the START II Treaty, both the United States and the Russian 
Federation are committed to begin negotiations on a third round of arms reductions talks, nomi-
nally called START III.  As of Summer 2000, these negotiations had not yet begun.  A reduction 
in the total number of allowable warheads to values in the range of 1500-2500 is a distinct possi-
bility.  The START III Treaty will undoubtedly require START IV negotiations to begin as soon 
as it becomes effective. 
 
 While negotiations on limiting strategic arms were being conducted, the planned deploy-
ment of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles into West-
ern Europe coupled with the Soviet deployment of SS-20 ballistic missiles threatened serious 
instability.  This created a unique opportunity for the first, zero-zero arms control agreement.  
Zero-zero agreements mean that both sides completely eliminate certain weapons from their in-
ventories. 
 
 Formally titled the “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range 
Missiles”, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was:[154] 
 * Signed on 8 December 1987 by the United States and the Soviet Union 
 * Ratification advised by the U. S. Senate on 27 May 1988 
 * Instruments of ratification exchanged on 1 June 1988 
 * Entered into force on 1 June 1988 
 * Proclaimed by U. S. President on 27 December 1988 
 
 The first principle provision of this treaty was the complete elimination of all shorter 
range (500 to 1000 km range) and intermediate range (1000 to 5500 km range) ground-launched 
ballistic and cruise missiles.  This meant elimination (destruction not just removal from active 
deployment) of the U. S. Pershing IA and Pershing II ballistic missiles and BGM-109G (GLCM) 
cruise missiles and the Soviet SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, and SS-23 ballistic missiles.  The sec-
ond principle provision is the prohibition on developing any future ground-launched missiles 
with ranges between 500 and 5500 km range.  The elimination was overseen by on-site inspec-
tions and involved total physical destruction of all major missile components and launcher sys-
tems using techniques similar to those specified in the later START treaties. 
 
 The “Fissile Material Production Cut-off Treaty” [211] is a proposal currently under 
consideration by the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament.  The basic tenet of such a treaty 
would be to ban further production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for use in nuclear 
weapons.  It would place quantitative limits on the quantity of highly enriched material a State 
could have and it would place all fissile material enrichment and production facilities under 
IAEA Safeguards.  A draft of such a treaty has not yet been circulated for comment and negotia-
tion. 
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Environmental Modification Convention 
 
 The Environmental Modification Convention (or EMC) is the primary international 
agreement for preventing environmental modification as a means of warfare.  Formally titled the 
“Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modi-
fication Techniques”, the EMC was [117]: 
* Signed on 18 May 1977 by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and 
many other states 
 * Ratified by the U. S. President on 13 December 1979 
 * Treaty entered into force on 5 October 1978 
Countries which have ratified or acceded to the EMC include: 
 Afghanistan   Algeria   Antigua & Barbuda 
 Argentina   Australia   Austria 
 Bangladesh   Belarus   Belgium   
 Benin    Brazil    Brunei    
 Bulgaria   Canada    Cape Verde 
Chile    Cuba    Cyprus   
 Czech Republic  Denmark   Dominica 
 Egypt    Finland   Germany   
 Ghana    Greece    Guatemala 
 Hungary   India    Ireland 
 Italy    Japan    Republic of Korea 
 Kuwait   Laos    Malawi 
 Mauritius   Mongolia   Netherlands 
 New Zealand   Niger    North Korea   
Norway   Pakistan   Papua New Guinea 
 Poland    Romania   Russian Federation(as USSR) 
 St. Christopher-Nevis  Saint Lucia   St. Vincent & Grenadines 
 Sao Tome & Principe  Solomon Islands  Spain 
 Sri Lanka   Sweden   Switzerland 
 Tunisia   Ukraine   United Kingdom 
United States   Uruguay   Vietnam 
 Yemen 
Countries which have signed but not ratified the EMC include:  
 Bolivia   Ethiopia   Holy See 
 Iceland   Iran    Iraq 
Lebanon    Liberia    Luxembourg 
 Morocco   Nicaragua   Portugal 
 Sierra Leone   Syria    Turkey 
 Uganda   Uzbekistan   Zaire 
Countries of special note which have neither signed nor acceded to the EMC include: 
 Burma (Myanmar)  China    France   
Indonesia   Israel    Libya    
 Mexico    Panama    Singapore   
 South Africa   Sudan    Taiwan  
 Thailand   Venezuela 
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 The principal provisions of the Environmental Modification Convention include: 
Parties to this Convention undertake not to: 
* Engage in any military or any other hostile use of environmental modification  
   techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects as the means of  
   destruction, damage, or injury to any other party. 
* Assist, encourage, or induce any state, group of states, or international organization to 
   engage in activities contrary to this Convention. 
Parties to this convention undertake to: 
 * Facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of scientific 
    and technological information on the use of environmental modification techniques for  
     peaceful purposes. 
* Take any measures it considers necessary to prohibit or prevent any activity in violation 
   of this Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction. 
The provisions of this convention shall not hinder the use of environmental modification tech-
niques for peaceful purposes. 
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Open Skies Treaty 
 
 The Open Skies Treaty would permit the overflight of the sovereign territory of any 
state by aircraft equipped with specific sensor technologies for the verification of arms control 
treaties.  Failure of a similar measure in the late 1950's led to the development of spy satellites to 
overfly the sovereign territory of other states to acquire photographs of military developments.  
This action was of sufficiently questionable legality that official acknowledgment of the capabil-
ity was not made for four decades.  The Open Skies Treaty is intended to reduce many of the un-
certainties and difficulties associated with satellite systems and to make verification technology 
available to nations without major space programs.  The treaty addresses only the geographical 
regions of concern to NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries.   
 
 Formally titled the “Treaty on Open Skies”,[212] the Open Skies Treaty was: 
* Signed on 24 March 1992 by the United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom,  
   and many others 
 * Ratified by the United States on 3 December 1993. 
* Treaty has not yet entered into force due to the failure to achieve ratification by  
   Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation (who are required for entry into effect). 
Countries that have signed and ratified the Open Skies Treaty include: 
 Belgium   Bulgaria   Canada 
 Czech Republic  Denmark   France  
 Germany   Greece    Hungary 
 Iceland   Italy    Luxembourg 
 Netherlands   Norway   Poland 
 Portugal   Romania   Slovak Republic 
 Spain    Turkey    United Kingdom 
 United States    
Countries that have signed but not ratified the Open Skies Treaty include: 
 Belarus   Georgia   Kyrgyzstan 
 Russian Federation  Ukraine 
The treaty is open to signature by the following countries, which have not yet done so: 
 Armenia   Azerbaijan   Kazakhstan 
 Moldova   Tajikistan   Turkmenistan 
 Uzbekistan  
 
 The principle provisions of the Open Skies Treaty include: 
Each State Party agrees: 
 * To accept (if requested to do so) a number of observation flights over its territory by 
    States Parties in accordance with the provisions of this treaty up to limits defined by the 
    “passive quotas” in Annex A.  The maximum passive quota for any State has been  
    initially agreed to be 42 flights.  Many states have much smaller passive quotas.  In the 
    initial distribution, the sum of the active quotas of all other States has seldom  
    approached the passive quota for any State. 
 * To have the right (if it desires to do so) to conduct observation flights over the  
    territories of other States Parties in accordance with the provisions of this treaty up to 
    limits defined by the “active quotas” in Annex A. 
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 * That the total active quota of any State Party shall not exceed its total passive quota. 
 * That a State Party has the right (if it desires to do so) to conduct a number of  
    observation flights over the territory of another State Party as that other State Party has 
    the right to conduct observation flights over the territory of the first State Party.   
 * The Open Skies Consultative Commission shall meet annually to review and  
    renegotiate the quotas. 
 * Observation aircraft will be equipped only with sensor from among the following  
    categories: 
  - optical panoramic and framing cameras 
  - video cameras with real-time display 
  - infrared line-scanning devices 
  - sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar (SAR). 
* Optical and panoramic cameras shall not have a ground resolution better than 30 cm at 
   the minimum height above ground.  The aircraft shall have no more than one panoramic 
    camera, one down-looking framing camera, and two obliquely-looking framing  
    cameras (one on either side) providing coverage of the ground up to 50 km on each side 
    of the aircraft. 
* Video cameras will not have a ground resolution better than 30 cm at minimum height 
    above ground. 
* Infrared line-scanning devices shall not have a ground resolution better than 50 cm at  
   the minimum height above ground.  Only one such device is permitted. 
* SAR sensors shall not have a ground resolution better than 3 m.  Only one such device  
   is permitted.  It may look from either side of the aircraft but not both simultaneously. 
 * Sensors for the collection, processing, retransmission, or recording of electronic signal 
    from electromagnetic waves are prohibited on the observation aircraft (except for such 
    equipment as is required for operation of the allowed sensor types) 
 * Sensors must have covers that can only be removed external to the aircraft to prevent  
    data acquisition prior to the specified observation flight. 
 * Sensors used must be commercially available to all States Parties to the Treaty. 
 * The observed country must be notified 72 hours in advance of the arrival of an  
    observation team. 
 * Observation flights must begin and end at specified “Open Skies” airfields and cannot 
   cannot cover greater ground distances than specified for each airfield. 
 * The observed country has the right to inspect the observation aircraft before and after  
    the observation flight. 
* The observed country has the right to place at least two flight monitors and one   
   interpreter on board the observation aircraft.  If the aircraft exceeds 35,000 kg gross 
   takeoff weight, then an additional monitor is permitted for each on-board sensor control 
   station.  
* Observation flights take precedence over regularly scheduled flights. 
* The observing party must file a detailed flight plan that observes the maximum flight 
    distance and minimum height above ground requirements necessary for limiting sensor 




Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
 
 In 1980 the Nations of the World convened in Geneva to address prohibiting certain con-
ventional weapons that were deemed to have indiscriminate effects or to cause unnecessary suf-
fering.  The first output of this conference, concluded on 10 October 1980, was the Convention 
on Conventional Weapons (CCW).  Properly called the “Convention on Prohibition or Re-
strictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Exces-
sively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects”, the convention was opened for signature on 
10 April 1981 and entered into force on 2 December 1983. [243]  The original convention had 
three separate protocols:  Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments, Protocol II on Mines, and 
Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons.[244]  The United States signed the convention on 8 April 
1982 and the U. S. Senate ratified Protocols I and II in March 1995.  On 3 May 1996, the First 
Review Conference for the CCW completed its review and adopted amendments to Protocol II 
and accepted a new Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons.[245]  The United States ratified the 
amended Protocol II on 24 May 1999, but has failed to ratify either Protocol III or Protocol IV. 
 
 The following list summarizes the ratification and/or accession status of each Protocol. 
[246]  After the name of each nation is a parenthetic list of numbers.  The numeral 1 denotes rati-
fication of Protocol I, 2 denotes ratification of Protocol II, 3 denotes ratification, of Protocol III, 
4 denotes ratification of Protocol IV, and A denotes ratification of amended Protocol II.  Thus 
(1234A) denotes acceptance of all five protocols. 
 Argentina (1234A)  Australia (1234A)  Austria (1234A) 
 Bangladesh (1234A)  Belarus (1234)  Belgium (1234A) 
 Benin (13)   Bosnia-Herzegovina (123A) Brazil (1234A) 
 Bulgaria (1234A)  Cambodia (1234A)  Canada (1234A) 
 Cape Verde (1234A)  China (1234A)  Colombia (1234A) 
 Costa Rica (1234A)  Croatia (123)   Cuba (123) 
 Cyprus (123)   Czech Republic (1234A) Denmark (1234A) 
 Djibouti (123)   Ecuador (123A)  El Salvador (1234A) 
 Estonia (134A)  Finland (1234A)  France (124A) 
 Macedonia (123)  Germany (1234A)  Georgia (123) 
 Greece (1234A)  Guatemala (123)  Holy See (1234A) 
 Hungary (1234A)  India (1234A)   Ireland (1234A) 
 Israel (12)   Italy (1234A)   Japan (1234A) 
 Jordan (13A)   Laos (123)   Latvia (1234) 
 Lesotho (123)   Liechtenstein (1234A) Lithuania (134A) 
 Luxembourg (1234A)  Maldives (1234A)  Malta (123) 
 Mauritius (123)  Mexico (1234)  Moldova (1234A) 
 Monaco (1A)   Mongolia (1234)  Netherlands (1234A) 
 New Zealand (1234A) Niger (123)   Norway (1234A) 
 Pakistan (123A)  Panama (1234A)  Peru (134A) 
 Philippines (1234A)  Poland (123)   Portugal (123A) 
 Romania (123)  Russian Federation (1234) Senegal (3A) 
 Seychelles (1234A)  Slovakia (1234A)  Slovenia (123) 
 South Africa (1234A)  Spain (1234A)  Sweden (1234A) 
 Switzerland (1234A)  Tajikistan (1234A)  Togo (123) 
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 Tunisia (123)   Uganda (123)   Ukraine (123A) 
 United Kingdom (1234A) United States (12A)  Uruguay (1234A) 
 Uzbekistan (1234)  Yugoslavia (123) 
 
 Protocol I (Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments) to the Convention quite simply pro-
hibits the use of any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which in the 
human body escape detection by x-rays.  That is, shrapnel from fragmentation weapons, bullets, 
or other projectiles cannot be made of plastics which are have opacity similar to human soft tis-
sues and are thus undetectable by x-rays. 
 
 Protocol II (Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps 
and Other Devices) addresses mines, booby-traps, and other similar devices.  In general, it is 
prohibited to direct such weapons against the civilian population or against individual civilians.  
Indiscriminate use is also prohibited.  Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons 
which is not on or directed at a military objective, which employs a means of delivery which 
cannot be directed at a specific military objective, or which may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.  
Specifically it is prohibited: 
 * To use mines in any city, town, village, or other are containing a similar concentration  
     of civilians in which combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not  
     appear imminent, unless they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military  
     objective or unless measures are taken to protect the civilians from their effects. 
 * To use remotely delivered mines unless such mines are only used within an area which 
    is a military objective and unless their location can be accurately recorded or each mine  
    has an effective neutralizing mechanism that will render them harmless or destroy 
    themselves after the mine no longer serves the military purpose for which it was  
    emplaced. 
 * To use any booby-trap in the form of an apparently harmless portable object which is 
    specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material and to detonate 
    when it is disturbed or approached. 
 * To use booby-traps which are in any way attached to or associated with: 
i. internationally recognized protective emblems, signs, or signals 
ii. sick, wounded, or dead persons 
iii. burial or cremations sites or graves 
iv. medical facilities, medical equipment, supplies, or medical transportation 
v. children’s toys or other portable objects or products designed for the feed-
ing, health, hygiene, clothing, or education of children 
vi. food or drink 
vii. kitchen utensils or appliances except in military establishments, locations, 
or supply depots 
viii. objects clearly of a religious nature 
ix. historic monuments, works of art, or places of worship that constitute the 
cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples 
x. animals or their carcasses. 
 * To use booby-traps which are designed to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary  
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    suffering. 
Parties to a conflict shall record the location of all pre-planned minefields laid by them and all 
areas in which they have made large-scale and pre-planned use of booby-traps.  Parties shall en-
deavor to ensure the recording of all other minefields, mines, and booby-traps which they have 
laid or placed in position.  Such records shall be retained and made available to all affected par-
ties.  After the cessation of active hostilities, the parties shall endeavor to reach agreement on 
actions necessary to remove or otherwise render ineffective, all minefields, mines, and booby-
traps placed in position during the conflict.  
 
 The amendments to Protocol II require the following additions.  Each Party is responsible 
for all mines, booby-traps, or other devices employed by it and undertakes to clear, remove, de-
stroy, or maintain them.   Mines, booby-traps, or other devices designed to explode based on any 
non-contact influence created by mine detectors during normal use in detection operations are 
expressly prohibited.  Self-deactivating mines with anti-handling devices that are also self-
deactivating are expressly prohibited.  Anti-personnel mines which are not detectable are ex-
pressly prohibited.  All mine used or produced after 1 January 1997 shall incorporate a material 
or device that enables the mine to be detected by commonly-available mine detection equipment 
and provides a signal equivalent to at least 8 grams of iron in a coherent mass.  All remotely-
delivered mines shall be designed so that no more than 10% will fail to self-destruct within 30 
days and have backup mechanisms such that fewer than 0.1% will function as mines after 120 
days. 
 
 Protocol III (Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weap-
ons) has the following provisions.  It is prohibited to make the civilian population the object of 
attack by incendiary weapons.  It is prohibited to make any military objective located within a 
concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons.  It is prohib-
ited to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of any 
incendiary attack except when such military objective is clearly separated from the concentration 
of civilians and all feasible precautions are taken to limit the incendiary effects to the military 
objective.  It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by 
incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal, or camou-
flage combatants or other military objectives.  Tracers, illuminants, and smoke munitions are not 
considered to be incendiary weapons. 
 
 Protocol IV (Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons) prohibits the employment of laser 
weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, 
to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.  In the employment of laser systems, the 
Parties shall take all feasible precautions (including training) to avoid the incidence of permanent 
blindness to unenhanced vision.  Blindness as the incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate 
military employment of laser systems, including laser systems used against optical equipment, is 
not covered by the prohibition of this Protocol.  Permanent blindness means irreversible and un-
correctable loss of vision which is seriously disabling (corrected visual acuity of less than 20/200 
Snellen measured using both eyes) with no prospect of recovery. 
 
 Note:  the United States has not ratified either the protocol on incendiary weapons or the 
protocol on blinding weapons.  The U. S. currently has a formal stated policy in place that pre-
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vents the U. S. from further development of blinding laser weapons.  However, this could change 
with changing administrations.  Furthermore, the various Judge Advocate Corps of the military 
services have unanimously concurred that laser blinding weapons are not in violation of prior 
international law and in fact are more humane than weapons designed to kill the intended targets.  
The author could describe at length the exact physiology and prognosis of laser eye injuries.  Fo-
veal damage is the most serious (usually resulting in clinical blindness) but is likely to affect 
only those few troops who are attempting to fire directly at the laser weapon carrier at the time 
the laser weapon is used.  The much more likely extra-foveal injuries produce less serious long-
term visual acuity reductions (nominally 20/40 or less) and the visual perception process tends 
over time to accommodate for the second small blind spot produced.  Every eye has a blind spot 
(where the optic nerve enters the eye) that the perception process has learned to ignore.  In short, 
the author believes the injuries produced by laser weapons are usually much less serious than 
popularly imagined or as argued by opponents of laser weapons.  More than a few laser re-
searchers have experienced blinding laser injuries.  Most of these individuals have resumed their 
careers without needing white canes and dark glasses.  Their injuries are handicapping but not 
completely incapacitating.  The author knows of no knowledgeable individuals, including him-
self, who would prefer death to the injuries a typical laser weapon would produce.  Such indi-
viduals undoubtedly exist, but the author has not met them.  Many people might protest that they 
would rather die than lose their sight, but few people actually commit suicide when they suffer a 
vision-impairing accident or illness. 
  
 The International Committee of the Red Cross is the non-governmental agency that 
voices the strongest support for banning blinding weapons [260] and has been a driving force 
behind the entire Convention on Conventional Weapons.  The ICRC is devoted among other 
things to halting warfare of all kinds, eliminating all weapons of war, and ending human suffer-
ing.  These are all laudable goals.  However, it appears that in the eyes of the ICRC, any weapon 
banned is one less weapon that needs to be banned, regardless of any priority based on degree of 
humaneness.  Given the unlikelihood of eliminating all weapons and all conflicts at this point of 
human societal development, the author believes that mankind would be better served by empha-
sizing weapons that preserve life over those that take life, even if disability results.  It is likely 












APPENDIX M.  POTENTIAL DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
 
 In the military arena we can consider any technology that has the potential for providing 
revolutionary new capabilities or quantum leap improvements in old capabilities to be a potential 
disruptive technology.  The disruptive technology need not be developed initially for military 
applications.  Commercial breakthroughs will become “militarized” at an exceeding rate in the 
future.  Witness the fact that computer technology was initially driven by military needs (the first 
computers were used for cryptography, generation of ballistic tables for artillery, and calculation 
of nuclear weapon designs) yet today it is the consumer segment that is pushing microprocessor 
technology to ever-increasing performance. 
 
 The United States military forces are vulnerable to disruptive technologies, as are virtu-
ally all other military forces.  Vulnerability to disruptive technologies is a transient process.  It 
begins whenever an adversary develops or deploys a new capability first and ends when we re-
spond by matching deployments of similar capability or deployment of an effective countermea-
sure capability.  The duration of the “window of vulnerability” depends on our ability to respond 
effectively, which often depends on where we were positioned in the race to develop the disrup-
tive technology.  Our existing force structure, doctrine, and traditions may make it difficult for us 
to develop or exploit such technologies when given the opportunity.  For example, consider an 
adversary’s development of artificial intelligence for replacing pilots in aircraft with computers.  
This was discussed in an earlier section of this work.  If the adversary exploits this technology, 
then that adversary can gain an aviation capability that is as far ahead of today’s U. S. aircraft 
capability as the aluminum monoplanes of WWII were ahead of the wood-and-fabric biplanes of 
WWI.  The U. S. is among the leaders in both aircraft and computer technologies.  By all rights, 
the U. S. should be the first to develop pilotless (or at least remotely piloted) combat aircraft.  
However, not surprisingly, aviators dominate the U. S. aviation development communities.  Few 
attempts to eliminate pilots (and thus the source of future military aviators) from combat aircraft 
are vigorously pursued.  Because we are not aggressively pursuing our own development, we are 
offering an opening to potential adversaries, and may also be significantly lengthening the win-
dow of vulnerability that would result if an adversary pursued that opening. 
 
 In Table M-1 we list a number of potential disruptive technologies.  The list is broken 
into those with relatively near-term potential (probable development and deployment timeframe 
is within the next 25 years) and longer-term potential (probable development time frame is at 
least 25-50 years or possibly much longer).  In the remainder of this chapter we will discuss the 
potential military impact of each of these potential disruptive technologies.  The technologies 
marked with an asterisk in Table M-1 have already been discussed in earlier sections and will not 
be discussed in depth at this time. 
 
 The reader should note that many of these disruptive technologies sound like science fic-
tion.  In truth since few of them are currently practical, they are science fiction.  However, the 
reader is reminded that atomic weapons and nuclear submarines and space flight were all science 
fiction for decades before they became science fact (and military reality).  None of the technolo-
gies listed below violate the basic laws of physics.  A number are likely to become practical and 
well established within one or two decades.  Most will be realized before the 21st Century is half 
over. 
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Table M-1.  Potential Disruptive Technologies 
 
   
   *Artificial Intelligences 
   *Trans-Atmospheric Vehicles 
   *Directed Energy Weapons 
   *Terminally-Guided Ballistic Missiles 
   *Weather Control 
   Advanced Algorithms 
   Target Recognition, Identification, and Discrimination 
   Micro-Electromechanical Systems (MEMS) 
   Z-Plane Electronics 
   Scalable Neural Network Chips 
Direct Mind-Computer Interfaces 
   Very Energetic Materials 
   Electromagnetic Launch 
   High Energy Density Power Supplies 
   Bionic Augmentation 
   Ultrastrong Fibers  
   High-Temperature Superconductors 
   Cold Fusion Power Supplies 
   Deep Diving Submarines  
   Quantum Computers 
   Passive Coherent Location 
   Ultrasensitive Magnetic Detectors 
   Ultrasensitive Gravitational Detectors 
   Active Element Conformal Array Antennas 
   Nanotechnology 
   Nanites 
   Genetically-Engineered/Cloned Warfighters 
   Fusion Power Plants 
   Nuclear Catalysts 
   Matter-Antimatter Reactors and Weapons 
   Tectonic Weapons 
   Gravity Control  
   “Warp” Drive 
   Psychic Weapons 
   Space Colonies 
 
  * Already discussed in earlier sections of this report 
 
 
 The discussion presented here will vary in depth and detail.  The fields are too diverse for 
the author to describe everything to the same level of detail.  In the same light, the list of poten-
tial disruptive technologies cannot be complete.  The nature of technological change indicates 
that as many new radically new discoveries will be invented every 15-20 years as have been in-
vented in all of prior history. [213],[214]  One cannot even dream of all of the possibilities that 




 Within the next 20 years computer systems will have computational and memory capa-
bilities that exceed those of the human brain.  Sometime thereafter, the software needed to im-
plement true machine intelligences will be implemented.  Even before that, “associate” systems 
or expert systems with the ability to handle uncertainty in inputs will find widespread use.  Asso-
ciates could eliminate the need for trained personnel in a number of functions including most 
non-criminal law, medical diagnostics and routine treatment, accounting, etc.  Intelligent lay per-
sonnel or personnel trained only to operate the “associate” might perform many of the functions 
currently reserved for doctors, lawyers, or certified public accountants. 
 
 In the military, associates might find application in reducing battle and planning staffs.   
They could almost certainly replace warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers cur-
rently needed to maintain complex electronic equipment.  A moderately trained enlisted person 
could perform almost any maintenance or diagnostic task if he had an associate capable of using 
visual and audio inputs, and capable of asking and answering questions based on the data pre-
sented to it.  We are currently experimenting with using teleconferencing to facilitate some such 
functions.  Here we are merely replacing the living remote “expert” with a computer-based em-
bodiment of that expert’s training and experience. 
 
The application of artificial intelligence (to unmanned aircraft) has been discussed in 
Chapter 4.  Similar application to unmanned surface combat vehicles and undersea combat vehi-
cles should be even easier than to aircraft.  Several cultures have found that some of the most 
effective weapons employed human operators willing to sacrifice their lives to achieve victory.  
Artificial intelligence would permit kamikaze-like weapons to be deployed without the need to 
sacrifice the operator (and eliminating any possible last minute changes of heart on the operator’s 
behalf).   
 
Coupling such intelligent computers with robots made practical by advances in micro-
electromechanical systems will lead to entities with important military uses.  For example, a 
multi-armed intelligent robot might be capable of performing damage control functions on ships 
(or even aircraft) that human sailors (aviators) could not perform.  They could repair hull damage 
in flooding or even flooded compartments.  They could fight fires without undue regard for heat, 
smoke, toxic gases, electrical malfunctions, etc.  They could repair equipment in high radiation 
environments such as nuclear reactor containment vessels.  They could operate in chemical or 
biological warfare environments (and perform critical decontamination functions) without need 
of special equipment.  They would also be far superior to human soldiers in performing routine 
functions such as equipment maintenance, ordnance assembly and handling, and material trans-
port. 
 
Use of intelligent robots is likely to ultimately lead to development of true androids (in-
telligent anthropomorphic robots).  Android soldiers could operate all existing military equip-
ment, reducing if not eliminating the need for new equipment acquisitions.  They would be capa-
ble of superhuman acts, would be difficult to kill or totally disable, would be unrelenting and 
fearless in the pursuit of their assigned objectives, could operate in environments hostile to hu-
man soldiers, and would almost certainly strike terror into the hearts of most human soldiers fac-
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ing them.  Android soldiers could lie buried under sand, soil, or even water for days while con-
ducting ambushes.  They would not need to be continually supplied with food or water, only 
ammunition.  Hundreds of android paratroopers could be crowded into a transport aircraft capa-
ble of carrying only a few dozen human paratroopers.  They could be transported to the theater of 
operations as bulk cargo.  A single container ship might transport could transport hundreds of 
thousands.  An army of millions of android soldiers could be maintained in an inactive state for a 
tiny fraction of what an army of thousands of human soldiers could be maintained.  Training of 
android soldiers would be unnecessary – all needed skills could be loaded as software.  Simply 
maintaining a force in being would cease to be a costly and facilities intensive endeavor.  





 Several countries are currently pursuing the development of trans-atmospheric vehicles 
(TAVs).  This technology will alter the way humanity views not only intercontinental travel but 
also space travel.  Space travel will become an intrinsic part of intercontinental travel.  The mys-
tique and aura of danger associated with rockets as intrinsic aspects of space travel will not be 
associated with a “space plane”.  As ordinary travelers experience space flight, the aura and mys-
tique will disappear.  More people will demand the ability to spend extended time in space.  
Space stations and space colonies are almost certain to result.  TAVs will also open new possi-
bilities in warfare by reducing reaction times and minimizing periods of aircraft vulnerability.  
They may also permit the global transport and debarkation of troops on time scales shorter than 
local forces can be redeployed to counter them.  The military applications of trans-atmospheric 
vehicles have been discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Directed Energy Weapons 
 
Weapons that kill at the speed of light have long been a staple of science fiction.  How-
ever, the U. S. and some of its allies will soon field one or more weapons with just such a capa-
bility.  Such weapons will be able to engage many dozens of threats per minute compared to a 
handful for missile-based weapons.  Greatly increased speed or agility will provide only mar-
ginal benefits to targets.  Reliance on saturation attacks will become more problematic for the 
attacker.  On the other hand, the characteristics of directed energy weapons are such that it may 
be advantageous to the attacker to resurrect the concept of armor.  An inch of stainless steel may 
utterly defeat a weapon designed to burn through 1/16” aluminum, yet impose only moderate and 
acceptable reductions in missile performance.  In short, directed energy weapons will force mili-
tary forces to rethink the entire way they do battle.  They truly represent a disruptive technology.  
Directed energy weapons have been discussed in Chapter 6 and Appendix I. 
 
Several technologies may permit applications of directed energy weapons to be realized. 
The first is the development of extremely compact electron particle accelerators for pumping free 
electron lasers.  Almost all aspects of free electron laser weapons can be currently packaged into 
practical sizes except the electron accelerators.  Compact accelerators will be moderately disrup-
tive in their own right as they will facilitate a variety of nuclear medicine therapies that are cur-
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rently limited by the high cost of accelerators.  The second is the development of scalable, coher-
ent array diode lasers.  Solid-state diode lasers are compact, power efficient and cheap when pur-
chase in large quantities.  If independent diode lasers can be coupled to form single coherent ap-
ertures (in a fashion analogous to active phased-array radar transmitters – see Appendix E), then 
the powers necessary for weapons application can be obtained directly.  If active phase control is 
part of this process, then the beam director (see Appendix I) might be eliminated as well.  An-
other facilitating technology is the development of compact high-energy power supplies.  These 
are discussed further in a later section in this appendix. 
 
 
Terminally-Guided Ballistic Missiles 
 
 Ballistic missiles have always been a difficult threat to counter.  Their long range and 
high velocity have made them almost impossible to kill.  Even after 30 years of development, 
ballistic missile defense is still very much hit and miss.  Strategic deception and target mobility 
have been the most important ways of defeating ballistic missiles to date.  When ballistic mis-
siles gain the ability to perform significant maneuvers, to identify and discriminate their targets 
from the background, and home in to hit moving targets, then they will have gained one more 
jump ahead of the missile defense designers.  Such technology has already been demonstrated by 
the United States (in the Pershing II intermediate range nuclear missile) and is being developed 
by at least two technically competent potential adversaries.  Terminally-guided ballistic missiles 





 The ability to accurately forecast the weather has proven its military utility time and 
again.  An additional ability to control the weather would clearly be a disruptive technology.  
Our growing knowledge of the forcing functions and responses that produce specific weather 
conditions will grant us the ability in the relatively near future to alter if not actually control the 
weather.  We should be able to control small-scale weather phenomena within one or two dec-
ades.  Control of large-scale phenomena such as typhoons will probably be possible before the 
middle of the 21st Century.  The ability to control the weather for peaceful purposes implies an 
ability to control the weather for military purposes.  The use of weather as a weapon has been 





 The term “advanced algorithms” is a catchall for computer programs that do more than 
simply execute a deterministic set of instructions.  Artificial intelligences as described above are 
clear examples of advanced algorithms, but many other forms are possible.  Almost all advanced 
algorithms will involve some sort of intelligence.   
 
 Each form of advanced algorithm described here is essentially a separate disruptive tech-
nology.  That is, they tend to be stand-alone accomplishments.  A breakthrough or demonstration 
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of one form of advanced algorithm does not imply that breakthroughs or demonstrations of other 
advanced algorithms will be forthcoming. 
 
 There are many activities that can be described as “advanced algorithms”.  A few of the 
possible ones are described below.  They include: 
• Self-organizing databases – databases that automatically sort inputs into appropriate 
fields and is capable of finding all possible relationships between data elements, in-
cluding those not pre-conceived by the programmers.   
• Natural language compilers – programs that automatically translate natural lan-
guage (e.g., English prose) instructions into compilable programs in a high-level pro-
gramming language such as C++. 
• Reverse compilers – programs that take existing executable computer programs (re-
gardless of original source language) and generate source code in a specific high-level 
programming language.  These programs facilitate reverse engineering of old codes 
and deciphering of acquired codes. 
• Automatic symbolic commenting programs – programs that take undocumented 
(uncommented) source code programs, determine the higher level mathematical op-
erations the source code programs perform, and generate comments using natural lan-
guage and symbolic mathematics.  These programs facilitate reverse engineering of 
old codes. 
• Direct manufacturing programs – programs that can take a three-dimensional 
drawing package and generate programs to control numerical controlled machine 
tools and robots to automatically fabricate and assemble complex mechanical sys-
tems.  
• Integrated circuit board design programs – programs that combine computer-aided 
design tools, performance simulation tools (such as SPICE), thermal analysis model-
ing, and reliability prediction tools into an integrated design environment.  Such 
codes would permit designers to see all aspects of circuit performance (including 
steady-state response, transient response, heat generation and dissipation, and reliabil-
ity) as each component is added to a complex electronic circuit board. 
• Evolutionary design programs – programs that combine genetic algorithms and 
natural language inputs to evolve novel design solutions with significantly improved 
performance.  
• Serial-parallel partitioning programs – programs that can take complicated nu-
merical problems and automatically partition the problem into serial versus parallel 
processes and optimally allocate the computations between multiple processors. 
Many others are undoubtedly possible.  However, they are beyond the ability of the author to 
identify and address them at the present time. 
 
 Advanced algorithms are disrupting in that, in every instance, the developer will be able 
to solve highly complex problems or perform highly complex tasks without requiring significant 
human labor in achieving the results.  Some of these advanced algorithms will undoubtedly be 
useful in addressing military problems or making military equipments.  The previously unobtain-
able solutions or the remarkable reductions in equipment costs will be the disruptive influence.  
For example, if equipment design, development, and production costs can be reduced by an order 
of magnitude, then it becomes possible to consider procuring ten times as many units.  The con-
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comitant increase in military capability would clearly prove disruptive (not only to an adversary 
who must face the improved capability but also to our own forces who must adapt to the luxury 
of quantity as well as quality). 
 
 
Target Recognition, Identification, and Discrimination 
 
 Automatic target recognition has been the focus of extensive study for thirty years.  
Automatic target recognition is the process of finding (without human viewer intervention) small 
targets in highly cluttered images having large fields of views.  Except in limited applications, 
the target recognition problem has not yet been satisfactorily solved.[248]  Target identification 
is the related process of determining the identity of a detected (and possibly hostile) target to a 
sufficient level of confidence that the target will be attacked or allowed to proceed unmolested.  
Decoy discrimination is the related process of determining whether a detected potential target is 
a real target or decoy intended to draw weapons away from real targets. 
 
 Future weapon systems desire the ability to prosecute multiple targets in short times.  For 
example, a goal of current aircraft systems is the ability to generate 4 kills per sortie.  This is not 
difficult to achieve if the targets are massed in tight formations or in convoys.  However, it is al-
most impossible to achieve when targets are widely dispersed in pre-prepared positions and/or 
extensively camouflaged.  Automatic target recognizers (ATRs) can facilitate high kill rates per 
sortie.  Ideally they will be able to detect potential targets even when they are partially obscured 
by terrain or foliage and/or routinely camouflaged.  ATRs can also facilitate the coverage of ex-
tremely large areas in small times, releasing the system operators to perform time critical func-
tions such as flying the aircraft.  The overload resulting from placing both target acquisition and 
piloting functions on the operator frequently degrades the ability to do both.  Even if a separate 
weapon systems operator is provided, ATRs can in principle perform the target detection func-
tions faster than that operator.  Target recognition is limited to determining whether a detected 
object belongs to a militarily significant target class (e.g., a tank versus a small car or a truck).  It 
does not guarantee that the target is hostile. 
 
 Target identification is performed by a combination of sensors and processing algorithms 
to provide reliable and robust classification of potential targets into specific military classes.  
Ideally, such systems would be able to discern friendly targets from hostile targets from neutral 
targets ((IFFN – Identification of Friend, Foe, or Neutral).  In practice it is doubtful that any sen-
sor system will ever be able to read the mind of the operator of a target to determine his true in-
tent.  For example, it will not be possible to unequivocally declare that the pilot of a friendly air-
craft has secretly turned traitor and is attempting to carry out a hostile act (until that act has been 
initiated).  Similarly, it is not possible to determine that the pilot of an aircraft belonging to a 
hostile air force is trying to defect rather than trying to carry out an attack.  It is also not even 
possible to determine if the pilot of a hostile aircraft is actually going to attack or merely simulat-
ing an attack.  Encounters of the latter kind occur all too frequently.   
 
 Target identification may be cooperative, non-cooperative, or semi-cooperative.  Coop-
erative systems involve the targeting system interacting with the targeted system to elicit a spe-
cific response from the targeted system.  For example, the targeting system may ask “Are you 
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friendly?” via an encrypted message from a radio frequency interrogator and the target (if 
friendly it will be able to decode the interrogation) will reply “I am friendly!” via an encrypted 
message from a radio frequency transponder.  Current cooperative interrogation-response IFFN 
systems may be jammed, they may be exploited, and they give erroneous results if a transponder 
malfunctions or is turned off.  Non-cooperative systems make their determination of identity 
based solely on the data that can be obtained by their associated sensor systems.  For example, a 
thermal imager may obtain a high resolution thermal image of the target which is subsequently 
processed by a image understanding and pattern recognition algorithms to identify the target.  
Current non-cooperative target recognition systems have not proven capable of providing suffi-
ciently accurate identifications.  Some targets are mis-classified;  others are not able to be classi-
fied properly.  Semi-cooperative systems involve the modification in distinct ways of observable 
characteristics (attributes that sensor systems can detect and measure) of friendly targets.  For 
example, on D-Day in 1944, the aircraft were painted with highly visible black and white stripes.  
Semi-cooperative systems are usually only useful for limited periods of time.  For example, the 
German Luftwaffe could have copied D-Day stripes within a few hours had it been to their ad-
vantage (they either decided it was not or just didn’t think to do it).    
 
 Barring the pathological situations mentioned above, it is conceivable that appropriate 
sensors could unequivocally identify the type of target to such a degree that means, motive, and 
opportunity can be inferred to a degree sufficient to permit lawful use of lethal force in response.  
It is even more likely that such sensors could eliminate all but the most pathological examples.  
For example, a viable target identification system would have unequivocally identified the Ira-
nian airbus that was shot down by the USS Vincennes as a commercial airliner (and not an F-14 
using commercial airline IFF codes).  A commercial airliner might be used in a kamikaze attack 
on a warship, but that situation is sufficiently pathological that launching a surface-to-air missile 
would have been unwarranted without considerable additional evidence.  Identification of a tar-
get as being of the same model as those used by U. S. forces, even if the adversary possesses a 
limited quantity of that same model, would reduce the a priori probability of an attack to a low 
enough level that weapons launches should be prohibited, barring significant additional evidence 
to the contrary. 
 
 Decoys have reached a high degree of sophistication.  Inflatable vehicle decoys can 
mimic the size, shape, color, texture, radar reflectivity, and thermal emission of real vehicles yet 
cost a thousand times less.  An entire decoy tank army can be deployed for less than the cost of a 
single real tank.  It is rumored that nine out of ten “tanks” destroyed by NATO air forces in the 
Kosovo conflict were decoys.  The decoys were intentionally exposed to detection while the real 
tanks were kept hidden.  Reentry vehicle decoys (called penetration aids) can be equally confus-
ing to sensors and seekers associated with ballistic missile defense systems.  An ICBM might 
carry 10 to 100 decoys for each reentry vehicle (nuclear warhead) carried.  Without decoy dis-
crimination 1000 interceptors might be required to guarantee destruction of the 10 warheads 
from a single MIRVed ICBM.  Decoy discrimination is essential to guarantee that the real targets 






Micro-Electromechanical Systems (MEMS) 
 
 Micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) [215] are a disruptive technology that is just 
beginning its disruptive run.  Rotating wheel gyroscopes the size of a baseball are being replac-
ing by vibrating quartz tuning forks the size of a paperclip.  These may be shortly replaced by 
differential pendulum accelerometers the size of a printed lower-case letter etched into silicon.  
Micro-mirror arrays with each mirror capable of being independently positioned via electrostatic 
forces can modulate light beam and produce projection displays or simulate targets moving 
against backgrounds for imaging seeker testing.  MEMS technology basically involves the ability 
to machine micron-sized mechanical parts out of silicon, quartz, and other materials using the 
lithography, photoresist, and etchant technologies developing for making integrated circuits.   
 
 Sensors of many different types can be envisioned.  Chemical sensors based on changes 
in mass or conductivity produced by adsorbed species.  Pressure sensors, strain gauges, tempera-
ture sensors, accelerometers, magnetic field sensors, electric field sensors, and electromagnetic 
radiation detectors, among others are possible.  Some of these have been available and used for 
years.  Actuators of different types can be envisioned.  Any mechanism that can be constructed 
on a macroscopic scale (centimeters) using steel, aluminum, or brass can be fabricated at the mi-
croscopic scale (tenths of millimeters) in silicon, quartz, or other semiconductor material.  Gears, 
racks and pinions, worm screws, pendulums, torsion bars, etc. can be microminiaturized.  Cou-
pled with integrated circuit electronics, almost anything might be fabricated at microscopic 
scales. 
 
Future military applications of MEMS technologies might be highly interesting.  For ex-
ample, motors the size of a printed period might operate miniature robotic “insects” that could 
covertly infiltrate enemy positions in the manner of flies or roaches.  Once there they may hide 
behind a baseboard or on the ceiling and “bug” enemy headquarters units using silicon sensor 
eyes or ears.  Similar devices with small explosive charges might attack military bases in 
swarms, seek out critical electronic components (e.g., radios or computers), mechanical compo-
nents (e.g., engines, generators, or even ordnance), or even people, and destroy or damage them.  





 Modern electronics is essentially two-dimensional.  Processor chips may have several 
square centimeters of area, but the individual devices seldom penetrate more than a few tens of 
micrometers into the silicon wafers in which they are fabricated.  Chips are interconnected at the 
edges.  As a result, electronic circuits tend to be built on long, wide, yet thin circuit boards.  
These may be stacked one above the other in a card cage, but the resulting structure is still 
mostly air or unused circuit board.  Z-plane electronics adds a third dimension to circuitry.   
 
Ordinary electronics package their circuits on thin boards, z-plane electronics package 
theirs in compact cubes.  Many benefits can derive from this.  First, electronics can be made 
more resistant to shock, vibration, and acceleration.  Large, thin boards are much more likely to 
flex or break under high g loadings than compact cubes.  Second, total weight will be reduced as 
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the supporting structure will be much smaller with z-plane electronics.  Third, total volume will 
be dramatically reduced because the air spaces are removed.  Fourth, highly parallel circuits are 
more naturally constructed in three dimensions.  For example, staring focal plane array imagers 
need individual preamplifiers and storage buffers for each of tens of thousands of detector ele-
ments prior to multiplexing.  This is a natural application of z-plane architecture. 
 
Z-plane architecture has not yet become the norm for several reasons.  First, electronic 
circuits generate heat that must be removed.  Two-dimensional architecture can take advantage 
of flat design to conduct heat away from semiconductor devices in the z direction.  However, it is 
possible to design conduction or convection cooling elements into 3-dimensional architectures.  
Second, current design tools and fabrication equipment is set up to do two-dimensional designs.  
Although development of three-dimensional tools and machines is a financial constraint on im-
plementation, there is no fundamental barrier to such three-dimensional circuitry.  Third, a mis-
take or flaw anywhere in a three-dimensional circuit may make it necessary to discard the entire 
circuit.  In two-dimensional circuits, a failed component can be readily removed and replaced.  
This is more difficult in a three-dimensional design. 
 
 
Scalable Neural Network Chips 
 
 Neural networks have revolutionized some forms of computation.  However, at the pre-
sent time, large neural networks (those capable of solving the more complex problems) must be 
simulated in conventional computers.  This negates the parallelism inherent in neural networks 
which is one (but not the only one) of their attractive features.  If neural network chips were 
available that could be scaled to arbitrary numbers of neurons and arbitrary numbers of synapses 
by directly connecting outputs from one chip to inputs of adjacent chips (as is done in array 
processors), then simulation could be avoided.  Enormous gains in processing throughput could 
be achieved.  A simulation requires thousands to millions of clock cycles to achieve what one or 
two clock cycles would achieve in a neural network chip.   
 
 Scalable chips would permit large neural nets with high throughput to be easily assem-
bled.  The resulting neural nets might be used to perform pattern recognition functions in support 
of automatic target identification.  They might facilitate the computation of phase shift associated 
with conformal array antennas.  They might also facilitate the implementation of large-scale con-
tent addressable memories and associative processors.  Lacking scalable chip implementations, 
neural network applications have been predominantly hypothetical.  Scalable chips will make 
neural networks practical in real systems. 
 
 
Direct Mind-Computer Interfaces 
 
 Many science fiction writers have described life in a world where people are directly in-
terfaced to their computers.  The interfaces were occasionally audio-visual with computer-
generated audio and video outputs (the latter displayed on a small handheld screen or on compact 
goggles) coupled with voice recognition for input.  Such interfaces can be purchased today.  In 
other instances, the computer was literally wired into one’s brain with a plug and cable.  Surgi-
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cally implanted devices permit computer-generated signals to stimulate appropriate parts of the 
brain to provide “output” functions and to measure and interpret neural electrical signals to ob-
tain “input” functions.  Such interfaces are under study today and may become practical within a 
few years.  Still other interfaces involved the equivalent of wireless transmission or telepathy.  
Wireless interconnection to the “plug” interface is possible with existing technology.  Other 
work is examining the ability for limited communication directly to the brain with microwave 
signals.  However, true telepathic interconnection is still in the realm of science fiction (if not 
actually fantasy).  Interfaces associated with a “plug” promise to be highly disruptive in their 
own right, although telepathic interfaces would be even more disruptive should they occur first. 
 
 Military personnel with direct mind-computer interfaces would be capable of much faster 
response in any given situation.  Recognition of a situation might be accelerated because the en-
tire “big and little pictures” are directly input into the brain.  This would negate the need to visu-
ally scan displays that in turn need to be manually generated by others (or at a minimum gener-
ated by a computer and output onto a video monitor).  The input might be impressed on the brain 
in a fashion that guarantees better long-term memory and recall than is currently achieved with 
visual or audio input.  The user would have instantaneous access to any of a number of com-
puter-based decision aids.  He would not be slowed by a need to input key data into separate 
programs.  It is possible that such direct linkage might produce fewer errors such as hitting the 
wrong key.  Finally, once a decision has been made, it is instantly communicated to the computer 
for immediate action.  The operator no longer needs to take even a few seconds to push a button.  
Communication between individuals would be faster.  One person wired to the network needs 
only to think a message for it to be sent to anyone else wired to the net.  It may even be possible 
to multiplex many different inputs that are currently difficult to handle.   
 
Since we do not have a complete understanding of conscious thought and neural function, 
such direct interfaces may open up possibilities we cannot even imagine at this time.  Direct neu-
ral connections might facilitate training.  It might be possible to convert computer data directly 
into stored memories.  One might learn a language overnight by having the appropriate CD-
ROM downloaded directly into human memory.  Alternatively one might translate in real time 
by accessing a computer translation program running in a multitasking environment.  One might 
learn how to fly a specific airplane or operate any weapon system without ever accessing real 
hardware or even virtual reality simulations of the hardware. Training might be shortened from 
months to mere days spent on technical details.  When connected to a group, the knowledge of 
one individual might be able to be shared with everyone.  In summary, it is possible that direct 
mind-computer interfacing could result in ten-fold reductions in required reaction times with ten-
fold improvements in the quality of the decisions being made.  The degree of coordination would 
also be strongly increased.  Being connected to a group would almost be the equivalent of being 
able to read each other’s minds in real time.  It is not impossible that such a merger of thoughts 
and memories might result in the equivalent of a “superintelligence”.  If two brains are better 
than one, what is a network of tens or thousands or millions (all sharing thoughts and memories) 
equivalent to? 
 
 One fringe category of information warfare has been described as Gibson warfare [90] in 
honor of the science fiction writer William Gibson.  In Gibson warfare, virtual reality entities 
fight in cyberspace yet produce consequences in real space.  Direct connections between a net-
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work and the human brain of the form described above leads to a possibility that a cyberspace 
attack might be capable of permanently altering the connected human’s mental processes or pos-
sibly even killing him. Gibson warfare would have left the realm of science fiction and become 
reality.  Along these lines we commonly talk about one individual’s mind being stronger than 
another’s.  In a merged-brain situation, would stronger individuals dominate weaker ones or 
would individual personalities disappear entirely?  Would individual personalities reappear when 
the individuals disconnect from the network?  
 
 
Very Energetic Materials 
 
 Current energetic materials (explosives and propellants) have energy contents that are in 
the range of 2 to 6.2 MJ/kg, detonation velocities between 4.8 and 9.2 km/s, and Chapman-
Jouguet (C-J) pressures between 140 and 390 kbar.  For comparison purposes, TNT has an en-
ergy content of 5.40 MJ/kg, a detonation velocity of 6.93 km/s, and a C-J pressure of 190 kbar, 
while HMX has an energy content of 6.19 MJ/kg, a detonation velocity of 9.11 km/s, and a C-J 
pressure of 387 kbar.  Since modern delivery platforms usually impose weight constraints on any 
warhead, then the energy content is a direct measure of potential performance.  The higher the 
energy content, the more energy can be delivered to a target by a warhead of specific weight.  
The detonation velocity and the C-J pressure can be related to the explosive quality of brisance 
(shattering ability).  The higher the detonation velocity, the more energy contained in the explo-
sive shock wave.  The higher the C-J pressure (essentially the pressure of the detonated explosive 
products immediately after detonation), the more force can be applied to confining material 
structures.   Ideally, the explosive community would like to find explosives with much higher 
values of all three parameters than are currently achieved. 
 
 The energy of many modern explosives is associated with nitrate or amino groups at-
tached to organic backbones.  There are other ways in which chemicals can store energy.  For 
example, molecules have extra energy when molecular bonds are strained by bending more 
tightly than normal.  For example, carbon atoms normally form tetrahedral bonded structures 
with an angle of 109.5° between any two atoms bonded to the carbon.  However, the carbon at-
oms in cubane lie on the corners of a cube with three of the bonds forming 90° angles.  Because 
of this excess energy in the strained bonds, cubane is much less stable than octane (having the 
same number of carbon atoms but with tetrahedral bonding).  The potential nitrogen analog of 
cubane (octaazacubane – N8) is roughly equally strained.  It has the further advantage of being a 
potential one-product (gaseous nitrogen – a “hard” molecule from a mass acceleration perspec-
tive) explosive.  Tetranitrotetraazacubane (four cubane carbons replaced by nitrogen atoms and 
four nitro groups bound to the remaining carbons) is predicted to have an energy content of 
roughly 7.8 MJ/kg, a detonation velocity of almost 10.4 km/s, and a C-J pressure of 540 kbar. 
[254]  The compound tetrahedrane (four carbon atoms bound into a tetrahedron – each carbon 
bound to other three carbons) is even more highly strained than cubane.  The compound dini-
trodiazatetrahedrane is predicted to have an energy content of roughly 9.37 MJ/kg (more than 




 Another highly strained compound might be made by combining the pentanitrogen cation 
with an azide anion, to produce N5N3. [255]  The pentanitrogen ion has a calculate heat of forma-
tion of 350 kcal/mole which corresponds to an energy content of 20.9 MJ/kg (of ion).  The addi-
tion of the azide ion is expected to add perhaps another 70 kcal/mole (total heat of formation of 
approximately 420 kcal/mole).  This is an estimate based on heats of formation of 64.4 kcal/mole 
for HN3, 71.0 kcal/mole (per azide ion) for Hg2(N3)2, 57.1 kcal/mole (per azide ion) for Pb(N3)2, 
and 73.8 kcal/mole for AgN3.  Thus, we would expect pentanitrogen azide to have an energy 
content of 15.7 MJ/kg. 
 
 It is likely that some of these highly strained compounds will be capable of mass produc-
tion.  What is not yet clear is whether they will be stable enough (i.e., insensitive enough to envi-
ronmental conditions of heat, shock, etc.) to be usable as military explosives. 
 
 Other high energy density energetic materials might be formed from metal slurries such 
as powdered aluminum and water or powdered aluminum and concentrated hydrogen peroxide.  
“Slushes” made from combustible gases frozen into “snows” as they bubble through liquid oxy-
gen can have very high energy content, although some of these materials are extremely sensitive.  
For example, a stoichiometric acetylene-oxygen slush has an energy content of 7.57 MJ/kg.  This 
is considerable higher than HMX but not in the category of a super-energetic explosive.  It is, 
nevertheless, one of the most energetic condensed phase explosives that has actually been syn-
thesized.  It is unfortunately extremely sensitive, and probably unusable for military purposes.  
However, it might make an excellent terrorist weapon as it can be improvised in the field. 
 
 It is clear that there is a possibility of using strained bonds, slurries, or other approaches 
to create super-energetic materials with energy contents that are considerably higher than that of 
TNT, perhaps as high as 20 MJ/kg.  It is of great interest to know the maximum energy that a 
purposefully designed chemical explosive might be expected to achieve.  The energy content of a 
hydrogen/oxygen explosive mixture is roughly 13.8 MJ/kg and is the most weight efficient ex-
plosive mixture known that involves simple molecules (that is one reason why hydrogen and 
oxygen are so often used as space launch rocket fuels).  We have also seen that pentanitrogen 
azide might be as high as 16 MJ/kg.  Super-energetic formulations may gain energy storage in 
the form of bond strain, but do so at the expense of requiring multiple heavy atoms per molecule.  
One electron volt of stored bond energy divided by the mass of a hydrogen atom is equivalent to 
95.74 MJ/kg.  Normal chemical bond energies are of the order of a few electron volts (ultraviolet 
photons with 5 eV energy can break bonds in almost any organic molecule), while the masses of 
the atoms forming the bonds are usually many times that of a hydrogen atom.  Normal chain 
molecules have less than one bond per atom (e.g., a diatomic molecule has one bond divided be-
tween two atoms).  So-called “single bonds”, “double bonds”, and “triple bonds” are counted as 
one bond each.  Ring-like molecules have roughly one bond per atom.  Molecules with interlock-
ing rings (such as cubane) may have between one and one and a half bonds per atom.  For a 
molecule with an average of 1.5 bonds per atom with an excess energy of 1 eV due to bond strain 
and an average atomic weight of 14 per atom (i.e., nitrogen) we calculate an energy content of 
only 9.1 MJ/kg.   
 
 If the total excess energy in the molecule greatly exceeds the energy of a single typical 
bond (of the order of 10 eV) then it is likely that thermal fluctuations will eventually lead to a 
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conformation that favors spontaneous decomposition.  For this reason it is doubtful that more 
than 2 eV excess energy per bond can be achieved in a material stable at room temperature.  
Thus, we might expect that 18 MJ/kg is a likely upper limit to what can be achieved.  This is an 
estimate; the actual limit may be somewhat lower.  If cryogenic storage (below liquid nitrogen 
temperatures, i.e., <77 K) were a practical option then this limit might be raised considerable.  
However, even if cryogenic storage were an option, materials with the ultrahigh bond strain still 
need to be identified. 
 
 If super-energetic (>15 MJ/kg) explosives can be synthesized with sufficient stability for 
safe handling, it would open up numerous possibilities.  Warheads could be miniaturized while 
retaining the same explosive power.  Only 350 kg of a super-energetic explosive would provide 
the destructive capability of 1000 kg of TNT.  This would permit much smaller weapons to be 
built with performance equivalent to larger weapons.  Alternatively, the yield of existing-sized 
weapons could be increased 3-fold.  For example, a single 250-kg bomb would approach the de-
structive power of our largest bombs (1000 kg).  Either way, the roughly 8000 kg bomb load of a 
single F/A-18F carrying advanced explosives would have 75% the destructive power of the 
bomb load of a B-52 carrying roughly 32000 kg of conventional explosive bombs.     
 
 Alternatively, the smaller warheads would permit considerably longer ranges or higher 
velocities to be achieved using airframes of comparable size to existing airframes.  If warhead 
weight were kept the same, the lethal radius of the warhead would be almost doubled.  The kill 
radius of a fragmentation warhead is nominally proportional to the square root of explosive 
yield.  If the higher explosive yield per unit mass was accompanied by higher detonation veloci-
ties (this is almost certain to occur given the higher energy densities), the shattering effect (bri-
sance) of warheads would be considerably enhanced.  This might improve the capabilities of 
deep-penetration warheads to destroy hardened buried targets.   
 
 If used as propellants, such super-energetic materials could lead to three-fold reductions 
in motor size (for comparable payload weights) or three-fold increases in missile range (for com-
parable motor weights).  Coupling super-energetic propellants with super-energetic explosive 
warheads might permit total missile size to be reduced 10-fold with no loss in capability (smaller 
warheads permit smaller motors to propel them at the same speed over the same distance).  An 
AEGIS cruiser could conceivably carry 500 or more missiles in the same space as each current 





 Electromagnetic launch is actually a family of closely related technologies all of whom 
use magnetic forces to accelerate “projectiles”.  Specifically, we may talk about electromagnetic 
guns, electromagnetic aircraft launch, and electromagnetic satellite launch (or mass launchers).   




 Electromagnetic guns use magnetic forces to accelerate small projectiles to extreme ve-
locities.   A high velocity v gives even a small mass m a significant kinetic energy T according to 
the equation 
  
  T  =  0.5mv2 
 
A 1-kg mass accelerated to 10000 m/s velocity has a kinetic energy of 50 MJ.  This is equivalent 
to the energy released by detonating 11.9 kg of TNT.  Electromagnetic guns can use the projec-
tile’s kinetic energy to kill large targets without the need of explosive warheads.   
 
 The most common form of electromagnetic gun being pursued is the rail gun.  In a rail 
gun, a conductive projectile completes a short circuit between two conductive guide rails.  When 
a large current is discharged through the circuit, the current in the projectile interacts with the 
magnetic field to produce a Lorentz force on the projectile, accelerating it down the length of the 
guide rails.  The accelerating force is proportional to the square of the current that can be forced 
through the rails. 
 
 One advantage of electromagnetic guns is that they use relatively lightweight projectiles, 
without warheads or separate propellant.  Thus, many more projectiles can be carried than can 
conventional shells.  The guns themselves may be lighter, may be more rapidly aimable, and may 
have higher rates of fires.  These potential advantages may or may not be realized in a practical 
design.  For example, the rate of fire will depend on how fast the gun’s energy storage mecha-
nism can be recharged and this will be a function of the size of the prime power supply.  One un-
deniable advantage is the short time of flight resulting from the high velocity.  This facilitates 
aiming (target lead angle and range drop are both dramatically reduced) and reduces the prob-
ability that an adversary can get off a killing shot. 
 
 Electromagnetic launch of aircraft basically replaces the steam-driven cylinder of current 
catapult systems with a linear induction motor.  Simple magnetic attraction of unlike poles and 
repulsion of like poles provides the motive force.  After injection into the motor section by hy-
draulic or compressed air ram, a shuttle made of permanent magnets is accelerated by a conven-
tional electromagnet stator assembly.  The stator elements change polarity as the shuttle passes to 
maintain a constant force. 
 
 Electromagnetic launch of aircraft has a number of potential benefits over conventional 
steam catapults.  First and foremost, the need for a large steam plant is eliminated.  This saves 
considerable space and weight on a ship.  It also makes gas turbine or diesel prime movers more 
attractive relative to nuclear power than they were when a steam plant was required.  Elimination 
of the steam plant also allows much lower infrared and acoustic signatures to be achieved.  It 
also eliminates a major consumer of maintenance man-hours resulting in reduced life-cycle cost.  
Second, it would facilitate the use of aircraft on somewhat smaller ships.  The length and width 
of launch and recovery areas are determined by the g-loadings limits and size characteristics of 
the aircraft to be handled and are only minimally influenced by the launch (and recovery) 
mechanisms.  Thus launch and recovery dictate the minimum deck area of an aircraft carrier.  
However, a considerable fraction of the size is determined by the need to have a large number of 
aircraft on deck.  Because electromagnetic launch systems would likely consume less below deck 
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volume of a ship, more aircraft could be kept in the hangar deck, rather than on the flight deck.  
Smaller aircraft carriers, with their accompanying significant construction cost savings (as well 
as operational cost savings), might mean that more aircraft carriers could be procured.   
 
 Electromagnetic launch is also more amenable to producing higher launch accelerations 
than steam catapults.  The length of a catapult L required to accelerate an aircraft to a velocity v 
with an acceleration a is given by the equation 
 
  L = v2/a 
 
When the navy transitions entirely to unmanned aircraft (capable of higher launch accelerations), 
then electromagnetic launch will permit the same airspeeds to be achieved in shorter flight decks 
(with further cost savings in construction).   
 
 Electromagnetic launch can also be adapted to smaller carriers with smaller air wings.  
For example, ships the size of the current helicopter carriers (LHD and LHA) could incorporate 
catapult launch for their Harrier aircraft without sacrificing too much volume.  Electromagnetic 
launch coupled with vertical landing would reduce many of the penalties currently paid in range 
and payload by short take-off/vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft and make them much more at-
tractive.  Assume the STOVL aircraft can tolerate the same launch accelerations as a conven-
tional aircraft.  If the STOVL aircraft can save 90% of the range penalty paid for near-vertical 
take-off by being catapult launched at 75 knots (compared to a nominal 150 knots for a conven-
tional aircraft catapult launch), then the STOVL catapult needs to be only 25% of the length of 
the conventional catapult. 
 
 Electromagnetic launch of spacecraft might involve a combination of levitation and ac-
celeration using the Meissner effect (the exclusion of magnetic fields from superconductors).  
The payload is carried by a carrier vehicle that is at least partially constructed from supercon-
ducting materials.  A dc magnetic field levitates the carrier to eliminate frictional losses.  The 
launch mechanism may or may not be partially evacuated to reduce aerodynamic drag.  This 
mechanism is composed of a number of coils through each of which a high current can be dis-
charged.  Initially one coil is energized behind the carrier, producing a strong field gradient at the 
superconductor.  The difference in magnetic pressure on each side of the superconductor pro-
duces the acceleration.  As the carrier passes each coil current is discharged through the coil to 
continue the acceleration.  Once the carrier and payload have reached orbital velocity, the carrier 
might continue into orbit and use orbital maneuvering thrusters to deliver the payload to a pre-
cise destination.  The carrier can then return to the launch site by reentering similar to the space 
shuttle.  Alternatively, the carrier could immediately eject its payload (to continue into orbit) and 
then be decelerated by additional coils whose current pulses are delivered just before the carrier 
passes them.   
 
 Electromagnetic spacecraft launchers will be very large.   If we assume an orbital veloc-
ity of 8000 m/s and a maximum launch acceleration of 10,000 gees (roughly 50% of a typical 
gun projectile acceleration – good spacecraft designs can accommodate this level of accelera-
tion), then the launcher must be 650 meters long.  This is large but many bridges have longer 
spans.  To launch payloads at a man-tolerable 3 gees, would require a launcher roughly 2200 km 
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long.  This is not practical.  However, for a launcher with a maximum(?) practical(?) length of 
the order of 50 km, the launch acceleration could be reduced to roughly 130 gees (high, but most 
satellite systems could be designed to withstand such launch transients). 
 
 Electromagnetic launch of spacecraft offers significant potential to change humanity’s 
view of space.  Once initial construction costs are paid for, the cost of launching a payload into 
space will be little more than the cost of the electricity.  If widespread fusion power or solar 
power is available, then this cost might be negligible.  Many systems concepts have fallen by the 
way simply because it cost too much to place them in orbit.  Another benefit is the ability to 
launch payloads at a rapid pace.  Theoretically, a new payload could be launched as rapidly as 
the energy storage system could be recharged (seconds to minutes).  Payload handling would 
probably limit launches to no more than a few per hour.  This is to be contrasted with days to 
weeks between launches today.  This means that even a massive project can be lifted to orbit in a 
few days or weeks rather than years (as the GPS system required or the Space Station is expected 
to require).  The rapid launch pace will also impact the logistics of anti-satellite warfare.  If an 
inventory of spare satellites is maintained on the ground, it is conceivable to have a replacement 
satellite on orbit within a single orbit time of the discovery of any satellite’s destruction.  Launch 
reliability and safety should also go up significantly.  The electromagnetic launcher is more akin 
to a light rail system than to the Space Shuttle.   
 
 Although electromagnetic launch by itself is not practical for launching manned space-
craft into orbit, it may replace the first stage of existing systems.  At 3 gees acceleration the 50-
km long launcher could accelerate a manned spacecraft to roughly 1200 m/s velocity.  This is 
fast enough that a scramjet engine could begin to operate efficiently or a single conventional liq-
uid-fueled rocket stage could continue boosting the spacecraft into orbit.  Elimination of the 
largest (booster) stage would have an enormous impact on cost as well as on safety and reliabil-
ity.  With low-cost, high reliability, and acceptable safety, it will be possible for anyone with a 
reason to go into space to be able to do so.  Industrial processes that are better performed in 
space, will be (as opposed to still being expensive research projects today).  Space tourism may 
be profitable.  Without a doubt, the door will be opened to the colonization of space. 
 
 
High Energy Density Power Supplies 
 
 Many potential military systems require extremely compact, high energy density power 
supplies to be practical.  For example, low-energy directed energy weapons (laser dazzlers) re-
quire approximately 1 kW average prime power and run times of at least an hour (preferably tens 
of hours) to be practical in some man-portable infantry applications.  If lead-acid or nickel-
cadmium batteries were to be used, the minimum-sized battery alone would weigh roughly 40 kg 
(far too heavy to for an infantryman to carry).  See Table M-2. [216]  Even if lithium-sulfur diox-
ide batteries were used the minimal battery would weigh an excessive 5 kg.  It would require a 
battery with an energy storage density of the order of 5 MJ/kg and a power density of the order 
of 1 kW/kg to make this and other applications truly practical.  
 
 Paths to realize the magic 5 MJ/kg @ 1 kW/kg performance levels have not yet been 
identified.  However, there are a number of potential approaches.  Batteries have not yet been 
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proven incapable of achieving the desired performance.  The energy storage efficiency of some 
battery systems is adequate, but the power density required has not. However, new battery mate-
rials are being developed are being developed all the time.  Supercapacitors are charge storage 
devices that are capable of withstanding high internal field strengths.  Energy storage efficiency 
Table M-2.  Characteristics of current power storage devices. 
 
 
          ENERGY STORAGE EFFICIENCY               POWER 
      MATERIAL        WEIGHT    VOLUME   DENSITY 
 
    Lead Acid Battery    0.1 MJ/kg  0.3 MJ/l           <50 W/kg  
    Nickel-Cadmium Battery  0.05-0.1 MJ/kg 0.1-0.2 MJ/l           30-150 W/kg  
    Lithium-Sulfur Dioxide Battery 1 MJ/kg     2 MJ/l            220 W/kg 
    Lithium-Thionyl Chloride Battery 2.0-5.5 MJ/kg  4-11 MJ/l           < 100 W/kg  
    High Explosive Generator  3-5 MJ/kg      3-5 MJ/l           3-5 x 105 MW/kg  
 
 
in a supercapacitor will scale as the square of the internal field strength achievable.  A quick es-
timate shows that 5 MJ/l can be achieved at field strengths of 109 V/m.  This value is only one 
order of magnitude lower than the typical fields experienced by outer shell electrons in atoms.  
Thus, it is possible that supercapacitors may approach but not achieve the desired efficiencies.  
Hydrogen-oxygen fuel cells represent a third possible avenue of approach.  The chemical energy 
stored in hydrogen (125 MJ/kg H2) is more than adequate.  However, the overhead associated 
with hydrogen storage and with the fuel cell itself has to date prevented them from reaching the 
desired performance.  Cold fusion, although a long-shot candidate, is still a possibility because of 
the enormous energy efficiency associated with fusion. 
 
 If power supplies with the required 5 MJ/kg @ 1 kW/kg characteristics can be achieved, 
then many military devices may become practical.  In the introduction to this section we men-
tioned the possibility for handheld directed energy weapons.  Another application lies in the area 
of bionic augmentation (discussed in the next section).  An average human being may expend 
roughly 3000 Calories (12.6 MJ) per day.  Running can consume 300 Calories per hour (350 W).  
A 5 kg power supply with the “magic” characteristics above could provide 10 times the power 
consumed by running for a period of over 7 hours.  Thus, it might be capable of powering a set 
of bionic legs running much faster than a human for a large fraction of a day.  Other applications 
of high energy density power supplies include active sensors such as radars on remote platforms 





 Medical science is at the verge of creating prosthetics with functionality comparable to 
the original “organ” and that are controlled by direct nervous connections.  Artificial legs, hands, 
and arms have reached a level of maturity that it is difficult to label their possessors as “dis-
abled”.  Within a few years we will have functional artificial eyes, ears, and noses as well as 
fully dexterous artificial limbs. 
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 It takes no great leap of imagination to envision artificial limbs with built-in weaponry.  
Built in guns would be more accurate (pointing would not have to account for how the weapon 
were being held) and incapable of being lost in close quarters combat. An artificial limb could 
also contain “built-in” computer and communications equipment.  Mechanical muscles could be 
made stronger than biological ones and would be less susceptible to fatigue or minor injury.  Ar-
tificial eyes could incorporate low-light level or thermal infrared imaging capabilities (or both).  
Artificial organs could be developed that enhanced human healing capabilities.  For example, 
blood gases and electrolytes can be monitored and altered to provide optimum performance. 
When bleeding is detected extra levels of platelets and/or clotting factors could be injected into 
the bloodstream.  Glucose or plasma could be injected into the bloodstream if deficiencies due to 
excessive exertion for long periods without adequate refreshment and rehydration were detected.  
Performance might be enhanced by injecting drugs (such as stimulants, tranquilizers, or painkill-
ers, as determined by circumstances) or by providing biofeedback control of physiological func-
tions. 
 
 The benefits of bionic augmentation might be such that professional soldiers (voluntarily 
or otherwise, depending on the culture) would routinely undergo surgery to replace perfectly 
good organs with superior prosthetics.  If one first-rate military power institutes this practice, 
could others refrain and place themselves at distinct disadvantages.  There are deep cultural im-
plications in this.  The “branding” that would accompany bionic augmentation might cause an 
even deeper divide between the military and the civilian population than currently exists.  The 
whole concept of civilian control of the military might be challenged. 
 
 If bionic mutilation is not an option because of these cultural limitations, then bionic 
augmentation in the form of mechanical exoskeletons or power suits remains an option. All of 
the bionic advantages described above can be provided without any need for sacrifice of limbs or 
organs.  The powered battle armor that is a staple of science fiction lacks only high energy den-
sity power supplies to be practical today. 
 
 
Ultrastrong Fibers  
 
 Many applications require materials much stronger and lighter than ordinary metals.  
These applications are now turning to composite materials using fibers (for strength) embedded 
in a matrix (to minimize fiber motion and wear).  The strength of these composites depends on 
the strength of the fibers.  Strong fibers are also being woven into fabric to provide strength and 
flexibility.  Among the commonly used fibers are glasses (as in Fiberglas), synthetic polymers 
(such as Kevlar), and carbon (graphite), the latter being perhaps the best currently available.  
Carbon fibers have tensile strengths of about 5 GPa at densities of about 2.25 g/cm3 (compared 
to 3 GPa at 7.9 g/cm3 for steel).  However, new and much stronger fibers are being developed.  
One of those being seriously studied is spider silk (dragline fibers) with strengths considerably 
greater than Kevlar.  Current work is aimed at producing spider dragline silk from the milk of 
genetically altered goats.  Unlike ordinary silk, which can be mass-produced by cultivating silk-
worms, spiders cannot be similarly grown in quantities and harvested like the silkworm cocoons.  




 However, the most promising candidate appears to be fibers made from carbon nano-
tubes.  A carbon nanotube is a tubelike stucture made entirely from carbon bonded in interlock-
ing “benzene” rings.  Nanotubes are close relatives of buckyballs.  Buckyballs are a novel form 
of carbon derived from the original molecule to be discovered, C60 or buckminsterfullerene.  In 
buckminsterfullerene each carbon has one double bond and two single bonds to other carbon at-
oms forming a spherical shell of carbon that looks like the geodesic dome designed by Buckmin-
ster Fuller, hence the name.  Other “buckyball” molecules have been found that have other 
shapes, including tubes.  The entire nanotube is essentially a single molecule.  Mechanically 
breaking such a fiber would be the equivalent of mechanically pulling a molecule into halves.  In 
fact, a large number of extra strong chemical bonds would have to be broken in order to break a 
nanotube.  Recent measurements indicate that the tensile strength of an individual nanotube is 
30-50 GPa. [217]  Theoretical estimates of the strength are as high as 200 GPa.  Thus, there is 
reason to believe that strengths of 100 GPa or higher may be achieved as the technology matures.  
The density of a nanotube should be somewhat less than the density of graphite.  Thus, nanotube 
composites could have ten times the strength of steel at one-fifth the density.  The same materials 
would be several times stronger than equivalent pieces made from Kevlar or graphite fibers. 
 
 The applications of super-strong fibers are numerous.  Body armor could be made lighter 
and capable of stopping even larger projectiles than currently possible.  Super-lightweight air-
frames would make possible routine human-powered flight as well as ultra-long endurance air 
vehicles.  Main battle tanks could have increased armor protections while shedding half of their 
current weight (or more).  Armor would once again become a practical design consideration for 
ships and aircraft.  Airframes capable of pulling 50-100 g maneuvers while fully loaded are an-
other possibility.  These super-agile airframes would be almost impossible to shoot down with 
interceptor missiles.  Even though missile airframes could be made even more agile using the 
same materials, improvements in seeker technology would almost certainly also be required.   
 
 The added strength with reduced weight would also allow extremely large structures to 
become practical.  Suspension bridges with 100-km clear spans become thinkable.  So too, do 
very large space structures.  In the 1970s NASA determined that space colony platforms enclos-
ing volumes of the order of 1000 km3 were feasible using steel construction materials. [218]  The 
primary limitation was the cost of lifting the huge weight of metal into orbit. Using super-strong 
fiber materials, comparable structures could be built with weights that are a few percent of the 
comparable steel structures.  Finally, nanotube fibers might actually make the “Space Elevator” 
possible. [219]  The “Space Elevator” is a cable drawn elevator with one end attached to the 
Earth at the Equator and the other end in geosynchronous orbit.  Satellites could be launched 
merely by pulling them up in the elevator car.  Detailed design studies have indicated that a ma-
terial of 60-70 GPa strength is required to make such an elevator a practical reality.  A practical 
space elevator could eliminate the launch costs that make many projects impractical.  For exam-
ple, large space stations, space colonies, space-based ballistic missile defense, and interplanetary 






 The use of superconductivity has long been negated by the need to cool the materials to 
temperatures below the liquefaction point of hydrogen (and more preferably to liquid helium 
temperatures, i.e., 4.2K). [220]  However, in the past two decades considerable progress has been 
made in extending the temperature at which superconductors can operate.  Current capabilities 
allow operation at temperatures somewhat above the temperature of liquid nitrogen (77K). Since 
cryogenic coolers can readily achieve this latter temperature, a number of new military applica-
tions are being considered.  Unfortunately, these high-temperature materials are essentially ce-
ramics and lack flexibility.  Current research is aimed at incorporating these materials into bend-
able “wire” that can be used to fabricate practical electric devices.  It may be several years before 
such “wire” is available at reasonable cost.  Furthermore, cryogenic coolers are costly, have reli-
ability limitations, and can only cool relatively small devices.  Thus, further improvements in 
high temperature operation are desired.  When the limit is extended to roughly 200 K, tempera-
tures which relatively inexpensive and reliable thermoelectric coolers can achieve, then a vast 
array of additional applications will become practical.  When the limit is extended above room 
temperature, then normal-conducting devices and circuits will almost certainly become obsolete.  
 
 Among the devices and technologies that will benefit from high temperature supercon-
ductors we must include:  
• Low power consumption electronics (superconducting interconnects remove one of 
the sources of power dissipation in electronic circuits). 
• Ultracompact high-power motors (superconducting magnets will not overheat as 
easily as conventional electromagnets). 
• Higher power microwave devices 
• Superconducting detector systems (superconducting junctions make excellent 
broadband – infrared through microwave – detectors).  Their current use is limited 
because of the need for excessive cooling. 
• SQUID seekers and imagers – supersensitive magnetic detectors can be fabricated 
into large arrays if cooling were not required.  Such arrays could be processed to pro-
vide directional and spatial shape information about any magnetic object.  This would 
permit discrimination of targets from clutter and allow their use in weapon delivery 
applications.  
• Electromagnetic launch – a superconducting linear motor would consume consid-
erably less prime power than a conventional motor.  
• Ultra-high-speed rail transportation – numerous designs exist for superconducting 
levitation rail systems.  The cost of cooling low-temperature superconductors has 
been one factor in their failure to gain acceptance on a wide scale. 
• Magnetic bearings can permit nearly frictionless suspension of large objects.  Very 
high rotational velocities and/or energies would be permitted. 
Many other applications will undoubtedly appear when this technology matures. 
 
 
Cold Fusion Power Supplies 
 
 The announcement of the discovery of “cold fusion” in March 1989 prompted an imme-
diate disavowal by the scientific community. [221]  Some of this was due to the “press confer-
ence” approach used in the announcement, some was due to perceived unwarranted speculation 
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on the part of the discoverers, and some was due to the outsider effect (how could a pair of 
chemists discover a physical phenomena that physicists have been unable to discover).  Despite 
the almost complete rejection of the phenomena of the scientific mainstream, the basic claim of 
excess energy generation was never disproved.  Instead, the “fringe” community that continued 
to investigate the phenomena has proven the existence of excess energy beyond any reasonable 
doubt.  A theoretical understanding of the phenomenon continues to elude scientists. 
 
 The lack of theoretical understanding does not preclude practical applications.  Super-
conductivity was discovered five decades before the Bardeen-Cooper-Schrieffer (BCS) theory 
was proposed.[222]  X-rays were being used in hospitals three decades before their origins in 
atomic transitions could be explained by the quantum theory.  Even without an underlying the-
ory, it should be possible to develop practical power supplies based on the cold fusion effect. 
 
 Given that the excess energy effect does not require enormous volumes of material to 
manifest itself, it appears that one of the first applications would be in compact, moderate-power, 
generation systems (comparable to turbine engines or fuel cells).  This would make “non-
nuclear” (i.e. non-fission) submarines possible with all of the advantages of nuclear power, but 
none of the disadvantages.  This would revolutionize undersea warfare.  The lack of nuclear dis-
advantages would drive most surface ships to adopt cold fusion power as their prime movers.  
This would eliminate one of the current vulnerabilities associated with the need for frequent un-
derway refueling. 
 
 Safe power plants would also be available for satellites and spacecraft.  If megawatt pow-
ers were available on satellites without the threat of a plutonium radiothermal generator or a nu-
clear power reactor occasionally crashing back to earth, then radar imaging satellites could pro-
liferate.  Electrical power could be made available to remote regions with considerably less 
logistics burden (gallons of deuterium oxide compared to tens of thousands of gallon of motor 
fuel).  The availability of megawatts powers from compact and safe reactors would make it pos-
sible to build truly mobile directed energy weapons, including directed energy weapons on 
spacecraft.  Undoubtedly, hundreds of other uses would be manifest long before large-scale fu-
sion powerplants for commercial electricity generation were ever built. 
 
 
Deep Diving Submarines 
  
 Improvements in materials and improvements in automation and artificial intelligence 
(permitting reduced manning or even elimination of manning) will permit truly deep diving 
submarines – submarines capable of operating at depths of several thousand meters or more.  
Such submarines may have considerably smaller pressure hulls with more of the submarine at 
ambient pressure.  This will reduce the truly vulnerable area of the submarine.  It will also facili-
tate the use of multiple outer hulls.  In addition, many of the features needed to harden the ship 
against pressures ten to one hundred times greater than those currently faced will provide added 
resistance to conventional weapons when at shallow depths.  Depth charges, torpedoes, direct-hit 
shaped charge weapons, and even nuclear depth charges (at reasonable standoff ranges) may not 
provide kills.  Such submarines will also be able to dive deeper than any current antisubmarine 
weapons are capable of functioning.  As a result, if they are capable of detecting an attack early 
enough to permit them to reach the depths before the weapons can catch them, they will be es-
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sentially invulnerable.  Even if they are unable to dive deeper than the attacking weapons, they 
may be able to reach the ocean bottom, where increased reverberation and topographic features 
will make it easier to confuse both active and passive sonar seekers. 
 
 Deep diving submarines will be harder to detect.  Intervening thermal layers can com-
pletely reflect acoustic emissions from the submarine.  The normal refractive ducting present in 
acoustic propagation in the ocean will make it difficult for a deep submarine to be detected by 
any shallow platform.  Acoustic waves emitted in the deep sound channel will tend to stay in the 
deep sound channel.  The ability to dive deep permits submarines to access more of the ocean 
bottoms.  A submarine lying “dead” on the ocean bottom will be almost impossible to detect ex-
cept with the most sophisticated side scan sonar systems.  If a deep submarine can remain unde-
tected until a battle group passes overhead, then it has a good chance of rising rapidly to the sur-
face, prosecuting a successful attack, and returning to the safety of the depths before a counterat-
tack can be mounted.   
 
 Development of deep diving submarines will almost certainly be accompanied by devel-
opment of weapons (torpedoes) capable of functioning in those depths.  In this case, the subma-
rine may never need to leave the depths in order to prosecute an attack.  Torpedoes appearing out 
of nowhere will be difficult to defend against.  Given the potential for submarine maneuvers at 
depth before beginning the final attack phase will give the surface forces little or no information 
with which to find and attack the submarine.   In essence, deep diving submarines will create a 
truly three-dimensional underwater battlespace, in which surface ships, aircraft, and shallow div-





 In ordinary computers numbers are represented in binary notation as strings of “bits” 
(bistable operating states of electronic circuits that can represent a “0” or a “1” – 5 bits can be 
used to represent any integer between 0 and 25–1 = 31).  The computer solves problems by in-
structing selected strings of bits to be altered according to a selected sequence of operations 
called a program.  In a quantum computer bits are replaced by qubits (quantum bits) which can 
represent a “0” or a “1” or any value in between or more than one value simultaneously.  Five 
qubits can represent all of the numbers between 0 and 31 simultaneously.  This property is a 
manifestation of quantum mechanical uncertainty.  Another property of qubits is that each qubit 
is weakly coupled to every qubit – another manifestation of quantum mechanics.  Changing one 
qubit has the ability to subtly change every other qubit.  External forces can be applied to each 
qubit to cause it to have higher or lower probability of representing a “1” or a “0”.  The program 
in a quantum computer is the sequence of applications of these external forces to selected groups 
of qubits.   
 
 Many elements of the quantum computer “art” are in hand today.  In 1981 Richard 
Feynman proved theoretically that any physical system could be simulated on a quantum com-
puter of appropriate size. [223]  This means that the technology should be applicable to solving 
virtually any physical (vice metaphysical) problem of interest.  By 1994, Peter Schor at AT&T 
Laboratories established the first algorithm (program) suitable for processing by quantum com-
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puter. [224]  In March 2000 a team at Los Alamos National Laboratory showed that a quantum 
computer could be built using the spins of atomic nuclei composing a molecule.  The spins could 
be altered by magnetic resonance using frequency-tuned pulses of radio frequency radiation.  In 
August 2000 a group at IBM actually solved a simple problem, order finding, using a quantum 
computer.  At labs around the world, researchers are looking at using nuclear spins, supercon-
ducting junctions, acoustically trapped electrons, and quantum dots (microscopic bumps on sili-
con) to implement ever larger, faster, and more stable quantum computers. 
 
The power of a quantum computer is that all possible solutions to a problem are calcu-
lated simultaneously.  A 32-bit microprocessor operating at 1000 MHz can perform approxi-
mately 32 billion one-bit operations every second.  A 32-qubit quantum computer operating at 
1000 MHz will perform the equivalent of 4.3 billion billion one-bit operations every second (8 
orders of magnitude higher).  Quantum computers with only 25 to 30 qubits should be capable of 
solving a significant number of problems.  They will be capable of solving those problems in 
only a few machine cycles (microseconds?).  Quantum computers with hundreds of qubits will 
likely be capable of solving any problem we can currently think of.  The enormous problem solv-
ing capacity of quantum computers will make them as revolutionary to computing today as the 
microprocessor was to computing in the 1980’s. 
 
 The most obvious and possibly the first practical application of quantum computers will 
be in the area of cryptography.  Schor’s algorithm [224] can be used to factor large numbers, a 
key step in breaking many of the most sophisticated encryption schemes.[224]  These encryption 
schemes are based on keys which are the products of very large prime numbers.  If the two prime 
number factors can be determined, the encrypted messages can be decoded.  Virtually every code 
based on pseudorandom sequences will be rapidly decipherable.  It is possible that all encryption 
techniques (except one-time pads) will be rapidly decipherable and secret communication will no 
longer be possible.  If this transpires, it may be impossible to achieve strategic surprise.  Diplo-
matic communications will be forced to bypass all forms of electronic communication.   
 
 Network-centric operations will be severely affected.  If encryption technology becomes 
rapidly decipherable, then our intelligence data, commands, and all other forms of communica-
tion will become rapidly transparent to almost every adversary.  Your adversaries will know eve-
rything communicated over the network almost as quickly as you know about it or transmit it.   
 
 Even commonly used systems will be vulnerable to exploitation.  Low probability of in-
tercept radars and communication links employ spread spectrum transmission and pulse com-
pression reception.  The pseudorandom noise-like spread spectrum techniques are readily ame-
nable to detection by quantum computers.  All possible pseudorandom sequences can be ana-
lyzed in parallel by a quantum computer.  Any receiver with a quantum computer can obtain the 
full processing gain of the intended receiver (that knows the pseudorandom sequence).  Thus, 
low probability of intercept devices using spread spectrum techniques will cease being low prob-
ability of intercept.  This will make it even harder to implement highly stealthy platforms.  Such 
platforms will be forced to operate under complete communications silence and will have to em-




Passive Coherent Location 
 
 It has been observed since the earliest days of radio, that an object moving between a 
transmitter and a receiver will cause interference.  Observation of such interference ultimately 
led to the invention of radar.  The weak radio signal which has “reflected” off of the moving ob-
ject will interfere with the radio signal traveling on a direct path between the transmitter and re-
ceiver.  The phenomenon is closely related to multipath in conventional radar systems.  In truth, 
it is multipath in a bistatic radar geometry.  The interference manifests itself as a roughly sinu-
soidal amplitude modulation that begins with low amplitudes and high frequencies and gradually 
grows in amplitude whiles its frequency decreases.  The amplitude grows to a maximum at some 
minimum frequency and then the process reverses with the amplitude decreasing while the 
modulation frequency increases until the amplitude becomes so small and/or the frequency so 
large that the effect seems to disappear.  After the interference damps out, the reflected signal 
may appear as a faint ghost image.   
 
 Passive coherent location uses the simultaneous detection and processing of such inter-
ference from at least transmitters at different locations.  The phase and frequency of the modula-
tion produced by a single moving target using a single transmitter depends on the position of the 
target relative to the transmitter and receiver, on the target velocity, and on the carrier frequency 
of the radio signal (which is known).  Measurement of the interference parameters from three 
transmitters permits determination of the target position and velocity (in three dimensions if the 
transmitter and receiver locations are precisely known; or in two dimensions if the transmitter 
locations are not known;).  Measurement of the parameters from a larger number of transmitters 
can permit tracking in three dimensions using transmitters of unknown locations. 
 
 Passive coherent location systems can be implemented using existing transmitters (such 
as television or radio stations) and ubiquitous receivers (such as home television sets) with a 
telephone or radio system to communicate the time at which maximum interference is observed. 
Maximum interference will occur when the target passes closest to the line of sight between the 
transmitter and the receiver.  A distributed network of such receivers with a central processing 
center to correlate interference reports can provide coarse tracking of airborne targets.  Improved 
performance can be obtained by performing more detailed analysis of the signals from each re-
ceiver and transmitting this data to the correlation center.  A single receiving station analyzing 
the signals from multiple distributed transmitters can eliminate the need for networking.  Even 
better performance can be achieved if dedicated transmitters are used to transmit ideal wave-
forms and dedicated receivers are used to detect and analyze those waveforms.  In this last in-
stance we have evolved to a netted multistatic radar system.  It still falls within the classification 
of passive coherent location because the receivers are not collocated with the transmitters. 
 
 A variety of passive coherent systems are being pursued.  The Lockheed Martin Silent 
Sentry system uses a sophisticated receiver to process signals from multiple radio and television 
transmitters.[249]  China appears to be developing a similar system.[250]  Russia has offered to 
sell a radar barrier system called Struna-1 which uses a linear array of bistatic radars operating in 
a forward scatter geometry.  Other systems are under active investigation. 
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 The interest in passive coherent location stems from its counterstealth potential.  Most air 
defense radars currently operate in a monostatic or backscatter geometry (receiver co-located 
with the transmitter).  Stealth design attempts to minimize scattering of radar radiation back to-
wards the radar.  One consequence of minimizing backscatter is that radar reflection in other ge-
ometries (including forward scattering) is at worst minimally reduced and may in fact be consid-
erably enhanced.  Thus, passive coherent location systems (which use forward scattering geome-
tries) will be minimally affected by current designs for stealth.  Both stealthy and non-stealthy 
targets will be detected, tracked, and engaged.  Any attempt to design for additional stealth in the 
forward scattering geometry will probably cause increased scattering in the backscatter geometry 
(which is unacceptable).  Thus, passive coherent location systems may turn the U. S. commit-
ment to stealth platforms into an expensive liability.   If stealth no longer guarantees survivabil-
ity, then U. S. forces will be severely disrupted.  Tactics and doctrine must change.  Missions 
may have to go unaddressed.  Added casualties must be anticipated. 
 
 
Ultrasensitive Magnetic Detectors 
 
 The development of superconducting quantum interference devices (SQUIDs) has led to 
the development of ultrasensitive magnetometers and compact magnetic gradiometers.  SQUID-
based magnetometers can be three to four orders of magnitude more sensitive than fluxgate mag-
netometers.  Since the dipole components of magnetic fields (including magnetic anomalies) fall 
off with the inverse power of range, three orders of magnitude improvement in sensitivity im-
plies a potential increase in detection range of one order of magnitude (10X), assuming the 
detection range is not limited by clutter.  Because SQUIDs are basically two-dimensional devices 
(they are similar in size to microprocessor chips), whereas fluxgates are three-dimensional (they 
are typically longer than they are wide), SQUID magnetometers can be considerably smaller than 
fluxgate magnetometers with comparable flux areas.  The recent advances in high-temperature 
superconductivity permits the manufacture of SQUIDs that operate at liquid nitrogen tempera-
tures (77K) rather than liquid helium temperatures (4 K).  Liquid nitrogen temperature SQUIDs 
can be employed in numerous military applications whereas liquid helium temperature SQUIDs 
cannot. 
 
 One obvious application is to replace fluxgate magnetometers in traditional magnetic 
anomaly detectors.  In this application, there may be reductions in size achievable.  However, the 
increase in sensitivity may not translate into increased detection range because clutter (magnetic 
rocks and debris from sunken vessels) often limits detection range.  The use of gradient magne-
tometers may improve this somewhat.   
 
 Another potential application is in mines or fixed-position sensors.  Since a mine or a 
fixed-position sensor (such as an element of a grid of sensors) looks for time-dependent varia-
tions of the magnetic field (not space-dependent variations), they will be relative insensitive to 
the clutter that limits airborne magnetic anomaly detectors.  A ten-fold increase in range allows 
magnetic detectors to play a role in deeper-water mines similar to CAPTOR.  Alternatively, the 
increased sensitivity would require any magnetic-silencing (used to defeat magnetic influence 
mines) to be performed an order of magnitude better than currently required.  Ships that are 
deemed adequately silenced today would trigger mines with more sensitive magnetic detectors.   
 371
 
 The magnetic field changes produced by current vessels could be detected at ranges of 
the order of 10 km.  Thus, SQUID magnetometers could be incorporated into a grid with 10-20 
km element spacing covering a large area with a management number of elements.  For example, 
a region 200 km by 1000 km (roughly the size of the entire Persian Gulf) could be covered with 
only 500-2000 sensor elements.  Virtually any vessel larger than a corvette, surface or subsur-
face, could be continuously tracked anywhere within the sensor system.  The application to sub-
marine tracking (of even the quietest electric drive boats) would make it virtually impossible for 
submarines to operate in littoral waters without detection and subsequent attack. 
 
 Ultrasensitive magnetic sensor might also be useful in seeker applications.  Although 
non-ferromagnetic aluminum, titanium, and composites dominate aircraft construction materials, 
virtually every aircraft, even stealth aircraft must have some magnetic materials or magnetic field 
producing components, such as electrical generators.  These fields might be detectable at dis-
tances of the order of a kilometer or more.  If a fire direction system can get a missile close to a 
target, if only by chance, then a gradient magnetometer might be able to guide that missile with 




Ultrasensitive Gravitational Detectors 
 
 All objects have gravitational fields that are proportional to their mass.  Furthermore, we 
currently know of no way to mask or alter those gravitational fields.  Sensitive gravitational field 
detectors could provide robust target detection capabilities.  Gravity gradiometers would further 
enhance detection sensitivity.  They might be very useful in detecting stealth aircraft.  Any mass 
detected flying between the sensor and the sky must be a target of interest.  It is conceivable that 
an array of ultrasensitive gravitational detectors would prove to be the ultimate in counterstealth 
systems.  Gravitational anomalies might also be useful in detecting submerged or buried objects.  
Cavities such as tunnels or buried bunkers might also be detectable. 
 
 
Active Element Conformal Array Antennas 
 
 Phased array antennas for radars (see Appendix E) are usually considered to be superior 
to conventional reflector antennas.  On many platforms, normal antenna sizes (including those of 
current phased array antennas) are severely limited.  Weight will limit the size of antennas placed 
on masts.  Clear area will limit the size in aircraft applications.  Available superstructure area 
limits the size of phased array antennas mounted on many surface ships.  On some platforms, the 
maximum power available is limited by the powers that available power amplifiers can produce.  
Active element conformal array antennas can significantly increase available antenna size by al-
lowing the phased array to be wrapped around the entire skin of the platform, rather than being 
localized to the restricted space available to a flat rigid array.  In addition, maximum power is 
determined not by amplifier size but by the number of active elements in the array.  Adding more 
elements will increase the available transmit power as well as increase the size of the antenna.  
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This not only decreases beamwidth and improves angular resolution, it also increases the antenna 
gain, which further enhances target detection and tracking ability. 
 
 There are several critical technology elements in implementing active element conformal 
array antennas.  These include development of the active elements, development of sensors for 
determining the exact position in space of each element, and a processor for calculating the phase 
shifts needed to form the beam for each choice of beam direction and set of antenna element lo-
cations.  The active elements must include amplifiers, phase shifters, and duplexers.  The posi-
tion sensors may yield absolute position measurements, although it is sufficient to provide posi-
tion measurements relative only to the neighboring array elements.  The processor must calculate 
the phase of each antenna element relative to a hypothetical wavefront propagating in the desired 
direction.  This is not difficult but it is computationally intense. 
 
 Conformal array antennas would find immediate use in fire control radars on aircraft.  
Aperture size in these systems is limited by the fuselage diameter.  Placing the antenna elements 
along the wings and fuselage would increase the field of view of these radars as well as improv-
ing angular resolution and increasing antenna gain (increasing useful range).  Target detection 
radars on helicopters are another potential application.  Placing the array in the rotating helicop-
ter blades would eliminate current weight constraints (they are usually mounted on a mast above 
the main radar) and provide more than an order of magnitude improvement in target location ac-
curacy.  Conformal array antennas may also make it possible to implement viable ballistic mis-
sile defense radars on board surface ships.  The nominal requirement of 3 x 106 W-m2 (defined in 
the ABM treaty as the threshold for ABM radars) can be met by a radar with a 10 m x 30 m an-
tenna transmitting 10 kW average power.[201]  Conformal arrays are also tailor-made for un-
manned vehicle applications.   Size and weight are critical in such application.  There is seldom 
as much space available as desired.  By using conformal array antennas, the maximum available 





Nanotechnology [228]-[230] is engineering and manufacturing at the molecular level.  In 
its ultimate form, devices of all kinds would be built atom by atom using machines called assem-
blers.  An assembler would act according to a program and construct new devices by following 
that program to assemble the entire device one atom at a time using atoms from a pool of ele-
mental resource materials.  In this respect, an assembler is an extrapolation from a robotic as-
sembly line that follows instructions from a program and constructs a car (or other object) one 
part at a time using parts drawn from inventory.  With an assembler in operation, macroscopic 
devices would appear to literally grow from a stream of raw materials.  Assemblers would obvi-
ously revolutionize manufacturing.  A flexible assembler would be capable of making anything 
from a mass of raw materials, just by changing its program.  It would be the “replicator” of Star 
Trek fame. 
 
Work on producing an assembler is taking several approaches.  In one approach, atomic 
force microprobes are used to position atoms one at a time on the surface of a substrate.  Get the 
first desired atom and place it onto the substrate.  Get the next desired atom and place it on the 
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substrate at the desired position relative to the first atom, and so on, until the finished product is 
assembled.  Any sort of possible molecular structure could be built in this fashion. 
 
Another approach recognizes that specialized assemblers already exist in nature in the 
form of ribosomes.  A ribosome is a complex molecule that reads the “program” encoded in a 
strand of RNA and builds the encoded protein, one amino acid at a time.  It is possible that artifi-
cial ribosomes could build other molecular structures using different basic building blocks.  This 
work is still in its infancy. 
 
 It is hypothesized that macroscopic nanotechnology will revolutionize the world almost 
overnight, when the breakthrough occurs (i.e., a programmable assembler is perfected).  Designs 
for nanoproducts and programs to produce them are already being generated in advance of the 
existence of the first assembler.  Once produced, the first assembler will produce other assem-
blers.  The existing designs and programs produced by others will immediately be adapted to the 
new assembler.  The development process might grow factorially. 
 
Nanotechnology can involve micro-machines fabricating macroscopic objects.  It could 
also involve the fabrication of molecular-sized machines.  This aspect of nanotechnology can be 
thought of as the extrapolation of micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) technology from 
the microscopic scale to the molecular scale.  Some structures have been made possible by the 
discovery of buckyballs.  Buckyballs are a novel form of carbon derived from the original mole-
cule to be discovered, C60 or buckminsterfullerene.  In buckminsterfullerene each carbon has one 
double bond and two single bonds to other carbon atoms forming a spherical shell of carbon that 
looks like the geodesic dome designed by Buckminster Fuller, hence the name.  Other “bucky-
ball” molecules have been found that assume other shapes, including bowls and tubes.  Addition 
of atoms other than carbon permits an unlimited variety of molecular shapes to be generated.  
Gears, shafts, bearings, tubes, vessels, etc. have already been designed from single complex 
molecules.  Current investigations are looking at how macroscopic devices might be translated to 
the molecular level and how they would be powered.  Robots the size of protein molecules might 
ultimately result from this work. 
 
Much current effort is being spent on creating special nanoscale materials.[252]  For ex-
ample, the electrical properties of small particles of metals as well as small particles of insulators 
have been found to be strongly dependent on the size of the particles.  Production of uniform 
nanoscale materials is expected to result in new electronic devices and in new chemical catalysts. 
 
Another aspect of nanotechnology research is focusing on molecular switches.[252]  Any 
entity that is capable of maintaining either of two distinct states and is capable of transitioning 
between those states given an appropriate stimulus can for a binary logic device.  Several differ-
ent kinds of nanoscale molecules have been found to exhibit two molecular configurations that 
can be externally selected based on the presence or absence of additional electrons.  It may prove 
possible to create computers using these molecules.  Given that these switches may be smaller 
than 10 nm and the scale of current computer switches is several times greater than 180 nm (the 
current lithographic linewidth achievable), it is clear that these molecular computer technologies 
offer the potential for major advances in computer packaging.  They might extend Moore’s Law 
for another 8 to 12 doubling times (15 to 20 years). 
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 In the author’s opinion, practical nanotechnology assemblers are at least several decades 
away.  He will say the same about practical nanoscale machines.  These will have the biggest 
impact and will be truly disruptive when they occur.  The development and employment of spe-
cial nanomaterials is occurring as the author writes.  However, similar materials advances are 
made all the time and are not likely to be disruptive.  Even though the development of practical 
nanoscale molecular switches is also likely in the next decade, the author cannot consider them 
disruptive either.  The capabilities they will enable are evolutionary and predicted by Moore’s 
Law.  They will merely provide new and different mechanisms (adding to a sizable list of other 
possibilities) to overcome the technological limits that will likely prevent CMOS transistor tech-
nology from sustaining Moore’s Law more than a few more doubling times into the future.  It is 





 The term “nanites” was popularized by “Evolution”, an episode of Star Trek:  The Next 
Generation [231] in which self-reproducing, robotic microbes employing nanotechnology [228] 
evolve intelligence.  The term is loosely used today to describe any form of robotic microbe (re-
producing or not; intelligent or not).  The simplest form of nanite (a deterministically pro-
grammed, non-reproducing robotic microbe) is perhaps more described using Drexler’s term “as-
sembler”. 
 
Nanites might revolutionize medicine [232].  They could move throughout the body re-
pairing damage to cell tissues, recognizing and killing cancer cells or pathogenic organisms, de-
stroying and recycling harmful proteins or other toxins, and even diagnose and repair damage to 
the body’s DNA.  In short, they might make it possible to live forever (barring accidents).  Short 
of this goal, they might regrow damaged organs, speed the knitting of broken bones, and clean 
arteries of built up cholesterol plaques, significantly extending human lifetimes. 
 
Nanites could also be used as weapons, especially reproducing nanites.  A nanite might 
do the opposite of one or more of the functions above, speeding death.  They could convert nor-
mal proteins into toxic proteins.  Consider a nanite that selectively produced botulinum toxin.  A 
single nanite might be able to kill an individual within hours.  Nanites might be able to convert 
normal proteins into the infectious kind – called prions – that cause Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 
(the human version of bovine spongiform encephalopathy – mad cow disease).  They could be 
made to be immune to normal biological defenses.  They might be the ultimate strategic “bio-
logical” weapon.  Conversely, nanites might be the only mechanism for curing any of the spongi-
form encephalopathies by selectively destroying the harmful prions.  They could act as “univer-
sal” antidotes to nerve agents by recognizing and destroying any cholinesterase inhibitor that was 
not natural to the body.  They could easily be made to act as antidotes to specific toxins such as 
botulinum.  
 
Nanites might also act to degrade or damage the equipment of an adversary.  For exam-
ple, a single nanite that converted plastic insulation into conducting graphite would create a short 
circuit in an electronics system in a short period of time.  Many such nanites would make virtu-
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ally all electronics useless.  Nanites might be used to turn petroleum supplies into worthless goo, 
alter the transparency of optical materials, or reduce the strength of structural materials.  Any-
thing a nanotechnology “assembler” might be able to make, a “nanite” might be able to unmake.  
The military implications are obvious. 
 
 Most importantly, nanites could fight other nanites.  If the adversary introduced a toxin-
producing nanite, we could program another nanite to either destroy the toxin or program that 
nanite to disassemble the toxin-producing nanite.  If the adversary introduced nanites that turned 
gasoline into tar, another nanite might be used to turn the tar back into gasoline or to alter the 
mechanism of the adversary so that it no longer attacked gasoline.  Once nanite technology be-
come available to one side, it is essential that the other side quickly develops similar technology 





 One of the public fears associated with genetic engineering is the potential for creating 
“superhumans”.  Mammals have already been successfully cloned.  It is only moral (and gov-
ernmental) restraint on the part of researchers that has prevented any publicized cloning of hu-
man beings.  With the deciphering of the human genome (recently transcribed but not yet fully 
understood), genetic engineers will be in a position to alter any aspect of human genetics.  In a 
few years it will be possible to select genes that lead to:  
• increased size and strength,  
• improved disease resistance,  
• increased ability to repair internal tissue damage,  
• increased tolerance of pain,  
• increased brain size,  
• faster reaction times,  
• improved vision (higher acuity, improved field of view, or improved low light sensi-
tivity),  
• decreased sensitivity to heat or cold,  
• ability to breathe effectively at high altitudes (say 10,000 m without an oxygen 
mask), etc., 
• increased willingness to follow orders,  
• increased aggressiveness, and 
• decreased survival instinct   
It might also be possible to incorporate capabilities found in other animals, such as:  
• gills to breath underwater,  
• webbed feet and hands to facilitate swimming, 
• sensitivity to magnetic fields,  
• sensitivity to electric fields,   
• the ability to detect heat emissions from targets,  
• the ability to generate electric shocks, 
• the ability to produce and deliver deadly toxins, 
• the ability to regenerate lost limbs or digits, or 
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• the ability to alter skin coloration to match the background.   
If a number of these genes are inserted into a single individual it is possible to create a much-
improved potential soldier.  Cloning that individual to make thousands of copies could produce 
an army of super-soldiers. 
 
 The ramifications of such a capability have formed the theses of dozens of science fiction 
novels.  Needless to say considerable public debate should occur before such an endeavor is even 
attempted.  However, no amount of debate or legislation will stop an unscrupulous group or na-
tion from attempting to clone superwarriors.  The question that arises, is what is to be done when 
it occurs?  Will such individuals be considered humans or animals or something different?  Will 
society accept the use of such individuals in suicidal situations?  After a conflict has ended what 
will the status be of the victorious clone-warriors?  What will be the status of the vanquished 
clone-warriors?  Should they be exterminated?  Can they be integrated into a peaceful society?  
These are not easy questions to answer. 
 
 It seems unlikely that any amount of genetic engineering will make it possible for com-
plete adult humans to be grown in periods of weeks or months, although it is likely that devel-
opment could be speeded up significantly.  Even with shortened development times it would 
likely take a decade after initial conception for any super-soldier to be useful.  It is only this 
which has prevented the author from labeling this technology as a near-term risk.  It is possible 
that such super-soldier projects could begin in earnest within a few years. 
 
 
Fusion Power Plants 
 
 Whether they are based on cold fusion, magnetic confinement (tokamaks), or inertial con-
finement (laser implosion), fusion power will almost certainly become practical before the end of 
the 21st Century.  With magnetic confinement and inertial confinement, the proof of principle 
demonstrations will be attempted before 2010.  After that, power production is just a matter of 
“engineering” (despite the fact this is extremely complicated engineering) and power plant con-
struction.  After Fermi had demonstrated that his Chicago nuclear pile could sustain a chain reac-
tion, there was no longer any serious doubt that either the atomic bomb or nuclear power plants 
would eventually be constructed.  The same will be true for fusion power after the “energy 
breakeven” experiments are completed. 
 
 Fusion power will essentially consume deuterium and produce helium.  There is enough 
deuterium in the oceans (roughly 2 x 1017 kg) to produce all of the world’s energy needs for the 
next 40 billion years (at current energy consumption rates – roughly 4 x 1020 J/yr).  Deuterium is 
available everywhere to anyone with access to electricity.  The cost of generating electricity will 
become limited primarily by maintenance of production and distribution equipment, not by the 
cost of fuel.  This should make energy extremely cheap, although it will never so abundant as to 
be free.  It might cause governments to consider whether power generation should be govern-
ment provided rather than provided by commercial concerns.  If power generation were national-
ized, it might prove cheaper not to charge directly per kW-hr consumed but to take the operating 
costs out general taxation revenues.  Energy consumers might not have to pay fees proportional 
 377
to the actual amount of energy they consumed, but proportional to the value of the goods they 
produced or the income they earned. 
 
 Fusion power will make it practical to provide unlimited amounts of power to even the 
remotest locations.  No longer will fuel supplies and logistics be major considerations in reactor 
siting.  One metric ton (one cubic meter) of deuterium will supply nearly 22 billion kilowatt-
hours of electricity.  This is equivalent to the annual energy output of a 2.5 gigawatt powerplant.  
Fusion reactors will necessarily be large if they are based on either magnetic confinement or in-
ertial confinement principles.  The huge capital investments required to build even a low-power 
output powerplant will suggest that higher-power plants (greater than tens of gigawatts) rather 
than lower-power plants (comparable to modern nuclear or fossil-fuel-fired plants) be built.  
Since even a low-power plant will probably be physically large, mobile platforms such as surface 
ships and submarine are unlikely to use them.  Fission reactors are likely to remain the power 
source for naval vessels.  However, the large concentration of power available from a large 
powerplant may make it possible to build large directed energy weapons.  Laser or high-power 





 A number of years ago there was considerable interest in the possibility that muons could 
act as catalysts for nuclear fusion.[233]  Unfortunately, the short lifetime of muons (2.2 µsec) 
has precluded their practical use.  A catalyst facilitates a reaction (usually by lowering a potential 
barrier to the reaction) but is not consumed by the reaction.  It may be temporarily used by one 
step in a complex process, but it must be regenerated in a later step.  Because it is not consumed, 
a small amount of catalyst can cause an enormous amount of reactants to be transformed into 
products.  In essence, neutrons are catalysts for nuclear fission in fissionable nuclides.  More 
general nuclear catalysts, if they can be found, might make it easy to perform any number of en-
ergetically favorable nuclear reactions.  These could include nuclear fusion or fission or transmu-
tation.   
 
 With catalysts, it may be possible to achieve fission chain reactions or fusion reactions 
without the necessity for large masses of reactants.  With fission catalysts, nuclear weapons 
could be scaled to any yield, including yields of only a few kilograms, and using correspondingly 
smaller quantities of fissionable material and reduced “fallout”.  Nuclear explosives could be 
considered (or reconsidered) for many applications where full-scale nuclear weapons were con-
sidered overkill or too “dirty”.  These include antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and hardened 
target destruction.  The U. S. deployed nuclear weapons for these purposes at some point in its 
history but later removed them from the inventory. 
 
 Efficiency of fission is also likely to improve.  A typical atomic bomb requires roughly 
50 kilograms of Uranium-235 to form a critical mass [134], but a Nagasaki-sized 20 kiloton yield 
is produced by fission of only one kilogram of uranium.  If a catalyst improved efficiency ten-
fold, then the amount of fissionable material required to make an explosive device of a given size 
could be reduced ten-fold.  The implication on the potential for nations (or terrorist groups) to 
acquire nuclear weapons is obvious.  A single reactor that could provide material for one bomb 
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per year can now provide material for ten.  Alternatively, theft of a quantity of fissionable mate-
rial that is not militarily significant today, might provide enough material to make one or two 
bombs.  Catalysts might also make it possible to make nuclear explosives out of low-enrichment 
reactor-grade nuclear fuels.  
 
 Nuclear catalysts might also provide the “philosopher’s stone” of ancient alchemy.  For 
example, the “decay” of Pb204 into Li7 and Au197 is energetically allowed, but is not observed in 
practice.  A nuclear catalyst might make this reaction practical, literally permitting one to turn 
large quantities of lead into gold.  Obviously, such an occurrence would make gold a relatively 
“worthless” metal, and ruin any economy that was still based on a gold standard.  Military appli-
cations might include in situ alteration of the properties of materials, such as turning semicon-
ducting silicon into conducting iron via fusion (and consequently destroying electronic systems) 
or causing fissionable materials in adversary weapons to explode by catalytically reducing the 
necessary critical mass below the mass of material that is present. 
 
 
Matter-Antimatter Reactors and Weapons 
 
 The annihilation of matter and antimatter theoretically offers the most efficient conver-
sion of mass into energy.  For example, complete fission of 1 kg of U-235 releases 19.6 kilotons 
of yield.  Complete annihilation of 1 kg of matter-antimatter releases 21.4 megatons of energy.  
The techniques being developed for magnetic confinement fusion power generation may also 
prove useful in the control, containment, and controlled annihilation of antimatter. 
 
To date no natural terrestrial sources of antimatter have been found (nor are they likely to 
be found).  In interstellar space there is considerable antimatter interspersed with more abundant 
ordinary matter.  It is possible that an interstellar spacecraft could harvest this antimatter as a fuel 
source.  It is also possible, but unlikely, that large clusters of antimatter (such as asteroids or 
planets) might be found elsewhere in the galaxy.  Barring such unlikely natural sources, it is 
unlikely that matter-antimatter reactors will ever be primary energy sources in terrestrial applica-
tions.  They will always consume more prime energy than they can produce.  The antimatter 
must be created from conventional energy sources through nuclear pair production. Thus, matter-
antimatter reactors will only be practical in applications where immense energies must be pro-
duced from relatively compact and lightweight reactors and fuels and the energy inefficiency as-
sociated with production of the antimatter can be balanced by the other benefits.  Military ves-
sels, interplanetary spacecraft, and energy weapons are likely candidates for using matter-
antimatter reactors. 
 
One reality must be faced.  If matter and antimatter can be harnessed for power genera-
tion, it will be trivial to arrange their use in super explosive-weapons.  Matter-antimatter annihi-
lation is the most efficient form of conversion of mass into energy.  Annihilation of one kilogram 
of matter-antimatter will yield 9 x 1016 Joules = 21 megatons (compared to only 3.4 x 1014 J = 81 
kilotons for fusion of 1 kg of deuterium-tritium).  The enormously powerful “photon torpedoes” 
of Star Trek will have become reality, for these science fiction devices have been declared to be 
missiles with matter-antimatter warheads.  One medium-sized (e.g., 1000-kg) “photon torpedo” 
could release energy greater than the total yield producible by every nuclear warhead ever built.  
Uncontrolled annihilation is so much easier to arrange than controlled annihilation, that it is al-
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most certain that the development of “photon torpedoes” will precede development of matter-





 It is a well-known phenomenon that the detonation of large underground nuclear explo-
sions will trigger smaller earthquakes on nearby faults for days after the explosion.[225]  In fact, 
underground detonation sites are chosen to have an absence of nearby large faults with rapid 
stress buildup.  Studies of earthquakes at the Nevada Test Site [132] indicate that a nuclear ex-
plosion can affect the release of the energy in faults if any part of the fault passes within a dis-
tance R (in meters) of a nuclear explosion of yield W (in kilotons) where  
 
  R = 300 W1/3. 
 
For reasonable nuclear weapons sizes, the effective distances are less than a few kilometers.  
However, it should be noted that none of the Nevada Test Site faults are classified as major 
earthquake-producing faults. 
 
 Recently two Russian nuclear scientists (identified only as Bekhterev and Krivoshlykov) 
at the Snezhinsk Nuclear Research Center (formerly known as Chelyabinsk-70) have announced 
that nuclear explosions may be used to reduce the possibility of earthquakes.[226]  They claim 
that strong earthquakes were much fewer in the 1960’s to 1980’s, when underground nuclear 
tests were conducted with great frequency.  Supposedly the nuclear explosions tended to reduce 
the accumulated tensions in the earth’s crust. 
 
 Other mechanisms have been discovered that affect seismicity in local regions.  The 
building of dams and the filling of their reservoirs are known to produce changes in local earth-
quake patterns.  One acre-foot of water weighs more than 1200 tons and large reservoirs rou-
tinely store millions of acre-feet of water.  Depletion of underground water and oil & gas reser-
voirs through pumping (fluid depletion) or injection of fluids into underground reservoirs (such 
as oil field pressurization) can produce similar alterations in local seismic activity.  The removal 
of substantial amounts of rock through mining and quarrying also influences local seismic activ-
ity. [227] 
 
 As seismologists develop better understanding of tectonic forces, the properties of geo-
logical materials, and the subsurface structure of a region, they will ultimately be able to diag-
nose the buildup of stress and forecast its release.  A genuine ability to predict earthquakes cou-
pled with an ability to inject large amounts of additional energy into a system or the modification 
of external stresses may permit a certain degree of control over earthquakes, especially in their 
precise location, their precise timing, and their severity. 
 
 Any ability to control or even partially direct the forces associated with large earthquakes 
has obvious potential use as a weapon.  It is doubtful that an adversary could ever initiate an 
earthquake in an arbitrary location at an arbitrary time.  However, they might be able to increase 
the severity or modify the area of damaging effects by “fiddling with the system” in some fash-
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ion.  A few nuclear devices might be clandestinely inserted (under the guise of mining or oil 
drilling) at specific locations around a major fault that is predicted to rupture in the near future.  
Detonation of the devices might then permit premature triggering of the earthquake and possibly 
magnify the amount of energy that would be released by causing a larger segment of fault or a 
nearby collateral fault to rupture.  Such premature triggering might also be timed to occur at the 
time most critical in the target nation’s preparations for the upcoming disaster and magnify the 
total damage achieved (for example damaging many of the equipment and facilities being con-
structed to facilitate disaster relief).   
 
 It might be difficult to directly affect earthquake faults in an adversary’s territory.  How-
ever, earthquakes themselves need not be the weapons.  An adversary might be able to initiate 
vertical movements on undersea faults (either in their own coastal waters or in international wa-
ters and create enormous tsunamis that could then cross an ocean and devastate the coasts of an 
adversary.  If several smaller movements were simultaneously triggered at different locations, a 
“phased array” effect could make it possible to concentrate the tsunami effects on some coasts 
and ameliorate them on others. 
 
 A nuclear explosion that immediately triggered an earthquake at the same point might be 
very difficult to detect and identify.  Test ban treaty monitoring systems use both the shape and 
location of seismic signals to identify clandestine underground explosions.  A nuclear explosion 
does not have the same characteristics as an earthquake.  Explosions generate mostly compres-
sional (P) waves, while earthquakes invariably generate more shear (S) waves than P waves (al-
though there is always some P wave component).  S and P waves travel at different velocities 
and are easily distinguished.  Underground explosions cannot be hidden by triggering them when 
an earthquake occurs elsewhere.  The monitoring stations can determine the location of origin of 
each seismic signal component.  However, if the explosion and the earthquake occur simultane-
ously at the same point, the nuclear characteristics may be lost in the true seismic signal.  Thus, 
the target country might never know that it had been attacked. 
 
 Finally, the ability to predict the timing of future earthquakes can be militarily useful in 
itself.  For example, consider a prediction ability that lets it be known that a major (magnitude 8 
or above) earthquake will occur on a specific fault in a specific narrow time frame (a few days).  
This prediction might come from computer modeling or from observation of identifiable earth-
quake precursors (many are currently being studied but none are yet reliable).  However, any 
prediction of major disaster would cause national (if not international) attention to be focused on 
the disaster site.  If the U. S. were the site of the impending disaster, an adversary could take ad-
vantage of the reduced external attention to prepare for any sort of military activity without 
drawing the same level of U. S. response it would have earlier.  Once the disaster occurs, na-
tional attention, and in all likelihood, the military would be involved in disaster relief.  This pro-
vides an excellent opportunity for direct attack by the prepared adversary.  If the U. S. were the 
disaster area then the adversary could conduct other military operations (such as invasion of a 
neighbor) without the usual level of external intervention.  Many U. S. forces would be co-opted 
for disaster relief.  Strategic airlift, medical forces, and engineering units would all be committed 
directly to disaster relief.  Some of these units would in all likelihood be withdrawn from over-







Gravity Control  
 
 The likely development of a viable quantum theory of gravity (or more properly a “theory 
of everything”) some time within the next few decades will almost certainly be followed the de-
velopment of technologies for the practical manipulation of gravitational forces and fields.  By 
this the author does not imply the development of anti-gravity devices.  These will most likely 
not be permitted by the theory, although recent discoveries concerning the expansion of the uni-
verse indicate that gravity may not be the invariable quantity it has always been believed to be.  
However, the generation and use of gravitational waves almost certainly will be permitted by any 
acceptable theory.  A viable theory may also pave the way for the creation and manipulation of 
miniature black holes.   
 
 Small black holes (mass < 1015 g) have been predicted by Hawking and others.  These 
black holes are presumed to radiate energy (Hawking radiation) with a rate of emission that in-
creases inversely with the mass of the black hole.  As a consequence they might be useful as 
powerful explosives.  On the other hand, it is possible to place a strong electric charge on a rela-
tively stable, small black hole, thereby making it possible to control its motion by powerful elec-
tric and magnetic fields.  A black hole oscillator would generate intense gravitational radiation.  
An array of such oscillators could be focused to produce devastating field strengths at remote 
locations anywhere in space.  Earthquakes made to order would be “easily” produced.  The solid 
earth provides minimal “shielding” effects to gravitational radiation.  Such oscillators could also 
be used for one-way strategic communications to any point on earth (even deeply buried facili-
ties or deeply submerged submarines) from a single location.   
 
 Gravitational collapse (gravitic) weapons (weapons in which mass is injected into a small 
black hole) could be created with enormous potential yields.  Nuclear fission is only 0.1% effi-
cient in converting mass into energy (efficiency = mc2 (of energy out)/mc2 (of mass in));  nuclear 
fusion is only 0.4% efficient.  However, calculations have shown that gravitational collapse 
might be as high as 35-40% efficient in producing energy out per unit mass input.  Only matter-
antimatter annihilation is more efficient in converting mass into energy.  For each kilogram of 
gravitic fuel mass, 8 megatons of yield would result (compared to 80 kilotons for the fusion of 1 





 The same “theory of everything” that makes gravity control thinkable may pave the way 
for the development of “warp” drive or faster-than-light travel.  Reputable scientists are now be-
ginning to discuss the possibility of time travel and travel at equivalent speeds faster than light.  
The conditions currently believed to be required are beyond our technological abilities for the 
foreseeable future.  However, the existence of the theory may alter that.  The ability to travel to 
the stars and return within the lifetimes of those left behind will have a profound effect on man-
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kind.  It may even force the development of a unified world government and eliminate the need 
for a terrestrial military.  What we find in the stars will determine whether a military of any kind 





 Although many people still consider psychic powers to be fantasy, several Governments 
have spent large sums to investigate their potential.  Despite a few sensational books that have 
attempted to expose these programs, any real progress that may or may not have been made re-
mains highly classified.  Incontrovertible proof remains unavailable to anyone except those few 
willing to subject themselves to psychic training by the proponents of the field.  Even personal 
experience with psychic powers can be questioned.  However, given the obvious high degree of 
belief in one or more psychic phenomena by the general population, it is difficult to dismiss them 
entirely as frauds or delusions.  If even a single segment of psychic technology proves to have a 
solid basis in reality, then it will have profound effects on how warfare and social intercourse are 
conducted.  
 
 There are many phenomena that are termed paranormal or psychic.  However, if we keep 
an open mind as to their reality, there are at least five that have some serious military relevance: 
remote viewing, telepathy, remote influencing, telekinesis, and teleportation.  Remote viewing is 
the area that has purported received the most governmental interest to date.[234],[235]  A remote 
viewer enters a trance-like state in an environment free of significant external stimulation and is 
able to visualize remote locations.   Such locations may be at great distances, inside of structures, 
and even located at other times (past and future).  For example, one oft-repeated claim is that a 
remote viewer described the characteristics of the Typhoon submarine prior to its first satellite 
observation.  The implications for intelligence and counter-intelligence would be substantial if 
remote viewing became fully accepted and could produce data that did not require substantiation 
by other means.  However, in 1995 the Central Intelligence Agency commissioned the American 
Institutes for Research to perform an independent review of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 
“Star Gate” remote viewing program, which was being considered for transition to CIA control.  
It was concluded that although a statistically significant effect was clearly present, the source of 
this effect could not be identified with certainty as being paranormal in origin.  Furthermore, 
there was no evidence that remote viewing was capable of providing operationally useful intelli-
gence.[261]  Using the results of this study as support, the CIA opted to officially remain out of 
the psychic intelligence field and the Star Gate program was terminated. 
 
 Telepathy is the ability to read other peoples minds.  The intelligence and counter-
intelligence implications are even greater than those of remote viewing.  If the intent of military 
commanders or governmental leaders could be accurately determined, then any stratagem could 
be countered in advance.   
 
 Remote influencing is the ability not just to read other people’s thoughts, but to influence 
those thoughts remotely.  Think about the benefits that would derive from knowing the enemy 
plans in advance and having the enemy unconsciously sabotage the execution of his own plans.   
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 Telekinesis is the ability to control the movement of objects at a distance.  Think of the 
possibilities of causing the wrong switch to be closed at an inopportune moment on the control 
panel of a missile launch control system or a nuclear reactor.  Mechanisms such as safe and arm 
devices might be impeded.  Fuzes might be set off prematurely.  Screws might be loosened caus-
ing subsequent failure of an aircraft access panel.  Foreign objects might find their way into sen-
sitive mechanisms.   
 
 Teleportation offers even more sinister opportunities.  Consider the ability to cause a 
bomb to material inside an enemy headquarters when a staff meeting was underway.  Mines 
could be made to materialize directly in the paths of ships or vehicles.  Weapon systems could be 





 Permanent space colonies, on the moon or the Lagrangian points in Earth orbit, have been 
technologically feasible for 30 years.[218]  However, the cost of establishing such colonies has 
been beyond the means of any nation due to the high cost per pound of placing materials into 
Earth orbit.  Not only must initial construction materials be lifted to the colony but also expend-
able materials such as food, water, and air must be periodically replaced.  It is ultimately likely 
that these colonies could become entirely self-sufficient, although attempts to demonstrate the 
self-sufficiency of closed ecosystems have not yet been successful.  Furthermore, new launch 
technologies may further reduce this economic constraint to growth.  Experience obtained with 
the International Space Station (which just recently inaugurated permanent inhabitation) will 
probably go a long way towards furthering desires to establish permanent space colonies.  All 
things considered, it is likely that permanent space colonies of some form will exist before the 
middle of the 21st Century and possibly within the next few decades. 
 
 If colonies are established by individual countries, primarily for the benefits of those 
countries, then should war between such countries break out on Earth, it may be difficult to con-
tinue to abide by the Outer Space Treaty and keep the colonies from becoming involved.  On the 
other hand it is likely that all space colonies will have more in common with each other than with 
their parent countries.  Coupled with the mutual dependence of each colony and its parent, this 
may foster closer international cooperation and ultimately force a true world government.  If per-
sonnel interchange between the Earth and its space colonies occurs, then the discipline required 
for space colony life may ultimately modify the behavior of the earthbound in positive ways (for 
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